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Abstract	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	 topic	 of	 this	 dissertation	 is	 Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	 of	 metaphysics	 viewed	
through	the	prism	of	Nietzsche’s	declaration	that	‘God	is	dead’.	I	argue	that	Nietzsche’s	
transvaluation	of	value	remains	ensnared	by	the	‘will	to	power’	and	the	nihilistic	destiny	
of	 the	 ‘eternal	 return’.	 I	 look	 at	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	
disenchantment	 of	 nature	 and	 the	 technological	 ‘framing’	 of	 Earth.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	
delineation	of	a	non-instrumental	way	life	requires	a	political	turn	that	is	quite	different	
from	 Heidegger’s	 own	 conservative	 nationalism.	 While	 the	 post-structuralist	
appropriation	of	Heidegger’s	late	thought	makes	some	tentative	moves	towards	a	post-
foundational	 democracy,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 political	 community	
stemming	from	Derrida,	Levinas,	and	Nancy	fails	to	adequately	deal	with	the	question	of	
democratic	 sovereignty.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 inadequacy,	 I	 take	 up	 the	 political	 theory	 of	
Benjamin,	 Schmitt,	 and	 Agamben	 in	 order	 to	 further	 delineate	 a	 ‘negative	 political	
theology’	 without	 reference	 to	 any	 metaphysical	 grounding	 of	 sovereign	 power.	
Essential	 to	 such	 a	 politics	 is	 the	 non-linear	 experience	 of	 time	 as	 ‘event’.	 I	 contrast	
Benjamin’s	notion	of	empty	 ‘homogenous	 time’	with	Agamben’s	analysis	of	non-linear	
‘revolutionary	 time’.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 eschatological	 remembrance	 of	 democracy	
requires	an	interruption	of	history	as	a	linear	sequence	of	time.	Against	the	instrumental	
‘framing’	of	democracy,	I	advocate	for	the	decentralization	of	sovereignty	to	local	modes	
of	participatory	self-government	such	as	general	assemblies,	councils,	and	cooperatives.	
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Introduction:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Argument	
A	major	claim	of	this	dissertation	is	that	modernity	is	an	age	of	‘spiritual	crisis’.	I	
argue	 that	 the	 modern	 age	 ought	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 light	 of	 Friedrich	 Nietzsche’s	
declaration	 that	 ‘God	 is	 dead’.	 The	 ‘death	 of	 God’	 is	 the	 discovery	 that	 Truth	 is	 not	
absolute.	Indeed,	Justice,	Beauty,	and	Truth	are	metaphysically	ungrounded.	The	notion	
of	Absolute	Truth	is	untenable	in	the	modern	era.	Truth	becomes	nothing	but	subjective	
preference.	 Postmodern	 thinkers	 interpret	 the	 relativity	 of	 truth	 as	 liberation.	 The	
deconstruction	 of	 that	 which	 Derrida	 calls	 a	 ‘transcendental	 signifier’	 opens	 up	 a	
plurality	 of	 diverse	 interpretations	 in	 place	 of	 the	 ‘first	 cause’.	 Nevertheless,	
postmodernism	 in	naïve	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	 very	 real	 danger	of	 nihilism	 stemming	
from	the	 ‘death	of	God’	 is	evaded,	 suppressed,	and	concealed.	 I	argue	 that	nihilism	 is	
not	 just	 an	 existential	 issue,	 but	 deeply	 political	 as	well.	 The	 planetary	 framework	 of	
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rationalization,	 secularization,	 and	 modernization	 undermines	 social	 ties	 to	
communities	of	belonging,	which	 in	turn	 leads	to	social	 fragmentation,	alienation,	and	
anomie.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 dissolution	 of	 value	 and	 truth,	 the	 only	 perceived	 refuge	
becomes	 the	 ‘active	 nihilism’	 of	 religious	 fundamentalism	 and	 political	 violence.	 As	
Nietzsche	indicates,	disclosing	the	ungrounded	abyss	provokes	a	‘metaphysical	need’	for	
moral	absolutes.	The	challenge,	therefore,	 is	to	face	the	void	without	succumbing	to	a	
nostalgia	for	the	Absolute.		
Another	major	claim	 is	 that	authoritarianism	is	symptomatic	of	nihilism,	not	 its	
converse.	Postmodern	thinkers	such	as	Jacques	Derrida	tend	to	associate	nihilism	with	
democratic	pluralism	and	authoritarianism	with	foundationalism.	For	Derrida,	nihilism	is	
emancipation	–	freedom	from	moral	absolutes	and	freedom	to	decide	for	oneself	what	is	
meaningful.	According	to	this	logic,	post-foundationalism	gives	rise	to	the	self-legislation	
of	 meaning,	 value,	 and	 truth.	 But	 what	 is	meaningful?	 Indeed,	 what	 is	 good?	 More	
often,	 the	 discovery	 that	 our	 highest	 values	 are	 ontologically	 ungrounded	 provokes	 a	
sense	of	angst,	anxiety,	or	horror	before	the	abyss.	We	ignore	the	‘metaphysical	need’	
for	security	at	our	own	peril.	To	paraphrase	Nietzsche,	it	is	necessary	for	man	to	know	
why	 he	 exists.	 But	 what	 happens	 when	 all	 possible	 answers	 to	 such	 a	 question	 are	
exposed	 as	 nothing	 but	 myth?	 Derrida	 deconstructs	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 comprehensive	
meta-narrative	 that	 could	 give	 meaning	 to	 life.	 But	 the	 postmodern	 account	 of	 the	
dissolution	of	an	overarching	meta-narrative	 is	 itself	 just	another	meta-narrative	–	the	
myth	of	the	absence	of	myth.	While	the	myth	of	postmodernism	has	become	entangled	
in	 its	 own	 web	 of	 self-contradictions,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 impossible	 to	 return	 to	 a	
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dialectical	belief	in	the	innate	logic	of	Reason,	History,	and	the	State.	What,	then,	is	the	
way	forward?	I	intend	to	journey	through	the	dangerous	landscape	of	political	nihilism	
in	search	of	an	answer.	The	path	that	leads	out	of	political	nihilism	is	long	and	winding.	
There	are	no	clear	answers	 to	 the	problem	of	nihilism,	and	no	guarantee	 that	we	will	
find	our	way.	My	hope	is	that	insight	into	the	ontological	groundlessness	of	being	may	
give	 way	 to	 post-foundational	 democracy	 rather	 than	 the	 law-founding	 violence	 of	
sovereign	decision.		
I	argue	that	the	‘death	of	God’	requires	that	thinking	occur	without	recourse	to	
metaphysical	 foundations.	 I	 understand	metaphysics	 to	 be	more	 or	 less	 synonymous	
with	 Platonic	metaphysics.	 Platonic	metaphysics	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 unconditional	
grounding	of	meaning,	value,	and	truth	in	a	fixed	origin,	foundation,	or	cause.	I	interpret	
Martin	 Heidegger’s	 fundamental	 ontology	 as	 an	 initial	 attempt	 to	 think	 without	
foundations.	 I	 nevertheless	 argue	 that	 Heidegger’s	 ontology	 replicates	 that	 which	 it	
attempts	 to	 supplant	 –	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 ungrounded	 ‘will	 to	 power’.	 Heidegger	
unwittingly	assigns	the	divine	attributes	of	God	to	Man	–	the	power	of	creation	ex	nihilo.	
After	the	‘death	of	God’,	Man,	not	God	becomes	the	sovereign	legislator	of	value.	Just	
as	 Nietzsche’s	 overcoming	 of	 nihilism	 is	 itself	 nihilistic,	 Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	 of	
metaphysics	remains	 insufficient	and	 incomplete.	 I	 therefore	argue	that	 it	 is	necessary	
to	move	beyond	the	philosophical	milieu	of	Heidegger’s	confrontation	with	Nietzsche	in	
order	 to	 more	 fully	 explicate	 a	 post-foundational	 democratic	 alternative	 to	 political	
nihilism.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 take	 up	 the	 post-structuralist	 appropriation	 of	 Heidegger’s	
thought	 by	 Jean-Luc	Nancy,	 Jacques	Derrida,	 and	 Emmanuel	 Levinas.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	
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deconstruction	 of	 political	 community	 and	 sovereign	 power	 ultimately	 renders	
democracy	 inoperative.	 I	 therefore	 turn	 to	 the	political	 theology	of	Giorgio	Agamben,	
Walter	Benjamin	and	Carl	Schmitt	in	order	to	more	fully	illuminate	an	alternative	post-
foundational	 democracy	 without	 recourse	 to	 any	 ‘onto-theological’	 grounding	 of	
sovereign	power.		
Following	 Heidegger,	 I	 claim	 that	 the	 relentless	 destruction	 of	 nature	 in	 the	
modern	era	arises	from	the	metaphysical	dualism	of	ancient	Greek	philosophy.	With	the	
‘flight	of	the	gods’	in	the	wake	of	the	universal	scientific	world-view,	nature	is	reduced	
to	 nothing	 but	 a	 resource	 for	 technological	 exploitation.	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	
attempts	 to	 cultivate	 a	 non-instrumental	 relation	 to	 nature	 through	 the	 practice	 of	
mindful	‘dwelling’	in	the	world.	But	the	political	implications	of	this	environmental	ethic	
remain	 undeveloped.	 I	 find	 it	 necessary	 to	 leave	 the	 climate	 of	 Heidegger’s	
confrontation	with	Nietzsche	in	order	to	more	fully	explore	the	democratic	implications	
of	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 metaphysics.	 I	 nevertheless	 use	 Heidegger’s	 analysis	 of	 the	
technological	 framing	 of	 Earth	 to	 understand	 the	 worldwide	 ‘depoliticization’	 and	
‘deterritorialization’	of	democracy.	I	argue	that	liberal	internationalism	does	not	signify	
a	more	enlightened	politics,	but	rather	the	narrow	vision	of	the	political	as	the	‘ground’	
of	politics.	I	attempt	to	think	the	political	not	as	a	metaphysical	foundation	of	the	state,	
but	as	the	ungrounded	‘site’	of	post-foundational	democracy.		
A	central	argument	of	this	dissertation	is	that	there	is	a	fundamental	relationship	
between	Heidegger’s	 overcoming	 of	 onto-theology	 and	 the	 struggle	 to	 overcome	 the	
authoritarian	 element	 of	 Schmitt’s	 political	 theology.	 Indeed,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	
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deconstruction	 of	 ‘onto-theology’	 lends	 itself	 to	 a	negative	 political	 theology	 of	 post-
foundational	 democratic	 anarchism.	 Schmitt	 argues	 that	 political	 sovereignty	 is	 a	
secularization	 of	 the	 theological	 notion	 of	 creation	ex	 nihilo.	 Just	 as	 the	 creative	 self-
legislation	 of	 values	 is	 a	 secular	 reflection	 of	 the	 divine	 will	 to	 create	meaning	 from	
nothing,	 sovereign	 power	 is	 a	 secularization	 of	 divine	 power	 to	 create	 order	 out	 of	
chaos.	 I	 understand	 Benjamin’s	 reflections	 on	 ‘divine	 violence’	 as	 the	 converse	 of	
Schmitt’s	 notion	 of	 ‘sovereign	 decision’.	 Indeed,	 for	 Benjamin,	 the	 non-linear	
temporality	 that	 is	delineated	by	Klee’s	drawing	Angel	of	History	 illuminates	 the	 ‘true	
exception’	to	the	eternal	return	of	law-making	and	law-preserving	violence.	I	argue	that	
true	democracy	is	anarchy.	An-arche:	without	foundation,	principle,	or	ground.		
An	 examination	 of	 the	 intersection	 of	 political	 nihilism	 and	 post-foundational	
democracy	after	the	‘death	of	God’	calls	into	question	the	modern	experience	of	time.	
While	ancient	philosophy	understands	 time	as	 the	 infinite	 repetition	of	a	 closed	 loop,	
modernity	 views	 time	 as	 a	 linear	 sequence	 of	 ‘nows’.	 While	 the	 former	 is	 a	 horrific	
vision	of	arbitrary	fate,	the	latter	amounts	to	a	catastrophic	faith	in	history	as	progress.	
Contra	 the	 modernist	 understanding	 of	 history	 as	 progress,	 I	 outline	 a	 revolutionary	
temporality	 of	 ‘the	 event.’	 Heidegger’s	 philosophy	 proves	 indispensable	 here.	 I	 argue	
that	 the	 advent	 of	 post-foundational	 democracy	 would	 be	 equivalent	 to	 an	
eschatological	break	from	the	dialectical	movement	of	history	towards	its	culmination	in	
the	universal	‘world-state’.	Contrary	to	the	historical	emergence	of	the	nation-state	and	
the	 more	 recent	 transition	 to	 post-national	 forms	 of	 super-state	 governance,	 post-
foundational	 democracy	 would	 amount	 to	 a	 reversal	 of	 this	 logic.	 Contrary	 to	 the	
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current	post-democratic	 centralization	of	power	at	 the	 level	of	 the	 continental	 super-
state	 (such	 as	 the	 EU),	 post-foundational	 democracy	 involves	 the	 decentralization	 of	
sovereignty	directly	to	the	people.		
	 Another	major	 claim	 is	 that	 post-foundational	 democracy	 is	 participatory,	 not	
representative.	 This	 involves	 an	 important	 distinction	 between	 liberalism	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	and	democracy	on	the	other.	While	the	former	is	a	modern	concept,	the	latter	is	
quite	 ancient.	 I	 therefore	 argue	 that	 democracy	 is	 not	 a	 utopian	 image	of	 the	 future.	
Instead,	democracy	involves	a	remembrance	of	a	forgotten	trace	of	the	past.	Following	
Heidegger,	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ‘step	 back’	 to	 the	 origins	 of	 democracy	 in	
ancient	 Greece	 in	 order	 to	 ‘leap	 beyond’	 the	 planetary	 framework	 of	 neoliberal	
globalization.	Against	 the	grain	of	history,	 I	argue	that	post-foundational	democracy	 is	
local,	 not	 global.	 For	 this	 reason,	 post-foundational	 democracy	 would	 require	 the	
dissolution	 of	 the	 liberal	 international	 framework	 of	 global	 capitalism.	 I	 therefore	
advocate	 for	 the	 participatory	 self-government	 of	 local	 regions,	 communities,	 and	
neighborhoods.		
	 		
Literature	
	 I	will	conduct	a	chronological	literature	review	from	1990	to	the	present	on	the	
academic	 scholarship	 that	 looks	 at	 the	 ‘death	 of	 God’	 as	 the	 essential	 site	 of	 ‘the	
political’	 in	the	modern	era.	This	review	is	not	 intended	to	be	systematic	or	complete.	
Rather,	 this	 review	 focuses	on	 the	 intersection	of	nihilism	and	politics	 stemming	 from	
Heidegger’s	 philosophical	 confrontation	 with	 Nietzsche.	 The	 literature	 on	 the	 topic	
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tends	 to	 range	 from	 viewing	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 as	 either	 giving	 rise	 to	 an	
ungrounded	 nihilism	 on	 one	 hand,	 or	 as	 cultivating	 a	 radical	 post-foundational	
democracy	 on	 the	 other.	 It	 is	 my	 aim	 in	 this	 dissertation	 to	 indicate	 the	 radical	
democratic	potential	of	 the	ungrounded	 ‘site’	of	 the	political	opened	by	 the	 ‘death	of	
God’.	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 would	 be	 a	mistake	 to	 overlook	 the	 very	 real	 threat	 of	 political	
nihilism	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	 of	 metaphysics.	 Indeed,	 post-
foundational	 democracy	must	 face	 its	 own	 condition	 of	 ontological	 groundlessness	 in	
order	 to	 move	 beyond	 Nietzsche’s	 horrific	 vision	 of	 cosmic	 nihilism.	 The	 danger	 of	
nihilism	 should	 not	 detract	 from	 an	 investigation	 of	 the	 transformative	 power	 of	
Heidegger’s	post-foundational	thinking.	I	argue	that	‘the	death	of	God’	is	the	site	of	the	
political	 in	the	modern	era.	 Indeed,	 I	suggest	that	the	void	of	God’s	absence	need	not	
threaten	the	future	of	democracy,	but	rather	serves	as	its	ungrounded	site.	Democracy	
is	an-arche	–	without	ground.	
Reiner	 Schürmann’s	 Heidegger:	 From	 Principles	 To	 Anarchy	 was	 published	 in	
1990	 and	 in	many	ways	 serves	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	my	 interpretation	 of	 Heidegger.	
Schürmann	 suggests	 a	 novel	 method	 of	 reading	 Heidegger	 ‘backward’.	 Schürmann	
interprets	Heidegger’s	early	writing	in	light	of	his	late	philosophy,	which	he	takes	to	be	
more	 authoritative	 and	 insightful:	 “When	 read	backward,	 from	 the	 last	writing	 to	 the	
first,	Heidegger	appears	in	a	different	light	.	.	.	Instead	of	a	unity	concept	of	ground,	we	
have	 the	 ‘fourfold’;	 instead	 of	 praise	 from	 the	 firm	 will,	 detachment;	 instead	 of	
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straightforward	identification	between	Fuhrer	and	right,	anarchy.”1	By	giving	priority	to	
Heidegger’s	 late	 thought,	 Schürmann	 opens	 up	 Heidegger	 scholarship	 far	 beyond	 the	
typical	 existential	 interpretations	 that	 dominated	 the	 literature	 at	 the	 time.	 Following	
Schürmann,	 I	 recognize	 a	 break,	 or	 ‘turn’	 between	 the	 style	 and	 substance	 of	
Heidegger’s	 early	 ontology	 and	 his	 late	 philosophy.	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 is	
characterized	 in	 part	 by	 a	 ‘turning’	 from	 the	 nihilistic	 ‘will	 to	 power’	 towards	 a	
meditative	 style	 of	 ‘non-willing’.	 In	 the	 third	 chapter,	 I	 suggest	 that	 Heidegger’s	 turn	
towards	 ‘non-willing’	 is	 of	 significant	 importance	 given	 Nietzsche’s	 own	 failed	 self-
overcoming	 of	 nihilism	 via	 the	 ‘will	 to	 power’.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 will	 to	 power	 is	 an	
expression	of,	rather	than	an	alterative	to,	Nietzsche’s	horrific	vision	of	cosmic	nihilism.	
Schürmann’s	 book	 is	 oriented	 by	 the	 dissolution	 of	 absolute	 truth	 as	 an	
ontological	 foundation	 for	 thinking	 and	 acting.	 Schürmann	 attempts	 to	 “show	 what	
happens	to	the	old	problem	of	the	unity	between	thinking	and	acting	once	‘thinking’	no	
longer	means	securing	some	rational	foundation	.	.	.	and	once	‘acting’	no	longer	means	
conforming	to	the	foundation	so	secured.”2	This	question	has	important	implications	for	
political	praxis.	 For	Heidegger	 ‘the	political’	 is	not	a	 foundation,	origin,	or	ground,	but	
rather	a	‘site’	of	interaction.3	Schürmann	argues	that	“to	deconstruct	the	ontic	origins	of	
the	political	would	mean	to	recover	some	of	the	conditions	of	the	Greek	polis	prior	to	
the	classical	age.”4	But	 in	 spite	of	 these	provocative	 suggestions,	 Schürmann	does	not	
                                                
1 Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger: From Principles To Anarchy, (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), 14 
2 Ibid, 1 
3 Ibid, 39 
4 Ibid, 91 
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seriously	engage	with	the	various	political	 implications	of	Heidegger’s	thought.	Indeed,	
Schürmann’s	 notion	 of	 anarchy	 is	 more	 epistemological	 than	 political.	 In	 the	 final	
chapter	 of	 my	 dissertation,	 I	 attempt	 to	 further	 unpack	 Schürmann’s	 notion	 of	 the	
deconstructed	 ‘site’	 of	 the	 Greek	 polis.	 I	 suggest	 that	 post-foundational	 democracy	
shares	 the	 local	 and	 participatory	 aspects	 of	 the	Greek	polis.	However,	 I	 do	 not	 view	
democratic	participation	through	the	agonistic,	tragic	lens	of	the	ancient	Greeks,	but	as	
a	form	of	cooperative	decision-making.			
One	of	the	most	significant	contributions	of	Schürmann’s	book	is	the	discussion	
of	Heidegger’s	epochal	history	of	being.	For	Heidegger,	each	epoch	of	history	discloses	a	
distinct	world	of	meaning	and	 intelligibility.	 In	this	sense,	Heidegger	views	history	as	a	
series	 as	 radical	 breaks	 rather	 than	a	 logical	 chain	of	development.	 I	 argue	 that	post-
foundational	 democracy	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 epochal	 break	 from	 history	 of	
Western	 metaphysics	 rather	 than	 its	 dialectical	 culmination.	 This	 is	 a	 very	 different	
approach	from	post-modern	thinkers	such	as	Gianni	Vattimo.	In	my	judgment,	Vattimo	
reduces	 post-foundational	 democracy	 to	 a	 variation	 of	 liberal	 democracy. 5 	Contra	
Vattimo,	I	suggest	that	post-foundational	democracy	is	an	alternative	to,	rather	than	a	
development	 of	 liberal-democracy.	 Indeed,	 I	 go	 on	 to	 suggest	 that	 post-foundational	
democracy	is	participatory,	not	representative.	
Schürmann’s	 book	 does	 not	 undertake	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 Heidegger’s	
philosophy	 of	 technology.	 For	 this	 reason	 Michael	 Zimmerman’s	 book	 entitled	
Heidegger’s	 Confrontation	 With	 Modernity:	 Technology,	 Politics,	 Art	 was	 a	 welcome	
                                                
5 Gianni Vattimo, Nihilism And Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, & Law, (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2004) 
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intervention	when	it	was	published	in	1990.	Zimmerman	looks	at	Heidegger’s	treatment	
of	 technology	 and	 politics	 in	 a	 broader	 constellation	 of	 German	 thinkers	 including	
Jünger,	 Nietzsche,	 and	 Hölderlin.	 Zimmerman	 looks	 at	 Heidegger’s	 critique	 of	
technology	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ‘spiritual	 crisis’	 of	modernity	 stemming	 from	 the	 ‘death	 of	
God’	 and	 the	 ungrounded	 ‘will	 to	 power’.	 For	 Heidegger,	 “both	 industrialism	 and	
modernity	are	symptoms	of	the	contemporary	disclosure	of	things	as	raw	material	to	be	
used	 for	 expanding	 the	 scope	 of	 technological	 power	 for	 its	 own	 sake.”6	Zimmerman	
suggests	 that	“discovering	 the	groundlessness	of	 the	 technological	era	makes	possible	
the	 openness	 –	 and	 anxiety	 –	 necessary	 for	 the	 arrival	 of	 a	 new,	 postmodern	 era.”7	
Zimmerman	 therefore	 frames	Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	of	 ancient	metaphysics	 as	 a	
revolutionary	 overturning	 of	 technological	 imperialism;	 “While	 recognizing	 that	 the	
Greek	world	could	never	be	revived,	Heidegger	called	for	the	Volk	to	initiate	a	beginning	
that	 was	 a	 radical	 and	 enduring	 as	 that	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 ancient	 Greeks.”8	For	
Heidegger,	the	step	back	to	the	‘Greek	beginning’	is	not	at	all	a	naïve	attempt	to	return	
to	 a	 previous	 epoch	 of	 history.	 Instead,	 the	 return	 to	 the	 beginning	 of	 philosophy	 is	
intended	 to	 inspire	a	 leap	beyond	 the	history	of	Western	metaphysics	 towards	a	new	
way	of	being	and	dwelling	in	the	world.	
Heidegger’s	 revolutionary	break	with	 industrialism	and	modernity	nevertheless	
proves	 disastrous	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 spectacular	 violence	 of	 World	 War	 II.	
Zimmerman	explains	that	“to	compensate	for	the	loss	of	God,	Germans	began	to	deify	
                                                
6 Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation With Modernity: Technology, 
Politics, Art, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), xiii 
7 Ibid, 236 
8 Ibid, 115 
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the	Volk	and	make	it	the	source	of	meaning	and	purpose	for	their	lives.”9		In	this	sense,	
Heidegger’	critique	of	technology	replicates	the	same	anthropocentric	assumptions	that	
it	attempts	 to	supplant.	Zimmerman:	“The	radical	break	which	occurred	between	God	
and	humanity	at	Auschwitz	resulted	from	a	hubristic	humanity	which	tried	to	raise	itself	
to	the	level	of	the	all-powerful	God.”10	The	Volk	supplants	God	as	the	generative	source	
of	 value,	 meaning,	 and	 truth.	 But	 neither	 Volk	 nor	 Staat	 nor	 Führer	 can	 occupy	 the	
empty	place	of	God.	Indeed,	I	argue	in	the	second	chapter	that	the	‘death	of	God’	is	also	
the	 ‘end	 of	 Man’	 understood	 as	 a	 reflection,	 or	 image	 of	 the	 divine.	 But	 in	 spite	 of	
Heidegger’s	 deification	 of	 the	 German	 Volk,	 I	 nevertheless	 see	 value	 in	 Heidegger’s	
notion	 of	 a	 break	 from	 the	 technological	 nihilism	 of	 the	 ‘first	 beginning’	 and	 the	
potential	for	‘another	beginning’.	Heidegger	is	no	doubt	correct	that	neither	capitalism	
nor	 socialism	 is	 capable	 of	 addressing	 the	 accelerating	 destruction	 of	 Earth.	 By	
presenting	Heidegger	 in	 a	 broader	 constellation	 of	 post-foundational	 thinkers	 such	 as	
Levinas	and	Benjamin,	I	attempt	to	draw	out	the	eschatological	elements	of	Heidegger’s	
‘step	back’	from	and	subsequent	‘leap	beyond’	the	history	of	productionist	metaphysics.	
I	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	 essential	 relationship	 between	 a	 break	 with	 Western	
metaphysics	and	the	advent	of	 the	 totalitarian	State	as	seen	 in	Nazi	Germany.	On	the	
contrary,	 I	 argue	 that	 such	 a	 break	 is	 consistent	 with	 Levinas’	 notion	 of	 ‘ethical	
command’	and	Benjamin’s	notion	of	 ‘divine	violence’.	Levinas	and	Benjamin	illuminate	
democratic	 alternatives	 to	 political	 nihilism	 that	 remains	 unexplored	 in	 Zimmerman’s	
book.	
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Losurdo’s	 book	Heidegger	 &	 The	 Ideology	 Of	 War:	 Community,	 Death,	 &	 The	
West,	 published	 in	 2001,	 builds	 on	 Zimmerman’s	 work	 by	 undertaking	 a	 sustained	
analysis	 of	 Heidegger’s	 political	 thought	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 reactionary	 anti-
modernist	 intellectual	 milieu	 of	 pre-war	 Germany.	 Losurdo	 suggests	 that	 Heidegger’s	
philosophy	 is	permeated	by	 the	same	toxic	political	climate	 in	which	 it	arose.	Losurdo	
therefore	 views	 Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 ‘another	 beginning’	 through	 the	 dark	 prism	 of	
revolutionary	 fascism	 in	 pre-war	 Germany.	 Losurdo:	 “What	 explains	 Heidegger’s	
encounter	 with	 Nazism	 is	 the	 combination	 of	 an	 extremely	 radical	 denunciation	 of	
scientific	 and	 political	 modernity	 and	 a	 fervent	 desire	 for	 an	 event	 that	 will	 restore	
primal	 greatness.”11	For	 Heidegger,	 political	 revolution	 is	 not	 nearly	 radical	 enough;	
what	 is	 needed	 is	 a	 transfiguration	 of	 our	 basic	 experience	 of	 being.	 Losurdo:	 “The	
political	 revolution	 cannot	 be	 considered	 complete	 without	 a	 radical	 cultural	 and	
philosophical	 transformation,	 without	 rethinking	 the	 ‘fundamental	 conception	 of	
being’.”12	For	Losurdo,	Heidegger’s	desire	for	‘another	beginning’	caused	him	to	mistake	
the	 Nazi	 seizure	 of	 the	 State	 as	 a	 ‘leap	 beyond’	 the	 history	 of	Western	metaphysics	
which	 he	 so	 desperately	 sought.	 I	 nevertheless	 view	 the	 nationalist	 revolution	 in	
Germany	as	an	expression	of,	rather	than	an	alternative	to	the	technological	imperialism	
of	the	modern	era.		
Losurdo	nevertheless	stops	short	of	arguing	that	Heidegger’s	thinking	is	nothing	
but	a	philosophical	expression	of	Nazi	 ideology.	Losurdo	argues	that	“the	denunciation	
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of	modernity	is	at	the	same	time	a	point	in	common	with	Nazism,	and	a	possible	critical	
confrontation	 with	 it.” 13 	Losurdo	 understands	 National	 Socialism	 as	 a	 rejection	 of	
modernity	that	paradoxically	accelerates	some	of	its	most	destructive	attributes,	such	as	
industrial	warfare.	Losurdo:	“Nazism	keeps	alive	the	hope	for	a	regeneration	of	society,	
one	 that	 will	 be	 able	 to	 halt	 and	 reverse	 the	 processes	 of	 industrialization	 and	
urbanization.”14	Following	Losurdo,	 I	 look	at	 the	elements	of	Heidegger’s	 thought	 that	
signify	 a	 critical	 confrontation	 with	 National	 Socialism,	 in	 addition	 to	 points	 of	
intersection	 between	 the	 two.	 According	 to	 the	 ideology	 of	 National	 Socialism,	 war	
offers	 up	 the	 essential	 sacrifice	 upon	which	 a	 nation	 is	 founded.	 In	 other	words,	 the	
nation	must	be	forged	from	out	of	the	common	struggle	of	war	 in	the	absence	of	any	
metaphysical	 grounding	 of	 the	 community.	 In	 the	 fourth	 chapter,	 I	 ask	 whether	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 found	 a	 democratic	 people	 without	 recourse	 to	 foundational	 violence.	
Moreover,	 I	 ask	 whether	 political	 community	 can	 be	 founded	 on	 the	 suspension	 of	
violence	 rather	 than	 its	 expression?	 While	 fascism	 seeks	 an	 alternative	 to	 liberal	
anomie,	liberalism	seeks	an	alterative	to	nationalist	violence.	In	this	dissertation,	I	seek	
an	alternative	to	both.	
Richard	Wolin’s	book	entitled	Heidegger’s	Children,	published	in	2001,	attempts	
to	 establish	 Heidegger’s	 toxic	 philosophical	 legacy	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ‘dangerous’	 political	
thought	 of	 his	 Jewish	 students:	Hannah	Arendt,	 Karl	 Löwith,	Hans	 Jonas,	 and	Herbert	
Marcuse.	According	to	Wolin,	“like	a	Greek	tragedy,	the	sins	of	the	father	will	be	visited	
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upon	 the	 daughters	 and	 sons.” 15 	Wolin	 suggests	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 attempt	 of	
Heidegger’s	students	to	think	‘with	Heidegger	against	Heidegger’	their	political	thought	
nevertheless	 remains	 contaminated	 by	 Heidegger’s	 hostility	 towards	 technology,	
liberalism,	 and	 democracy.	 Wolin’s	 critique	 is	 rather	 shallow	 and	 unconvincing.	 This	
insufficiency	 is	 likely	 a	 result	 of	 Wolin’s	 almost	 exclusive	 focus	 on	 the	 political	
implications	 of	 Being	 And	 Time.	 In	 focusing	 on	 the	 early	 themes	 of	 Being	 And	 Time,	
Wolin	 betrays	 an	 obvious	 unfamiliarity	 with	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought.	 Wolin	 fails	 to	
engage	with	 that	which	Shurmann	calls	 the	 ‘turning’	 that	occurs	between	Heidegger’s	
early	writing	and	his	 late	thought.	While	some	of	Wolin’s	criticisms	of	Being	And	Time	
are	indeed	justified,	Wolin	nevertheless	 leaves	the	political	 implications	of	Heidegger’s	
more	 challenging	 later	 thought	 unexplored.	 My	 dissertation	 draws	 heavily	 from	
Heidegger’s	 late	 essays	 and	Beiträge,	 a	 series	 of	meditative	writings	 that	 include	 the	
recently	translated	Contributions	To	Philosophy	(Of	The	Event),	The	Event,	Mindfulness,	
Overcoming	 Metaphysics,	 The	 History	 Of	 Being,	 and	 The	 Beginning	 Of	 Western	
Philosophy.	 By	 drawing	 from	 these	 late	 sources,	 I	 hope	 to	 conduct	 a	 more	 honest	
evaluation	of	Heidegger’s	political	legacy.		
While	I	disagree	with	many	elements	of	Wolin’s	book,	I	nevertheless	agree	with	
his	 interpretation	of	Heidegger’s	philosophy	as	a	response	to	the	nihilism	provoked	by	
Nietzsche’s	declaration	that	‘God	is	dead’.	Wolin:	“According	to	Nietzsche,	the	death	of	
God	was	symptomatic	of	 the	delegitimation	of	 the	highest	Western	values	and	 ideals.	
What	remained	was	a	devil’s	choice	between	the	abyss	of	nihilism	and	Nietzsche’s	own	
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alternative:	 the	 superman	who	was	 ‘beyond	 good	 and	 evil’.	 Such	were	 the	 ‘ontic’	 or	
historical	 origins	 of	 Heidegger’s	 Existenz-philosophie.”16	By	 attempting	 to	 address	 the	
nihilism	of	‘the	West’,	Heidegger	seeks	“to	provide	the	Nazi	movement	with	the	proper	
philosophical	direction.”17	But	for	Heidegger,	Nietzsche’s	overcoming	of	nihilism	via	the	
‘overman’	is	not	an	alternative	to	nihilism,	but	rather	its	most	violent	expression.	Wolin	
appears	 to	be	 ignorant	of	 the	 fact	 that	Heidegger	viewed	his	own	attempt	 to	provide	
‘philosophical	direction’	for	the	Nazi	regime	as	a	spectacular	failure.	In	my	view,	Wolin	
betrays	 a	 strong	 reactionary	 bias	 against	 any	 and	 all	 challenges	 to	 representative	
democracy	 and	 liberal	 capitalism.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Wolin	 looses	 sight	 of	 the	
transformative	 potential	 of	 Heidegger’s	 thought	 and	 that	 of	 his	 students.	 Wolin	
demonstrates	 little	appreciation	for	the	originality	of	 the	thinkers	that	he	dismisses	as	
‘dangerous’,	 ‘toxic’,	 and	 ‘contaminated’.	 Needless	 to	 say,	 I	 strongly	 disagree	 with	
Wolin’s	 assessment	 of	 ‘Heidegger’s	 children’.	 Hannah	 Arendt	 and	 Herbert	 Marcuse	
(along	with	Leo	Strauss)	are	by	far	the	most	important	and	insightful	political	theorists	
of	 the	 20th	 Century.	 It	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 all	 three	 owe	 a	 significant	 debt	 to	
Heidegger’s	philosophy.		
In	 spite	 of	 the	 many	 insufficiencies	 and	 oversights	 of	 Wolin’s	 argument,	 I	
nevertheless	find	value	in	Wolin’s	attempt	to	evaluate	Heidegger’s	philosophy	in	light	of	
the	 political	 legacy	 of	 his	 students	 rather	 than	 solely	 based	 on	 his	 own	 political	
commitments,	 as	 significant	 as	 those	 are.	 For	 this	 reason,	 my	 dissertation	 places	
Heidegger	 in	 a	 constellation	of	 political	 thinkers	who	have	been	deeply	 influenced	by	
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Heidegger’s	 philosophical	 legacy.	 Unlike	 Wolin,	 my	 aim	 is	 not	 to	 reject	 Heidegger’s	
philosophy	 outright.	 Instead,	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 deeply	 insightful	 elements	 of	
Heidegger’s	thought	can	be	more	clearly	discerned	by	evaluating	Heidegger	in	light	of	a	
broader	 constellation	 of	 thinkers	 inspired	 by	 his	 philosophy,	 including	 Derrida,	
Benjamin,	 and	 Levinas.	 Indeed,	 Heidegger’s	 ‘step	 back’	 to	 the	 philosophy	 of	 ancient	
Greece	 informs	 my	 own	 discussion	 of	 post-foundational	 democracy	 in	 light	 of	 the	
ancient	 Greek	 polis.	 Against	 the	 authoritarian	 destruction	 of	 history,	 the	 ‘step	 back’	
requires	 a	 remembrance	 of	 our	 origins,	 a	 critical	 exercise	 that	 Wolin	 condemns	 as	
inherently	dangerous	to	the	liberal	international	order.		
Julian	 Young’s	 book	 on	 Heidegger’s	 Later	 Philosophy,	 published	 in	 2002,	 is	 a	
welcome	change	 from	Wolin’s	 treatment	of	Heidegger’s	philosophy	as	nothing	but	an	
extension	 of	 Nazi	 ideology.	 Young	 uncovers	 a	 crucial	 element	 of	 Heidegger’s	 thinking	
that	 had	 remained	 relatively	 unexplored	 in	 the	 literature	 up	 this	 point	 –	 ‘the	 event’.	
Young:	“Metaphysics	blocks	access	to	the	unfathomable	‘depth’	of	Being,	to	the	mystery	
of	 its	 ‘self-concealment’,	 and	 it	 blocks	 access	 to	 Being’s	 ‘granting’	 of	 being	 to	 us,	 the	
phenomenon	of	its	self-disclosure,	 its	‘giving’	of	 itself	to	us	(in	the	Event).”18	While	the	
ancient	 Greeks	 perceived	 the	 radiant	 emergence	 of	 being	 to	 presence,	 we	 are	more	
likely	to	perceive	the	withdrawal	of	being	into	the	darkness	of	concealment	in	our	own	
era	 after	 the	 ‘death	 of	 God’.	 Young	 indicates	 an	 important	 relation	 between	 poetry,	
technology,	 and	nature	 in	Heidegger’s	 late	 thought.	Heidegger	 understands	poiesis	as	
‘bringing	forth’,	techne	as	‘aided	bringing	forth’,	while	physis	is	understood	as	‘unaided	
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bringing	forth’.19	Young	goes	on	to	argue	that:	“By	occluding	the	sense	of	the	world	as	
‘brought	forth’,	as	the	self-revelation	of	the	divine,	it	destroys	the	sense	of	it	as	a	sacred	
place,	and,	as	such,	a	place	to	be	reverenced	and	cared	for.”20	In	this	sense,	Heidegger’s	
thought	lends	itself	to	a	conservation	ethic	of	‘sparing’	and	‘preserving’,	rather	than	the	
Nietzschean	 will	 to	 generate	 meaning	 ex	 nihilo,	 from	 out	 of	 nothing.	 Heidegger	
envisions	humanity	not	as	‘overmen’,	but	as	‘guardians’	of	nature.		
While	 Young’s	 book	 offers	 an	 insightful	 exploration	 of	 the	 environmental	
implications	of	Heidegger’	late	philosophy,	he	nevertheless	evades	the	more	disturbing	
political	 implications	of	Heidegger’s	 thought	as	discussed	by	Zimmerman	and	Losurdo.	
Young	 does	 not	 look	 in	 any	 great	 detail	 at	 how	 Heidegger’s	 environmental	 ethic	 of	
dwelling	might	be	politically	accomplished.	In	my	view,	Heidegger’s	environmental	ethic	
cannot	 be	 accomplished	 via	 liberal	 representative	 democracy.	 Nor	 can	 an	 ethic	 of	
dwelling	 be	 accomplished	 via	 fascism,	 which	 is	 as	 much	 an	 intensification	 of	
technological	 nihilism	 as	 a	 rebellion	 against	 it.	 I	 therefore	 suggest	 that	 participatory	
democracy	and	 local	 forms	of	 extra-parliamentary	political	 action	are	better	 suited	 to	
the	cultivation	of	a	non-instrumental	relation	to	nature.		
Graham	Harman’s	2007	book	Heidegger	Explained:	From	Phenomenon	To	Thing	
is,	in	my	judgment,	the	best	overall	study	of	Heidegger’s	philosophical	corpus,	from	the	
early	phenomenological	writings	on	existential	themes	to	the	late	poetic	meditations	on	
technology	and	art.	Harman	suggests	that	Heidegger’s	fundamental	insight	is	that	being	
is	 not	 a	 presence,	 but	 an	 event.	 Harman:	 “All	 things	 that	 exist	 have	 the	 character	 of	
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events.” 21 	For	 Heidegger,	 being	 does	 not	 persist	 through	 time	 as	 an	 ontological	
substance.	 Instead,	 being	 ‘happens’,	 or	 ‘occurs’	 only	 to	 ‘recede’	 or	 ‘withdraw’	 from	
presence;	being	 is	 an	event.	 The	 temporality	of	 the	event	 is	not	oriented	 towards	 the	
future,	but	 to	 the	past.	Before	we	can	 represent	 it	 to	ourselves,	 the	moment	 is	gone,	
only	 a	 memory.	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 fleeting	 nature	 of	 temporal	 impermanence,	 Harman	
claims	that	“the	past	is	never	entirely	gone,	since	its	possibilities	remain	with	us	in	the	
form	of	a	heritage.”22	Harman:	“Yet	there	 is	no	way	of	touching	our	destiny	unless	we	
make	 contact	 with	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Greek	 beginning.	 Greek	 philosophy	 is	 the	 place	
where	humans	 first	 take	a	stand	amidst	beings	as	a	whole,	 interrogating	and	grasping	
them.”23	According	to	Harman,	“the	Greeks	understood	what	Husserl	did	not	–	that	all	
light	emerges	only	from	shadow,	and	never	entirely	dispels	that	shadow.	Things	do	not	
appear	in	lucid	presence	in	consciousness,	but	emerge	only	party	from	the	unveiling	of	
being.”24	There	are	two	beginnings	in	the	history	of	‘the	West’:	1)	the	‘first	beginning’	in	
the	 classical	 age	 of	 ancient	 Greece,	 and	 2)	 ‘another	 beginning’	 that	 has	 yet	 to	 be	
accomplished.	 Following	 Young,	 Harman	 suggests	 that	 a	 ‘new	 beginning’	 would	
illuminate	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 technological	 framing	 of	 nature,	 and	 cultivate	 a	 non-
instrumental	way	of	 ‘dwelling’	 on	our	 finite	 planet.	Unfortunately,	 any	 interest	 in	 the	
environment	 implications	 of	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 has	 been	 supplanted	 by	 the	
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question	 of	 Heidegger’s	 personal	 involvement	 with	 National	 Socialism	 ever	 since	 the	
publication	of	Emmanuel	Faye’s	landmark	book,	to	which	we	now	turn.	
Emmanuel	 Faye’s	 book	 entitled	 Heidegger:	 The	 Introduction	 Of	 Nazism	 Into	
Philosophy	made	a	significant	impact	when	it	was	published	in	2009.	For	better	or	worst,	
Faye’s	book	has	shaped	Heidegger	scholarship	ever	since.	Like	Wolin,	Faye	argues	that	
Heidegger’s	 philosophy	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 vile	 expression	 of	 Nazi	 ideology.	
According	to	Faye,	“we	witness,	in	courses	and	lectures	that	are	ostensibly	presented	as	
‘philosophical’,	 a	 progress	 dissolving	 of	 the	 human	 being,	 whose	 individual	 worth	 is	
expressly	 denied,	 into	 a	 community	 of	 people	 rooted	 in	 the	 land	 and	 united	 by	
blood.”25Faye:	“That	quest	for	soil,	for	essential	enrootedness,	and	for	a	freeing	of	the	
life	 forces,	 is	 what	 energized	 Heidegger	 in	 his	 struggle	 for	 a	 vision	 of	 the	 historical	
world.”26	Faye’s	 critique	 goes	 further	 than	 that	 of	 Wolin,	 arguing	 that	 Heidegger’s	
philosophy	is	 infected	with	biological	racism	and	anti-Semitism	grounded	in	little	more	
than	 crude	 provincialism.	 Faye’s	 book	 is	 a	 force	 to	 be	 reckoned	 with.	 After	 reading	
Faye’s	 book,	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 possible	 to	 evade	 or	 deny	 Heidegger’s	 Nazi	 sympathy’s	
during	the	war	years.	But	Faye’s	argument	too	often	reads	as	a	shrill	polemic.	Moreover,	
Faye	 makes	 numerous	 unjustifiable	 leaps	 in	 logic.	 Heidegger’s	 philosophy	 is	 not	
necessarily	 an	 extension	 of	 party	 doctrine.	 Faye	 fails	 to	 convince	 that	 Heidegger’s	
involvement	with	National	Socialism	contaminates	his	entire	philosophical	corpus	with	
Nazi	propaganda.		
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Faye	seems	completely	oblivious	to	the	deeply	insightful	aspects	of	Heidegger’s	
philosophy	 taken	 up	 by	 scholars	 such	 as	 Harman	 and	 Young.	 Instead,	 Faye	 reads	
Heidegger’s	Being	And	Time	as	a	political	manifesto,	arguing	 that	 the	displacement	of	
the	Cartesian	ego	in	Being	And	Time	paves	the	way	for	the	destruction	of	the	individual	
by	the	Nazi	State.	Faye:	“The	real	project	of	Being	And	Time	is	the	project	to	destroy	the	
idea	 of	 the	 I	 in	 order	 to	 make	 room	 for	 the	 ‘most	 radical	 individuation’,	 which	 is	
emphatically	 realized	 not	 in	 the	 individual	 but	 in	 the	 organic	 indivisibility	 of	 the	
Gemeinschaft	of	 the	people.”27	This	 is	 a	 complete	misreading	 in	my	 judgment.	 Contra	
Faye,	 I	 am	 in	 agreement	with	 Herbert	 Dreyfus’s	masterful	 exposition	 in	Being	 In	 The	
World:	A	Commentary	On	Heidegger’s	Being	And	Time,	Division	I.	In	that	book,	Dreyfus	
argues	that	Heidegger’s	displacement	of	the	Cartesian	ego	via	an	investigation	of	‘being-
in-the-world’	 is	 primarily	 an	 ontological	 rather	 than	 political	 project.	 Contra	 Faye’s	
polemic,	 Heidegger	 intends	 to	 ‘bracket’	 consciousness	 of	 the	 object	 in	 order	 to	 ‘step	
back’	 to	 the	 phenomenological	 horizon	 in	 which	 the	 object	 appears,	 or	 occurs.	 It	
becomes	 clear	 in	 light	 of	 Dreyfus’	 lucid	 analysis	 of	 Heidegger’s	 fundamental	 ontology	
that	Faye’s	interpretation	of	Being	And	Time	is	both	limited	and	ideologically	motivated.	
Heidegger’s	 fundamental	 ontology	 is	 far	 from	 perfect,	 but	 it	 is	 hardly	 the	 Nazi	
propaganda	that	Faye	claims	it	to	be.	
Contrary	to	Faye’s	indulgence	in	ad	hominem	attack,	David	Ohana	offers	a	more	
honest	and	insightful	evaluation	of	Heidegger’s	confrontation	with	Nietzsche’s	legacy	in	
The	Dawn	Of	Political	Nihilism,	published	in	2012.	Ohana	looks	at	Nietzsche	in	a	broader	
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constellation	 of	 European	 nihilism,	 including	 Italian	 Futurism,	 National	 Socialism,	 and	
Soviet	 Communism.	 Ohana	 places	 European	 nihilism	 in	 the	 intellectual	 context	 of	
thinking	 that	 responds	 to	 the	 ‘death	 of	God’.	Ohana:	 “The	 cultural	 and	 political	 crisis	
that	overcame	the	European	cultural	elite	took	the	form	of	a	rejection	of	the	validity	of	
the	 accepted	 ideas	 of	 the	Western	 heritage	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 of	 a	 proposal	 of	 a	
radical	alternative	to	that	crisis	on	the	other.”28	Ohana’s	most	significant	insight	is	that	
nihilism	and	 totalitarianism	are	not	 two	opposed	world-views,	but	 rather	 two	sides	of	
the	 same	 coin.	 Ohana:	 “Until	 now,	 nihilism	 and	 totalitarianism	 were	 considered	
opposites:	 one	 an	 orderless	 state	 of	 affairs,	 the	 other	 a	 strict	 regimented	 order.	 On	
closer	 scrutiny,	 however,	 a	 surprising	 affinity	 can	 be	 found	 between	 these	 two	
concepts.”29	Totalitarianism	is	not	an	alternative	to,	but	rather	an	expression	of	nihilism	
–	the	will	to	establish	order	in	the	midst	of	chaos.	Totalitarianism	is	creation	ex	nihilo	–	
out	of	nothing.		
According	 to	 Ohana,	 “the	 Nietzschean	 therapy	 for	 this	 radical	 diagnosis	 (the	
death	of	God)	was	the	existence	of	the	will	to	power	as	the	counterweight	to	nihilism.”30	
Nietzsche’s	nihilist	revolution	involves	supplanting	ethics	with	aesthetics.	In	the	absence	
of	 any	 metaphysical	 grounding	 of	 morality,	 Nietzsche	 advocates	 for	 the	 aesthetic	
creation	 of	 meaning	 via	 the	 generative	 will.	 Ohana:	 “The	 nihilistic	 revolution	 is	
necessarily	 connected	 with	 the	 aesthetic	 one.	 Nietzschean	 nihilism	 –	 having	 gone	
beyond	 the	 traditional	 criterion	 for	 good	 and	 evil,	 truth	 and	 falsity	 –	 led	 to	 the	 new	
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creative	 principle	 of	 the	 will	 to	 power.	 Traditional	 ethics	 was	 replaced	 by	 new	
aesthetics.” 31 	Ohana	 explains	 that	 “Nietzsche	 viewed	 the	 world	 from	 an	 aesthetic	
standpoint:	the	paradoxical	result	of	the	death	of	God	was	the	birth	of	the	self-created	
man,	 and	 thus	 nihilism	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 a	 concept	 of	 the	 world	 as	 an	 aesthetic	
phenomenon.”32	In	the	modern	age,	there	are	no	moral	absolutes	that	could	provide	a	
secure	foundation	for	thinking	and	acting.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	generate	meaning	
as	 an	 aesthetic	 act	 of	 creation.	 I	 nevertheless	 argue	 against	 the	 ‘will	 to	 power’	 as	 an	
antidote	to	nihilism	in	the	first	and	second	chapters.	The	self-overcoming	of	nihilism	is	
not	an	adequate	response	to	the	 loss	of	objective	morality.	Ohana	states	the	problem	
well;	 “Man	created	an	 illusion	of	wholeness,	order,	and	unity	 in	order	 to	organize	 the	
chaos	by	giving	 it	a	meaningful	structure,	but	the	reflective	consciousness	exposes	the	
illusion.”33	Man	cannot	bear	to	be	the	origin	of	his	own	meaning.	I	suggest	that	after	the	
‘death	 of	 God’,	 it	 is	 still	 possible	 to	 find	meaning	 outside	 of	 ourselves	 located	 in	 the	
ethical	command	of	the	other.		
Tracy	Strong’s	Politics	Without	Vision,	published	in	2013,	looks	at	a	constellation	
of	 20th	 Century	 political	 thinkers	 including	Nietzsche,	Weber,	 Schmitt,	 Heidegger,	 and	
Arendt.	Strong’s	major	claim	is	that	politics	in	the	20th	Century	lacks	vision.	This	lack	of	
vision,	 according	 to	 Strong,	 is	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 the	 dissolution	 of	 any	 transcendental	
ideal	 in	 the	modern	 age.	 Strong:	 “Humans	 no	 longer	 can	 rely	 on	 any	 transcendental	
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grounding	to	finalize	their	thinking	–	be	that	God,	or	nature,	or	history.”34	Strong	looks	
at	 the	 neoliberal	 ‘depoliticization’	 of	 the	 State	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 this	 lack	 of	
transcendent	 vision.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 relentless	 globalization	 of	 modernity,	 Strong	
looks	at	 an	alternative	 constellation	of	political	 thinkers	 in	order	 to	explore	paths	not	
taken.	One	of	Strong’s	most	interesting	suggestions	is	that	contemporary	politics	ought	
to	 be	 reoriented	 around	 the	 polis	 rather	 than	 the	 State	 as	 the	 primary	 ‘site’	 of	 the	
political.	Strong:	“The	polis	is	not	state	or	even	city-state	.	.	.	it	is	rather	‘the	site	of	the	
abode	of	human	history	that	belongs	to	humans	in	the	midst	of	beings’	.	.	.	the	polis	is	
the	polos	-	both	a	pole	and	a	vortex	‘around	which	everything	turns’.”35	For	Strong,	“the	
polis	must	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 origin,	 as	 a	work	 of	 art.”36	But	 as	we	 have	 seen,	 the	
aesthetic	approach	to	politics	is	problematic.	I	tend	to	agree	with	Benjamin,	who	claims	
that	the	ultimate	expression	of	the	‘aestheticization’	of	politics	is	the	fascist	mass	rally.	
Instead	of	aesthetics,	what	is	needed	is	an	‘ethical	turn’	after	the	dissolution	of	absolute	
value	and	the	Nietzschean	 ‘will	 to	nothing’.	Strong	nevertheless	makes	 four	 important	
claims	that	map	the	territory	I	aim	to	explore:	
	
1) The	modern	age	is	the	age	of	world	politics	
	
2) The	modern	age	has	seen	a	shift	from	localized	and	limited	goals	
of	 national	 interest	 to	 the	 limitless	 pursuit	 of	 power	 without	
purpose	
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3) Part	of	 this	 shift	entails	 the	growth	of	 the	 invisible	government	
over	against	the	visible	government		
	
4) This,	 in	 turn,	 leads	 to	 the	 erosion,	 perhaps	 even	 the	
disintegration	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 that	 is,	 the	 space	 in	 which	
human	beings	belong	and	live	as	citizens.37	
	
	
The	modern	age	 is	 indeed	the	age	of	world	politics.	 It	would	seem	that	we	are	
living	 through	 a	 transition	 from	 the	 nation-state	 to	 a	 new	 post-national	 world	 order.	
However,	the	implications	of	the	end	of	the	nation-state	remain	uncertain	given	that	an	
alternative	 post-Westphalian	model	 has	 yet	 to	 emerge	 in	 full.	 Apart	 from	 that	which	
Strong	 calls	 ‘invisible	 government’	 of	 the	 deep	 state,	 there	 are	 no	 actually	 existing	
alternatives	 to	 liberal	 democracy.	 A	 new	 vision	 of	 post-foundational	 democracy	
therefore	 requires	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 ‘site’	 of	 the	 political.	 In	 this	 dissertation	 I	
trace	a	line	from	Heidegger’s	overcoming	of	‘onto-theology’,	through	its	post-structural	
appropriation,	 and	 finally	 towards	Benjamin’s	 confrontation	with	political	 theology.	 In	
my	 judgment,	 the	 polis	 should	 not	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 the	 nation-state	 –	 nor	 as	 the	
continental	super-state	or	the	planetary	world-state	–	but	as	the	demos	in	which	we	live	
and	dwell	and	encounter	one	another.	For	democracy	to	have	a	future,	it	must	be	local,	
not	global.			
	
Context	
I	 will	 attempt	 to	 contextualize	 this	 dissertation	 within	 a	 broader	 intellectual	
horizon	than	a	narrow	literature	can	provide.	I	will	therefore	look	at	the	intersection	of	
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political	 nihilism	 and	 post-foundational	 democracy	 within	 the	 broader	 horizon	 of	
contemporary	political	theory.	I	will	juxtapose	the	post-Heideggerian	deconstruction	of	
metaphysics	 that	 I	 will	 explore	 throughout	 this	 dissertation	 with	 neo-Marxist	 theory.	
While	Heidegger	and	Nietzsche	are	both	‘right-wing’	thinkers,	this	dissertation	engages	
primarily	 with	 the	 political	 ‘left’.	 I	 define	 ‘the	 left’	 as	 those	 for	 whom	 Marx	 is	 a	
significant	political	thinker.	 In	what	follows,	 I	review	some	significant	trends	 in	current	
Marxist	theory	 in	relation	to	my	own	engagement	with	the	political	nihilism	stemming	
from	the	‘death	of	God’	and	the	potential	emergence	of	a	post-foundational	democracy.		
I	 will	 now	 look	 at:	 1)	 the	 Frankfurt	 School	 of	 Horkheimer	 and	 Adorno,	 2)	 the	
postmodern	Marxism	of	Derrida	and	Deleuze,	and	3)	The	Marxist	political	 theology	of	
Zizek	and	Badiou.		
First,	 I	will	 look	at	 the	Frankfurt	 School	of	 critical	 theory.	 The	Frankfurt	 School	
was	a	 loose	academic	 community	of	post-Marxist	 scholars	 including	Max	Horkheimer,	
Theodor	 Adorno,	 and	Herbert	Marcuse.38	The	 purpose	 of	 the	 Frankfurt	 School	was	 in	
part	 to	 explain	 the	 absence	 of	 proletarian	 revolution	 in	 the	 capitalist	 ‘West’.	 The	
problem	 is	 that	 history	 proved	Marx’s	 theory	 of	 dialectical	 materialism	 wrong.	 Marx	
argues	that	the	dialectic	of	‘World-History’	is	driven	by	the	innate	telos	of	the	economic	
‘mode	of	production’.	The	dialectical	logic	of	history	means	that	capitalism	transitions	to	
communism	just	as	day	gives	way	to	night.	But	when	communism	failed	to	give	way	to	
capitalism	 in	 Europe,	 it	 proved	necessary	 to	develop	a	 theory	 ‘class	 consciousness’	 to	
explain	 the	 ‘false	consciousness’	of	 the	masses.	As	 the	cultural	 theorist	Zizek	explains,	
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“the	great	defining	problem	of	Western	Marxism	was	the	lack	of	a	revolutionary	subject:	
why	is	it	that	the	working	class	does	not	complete	the	passage	from	in-itself	to	for-itself	
and	 constitute	 itself	 as	 a	 revolutionary	 agent?”39	Contra	 Marx,	 the	 Frankfurt	 School	
argues	 that	 the	 proletariat	 must	 first	 recognize	 their	 historical	 role	 as	 the	 subject	 of	
history,	and	only	then	will	revolution	follow.	The	task	of	critical	theory	is	to	bring	about	
this	 new	 ‘class	 consciousness’,	 or	 that	 which	 Marcuse	 calls	 a	 ‘new	 sensibility’.	 This	
required	a	 shift	 from	Marx’s	 focus	on	political	economy	 towards	questions	of	 culture,	
philosophy,	and	aesthetics.		
Hannah	 Arendt	 was	 the	 first	 to	 perceive	 that	 National	 Socialism	 and	 Soviet	
Communism	 share	 the	 same	 totalitarian	 form	with	 different	 ideological	 content.	 The	
brutality	of	‘actually	existing’	communism	in	the	Soviet	Union	left	critical	theory	in	‘the	
West’	 without	 a	 compelling	 alternative	 model	 to	 the	 planetary	 hegemony	 of	 liberal	
capitalism.	Instead,	a	democratic	alternative	would	have	to	be	fashioned	from	out	of	the	
‘determinate	 negation’	 of	 existing	 social	 conditions.	 The	 political	 theorist	 Susan	Buck-
Morss	explains	that	“the	Hegelian	dialectic	of	progress,	the	optimistic	scenario	of	world	
history	 as	 inevitable	 transcendence	 through	 negation,	 was	 long	 ago	 stripped	 of	
legitimacy.	 In	 its	wake,	there	has	been	an	almost	exclusive	focus	on	the	 left	on	critical	
epistemology,	 the	 moment	 of	 negation,	 as	 if	 critique	 were	 all	 that	 is	 required	 of	
philosophy.”40	In	my	judgment,	the	well-worn	criticism	of	critical	theory	is	more	or	less	
accurate	 –	 that	 social	 criticism	 lacks	 a	 sufficient	 normative	 grounding.	 The	 basis	 of	
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critique	 is	 opposition	 to	 the	 status	 quo	 rather	 than	 an	 alternative	 vision.	 The	 Post-
Hegelian	 method	 of	 ‘negation’	 utilized	 by	 the	 Frankfurt	 School	 lacks	 affirmation.	
Moreover,	 critical	 theory	 lacks	 a	 compelling	 model	 of	 political	 praxis	 beyond	 mere	
protest.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 alternative	 political	 vision,	 social	 criticism	 too	 often	
succumbs	 to	 petty	 resentment.	 In	 fact,	 contemporary	 critical	 theory	 has	 largely	
degenerated	 into	 ‘checking	 privilege’	 on	 social	 media	 and	 enforcing	 ‘safe	 spaces’	 on	
university	campuses.	 In	my	opinion,	we	need	to	begin	looking	at	alternative	models	of	
local	self-governance,	not	just	blind	refusal,	protest,	and	dissent.		
Having	 looked	 at	 the	 Frankfurt	 School	 of	 critical	 theory,	 I	will	 now	 look	 at	 the	
postmodern	 variation	of	Marxism.	At	 the	end	of	 the	20th	Century,	 the	 collapse	of	 the	
Soviet	Union	along	with	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	were	taken	to	signify	the	final	victory	
of	 liberal	 capitalism	 over	 the	 communist	model.	 Francis	 Fukuyama	 famously	 declared	
that	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 amounts	 to	 ‘the	 end	 of	 history’.	 Fukuyama	
suggests	that	with	the	collapse	of	communism,	liberal	democracy	is	destined	to	become	
the	most	advanced	stage	of	political	organization	ever	to	be	realized.	For	Fukuyama,	the	
global	 adoption	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 signifies	 the	 dialectical	 fulfillment	 of	 Hegel’s	
‘universal	history’.	Fukuyama	argues	that	the	planetary	hegemony	of	 liberal	capitalism	
marks	 the	 dialectical	 fulfillment	 of	 ‘World-Spirit’.	 More	 recently,	 the	 ‘end	 of	 history’	
thesis	has	been	used	to	justify	the	imposition	of	liberal	democracy	via	military	force	in	
Afghanistan,	 Iraq,	 Libya,	 and	 Syria,	 with	 more	 ‘rogue	 states’	 sure	 to	 follow.	 But	 of	
course,	history	did	not	‘end’	in	1989.	History	has	returned	with	a	vengeance	in	the	21st	
Century.	 Today,	 liberalism	 faces	 a	 crisis	 of	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 face	 new	 and	 emerging	
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threats.	As	the	post-war	liberal	consensus	falters,	it	can	no	longer	be	taken	for	granted	
that	we	have	seen	the	last	of	revolutionary	nationalism.	What	is	needed	is	a	democratic	
alternative	 to	 both	 provincial	 nationalism	 and	 the	 rootless	 cosmopolitanism	 it	 rightly	
rejects.		
In	 Specters	 Of	 Marx,	 Derrida	 responds	 to	 the	 utopian	 triumphalism	 of	
Fukuyama’s	 ‘end	of	history’	 thesis.	 In	 that	 text,	Derrida	 looks	at	Marxism	 through	 the	
prism	of	a	‘hauntology’.	For	Derrida,	the	‘specters	of	Marx’	do	not	refer	to	a	communist	
threat	that	 ‘haunts’	Europe.	 Instead,	Derrida	suggests	that	Marx	himself	 is	haunted	by	
the	hermeneutic	openness	of	communism	to	alternative	interpretations.	Unfortunately,	
these	‘specters’	were	thoroughly	exorcised	with	the	implementation	of	actually	existing	
communism	in	the	Soviet	Union.	Derrida	therefore	distinguishes	between	the	‘spirit’	of	
Marx’s	 critique	 of	 capitalism	on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 dogmatic	 certainty	 of	 existing	
communism	on	the	other.	Derrida	attempts	to	keep	communism	open	to	the	‘specter’	
of	 its	own	haunted	past.	 The	democratic	 ‘spirit’	 of	 communism	 involves	an	 important	
temporal	 element.	 Derrida’s	 theory	 of	 democracy	 is	 deeply	 informed	 by	 Heidegger’s	
philosophy	of	time.	For	instance,	Derrida’s	notion	of	a	‘democracy	to	come’	is	indebted	
to	 Heidegger’s	 description	 of	 ‘ecstatic’	 temporality	 in	 Being	 And	 Time.	 In	 that	 book,	
Heidegger	 describes	 how	 the	 present	 moment	 arises	 through	 the	 projection	 of	
consciousness	into	the	future	and	the	recollection	of	the	past.	For	Heidegger,	the	most	
important	 mode	 of	 temporality	 is	 the	 projection	 of	 consciousness	 into	 the	 future	 –	
‘being-towards-death’.	Heidegger’s	notion	of	‘being-towards-death’	is	not	some	kind	of	
Nazi	 warrior-ethic.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 ‘being-towards-death’	 is	 the	 opening	 of	
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consciousness	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 a	 future	 that	 cannot	 possibly	 be	 anticipated.	Although	
the	moment	of	one’s	death	cannot	be	known,	its	arrival	is	certain.	The	same	can	be	said	
for	revolution.		
Marx’s	theory	of	revolution	is	a	secularization	of	messianic	time.	Derrida	points	
out	 that	 Marx’s	 dialectical	 materialism	 operates	 according	 to	 a	 messianic	 temporal	
structure.	 Derrida	 distinguishes	 between	 ‘determinate	messianism’	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
and	 ‘indeterminate	 messianism’	 on	 the	 other.	 Determinate	 messianism	 refers	 to	 a	
religious	 community	 of	 belief,	 while	 indeterminate	 messianism	 refers	 to	 the	 future-
oriented	 temporality	 of	 expectation.	 Derrida	 suggests	 that	 Marxists	 anticipate	 the	
communist	revolution	just	as	Christians	hope	for	the	‘second	coming’	of	Christ.	Derrida’s	
notion	of	the	‘democracy	to	come’	also	expresses	this	 ‘messianic	time’	of	expectation.	
Democracy	 is	 never	 complete,	 it	 is	 always	 still	 to	 come.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Derrida	
understands	democracy	as	a	radical	openness	to	the	future.	Democracy	is	an	unfinished	
project.	 It	 is	 nevertheless	 important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 democracy	 is	 not	 just	 the	
promise	of	the	future.	Indeed,	democracy	is	also	the	inheritance	of	the	past.	For	Derrida	
too,	the	‘inheritance	of	democracy’	involves	the	remembrance	of	the	past	as	well	as	the	
openness	 to	 the	 future.	 In	 my	 view,	 Derrida’s	 notion	 of	 democracy	 as	 inheritance	 is	
indebted	to	Heidegger’s	philosophy	of	time.	The	temporality	of	Heidegger’s	late	thought	
is	quite	different	from	the	existential	attunement	of	‘being-towards-death’	investigated	
in	 Being	 And	 Time.	While	 Heidegger’s	 early	 philosophy	 emphasizes	 the	 projection	 of	
consciousness	into	the	future,	his	late	thought	is	more	concerned	with	the	recollection	
of	 history,	 tradition,	 and	 the	 nihilistic	 destiny	 of	 ‘the	West’.	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	
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attempts	 to	 ‘step	 back’	 to	 the	 origins	 of	 philosophy	 in	 ancient	 Greece.	 Likewise,	 the	
inheritance	 of	 democracy	 requires	 that	 we	 remember	 its	 beginnings	 in	 the	 ancient	
Athenian	 polis.	 Only	 then	 can	 we	 shelter	 the	 democratic	 tradition	 for	 future	
generations.		
For	this	reason,	my	own	engagement	with	post-foundational	democracy	tends	to	
emphasis	 the	 revolutionary	 nature	 of	 non-linear	 time.	 In	 my	 judgment,	 Derrida’s	
messianic	structure	of	time	bears	too	many	structural	similarities	to	the	same	Marxist-
Hegelian	dialectic	 of	 history	 that	he	 claims	 to	oppose.	While	Derrida’s	messianic	 time	
lacks	 the	 teleological	 direction	 of	 Hegel’s	 universal	 history,	 both	 messianic	 time	 and	
dialectical	history	are	nevertheless	oriented	towards	the	future.	The	problem,	however,	
is	that	the	orientation	of	consciousness	towards	a	utopian	future	tends	to	remain	blind	
to	the	atrocities	of	the	past.	This	forgetfulness	makes	it	more	likely	that	these	atrocities	
will	 be	 repeated	 in	 a	 perpetual	 cycle	 of	 ‘eternal	 return’.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 find	 it	
necessary	 to	 emphasize	 the	 eschatological	 remembrance	 of	 democracy	 in	 order	 to	
counter	Hegel’s	ideology	of	history	as	progress.		
The	 philosophy	 of	 Deleuze	 is	 less	 entangled	 with	 dialectical	 materialism	 than	
that	of	Derrida.	Deleuze’s	thinking	is	an	expression	of	the	philosophy	of	immanence	and	
the	politics	of	affect	stemming	from	a	neo-Spinozist	ontological	pluralism.	The	turn	from	
Marx	to	Spinoza	in	contemporary	political	theory	is	a	result	of	the	ideological	absurdity	
of	 dialectical	 materialism.	 With	 the	 ‘death	 of	 God’,	 Hegel’s	 deification	 of	 history	 as	
‘World-Spirit’	 is	 no	 longer	 convincing;	 nor	 is	 Marx’s	 faith	 in	 the	 innate	 telos	 of	 the	
technical	 ‘mode	 of	 production’.	 Spinoza’s	 philosophy	 depicts	 the	 vital	 dynamism	 of	
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material	 becoming	 without	 the	 direction	 of	 a	 Hegelian	 telos.	 Consequently,	 the	
multitude	 replaces	 the	proletariat	as	 the	subject	of	history.	Gilles	Deleuze	 is	 the	most	
important	figure	of	this	neo-Spinozist	intellectual	genealogy.	Like	Heidegger,	Deleuze	is	
concerned	with	overturning	the	Platonic	legacy	of	metaphysical	dualism.	Plato	envisions	
two	worlds:	 1)	 the	 immanent	world	 of	 illusion,	 and	 2)	 a	 transcendent	world	 beyond,	
behind,	or	beneath	this	world.	Contra	Plato,	Deleuze	affirms	this	world	–	the	immanent	
plane	of	material	becoming.	In	my	opinion,	the	problem	is	that	the	plane	of	immanence	
lacks	the	vertical	dimension	of	transcendence.	There	is	no	outside	of	immanence,	just	as	
there	is	no	way	out	of	the	neo-liberal	planetary	frame.		
The	philosophical	problem	of	the	immanent	frame	is	also	evident	in	the	politics	
of	 affect	 stemming	 from	 Deleuze.	 The	 ontology	 of	 radical	 immanence	 can	 be	
understood	as	nothing	but	the	ideology	of	global	capitalism.	Because	Deleuzian	political	
ontology	lacks	a	notion	of	transcendence	(within	immanence),	the	politics	of	affect	lacks	
any	concept	of	transformative	political	praxis	aside	from	resistance.	In	my	judgment,	the	
limitation	 of	 political	 praxis	 to	 resistance	 is	 defeatist.	 All	 resistance	 can	 imagine	 is	 a	
perpetual	agonistic	struggle	against	the	persistent	neo-liberal	global	order.	That	we	no	
longer	 speak	 of	 revolution	 indicates	 an	 utter	 lack	 of	 alternative	 political	 vision.	 Brian	
Massumi	comes	close	to	admitting	as	much	in	a	moment	of	self-criticism:	“It	seems	to	
me	that	there’s	been	a	certain	type	of	convergence	between	the	dynamic	of	capitalist	
power	 and	 the	 dynamic	 of	 resistance.” 41 	Ultimately,	 Deleuzean	 ontology	 is	 an	
expression	 of,	 rather	 than	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 novel	 transmutations	 of	 global	
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capitalism.	The	political	ontology	of	assemblages,	networks,	and	flows	is	nothing	but	an	
ideological	 expression	 of	 late-capitalism.	 Contra	 Delezue’s	 neo-Spinozist	 ontology,	 I	
argue	 that	 Rousseau’s	 delineation	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 is	more	 relevant	 to	 the	
political	challenges	of	the	present,	and	more	in	line	with	the	deconstructive	genealogy	
that	 I	wish	to	consider.	 I	will	 suggest	 that	breaking	through	the	plain	of	 immanence	 is	
precisely	what	Benjamin	imagines	with	his	notion	of	‘divine	violence’.		
Having	 looked	 at	 critical	 theory	 and	 postmodernism,	 I	 will	 now	 look	 at	 the	
political	 theology	 of	 Zizek	 and	 Badiou.	 The	 contemporary	 revival	 of	 Orthodox	
Communism	directs	our	attention	away	 from	postmodern	 themes	of	 gender,	 identity,	
and	race	back	to	classical	political	questions	of	agency,	sovereignty,	and	the	state.	Zizek	
argues	 that	 the	 liberal	 cosmopolitanism	 espoused	 by	 Derrida	 neutralizes	 the	 class-
conflict	 of	 capitalism.	 Zizek:	 “The	 class	 problematic	 of	 workers	 exploitation	 is	
transformed	 into	 the	multiculturalist	 problematic	 of	 the	 ‘intolerance	 of	Otherness’	 .	 .	
.”42	This	 liberal	 ethic	 of	 tolerance	 is	 problematic	 for	 Zizek	 because	 it	 deflects	 political	
consideration	away	from	the	problem	of	class	struggle	and	revolution	towards	questions	
of	 identity	 politics.	 Zizek	 asks,	 “Why	 is	 the	 proposed	 remedy	 tolerance,	 rather	 than	
emancipation,	political	struggle,	or	even	armed	struggle?	The	source	of	this	culturation	
is	 defeat,	 the	 failure	 of	 directly	 political	 solutions	 .	 .	 .”43	For	 Zizek,	 the	 problem	with	
postmodernism	 is	 that	 it	 has	 bought	 into	 Fukuyama’s	 ‘end	 of	 history’	 thesis.	
Postmodernism	takes	for	granted	that	liberal	capitalism	is	the	most	preferable	form	of	
government.	 Indeed,	 postmodernism	 legitimates	 liberal	 capitalism	 by	 perpetuating	 a	
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discourse	of	 inclusivity,	diversity,	 and	 tolerance.	 For	Zizek,	 it	 is	 therefore	necessary	 to	
redirect	politics	away	from	questions	of	identity	towards	concrete	questions	of	political	
action.	 The	problem,	 however,	 is	 that	 this	 new	 ‘communist	 horizon’	 fails	 to	 learn	 the	
tragic	 lessons	 of	 the	 20th	 Century.	 Soviet	 Communism	 didn’t	 fail	 just	 because	 it	 was	
improperly	implemented.	Marxism	is	 intrinsically	flawed;	it	replicates	the	metaphysical	
concepts	 of	 the	 universality	 of	 reason,	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 history	 as	
progress.		
There	is	no	great	distance	between	the	Leninist	Party-State	and	that	which	Marx	
calls	the	‘dictatorship	of	the	proletariat’.	In	my	view,	the	communism	of	both	Zizek	and	
Badiou	 contains	 an	 authoritarian	 impulse.	 Zizek	 has	 on	 occasion	 argued	 for	 an	
authoritarian	Stalinist	State,	while	Badiou	regularly	calls	for	a	Maoist	Cultural	Revolution	
and	armed	political	violence.	This	violent	impulse	is	even	more	shocking	given	that	both	
Zizek	and	Badiou	view	the	communist	militant	as	a	secularization	of	the	Christian	‘knight	
of	 faith’.	 Both	 the	 communist	militant	 and	 the	 Christian	 ‘knight	 of	 faith’	 uphold	 that	
which	Badiou	calls	‘fidelity’	to	the	Event.		Just	as	Christianity	arises	from	out	of	the	Event	
of	crucifixion,	communism	comes	into	being	from	out	of	an	Event	that	discloses	a	new	
world	 of	 possibilities.	 Badiou:	 “An	 event	 is	 something	 that	 brings	 to	 light	 a	 possibility	
that	was	invisible	or	even	unthinkable	.	.	.	it	opens	up	a	possibility.”44	Badiou	cites	three	
such	events	in	the	history	of	Communism	to	which	the	militant	must	remain	faithful:	1)	
The	 Paris	 Commune,	 2)	 the	 Russian	 Bolshevik	 Revolution,	 and	 3)	 The	Maoist	 Cultural	
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Revolution.	These	events	are	‘world-disclosing’;	they	illuminate	a	horizon	of	possibilities	
for	political	action.		
Following	Badiou,	Zizek	understands	communism	as	a	secularization	of	Christian	
political	theology.	Zizek:	“There	is	a	direct	linage	from	Christianity	to	Marxism	.	.	.	There	
is	no	Christ	outside	St	Paul;	 in	exactly	the	same	way,	there	 is	no	 ‘authentic	Marx’	that	
can	 be	 approached	 directly,	 bypassing	 Lenin.”45	Just	 as	 the	 Christian	 religion	was	 not	
founded	 by	 Jesus,	 but	 rather	 by	 St.	 Paul,	 Lenin,	 not	 Marx,	 established	 the	 first	
Communist	 state.	 For	 Zizek,	 Lenin’s	 transformation	 of	 Marx’s	 teachings	 into	
Communism	follows	the	same	pattern	as	Paul’s	transformation	of	Christ’s	teaching	in	to	
Christianity.	 The	 Party	 becomes	 identical	 with	 the	 State,	 just	 as	 the	 Church	 becomes	
identical	with	Christ	in	the	Christian	tradition.	The	foundation	of	political	order	shelters	
the	truth,	but	also	conceals	it.	For	Badiou,	the	truth	is	that	“Communism	can	only	be	a	
movement,	it	cannot	be	a	State.”46	Badiou:	“the	idea	of	Lenin	was	to	dispel	forever	the	
specter	of	the	failure	of	the	Paris	Commune	.	.	.	One	had,	therefore,	the	‘Party-State’	as	
communism’s	center	of	gravity.”47	Lenin’s	founding	of	the	Soviet	Union	is	not	motivated	
by	the	desire	to	remain	faithful	to	Marx’s	teachings,	but	by	a	‘fidelity’	to	the	Event	of	the	
Paris	Commune	and	to	the	foundation	of	the	Soviet	State.	The	problem,	however,	is	that	
with	the	identity	of	Party	and	State	communism	becomes	dictatorship.		
Contrary	 to	 the	 false	 dialectical	 unity	 of	 the	 Leninist	 State,	 I	 emphasize	 the	
distinction	between	democracy	and	the	state.	 I	suggest	that	that	the	dialectical	notion	
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of	Reason,	History,	 and	 the	 State	 as	 incarnations	of	 ‘World-Spirit’	 are	untenable	 after	
the	‘death	of	God’.	More	specifically,	the	Marxist	doctrine	that	the	progress	of	history	is	
by	 an	 innate	 logic	 towards	 its	 dialectical	 culmination	 in	 the	 universal	 state	 cannot	 be	
justified	without	recourse	to	‘onto-theological’	notions	of	divine	providence.	In	my	view,	
Zizek	 and	 Badiou	 are	 too	 accepting	 of	 the	 political	 violence	 that	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	
Communist	 State	would	 require.	Moreover,	 the	political	 theology	of	 Zizek	and	Badiou	
lacks	 an	 eschatological	 element.	 Contra	 Zizek	 and	 Badiou,	 I	 rely	 on	 the	 principle	 of	
political	 non-violence,	 or	 that	 which	 Benjamin	 calls	 ‘divine	 violence’.	 I	 attempt	 to	
counter	 the	Marxist-Hegelian	 notion	 of	 history	 as	 progress	with	 Benjamin’s	 notion	 of	
history	as	catastrophe.	For	Benjamin,	political	revolution	is	not	the	telos,	or	fulfillment	
of	history,	but	its	eschaton,	or	end.		
	
Method	
It	 is	 necessary	 that	 any	 research	 methodology	 be	 well	 suited	 to	 the	 topic	
investigated.	The	use	of	systematic	methodology	would	be	inappropriate	given	that	this	
dissertation	 looks	 at	 the	 shattered	 foundations	 of	metaphysical	 systems.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	
necessary	 for	 textual	 interpretation	 to	 acknowledge	 its	 own	 lack	 of	 objective	
foundations.	 But	 this	 lack	 of	 metaphysical	 foundations	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 as	 a	
justification	 for	 arbitrary	 subjectivism.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 an	 alternative	 method	 is	
needed.		
Throughout	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 attempt	 to	 utilize	 Benjamin’s	 constellational	
method	 of	 interpretation.	 Benjamin	 claims	 that	 “for	 knowledge,	 method	 is	 a	 way	 of	
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acquiring	 its	 object	 .	 .	 .	 for	 truth,	 method	 is	 self-representation,	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	
imminent	 in	 its	 form.”48	The	 implication	 is	 that	an	 investigation	 into	 the	dissolution	of	
linear	 narratives	 cannot	 itself	 maintain	 a	 linear	 form.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 arrange	 the	
chapters	of	this	dissertation	as	a	series	of	constellations	rather	than	a	traditional	linear	
narrative.	Benjamin	claims	that	“ideas	are	to	objects	as	constellations	are	to	stars.”49	In	
the	modern	era,	the	search	for	truth	is	akin	to	the	salvaging	of	fragmentary	truths	from	
the	 ruins	 of	 metaphysical	 foundations.	 As	 a	 result,	 every	 idea	 is	 a	 fragment	 of	 a	
shattered	whole.	These	fragments	must	be	arranged	in	various	constellations	in	order	to	
perceive	 their	 deeper	 significance.	 Roger	 Foster	 looks	 at	 Benjamin’s	 constellational	
method	together	with	 its	use	by	Adorno.	Foster	explains	that	“the	god-forsaken	world	
that	 formed	the	Baroque	perspective	on	the	ruins	of	history	 is	here	secularized	 in	 the	
contemplation	 of	 the	 ruins	 of	 philosophical	 systems.	 Philosophy	 now	 has	 the	 task	 of	
constructing	 meaning	 through	 the	 interpretation	 and	 arraignment	 of	 these	
fragments.”50	In	this	sense,	the	constellational	method	is	a	secularization	of	the	‘flight	of	
the	gods’	from	the	disenchanted	world.		
The	 constellational	 method	 recognizes	 the	 ‘non-identity’	 of	 the	 map	 and	 the	
territory.	The	intention	of	Benjamin’s	method	is	to	arrange	the	fragments	of	truth	into	
an	intelligible	constellation	by	viewing	the	object	of	inquiry	from	a	plurality	of	different	
perspectives.	The	meaning	of	a	constellation	is	derived	from	the	relation	between	ideas,	
rather	than	abstracting	the	idea	from	its	relations	and	context.	Benjamin:	“Tirelessly,	the	
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process	of	thinking	makes	new	beginnings,	returning	in	a	roundabout	way	to	its	original	
object.	 This	 continual	 pausing	 for	 breath	 is	 the	mode	most	 proper	 to	 the	 process	 of	
contemplation.	 For	 by	 pursuing	 different	 levels	 of	meaning	 in	 its	 examination	 of	 one	
single	 object	 it	 receives	 both	 the	 incentive	 to	 begin	 again	 and	 the	 justification	 for	 its	
irregular	rhythm.”51	For	example,	I	repeatedly	return	to	‘death	of	God’	in	order	to	view	
the	problem	of	nihilism	from	a	variety	of	different	angles.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	 look	at	
the	‘death	of	God’	as	the	dissolution	of	any	metaphysical	foundation,	origin	or	ground.	I	
argue	 that	 the	 moral	 relativism	 of	 Nietzsche’s	 revaluation	 of	 value	 gives	 way	 to	 the	
tragic	view	of	history	as	‘eternal	return’.	I	then	look	Heidegger’s	deconstruction	of	Man	
as	the	mirror	image	of	God	in	the	second	chapter.	 I	 look	at	some	of	the	anti-humanist	
implications	 of	 the	 phenomenal	 clearing	 opened	 up	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 any	
transcendental	signifier.	The	third	chapter	looks	at	the	‘death	of	God’	as	the	‘oblivion’	of	
being	 to	 the	 technological	 ‘framing’	 of	 Earth.	 I	 then	 turn	 to	 the	 dissolution	 of	 any	
metaphysical	grounding	of	political	community	in	the	third	chapter.	Finally,	I	look	at	the	
‘judicial	 void’	 opened	 by	 the	 death	 of	 the	 God-King	 through	 an	 engagement	 with	
political	theology	in	the	last	chapter.	Rather	than	giving	way	to	catastrophic	nihilism,	the	
loss	of	any	absolute	arche	opens	a	 ‘site’	of	democratic	an-arche.	 I	present	Benjamin’s	
eschatological	 remembrance	of	democracy	as	 a	 remedy	 to	Nietzsche’s	 tragic	 vision	of	
history.	Each	perspective	is	intended	to	add	a	layer	of	meaning	and	intelligibility.	Taken	
together,	 these	 layers	 of	 meaning	 do	 not	 make	 up	 a	 complete	 whole,	 but	 rather	 a	
shifting	mosaic	that	remains	forever	open	to	interpretation.	
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The	 constellational	 method	 of	 interpretation	 embodies	 the	 search	 for	
redemption	in	 its	form.	Interpretation	has	no	alternative	but	to	confront	the	futility	of	
language	through	linguistic	expression.	The	map	is	an	inadequate	representation	of	the	
territory,	 but	 it	 can	 nevertheless	 show	 the	 way.	 The	 very	 attempt	 to	 express	 the	
inexpressible	maintains	a	sense	of	hope	without	succumbing	to	the	horror	of	nihilism.	
Foster	explains	that	“the	constellation	is	a	form	of	writing	that	brings	to	self-awareness	
the	 block	 on	 experience	 that	 curtails	 what	 concepts	 are	 able	 to	 say.”52	Foster:	 “But	
because	interpretation	retains	the	striving	of	thought	to	say	the	unsayable,	even	though	
it	 is	 impossible	within	current	experience,	 it	maintains	the	possibility	of	redemption	 in	
the	form	of	hope.	It	is	therefore	the	constant	exertion	of	thought	to	say	what	it	cannot	
say	 that	 preserves	 the	 transcendent	 within	 thinking.”53 	This	 sense	 of	 hope	 proves	
indispensable	 to	 my	 own	 inquiry	 into	 political	 nihilism	 and	 democratic	 alternatives.	
Throughout	 the	 dissertation,	 I	 occasionally	 draw	 from	 that	 which	 Derrida	 calls	 the	
‘margins	of	philosophy’,	including	negative	theology,	eschatology,	and	romanticism.	The	
point	is	not	to	outline	these	heterodox	traditions	in	a	systemic	fashion,	but	to	draw	from	
these	traditions	to	further	the	exposition	of	my	major	arguments.		
	
Summary	
The	 first	 chapter	 of	 this	 dissertation	 argues	 that	 Nietzsche’s	 genealogy	 of	
morality	 culminates	 in	 the	 ‘death	of	God’,	uncovering	 the	Promethean	destiny	of	 ‘the	
West’.	 It	 was	 for	 good	 reason	 the	 Greeks	 worshiped	 Beauty	 rather	 than	 Truth.		
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Relativism	and	 the	 radical	 contingency	of	 value	give	way	 to	 the	metaphysical	need	 to	
believe	in	the	divinity	of	truth.	I	nevertheless	argue	that	Nietzsche’s	aesthetic	response	
to	the	horror	of	ontological	groundlessness	proves	insufficient.	I	argue	that	to	the	extent	
that	it	is	rooted	in	the	ungrounded	‘will-to-power’,	Nietzsche’s	overcoming	of	nihilism	is	
also	nihilistic.		
The	second	chapter	argues	that	Heidegger’	fundamental	ontology	is	an	attempt	
to	overcome	 the	onto-theological	 legacy	of	Platonic	philosophy.	Metaphysics	 conceals	
the	 difference	 between	what	 there	 is	 in	 the	world	 and	 the	 basic	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	
world	at	all.	The	aim	of	overcoming	onto-theology	 is	 to	 turn	our	attention	to	 the	pre-
Socratic	wonder	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 appropriation	 of	Heidegger’s	
ontology	 by	 Jean-Paul	 Sartre	 replicates	 the	 same	 Cartesian	 anthropocentricism	 that	
Heidegger’s	description	of	‘being-there’	is	intended	to	supplant.	I	suggest	that	Jean-Luc	
Nancy’s	deconstruction	of	monotheism	 is	a	more	 faithful	appropriation	of	Heidegger’s	
‘de-structuring’	of	metaphysics	as	well	as	a	necessary	corrective	 to	Sartre’s	existential	
humanism.		
The	 third,	 and	 largest	 chapter	 traces	 the	 instrumental	 mode	 of	 ‘being-in-the-
world’	 to	 the	 beginning	 of	 Western	 metaphysics	 in	 ancient	 Greece.	 The	 root	 of	 the	
problem	is	the	technological	understanding	of	things	as	objects	and	truth	as	objectivity.	
Heidegger	indicates	a	more	primordial	understanding	of	truth	as	‘event’.	For	Heidegger,	
the	 emergence	 of	 an	 alternative	 non-instrumental	way	 of	 life	 depends	 upon	whether	
the	temporal	‘event’	comes	to	‘resonate’	in	poetic	language.	I	argue	that,	while	deeply	
insightful,	 Heidegger’s	 attempt	 to	 elucidate	 ‘the	 event’	 in	 poetry	 is	 ultimately	
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insufficient.	I	suggest	that	Levinas’	post-foundational	ethics	comes	closer	to	delineating	
a	non-instrumental	relation	to	being.	
The	fourth	chapter	looks	at	the	non-cognitive	material	basis	of	Levinas’	ethics.	I	
use	 the	 confrontation	 between	 Antigone	 and	 Creon	 in	 Sophocles’	 play	 Antigone	 to	
elucidate	the	tragic	strife	between	the	ethical	command	and	sovereign	violence.	I	argue	
that	Nancy,	Derrida,	and	Levinas	come	dangerously	close	to	condemning	the	demos	as	
inherently	 violent.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	anarchy	of	 the	 ‘ethical	 relationship’	nevertheless	
lends	itself	to	local	forms	of	democracy	such	as	the	ancient	Greek	polis.		
In	 the	 fifth	 and	 final	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 metaphysics	
lends	 itself	 to	a	negative	political	 theology.	History	and	 time	are	 important	 themes	of	
this	chapter.	I	contrast	Benjamin’s	notion	of	‘empty	homogenous	time’	with	Agamben’s	
analysis	 of	 non-linear	 ‘revolutionary	 time’.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 eschatological	
remembrance	 of	 our	 inheritance	 of	 democracy	 requires	 an	 interruption	 of	 the	 future	
oriented	time-consciousness	of	modernity.	
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I.	The	Promethean	Fate	Of	The	West	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	Genealogy	Of	Morality	
This	 chapter	 looks	 at	 Nietzsche’s	 confrontation	 with	 the	 innate	 nihilism	 of	
Western	metaphysics.	 I	suggest	that	nihilism	is	not	just	an	existential	 issue,	but	deeply	
political	as	well.	 In	 spite	of	his	 rigorous	critique	of	Platonism,	 I	 suggest	 that	Nietzsche	
shares	with	Plato	an	authoritarian	vision	that	is	rooted	in	the	cyclical	experience	of	time.	
The	 temporality	 of	 the	 eternal	 return	 unveils	 a	 vista	 of	 cosmic	 nihilism	 that	 cannot	
possibly	be	endured.	In	the	absence	of	metaphysical	foundations,	the	vital	will	to	power	
is	assigned	an	 impossible	 task	–	 to	 create	meaning	 from	nothing.	 I	 suggest	 that	when	
confronted	 with	 the	 horror	 of	 the	 ungrounded	 void,	 the	 self-overcoming	 of	 nihilism	
reverts	to	self-annihilation.	The	declaration	that	 ‘God	 is	dead’	becomes	the	belief	 that	
‘death	is	God’.	 I	trace	Nietzsche’s	cosmic	nihilism	back	to	Plato’s	myths	and	the	poetic	
vision	 of	 Sophocles	 and	 Aeschylus.	 I	 argue	 that	 Nietzsche’s	 overcoming	 of	 nihilism	 is	
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itself	nihilistic.	However,	 this	does	not	mean	 that	Nietzsche’s	project	 is	 as	a	 complete	
failure.	On	the	contrary,	I	suggest	that	Nietzsche’s	deepest	insight	is	that	the	good	life	is	
not	the	pursuit	of	truth,	but	the	alleviation	of	suffering.	The	challenge,	therefore,	 is	to	
face	the	ungrounded	void	without	succumbing	to	nostalgia	for	the	Absolute.	
According	 to	 Martin	 Heidegger’s	 influential	 interpretation,	 Nietzsche’s	 ‘will	 to	
power’	occupies	the	threshold	between	the	culmination	of	nihilism	and	its	supersession	
towards	a	genuine	affirmation	of	life.	In	my	view,	Nietzsche	ultimately	fails	to	overcome	
the	 tragic	destiny	of	 ‘the	West’.	Contrary	 to	his	original	 intent,	Nietzsche’s	attempt	 to	
overcome	 nihilism	 is	 itself	 nihilistic.	 Heidegger:	 “Thought	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 essence	 of	
nihilism,	Nietzsche’s	overcoming	 is	merely	 the	 fulfillment	of	nihilism.”54	By	delineating	
the	 nihilistic	 destiny	 of	 Western	 metaphysics,	 Nietzsche	 brings	 us	 face	 to	 face	 with	
disenchantment	 of	 all	 value,	 meaning,	 and	 truth	 in	 the	modern	 era.	 In	 other	 words,	
Nietzsche	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 precipice	 of	 ‘the	 abyss’	 while	 nevertheless	 failing	 to	
accomplish	leap	beyond.	Nietzsche’s	genealogical	method	deconstructs	the	divine	origin	
of	 tradition,	 custom,	and	 law.	The	problem,	however,	 is	 that	value	 looses	 its	affective	
power	 once	morality	 is	 perceived	 as	 nothing	more	 than	 a	 social	 construct	 subject	 to	
continual	 revaluation.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 divine	 origins,	 morality	 amounts	 to	 nothing	
more	than	subjective	preference.	The	radical	de-centering	of	meaning,	value,	and	truth	
is	the	inevitable	result.		
Nietzsche’s	declaration	that	‘God	is	dead’	means	that	our	highest	values	devalue	
themselves.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 ‘death	 of	 God’	 requires	 that	 thinking	 occur	 without	
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recourse	to	metaphysical	foundations.	I	argue	that	Nietzsche’s	aesthetic	response	to	the	
horror	 of	 ontological	 groundlessness	 proves	 insufficient.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 radical	
contingency	of	value,	meaning,	and	truth,	Nietzsche	attempts	to	legislative	a	new	table	
of	values	‘beyond	good	and	evil’.	I	will	nevertheless	argue	that	the	‘revaluation	of	value’	
does	not	signify	the	overcoming	of	nihilism,	but	rather	its	full	expression.	The	vital	‘will	
to	power’	is	assigned	an	impossible	task	–	to	create	meaning	ex	nihilo.	I	will	suggest	that	
when	confronted	with	the	cosmic	nihilism	of	the	‘eternal	return’,	the	self-overcoming	of	
nihilism	reverts	to	self-annihilation.		
I	tend	to	interpret	Nietzsche’s	legacy	in	light	of	Heidegger’s	appropriation	of	the	
problem	of	nihilism.	For	Heidegger	and	Nietzsche	both,	European	history	is	nihilistic	to	
the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 innate	 violence	 of	 Platonic	 metaphysics.	
Heidegger:	 “European	 history	 reveals	 its	 fundamental	 feature	 as	 nihilism.”55	Platonic	
metaphysics	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 unconditional	 grounding	 of	 meaning,	 value,	 and	
truth	 in	 a	 fixed	 origin,	 foundation,	 or	 cause.	 Heidegger:	 “Metaphysics	 is	 an	 inquiry	
beyond	 or	 over	 beings,	 which	 aims	 to	 recover	 them	 as	 such	 and	 as	 a	 whole	 for	 our	
grasp.”56	In	other	words,	metaphysics	seeks	to	comprehend	the	ground	of	being	in	order	
to	grasp	the	totality	of	being.	Metaphysics	is	an	expression	of	nihilism	for	the	following	
reason:	 The	 ill-fated	 attempt	 to	 grasp	 the	 ultimate	 foundation,	 origin,	 or	 ground	 of	
being	leads	to	the	startling	discovery	that	being	is	in	fact	ungrounded.	This	discovery	can	
be	 unsettling	 to	 say	 the	 least.	 In	Heidegger’s	words,	 “an	 attempt	 to	 delimit	 beings	 in	
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what	they	are,	in	their	Being,	leads	us	to	the	brink	of	nothingness,	and	to	the	abyss.”57	
Heidegger:	“We	must	not	shrink	back	here	and	must	rather	consider	this:	If	we	want	to	
grasp	 beings	 (the	 Greeks	 say	 delimit,	 place	 within	 limits),	 then	 we	 must,	 indeed	
necessarily,	 proceed	 to	 the	 limit	 of	 beings,	 and	 that	 is	 nothingness.”58	Thinking	 is	 the	
endurance	of	 this	 abyss,	 chasm,	or	 void	at	 the	heart	of	being.	 It	would	 seem	 that	 for	
Heidegger,	thinking	is	a	dangerous	exercise.		
The	 philosophy	 of	 Immanuel	 Kant	 exemplifies	 the	 kind	 of	 metaphysical	
grounding	of	morality	 that	Nietzsche’s	genealogy	renders	untenable.	Unlike	Nietzsche,	
Kant	 evades	 the	 nihilistic	 implications	 of	 attempting	 to	 ground	 morality	 upon	 mere	
reason.	According	to	Nietzsche’s	analysis,	Kant	“wanted	to	supply	a	rational	foundation	
for	morality	 .	 .	 .	 Morality	 itself,	 however,	 was	 accepted	 as	 given.”59	In	 attempting	 to	
ground	morality,	Kant	simply	takes	it	for	granted	that	such	an	exercise	is	both	possible	
and	 desirable.	 Nietzsche	 exposes	 the	 insufficiencies	 of	 Kant’s	 philosophy	 by	 posing	 a	
radically	different	kind	of	question,	one	 that	 is	 genealogical	 rather	 than	metaphysical.	
While	 Kant	 poses	 “the	 question	 of	 where	 our	 good	 and	 evil	 really	 originated”,	 and	
therefore	seeks	a	metaphysical	grounding	of	morality	 in	 the	transcendental	categories	
of	 subjective	 reason,	 Nietzsche	 instead	 asks:	 “Under	 what	 conditions	 did	 man	 make	
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these	 value	 judgments	 good	 and	 evil?” 60 	More	 simply,	 while	 Kant	 passes	 moral	
judgment	upon	existence,	Nietzsche	inverts	this	relationship,	judging	morality	from	the	
perspective	of	life	itself.	Nietzsche’s	genealogy	of	morality	therefore	indicates	a	radical	
inversion	of	Platonic	orthodoxy.	Nietzsche:	“What,	seen	in	the	perspective	of	life,	is	the	
significance	of	morality?”61	Oblivious	 to	 this	 line	of	 questioning,	 Kant’s	 transcendental	
idealism	attempts	to	ground	universal	moral	law	upon	the	a	priori	categories	of	practical	
reason.		
For	 Kant,	 the	 moral	 law	 is	 characterized	 by	 its	 universality.	 Moreover,	 the	
unconditional	moral	law	can	be	distinguished	with	certainty	from	the	relativity	of	social	
maxims,	customs,	and	norms	on	the	basis	of	practical	reason.	Nevertheless,	the	attempt	
to	metaphysically	ground	morality	 in	the	sovereignty	of	reason	 is	both	unfounded	and	
untenable.	While	Kant	suggests	that	practical	reason	is	the	ultimate	foundation	of	moral	
law,	Nietzsche	argues	that	reason	 is	not	at	all	 transcendental.	 Instead,	reason	remains	
historically	mediated	by	the	same	social	conditions	from	which	it	claims	independence.	
Consequently,	 there	 is	no	 rational	basis	by	which	 to	distinguish	between	 the	absolute	
moral	 law	 and	 the	 relativity	 of	 value.	 Additionally,	 Kant’s	 universal	 moral	 law	 bears	
within	 itself	 a	 self-contradiction.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 ‘the	 moral	 law	 within’	 is	
unconditional,	 absolute,	 and	 therefore	 every	 bit	 as	 objective	 as	 the	 laws	 of	 physics	
governing	the	movement	of	‘the	starry	skies	above’.	On	the	other	hand,	the	moral	law	is	
not	 so	much	discovered	 as	 it	 is	 legislated	 by	 the	 autonomous	will.	Only	 one	 of	 these	
                                                
60 Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy Of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New 
York, NY: Vintage, 1967), 16 
61 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth Of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York, NY: 
Vintage, 1967), 22 
	 46	
claims	 can	 be	 true.	 Either	 the	 law	 is	 absolute	 and	 determines	 the	 will,	 or	 the	 will	 is	
primary	 and	 constitutes	 the	 law.	 In	 my	 opinion,	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 autonomous	 will	
marks	the	true	originality	of	Kant’s	thinking.	For	Kant,	the	autonomous	will	only	submits	
to	law	that	it	has	legislated.	The	Kantian	legacy	of	secular	modernity	is	that	all	value	is	
perceived	 as	 historically	 contingent.	 Put	 simply,	 there	 is	 no	moral	 law	 at	work	 in	 the	
cosmos	apart	from	the	law	that	is	willed	into	existence	ex	nihilo,	out	of	nothingness.	
The	 Kantian	 legacy	 of	 secular	 modernity	 becomes	 readily	 apparent	 in	 light	 of	
John	 Stuart	Mill’s	 appropriation	 and	 development	 of	 Kant’s	 thought.	 Mill’s	 notion	 of	
individual	 freedom	 is	widely	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 foundation	 of	 political	 liberalism,	 a	
tradition	to	which	Nietzsche	is	vehemently	opposed.	In	my	view,	Kant’s	notion	of	moral	
autonomy	 is	 the	 basis	 of	Mill’s	 idea	 of	 political	 freedom.	 Like	 Kant’s	 notion	 of	moral	
autonomy,	Mill’s	 idea	of	political	 freedom	is	both	 formal	and	abstract.	The	problem	 is	
that	liberal	freedom	does	not	provide	a	compelling	vision	of	‘the	good	life’.	Mill	argues	
that	we	are	 free	 to	determine	the	good	 in	our	own	way,	so	 long	as	our	own	freedom	
does	not	inhibit	the	freedom	of	others.	Nevertheless,	Mill	fails	to	pose	the	fundamental	
question,	 mainly	 –	 What	 is	 the	 good	 life?	 The	 implication	 of	 the	 liberal	 notion	 of	
freedom	developed	by	Kant	and	Mill	is	that	‘X’	is	not	willed	because	it	is	good.	Instead,	
‘X’	is	good	because	it	is	willed.	The	relativity	of	value	resulting	from	moral	self-legislation	
eradicates	 any	 notion	 of	 intrinsic	 meaning	 in	 the	 world.	 The	 will	 is	 completely	
ungrounded.	Or,	to	phrase	the	matter	differently,	the	will	is	grounded	in	nothing	other	
than	 the	 will	 itself	 –	 ‘the	 will	 to	 will’.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 significant	 problem:	 that	 while	
everything	 is	 permitted,	 nothing	 is	 compelling.	 Nietzsche:	 “One	 would	 rather	 will	
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nothing	 than	not	will.”62	In	 the	words	of	 the	poet	Yeats:	 “The	best	 lack	all	 conviction,	
while	the	worst	are	full	of	passionate	intensity.”63	In	this	sense,	nihilism	is	not	opposed	
to,	but	rather	symptomatic	of	political	liberalism.		 	
Nietzsche’s	most	provocative	claim	is	that	the	‘highest	values’	of	the	modern	age	
originate	from	a	‘slave	revolt’	in	morality.	Nietzsche	distinguishes	between	two	different	
kinds	 of	 morality:	 1)	 noble,	 or	 master	 morality,	 and	 2)	 slave	 morality.	 According	 to	
Nietzsche,	the	virtues	of	the	ancient	Greeks	exemplify	‘noble	morality’,	while	the	values	
of	 the	 ancient	 Hebrews	 is	 akin	 to	 a	 ‘slave	 revolt’	 in	 morality.	 While	 ‘noble	 morality’	
affirms	 the	ancient	 virtues	of	 courage,	 strength,	 and	honour,	 the	 ‘slave	 revolt’	 inverts	
this	 ‘table	of	 values’.	With	 the	 ‘slave	 revolt’,	 the	 ancient	 virtues	of	 strength,	 courage,	
and	 honour	 are	 replaced	with	 the	 Christian	 values	 of	 humility,	 love,	 and	 compassion.	
Nietzsche’s	evaluation	of	these	two	different	kinds	of	morality	is	extremely	nuanced.	On	
the	one	hand,	Nietzsche	respects	the	vitality	of	noble	morality.	But	on	the	other	hand,	
Nietzsche	admires	the	strength	of	will	required	to	undermine	and	supplant	these	noble	
values.	 In	fact,	the	‘slave	revolt’	 in	morality	accomplishes	that	which	Nietzsche	himself	
initiates	but	never	accomplishes	–	a	‘revaluation	of	value’.		
Nevertheless,	Nietzsche’s	tentative	admiration	for	this	‘slave	revolt’	is	tempered	
by	his	dislike	of	the	‘spirit	of	resentment’	from	which	it	originates.	Nietzsche	claims	that	
the	 ‘slave	 revolt’	 in	 morality	 originates	 from	 a	 seething	 sense	 of	 psychological	
resentment	towards	the	ruling	nobility.	The	‘revaluation	of	value’	is	not	motivated	by	a	
desire	 for	 justice.	 Instead,	 the	 ‘slave	 revolt’	 is	 rooted	 in	a	 twisted	and	cruel	desire	 for	
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vengeance	 and	 retribution.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 ‘slave	 revolt’	 is	 not	 the	
abolition	of	hierarchical	structures	of	power,	but	instead,	to	seize	the	position	of	power	
for	oneself,	and	to	rule	as	one	was	once	ruled.	For	this	reason,	Nietzsche	judges	‘slave	
morality’	to	be	reactionary	rather	than	life	affirming	and	genuinely	creative.	The	‘slave	
revolt’	is	nothing	more	than	a	reactionary	rejection	of	the	noble	sense	of	what	is	good.	
According	 to	Nietzsche,	 the	 slave	 first	 conceives	of	 “the	evil	 enemy	and	 the	Evil	One,	
and	this	 in	fact	 is	his	basic	concept,	from	which	he	then	evolves,	as	an	afterthought,	a	
good	one	–	himself!”64	In	this	sense,	“slave	morality	.	.	.	is	fundamentally	reaction.”65	All	
that	 ‘noble	 morality’	 calls	 good	 ‘slave	 morality’	 calls	 bad.	 While	 noble	 morality	 is	 a	
spontaneous	 affirmation	 of	 the	 good,	 “the	 slave	 revolt	 in	 morality	 begins	 when	
resentment	itself	becomes	creative	and	gives	birth	to	values.”66	‘Slave	morality’	is	driven	
by	a	hatred	of	evil,	which	the	slave	identifies	as	everything	the	noble	considers	good.		If	
‘slave	morality’	is	founded	upon	hatred	and	resentment,	‘noble	morality’	is	inspired	by	
love	of	the	good.	Nietzsche	argues	that	the	noble	“conceives	the	basic	concept	‘good’	in	
advance	and	spontaneously	out	of	himself	and	only	then	creates	for	himself	an	idea	of	
‘bad’!	 This	 ‘bad’	 of	 noble	 origin	 and	 that	 ‘evil’	 out	 of	 the	 cauldron	 of	 unsatisfied	
hatred.”67	In	 other	 words,	 while	 slave	 morality	 distinguishes	 between	 good	 and	 evil,	
‘noble	 morality’	 distinguishes	 between	 good	 and	 bad.	 Nietzsche	 admires	 the	 ‘slave	
revolt’	 in	morality	 for	 accomplishing	 a	 ‘revaluation	 of	 value’.	 Nevertheless,	 Nietzsche	
ultimately	remains	faithful	to	the	spontaneity	and	vitality	of	noble	morality.		
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For	Nietzsche,	 ‘slave	morality’	 violates	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 itself;	 it	 violates	 the	
basic	law	that	the	strong	should	devour	the	weak.	Nietzsche	expresses	this	controversial	
argument	by	means	of	analogy.	The	struggle	between	master	and	slave	is	equivalent	to	
the	relationship	between	the	bird	of	prey	and	the	lamb.	The	bird	of	prey	hunts	the	lamb	
because	it	is	strong,	just	as	the	lamb	is	prey	to	the	bird	because	it	is	weak.	While	noble	
morality	 celebrates	 this	 strength,	 slave	 morality	 condemns	 it.	 Instead,	 slave	 morality	
makes	 a	 virtue	 of	 weakness	 and	 a	 sin	 of	 strength.	 In	 this	 sense,	 ‘slave	 morality’	 is	
amounts	 to	 a	 mutilation	 of	 the	 will;	 the	 will	 is	 repressed	 and	 turned	 against	 itself	
through	 the	 psychological	 internalization	 of	 conscience	 and	 guilt	 perpetuated	 by	
organized	 religion.	 Nietzsche	 levels	 some	 of	 his	 sharpest	 criticism	 at	 the	 moral	
indoctrination	 of	 ‘ascetic	 priests’.	 The	 ‘ascetic	 priests’	 are	 evocative	 of	 the	 Catholic	
clergy	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Hindu	 Brahmin	 caste.	 Nietzsche:	 “The	 ascetic	 priest	 alters	 the	
direction	of	resentment.	By	instilling	such	notions	as	sin	and	guilt,	the	will	is	folded	back	
upon	 itself	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 self-discipline	 and	 self-overcoming.”68	In	 other	 words,	
religious	asceticism	trains	the	will	to	repress	the	affirmative	life-instincts	for	the	sake	of	
disciplinary	self-mastery.	Such	discipline	of	the	will	is	presumably	achieved	through	the	
religious	 practice	 of	 poverty,	 humility,	 and	 chastity	 as	 wells	 as	 spiritual	 training	 in	
fasting,	 yoga,	 and	 meditation.	 According	 to	 Nietzsche,	 ‘ascetic	 priests’	 exemplify	 the	
bitter	 resentment	 of	 ‘slave	 morality’.	 Nietzsche:	 “Here	 rules	 a	 resentment	 without	
equal,	that	of	an	insatiable	instinct	and	power-will	that	want	to	become	master	not	over	
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something	in	life	but	over	life	itself	.	.	.”69	Mastery	over	life	is	characterized	by	belief	in	
the	‘ascetic	ideal’.	The	‘ascetic	ideal’	is	the	ancient	metaphysical	faith	in	the	goodness	of	
truth;	“the	faith	in	a	metaphysical	value,	the	absolute	value	of	truth	.	.	.”70	Nietzsche:	“It	
is	the	profound,	suspicious	fear	of	an	incurable	pessimism	that	forces	whole	millennia	to	
cling	 to	 a	 religious	 interpretation	of	 existence	 .	 .	 .	 Piety,	 the	 ‘life	 in	God’,	 seen	 in	 this	
way,	would	appear	as	fear	of	truth.”71	It	is	interesting	that	in	spite	of	his	criticism	of	the	
‘ascetic	 ideal’,	 Nietzsche	 readily	 admits	 that	 he	 too	 relies	 upon	 faith	 in	 the	 value	 of	
truth.		
It	is	perhaps	unexpected	that	Nietzsche	himself	confesses	a	‘metaphysical	need’	
for	the	ascetic	faith	in	the	absolute	value	of	truth.	Nietzsche’s	own	‘revaluation	of	value’	
can	only	be	undertaken	on	the	basis	of	an	unconditional	belief	in	the	‘ascetic	ideal’.	This	
is	 unfortunate,	 seeing	 as	 the	 ‘revaluation	 of	 value’	 disenchants	 the	 very	 faith	 upon	
which	it	depends.	The	‘will	to	truth’	deconstructs	its	own	foundation	–	the	ascetic	faith	
that	 “god	 is	 truth,	 that	 truth	 is	 divine.” 72 	Consequently,	 Nietzsche’s	 genealogy	 of	
morality	is	caught	in	a	performative	contradiction.	On	the	one	hand,	the	‘revaluation	of	
value’	presupposes	an	absolute	truth	beyond	any	revaluation	and	upon	which	the	task	
of	 revaluation	 is	 nevertheless	 grounded.	 But	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 ‘revaluation	 of	
value’	 is	 precisely	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 all	 such	 absolutes.	 The	 task	 of	 ‘revaluation’	
therefore	undermines	and	destroys	its	own	conditions	of	existence.	Nietzsche:	“That	the	
ascetic	 ideal	has	meant	so	many	things	to	man,	however,	 is	an	expression	of	the	basic	
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fact	of	the	human	will,	its	horror	of	a	vacuum:	it	needs	a	goal	–	and	it	would	rather	will	
nothingness	than	not	will.”73	In	other	words,	faith	in	the	‘ascetic	ideal’	is	symptomatic	of	
the	basic	 fact	 that	 “man	has	 to	believe,	 to	 know,	 from	 time	 to	 time	why	he	exists.”74	
Nietzsche:	“Apart	from	the	ascetic	ideal,	man,	the	human	animal,	has	no	meaning	.	.	.”75		
In	Nietzsche’s	final	analysis,	“this	ascetic	priest,	this	apparent	enemy	of	life,	this	
denier	 –	 precisely	 he	 is	 amongst	 the	 greatest	 conserving	 and	 greatest	 yes-creating	
forces	of	life.”76	Nietzsche	explains	that	“from	the	moment	faith	in	the	god	of	the	ascetic	
ideal	is	denied,	a	new	problem	arises	–	that	of	the	value	of	truth	.	.	.	The	value	of	truth	
must	 for	 once	 be	 experimentally	 called	 into	 question.”77	Nietzsche	 therefore	 poses	 a	
deeply	 unsettling	 question:	 “What	 if	 this	 belief	 is	 becoming	 more	 and	 more	
unbelievable,	 if	 nothing	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 divine	 any	 longer	 unless	 it	 be	 an	 error,	
blindness,	 lies	 –	 if	 god	 himself	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 our	 longest	 lie?”78	It	would	 seem	 as	 if	
“some	ancient	and	profound	trust	has	been	turned	into	doubt	.	.	.	and	how	much	must	
collapse	now	that	this	faith	has	been	undermined	.	.	.”79	Nietzsche	recoils	but	does	not	
retreat	from	the	horror	of	such	a	‘collapse’.	Indeed,	the	will	to	truth	“forbids	itself	the	lie	
involved	in	the	faith	in	god.”80	Not	only	does	Nietzsche’s	genealogy	of	morality	expose	
the	groundlessness	of	our	highest	values,	but	in	an	even	more	radical	gesture,	questions	
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the	 value	 of	 truth	 as	 such!	 Nietzsche	 therefore	 poses	 a	 remarkably	 new	 kind	 of	
question:	 “Might	 not	 morality	 be	 ‘a	 will	 to	 negate	 life’,	 a	 secret	 instinct	 of	
annihilation?”81	What	is	the	value	of	value?	What	is	the	value	of	morality	for	life?	Does	
morality	 benefit	 or	 inhibit	 the	 flourishing	 of	 life?	 Prior	 to	 Nietzsche’s	 provocation,	
Western	philosophy	was	established	upon	Socrates’	assurance	that	 ‘the	virtuous	 life	 is	
the	 happy	 life’.	 However,	 Nietzsche	 suggests	 that	 the	 benefit	 of	 morality	 to	 life	 has	
heretofore	been	merely	presumed	as	fact.	The	social	utility	of	morality	has	never	been	
subjected	to	serious	doubt,	which	is	precisely	Nietzsche’s	intent.		
	
The	Death	Of	God	
The	prophetic	declaration	that	‘God	is	dead’	does	not	necessarily	announce	the	
emancipation	 from	religious	dogma,	as	Nietzsche’s	post-modern	enthusiasts	presume.	
Nor	does	it	announce	a	catastrophic	loss	of	faith,	as	is	the	interpretation	of	Nietzsche’s	
neo-reactionary	readers.	The	matter	at	hand	is	neither	simple	nor	clear.	The	meaning	of	
the	death	of	God	has	yet	 to	be	decided	 for	 the	 reason	 that	we	are	 still	 living	out	 the	
implications	of	what	 it	means	to	exist	 in	a	godless	age.	Nietzsche’s	famous	declaration	
that	‘God	is	dead’	is	uttered	in	aphoristic	form	in	the	parable	of	the	madman.	As	Eugene	
Thacker	 indicates	 in	 ‘12	 Fragments	On	Nihilism’,	 “we	 do	 him	 a	 disservice	 if	we	 credit	
Nietzsche	 for	 the	death	of	God.	He	 just	happened	 to	be	at	 the	 scene	of	 the	crime”.82	
That	 a	 madman	 should	 witness	 this	 event	 is	 appropriate,	 given	 that	 insight	 into	 the	
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ungrounded	horror	of	being	 is	akin	 to	a	madness	 that	 can	 scarcely	be	endured.	Upon	
stumbling	 upon	 this	 dangerous	 discovery,	 the	 madman	 descends	 from	 the	 monastic	
solitude	of	the	mountain	into	the	bustle	of	the	market.	Predictably,	the	public	does	not	
readily	 receive	 the	 madman’s	 message.	 Ironically,	 it	 is	 the	 madman,	 bearing	 the	
message	 of	 God’s	 absence,	 who	 is	 the	 authentic	 seeker	 of	 God.	 It	 is	 the	 unbelieving	
villagers,	 weak	 of	 faith,	 who	 ultimately	 reject	 the	 ‘death	 of	 God’.	 Moreover,	 the	
madman	not	only	discovers	that	God	is	dead,	but	that	we	have	killed	him:	“God	is	dead.	
God	 remains	dead.	And	we	have	killed	him”.83	At	 first,	 it	 seems	 that	 “there	has	never	
been	a	greater	deed”;	that	humanity	has	reached	spiritual	maturity	and	is	no	longer	in	
need	 of	 such	 dogmatic	 certainties	 as	 belief	 in	 God.84 	It	 turns	 out	 that	 this	 initial	
estimation	 is	 far	 too	optimistic.	The	madman	ultimately	concludes	 that	he	has	arrived	
too	early;	that	“this	tremendous	event	 is	still	on	 its	way.”85	Although	God	 is	dead,	this	
truth	remains	too	horrific	to	bear.	The	madman	says	that	“We	have	killed	him	–	you	and	
I”.86	What	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 bear	 responsibly	 for	 the	 death	 of	 God?	 Both	 the	 solitary	
individual	and	the	unreflective	 ‘herd’	share	responsibility	 for	this	crime.	 It	 is	clear	that	
‘the	herd’	 bears	 responsibility	 for	 unreflectively	 receiving	 established	dogma	as	 truth.	
But	 in	what	sense	is	the	madman	responsible	for	the	death	of	God?	The	only	crime	of	
the	madman	is	to	seek	truth	unconditionally,	no	matter	how	unsettling	that	truth	may	
be.	For	Nietzsche,	it	is	precisely	such	fidelity	to	truth	that	kills	God,	so	to	speak.	The	‘will	
to	 truth’	 disenchants	 the	 necessary	 fiction	 that	 God	 is	 truth	 and	 truth	 is	 divine.	 Put	
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simply,	 truth,	 for	Nietzsche,	 is	 akin	 to	madness.	 For	 this	 reason,	 truth	 is	 ‘the	 greatest	
danger’.	As	such,	truth	ought	to	remain	hidden,	a	privilege	of	the	noble	few.		
Nietzsche’s	 announcement	 that	 ‘God	 is	 dead’	 is	 an	 allegory	 for	 at	 least	 three	
related	 phenomena:	 1)	 the	 discovery	 that	 the	 divine	 realm	 of	 ideas	 is	 a	myth,	 2)	 the	
ensuing	disenchantment	of	the	temporal	world	of	appearance,	and	3)	the	culmination	of	
metaphysics	 in	 the	 nihilistic	 destiny	 of	 ‘the	 West’.	 According	 to	 Heidegger’s	
interpretation,	Nietzsche’s	use	of	the	term	‘God’	refers	to	super-sensory	realm	of	ideas.	
Since	Plato,	Western	metaphysics	has	been	characterized	by	the	position	that	the	ideal	
realm	of	forms	is	“the	true	and	genuinely	real	world”.87	The	‘ascetic	ideal’	is	not	limited	
to	religion;	it	is	prevalent	in	philosophy	as	well.	For	Nietzsche,	the	beginning	of	Western	
metaphysics	 in	 ancient	 Greece	 is	 the	 origin	 of	 asceticism.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Nietzsche	
suggests	that	Plato	 is	the	first	 ‘ascetic	priest’.	Nietzsche:	“The	 idea	at	 issue	here	 is	the	
valuation	the	ascetic	priest	places	on	our	life:	he	juxtaposes	it	[becoming]	with	a	quite	
different	 mode	 of	 existence	 [being]	 .	 .	 .”88	The	 problem	 with	 Plato’s	 metaphysical	
dualism	between	being	and	becoming	is	that	this	world	is	viewed	as	illusory	and	empty	
of	true	substance.	The	phenomenal	world	of	becoming	is	devalued	by	the	metaphysical	
valuation	of	an	 ideal	world	of	 true	being.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	 true	super-sensory	world,	
the	 phenomenal	 world	 of	 appearance	 is	 false.	 Nietzsche:	 “Philosophical	 men	 have	 a	
presentiment	that	the	world	 in	which	we	live	and	have	our	being	 is	mere	appearance,	
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and	that	another,	quite	different	 reality	 lies	beneath	 it.”89	In	 light	of	 this	metaphysical	
dualism,	 the	 imperative	of	 reason	amounts	 to	“the	annihilation	of	 the	veil	of	maya	 .	 .	
.”90	In	 this	 sense,	 Platonic	 metaphysics	 devalues	 life	 as	 mere	 appearance,	 illusion,	 or	
‘maya’.	The	aim	of	philosophical	reason	is	to	‘annihilate’	this	false	world	of	appearance	
in	order	to	intuit	the	divine	world	of	forms.	
The	‘divided	line’	between	the	sensible	and	super-sensible	realms	is	symbolized	
by	 Plato’s	 famous	 allegory	 of	 the	 cave	 in	 The	 Republic.	 In	 Plato’s	 Republic,	 Socrates	
invites	 his	 interlocutors	 to	 imagine	 the	 human	 condition	 as	 one	 of	 bondage	 in	 an	
underground	cave-like	dwelling.	Upon	the	walls	of	this	underground	dwelling	are	images	
of	shadows	cast	by	fire.	Since	the	prisoners	lack	any	knowledge	of	existence	outside	of	
the	cave,	the	shadows	of	artificial	things	are	mistaken	for	the	things	themselves.	There	
is	nevertheless	a	world	beyond	the	bondage	of	the	cave	–	a	world	of	radiant	sunlight	in	
which	the	things	themselves	shine	forth.	The	Sun	represents	the	form	of	‘the	Good’,	the	
source	 of	 true	 knowledge,	 of	which	 the	 perception	 of	 shadows	 is	 a	mere	 semblance.	
Socrates	 then	 asks	 us	 to	 image	 that	 the	prisoner	was	 compelled	 to	 emerge	 from	 this	
false	world	 of	 darkness.	 For	 Plato,	 the	world	 of	 ‘shadows	 cast	 by	 fire’	 represents	 the	
illusory	world	of	appearance,	while	the	world	of	‘overwhelming	beauty’	represents	the	
true	realm	of	 forms.	The	prisoners’	 forced	ascent	 from	the	cave	would	amount	to	the	
destruction	 of	 the	 illusions	 to	 which	 one	 clings	 as	 certain	 and	 true.	 One	 would	 be	
compelled	towards	the	unknown.	Upon	emerging	from	the	underground	prison,	one	is	
compelled	 by	 some	 unknown	 force	 to	 turn	 and	 gaze	 upon	 the	 Sun	 itself.	 The	 Sun	
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represents	 the	 Supreme	 Source,	 the	 form	 of	 ‘the	 Good’	 that	moves	 all	 without	 itself	
being	moved.	Upon	 first	perceiving	 the	 radiant	 illumination	of	 the	Sun,	one	would	be	
blinded,	and	therefore	subjected	to	a	state	of	ignorance	even	more	extensive	than	one’s	
condition	of	bondage	in	the	cave.	However,	once	one’s	eyes	adapt	to	the	sunlight,	one	
would	perceive	a	world	of	overwhelming	beauty	in	which	the	forms	are	intuited	as	they	
truly	 are.	 For	 Socrates,	 such	 true	vision	amounts	 to	wisdom.	 Socrates	 then	asks	us	 to	
imagine	 that	 following	 his	 ascent	 into	 the	 radiance	 of	 being,	 the	 prisoner	 were	
compelled	to	again	descend	into	the	darkness	of	the	cave.	While	the	prisoner	was	once	
bound	in	a	state	of	ignorance,	now	the	prisoner	is	bound	in	a	state	of	knowledge.	Plato’s	
allegory	indicates	that	knowledge	does	not	bring	freedom.	The	prisoner	remains	bound	
in	spite	of	the	wisdom	gained.	Nevertheless,	 inspired	by	such	visions	of	overwhelming	
beauty,	 the	 prisoner	 feels	 compelled	 to	 bear	 witness	 to	 the	 truth	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	
others.	 The	 prisoner	 therefore	 attempts	 to	 teach	 what	 he	 has	 learned:	 that	 we	 are	
ignorant	of	 our	own	bondage.	 This	world	 is	 a	mere	 semblance	of	 truth.	 Furthermore,	
there	 is	 another	 world	 beyond	 our	 own,	 a	 world	 of	 overwhelming	 beauty	 and	 truth.	
Tragically,	the	prisoner	is	not	believed.	Moreover,	he	is	hated	and	despised	by	those	he	
wishes	to	teach.	Lacking	knowledge	of	‘the	Good’,	those	bound	within	the	depths	of	the	
cave	prefer	 ignorance	 to	 truth.	Such	 is	 the	human	condition	according	 to	 the	Platonic	
legacy	of	Western	metaphysics.	
In	my	opinion,	the	meaning	of	Plato’s	allegory	is	identical	to	that	of	Nietzsche’s	
allegory	of	the	madman.	For	Plato,	this	illusory	world	of	appearance	is	symbolized	by	a	
world	of	 ‘shadows	cast	by	 fire’,	while	 the	 true	world	of	 the	 forms	 is	 represented	by	a	
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world	of	‘overwhelming	beauty’	 illuminated	by	the	Sun.	In	light	of	Plato’s	allegory,	 the	
‘death	 of	 God’	 therefore	 indicates	 that	 “the	 suprasensory	 world	 is	 without	 effective	
power.”91	Heidegger:	“That	 the	highest	values	hitherto	are	devalued	means	that	 these	
ideals	 lose	 their	 capacity	 to	 shape	 history.”92	In	 other	words,	 the	 implication	 of	what	
Nietzsche	calls	‘the	death	of	God’,	or	what	Heidegger	names	‘the	end	of	metaphysics’,	is	
that	 the	 unconditional	 grounding	 of	 reality	 has	 itself	 become	 unreal.	 However,	 the	
discovery	that	the	real	world	of	forms	is	a	myth	does	not	simply	render	the	false	world	
of	 appearance	 true.	 Heidegger:	 “If	 God,	 as	 the	 suprasensory	 ground	 and	 goal	 of	 all	
reality	 is	 dead,	 if	 the	 suprasensory	 world	 of	 the	 Ideas	 has	 suffered	 the	 loss	 of	 its	
obligatory	and	above	all	its	vitalizing	and	upbuilding	power,	then	nothing	more	remains	
to	 which	 man	 can	 cling	 and	 by	 which	 he	 can	 orient	 himself.”93	The	 ‘death	 of	 God’	
provokes	a	condition	of	existential	disorientation	in	light	of	the	radical	contingency	of	all	
meaning,	value,	and	truth.	In	Nietzsche’s	words,	the	‘death	of	God’	is	akin	to	“plunging	
continually	 .	 .	 .	 through	an	 infinite	nothing”.94	The	 temptation,	 in	 light	of	 this	 state	of	
existential	 groundlessness	 and	 psychological	 disorientation,	 is	 to	 attempt	 to	 reorient	
oneself	 by	 clinging	 to	 the	 illusion	 of	 a	 transcendent	 power.	 Heidegger:	 “The	 cause	 of	
nihilism	is	morality,	in	the	sense	of	positing	the	supernatural	ideals	of	truth,	goodness,	
and	beauty	that	are	valid	 in	themselves.”95	The	nihilist	believes:	1)	that	this	world,	the	
world	that	 is,	 should	not	be,	and	2)	 that	 the	other	world,	 the	world	that	should	be,	 is	
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not.96	This	 is	 precisely	 the	meaning	of	 Plato’s	 allegory	of	 the	 cave,	 in	which	 illusion	 is	
preferred	to	truth.	
The	belief	of	 the	nihilist	 is	 identical	 to	 that	of	 the	metaphysician.	For	 instance,	
Plato	argues	that	this	world	only	retains	value	in	light	of	a	true	world	beyond	our	own.	
The	 divine	 world	 of	 forms	 grounds	 the	 material	 world	 of	 appearance	 in	 true	 being.	
Consequently,	“whatever	has	value	in	our	world	now	does	not	have	value	in	itself”.97	In	
order	to	affirm	value,	meaning	and	truth	in	this	world,	one	“must	affirm	another	world	
than	the	world	of	 life,	nature,	and	history.”98	Nevertheless,	Nietzsche	asks:	“Insofar	as	
they	 affirm	 this	 ‘other	 world’	 .	 .	 .	 must	 they	 not	 by	 the	 same	 token	 negate	 its	
counterpart,	 this	 world,	 our	 world?”99	Heidegger	 cites	 Socrates,	 who	 perceives	 “the	
world	down	here	as	a	veil	of	tears	in	contrast	to	the	mountain	of	everlasting	bliss	in	the	
beyond.”100	The	 truth	 of	 this	 world	 is	 a	 mere	 reflection	 of	 a	 higher	 world.	 But	 the	
existence	 of	 another	world	would	 at	 the	 same	 time	 negate	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 this	
world.	 Consequently,	 while	 metaphysics	 is	 already	 inherently	 nihilistic,	 so	 too	 is	 the	
destruction	of	metaphysics	via	the	‘revaluation	of	value’.	Again,	although	metaphysical	
dualism	 is	 thoroughly	 nihilistic,	 the	 collapse	 of	 metaphysical	 dualism	 risks	 bringing	
nihilism	 to	 its	 full	 expression.	While	 formerly	 this	world	 lacked	meaning	 in	 itself,	 now	
the	 world	 lacks	 any	 meaning	 whatsoever;	 nature	 has	 become	 “indifferent	 beyond	
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measure”.101	As	a	result	of	the	disenchantment	of	the	supersensory	realm,	our	own	“de-
deified	 world	 has	 become	 stupid,	 blind,	 mad,	 and	 questionable.”102	Just	 as	 the	 true	
world	 has	 become	 a	 myth,	 the	 apparent	 world	 too	 has	 become	 ungrounded.	 In	
Nietzsche’s	words,	an	“ancient	and	profound	trust	has	been	turned	into	doubt	.	.	.	and	
how	much	must	 now	 collapse,	 now	 that	 this	 faith	 has	 been	 undermined.”103	It	would	
seem	 that	 both	 the	 traditional	 faith	 in	 unconditional	 value	 and	 the	 modern	 critical	
revaluation	 of	 value	 inevitably	 leads	 to	 nihilism.	 Platonic	 metaphysics	 is	 nihilistic	
because	meaning	 lies	 beyond	 the	world.	 The	 end	 of	metaphysics	 is	 nihilistic	 because	
there	is	no	longer	a	beyond,	and	therefore	no	meaning	either.		
Nihilism	is	“the	radical	repudiation	of	value,	meaning,	and	desirability.”104	As	the	
metaphysical	grounding	of	value	is	subjected	to	revaluation,	“the	highest	values	devalue	
themselves.	The	aim	is	lacking;	‘why?’	finds	no	answer.”105	In	this	sense,	the	‘revaluation	
of	 value’	 leads	 directly	 and	 unavoidably	 to	 a	 ‘devaluation	 of	 value’.	 However,	 it	 is	
Nietzsche’s	hope	that	the	‘devaluation	of	value’	is	only	a	transitional	stage	in	the	history	
of	 ‘the	West’.	The	 transition	 from	 ‘passive	nihilism’	 to	 ‘active	nihilism’	would	 signify	a	
new	epoch	of	‘world-history’.	In	the	fragmentary	Will	To	Power,	Nietzsche	distinguishes	
between	1)	 the	catastrophe	of	 ‘passive	nihilism’	on	 the	one	hand,	and	2)	 the	possible	
redemption	 of	 ‘active	 nihilism’	 on	 the	 other.	 For	 Nietzsche,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 decided	
whether	 the	 ‘death	 of	 God’	 signifies	 catastrophe	 or	 redemption.	 The	 implication	 of	
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passive	 nihilism	 is	 that	 “every	 kind	 of	 dogmatism	 that	 is	 left	 standing	 dispirited	 and	
discouraged”.106	Active	 nihilism,	 however,	 is	 “a	 violent	 force	 of	 destruction”.107	Active	
nihilism	is	the	conviction	that	“what	is	falling,	we	should	still	push”	108	in	order	that	“the	
weights	of	all	 things	 can	be	determined	anew.”109	In	 this	 sense,	active	nihilism	 is	 “not	
only	the	belief	that	everything	deserves	to	perish;	but	one	actually	puts	one’s	shoulder	
to	the	plough;	one	destroys”.110	Nevertheless,	it	seems	that	redemption	can	neither	be	
achieved	 through	 the	old	 faith	 in	 the	 ‘ascetic	 ideal’,	 nor	 through	 the	new	principle	of	
valuation	 –	 the	 ‘will	 to	 power’.	 For	Heidegger	 and	Nietzsche	 both,	 “nihilism	does	 not	
strive	 for	 mere	 nullity.	 Its	 proper	 essence	 lies	 in	 the	 affirmative	 nature	 of	 a	
liberation.”111	Heidegger:	 “Nihilism	 then	 proclaims	 the	 following:	Nothing	of	 the	 prior	
valuations	 shall	 have	 validity	 any	 longer;	 all	 beings	 must	 be	 differently	 posited	 as	 a	
whole	.	.	.”112	Consequently,	“the	will	to	power	becomes	the	principle	of	a	new	valuation	
.	 .	 .”113	Contrary	 to	 Kant’s	moral	 law,	 “the	will	 is	 now	 pure	 self-legislation	 of	 itself;	 a	
command	to	achieve	 its	essence,	which	 is	commanding	as	such,	 the	pure	powering	of	
power.”114	The	ungrounded	‘will	to	power’	has	no	purpose	apart	from	the	preservation	
and	enhancement	of	power;	it	is	the	‘will	to	nothing’.	
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It	 is	 at	 this	 point	 where	 the	 thinking	 of	 Heidegger	 and	 Nietzsche	 diverge.	
Heidegger	suggests	that	Nietzsche’s	error	is	to	presume	that	“the	basic	characteristic	of	
beings	is	‘will	to	power’,	and	all	interpretations	of	the	world,	to	the	extent	that	they	are	
kinds	of	 valuations,	 derive	 from	 the	will	 to	power.”	115	In	my	view,	Nietzsche’s	 ‘will	 to	
power’	more	closely	resembles	the	vitalism	of	Spinoza’s	Conatus	than	the	individualism	
of	Descartes’	Cogito.	For	Nietzsche,	 the	 ‘will	 to	 power’	 operates	 unconsciously	 at	 the	
instinctual	level;	it	is	a	transpersonal	force	that	runs	deeper	than	the	individual	ego.	For	
Heidegger,	the	‘will	to	power’	does	not	indicate	the	overcoming	of	nihilism,	but	rather	
its	logical	extension.	While	Nietzsche	distinguishes	between	passive	and	active	forms	of	
nihilism,	 Heidegger	 makes	 a	 similar	 distinction	 between	 ‘incomplete’	 and	 ‘complete	
nihilism’.	 While	 Nietzsche’s	 thinking	 exemplifies	 ‘incomplete	 nihilism’,	 Heidegger’s	
thinking	 presumably	 characterizes	 ‘complete	 nihilism’.	 Heidegger	 suggests	 that	
“incomplete	 nihilism	 does	 indeed	 replace	 the	 former	 values	 with	 others,	 but	 it	 still	
posits	the	latter	always	in	the	old	position	of	authority	that	is	gratuitously	maintained	as	
the	 ideal	 realm	 of	 the	 suprasensory.” 116 	While	 God	 has	 disappeared	 from	 his	
“authoritative	position	 in	the	suprasensory	world,	his	authoritative	place	 is	still	always	
preserved	.	.	.	as	that	which	has	become	empty.”117	Heidegger	suggests	that	“the	empty	
place	demands	to	be	occupied	anew	and	to	have	the	God	now	vanished	from	it	replaced	
by	 something	 else.”118	According	 to	 this	 demand,	 new	 ideals	 are	 set	 up	 as	 ‘highest	
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values’	in	the	realm	formerly	occupied	by	being	itself.	As	a	result,	being	is	transformed	
into	value,	and,	as	such,	into	an	arbitrary	determination	of	the	ungrounded	will.	
The	transformation	of	being	into	value	effectively	devalues	being	into	a	product	
of	the	will.	To	the	extent	that	being	is	“accorded	worth	as	a	value,	it	is	already	degraded	
to	 a	 condition	 posited	 by	 the	 will	 to	 power	 itself.”119	For	 Nietzsche,	 value	 has	 no	
metaphysical	grounding	apart	from	the	ungrounded	‘will	to	power’;	the	world	is	‘will	to	
power’	and	nothing	else.120	For	this	reason,	Heidegger	 judges	Nietzsche’s	genealogy	of	
morality	to	be	nihilistic.	Heidegger:	“Nietzsche’s	metaphysics	 is	nihilistic	 insofar	as	 it	 is	
value	thinking,	and	insofar	as	the	latter	is	grounded	in	will	to	power	as	the	principle	of	
all	valuation.	Nietzsche’s	metaphysics	consequently	becomes	the	fulfillment	of	nihilism	
proper,	 because	 it	 is	 the	metaphysics	 of	 the	will	 to	 power.”121	The	 implication	 is	 that	
there	is	nothing	of	value	apart	from	that	which	is	attributed	value	by	the	generative	will.	
Contrary	 to	 Nietzsche’s	 ‘incomplete	 nihilism’,	 Heidegger	 suggests	 that	 “completed	
nihilism	 must,	 in	 addition,	 do	 away	 with	 even	 the	 place	 of	 value	 itself,	 with	 the	
suprasensory	as	a	realm,	and	accordingly	must	posit	and	revalue	values	differently.”122	
The	challenge	of	completed	nihilism	is	to	leave	the	open	place	formerly	occupied	by	God	
empty,	open,	and	unoccupied	by	any	transcendental	signifier.	Heidegger	suggests	that	
“instead	of	[the	place	of	God],	another	[place]	can	loom	on	the	horizon	–	a	place	that	is	
                                                
119 Ibid, 103 
120 Nietzsche, Beyond Good And Evil, 48 
121 Heidegger, Nietzsche vl. III-IV, 204 
122 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 69 
	 63	
identical	 neither	with	 the	 essential	 realm	belonging	 to	 god	nor	with	 that	 of	man,	 but	
with	which	man	comes	once	more	into	a	distinctive	relationship	[with	being].”123	
For	Nietzsche,	humanity	in	its	present	form	is	not	up	to	the	task	of	assuming	self-
mastery	and	dominion	over	the	Earth.	A	new	type	of	man	must	therefore	be	created	–	
the	‘overman’.124	The	strength	of	will	required	for	undertaking	a	‘revaluation	of	value’	is	
rare,	as	is	anything	noble.	Nietzsche:	“Independence	is	for	the	very	few,	it	is	a	privilege	
of	the	strong.”125	Contrary	to	Heidegger,	Nietzsche’s	 insight	 into	the	groundlessness	of	
being	does	not	inspire	‘awe	and	wonder’,	but	horror	in	the	face	of	‘the	abyss’.	Nietzsche	
warns	that	the	vast	majority	of	people	lack	the	courage	to	exercise	the	generative	‘will	
to	power’	in	the	face	of	a	meaningless	and	indifferent	universe.	Only	an	elite	aristocratic	
caste	has	the	courage	to	face	the	groundlessness	of	being	and	summon	the	strength	of	
will	necessary	to	create	meaning	from	nothingness,	from	nothing	prior	to	the	will	itself.	
Nietzsche	advocates	for	the	creation	of	“a	new	aristocracy,	based	on	the	severest	self-
legislation.”126	Only	 the	caste	of	 the	 ‘overman’	 is	capable	of	becoming	who	they	are	–	
“self-legislators,	self-creators,	creators	of	new	values	and	tables	of	what	is	good.”127	Put	
simply,	 the	 highest	 need	 is	 “to	 teach	man	 the	 future	 of	man	 as	 his	will	 .	 .	 .”128	Such	
strength	 of	 will	 is	 fashioned	 through	 a	 strict	 adherence	 to	 ascetic	 regimes	 of	 self-
discipline	 “with	 the	 intention	 of	 training	 a	 ruling	 caste	 –	 the	 future	 maters	 of	 the	
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Earth.”129	Heidegger:	“Justice	looks	beyond	to	that	sort	of	mankind	which	is	to	be	forged	
and	bred	into	a	type,	a	type	that	possesses	essential	aptitude	for	establishing	absolute	
dominion	 over	 the	 Earth.”130	It	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	 interpret	 the	 ‘overman’	 as	
equivalent	to	the	modern	Enlightenment	project	of	moral	self-legislation,	whereby	each	
is	subject	only	to	the	law	that	they	themselves	will.	On	the	contrary,	‘the	highest	man’	is	
“he	who	determines	values	and	directs	the	will	of	millennia	by	giving	directions	to	the	
highest	natures.”131	It	is	therefore	no	less	true	for	Nietzsche	than	for	Aristotle	that	“the	
wise	man	must	not	be	ordered	but	must	order,	and	he	must	not	obey	another,	but	the	
less	wise	must	obey	him.”132		
Nietzsche	distinguishes	between	 the	 ruling	caste	of	 the	 ‘overman’	 from	under-
caste	 of	 the	 ‘last	man’.	 The	 ‘last	man’	 lacks	 sufficient	 courage	 to	 endure	 the	 spiritual	
transfiguration	 undergone	 by	 the	 ‘overman’.	 Instead,	 the	 ‘last	man’	 succumbs	 to	 the	
need	 for	 a	 metaphysical	 grounding	 of	 truth.	 The	 ‘metaphysical	 need’	 refers	 to	 the	
psychological	inability	to	cope	with	the	radical	contingency	of	truth.	In	response	to	the	
anxiety,	uncertainty,	and	disorientation	of	metaphysical	groundlessness,	the	 ‘last	man’	
clings	to	the	myth	of	divine	origins.	Just	as	the	allegory	of	the	cave	teaches	that	there	is	
an	 ideal	 realm	 that	 grounds	 this	world,	 the	myth	 of	 the	metals	 teaches	 of	 the	 divine	
origins	 of	 justice.	According	 to	Nietzsche,	 the	 purpose	 of	 Plato’s	myth	 is	 to	 instill	 the	
false	 belief	 “that	 the	 order	 of	 castes,	 the	 highest,	 the	 dominating	 law,	 is	 merely	 the	
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ratification	of	the	order	of	nature,	of	a	natural	law	of	the	first	rank.”133	The	teaching	of	
the	myth	of	the	metals	is	that	the	ruling	‘philosopher-kings’	belong	to	a	superior	caste,	
just	as	the	lower	castes	are	inherently	inferior.	It	therefore	follows	that	the	‘last	man’	is	
incapable	of	 self-mastery	and	 so	must	be	 ruled	by	 the	 ‘overman’.	The	 function	of	 the	
‘noble	lie’	is	to	maintain	order	by	justifying	hierarchical	social	relations	as	an	expression	
of	the	‘great	chain	of	being’.	This	hierarchy	is	justified	by	the	belief	that	the	social	order	
is	a	reflection	of	the	natural	order,	and	that	the	rule	of	the	few	is	at	the	same	time	the	
rule	of	the	best.		
We	 have	 seen	 that	 Nietzsche	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 perceived	 dualism	 and	
foundationalism	 of	 Platonic	 metaphysics.	 However,	 Nietzsche	 shares	 with	 Plato	 an	
authoritarian	 political	 vision	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 cyclical	 experience	 of	 time.	 For	
Nietzsche	 and	 Plato	 both,	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	 ‘eternal	 return’	 unveils	 a	 vista	 of	
cosmic	nihilism	that	cannot	possibly	be	endured.	Ohana	states	the	problem	well;	“Man	
created	 an	 illusion	 of	 wholeness,	 order,	 and	 unity	 in	 order	 to	 organize	 the	 chaos	 by	
giving	it	a	meaningful	structure,	but	the	reflective	consciousness	exposes	the	illusion.”134	
Man	cannot	bear	to	be	the	origin	of	his	own	meaning.	The	insight	into	the	Promethean	
destiny	of	 cyclical	 time	 reverts	 to	a	psychological	need	 for	political	order	grounded	 in	
foundational	 myth	 (the	 myth	 of	 foundations).	 By	 delineating	 the	 nihilistic	 destiny	 of	
Western	metaphysics,	Nietzsche	brings	us	 face	 to	 face	with	 the	disenchantment	of	all	
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value,	meaning,	and	truth.	Tragically,	Nietzsche	brings	us	to	the	precipice	of	‘the	abyss’,	
while	nevertheless	failing	to	accomplish	a	leap	beyond.		
	
The	Destiny	Of	Nihilism	
	 Nietzsche’s	 Birth	 of	 Tragedy	 poses	 the	 following	 question:	 “What	 is	 the	
significance	of	the	tragic	myth	amongst	the	Greeks?”135	For	Nietzsche,	tragic	myth	offers	
a	glimpse	into	the	nihilistic	fate	of	 ‘the	West’.	Nietzsche’s	visionary	 insight	 is	that	attic	
tragedy	is	an	aesthetic	response	to	the	horror	of	confronting	the	ungrounded	emptiness	
of	 being.	 The	 innate	 nihilism	 of	 Western	 metaphysics	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 startling	
conclusion	of	Plato’s	Republic,	the	myth	of	Er.	The	myth	of	Er	offers	a	shocking	vision	of	
cosmic	nihilism.	The	myth	tells	of	the	warrior	Er,	who	upon	dying	in	battle,	returns	to	life	
bearing	an	unsettling	account	of	the	afterlife.	Er	describes	the	transmigration	of	his	soul	
through	divine	realms.	Upon	departing	from	his	body	at	the	moment	of	death,	Er’s	soul	
first	arrives	at	a	landscape	of	heavenly	and	demonic	realms.	At	this	boundary	between	
worlds,	 the	 soul	 encounters	 a	 judge	who	measures	 out	 punishment	 and	 reward.	 The	
judge	directs	the	soul	towards	higher	or	lower	realms	based	upon	the	goodness	of	one’s	
life.	The	wicked	are	 imprisoned	in	the	depths	of	Tartarus,	each	sin	punished	ten	times	
over,	 while	 the	 virtuous	 ascend	 to	 heavenly	 realms	 of	 bliss.	 After	 receiving	 their	 just	
measure,	all	souls,	wicked	and	virtuous	alike,	journey	towards	a	panoramic	vista.	Upon	
entrance	into	this	visionary	realm,	the	soul	glimpses	the	horrific	‘Spindle	of	Necessity’,	a	
cosmic	vortex	turned	by	the	arbitrary	decree	of	the	hideous	Moirai	(Fates),	daughters	of	
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Ananke	 (Necessity).	 At	 this	 point	 of	 the	 journey,	 the	 soul	 must	 decide	 on	 its	 next	
reincarnation	based	upon	the	lessons	learned	from	previous	lives.	The	soul’s	decision	as	
to	what	constitutes	a	good	 life	will	determine	 the	 fate	of	 its	 reincarnation.	 If	 the	 soul	
decides	 wisely,	 it	 will	 ascend	 to	 a	 higher	 form	 of	 life.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	
philosophical	wisdom	is	of	cosmic	significance	for	Socrates.		
It	 is	 nevertheless	 strange	 that	 the	myth	 of	 Er	 ultimately	 undermines	 Socrates’	
assurance	 that	 the	 good	 life	 is	 also	 the	 happy	 life.	 Instead,	 the	 myth	 indicates	 that	
ultimately,	wisdom	is	futile.	Life	is	blind	suffering,	regardless	of	virtue	or	vice.	The	nullity	
of	wisdom	becomes	increasingly	evident	in	light	of	the	startling	culmination	of	the	soul’s	
transmigration.	 After	 deciding	 on	 the	 form	 of	 its	 next	 life,	 the	 soul	 must	 journey	 to	
Lethe,	 the	 river	 of	 forgetfulness.	 Upon	 reaching	 the	 banks	 of	 Lethe,	 the	 soul	 is	
compelled	 to	 drink	 from	 the	 river,	 and	 subsequently	 forgets	 its	 previous	 incarnations	
along	with	 the	 lessons	 learned.	 The	 soul	 is	 then	 carried	 away	by	 the	 solar	winds	of	 a	
cosmic	storm,	randomly	descending	as	a	shooting	star	into	its	next	incarnation.	Plato’s	
cosmological	 vision	 is	 horrifically	 bleak.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 soul’s	 reincarnation	 is	 not	
determined	 by	 just	 measure,	 but	 instead	 by	 blind	 Fate.	 If	 I	 may	 draw	 from	 Hindu	
terminology,	the	wheel	of	samsara	is	not	turned	by	Justice.	There	is	no	karma	in	Plato’s	
horrific	 vision,	 only	 arbitrary	 Fate.	 The	 myth	 of	 Er	 contradicts	 Socrates’	 fundamental	
teachings	that	“virtue	is	knowledge;	man	sins	only	from	ignorance;	he	who	is	virtuous	is	
happy”.136	In	order	to	establish	that	the	good	life	is	in	fact	the	best	form	of	life,	Socrates	
must	 presuppose	 a	 cosmological	 notion	 of	 justice	 operative	 within	 the	 universe.	
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However,	the	arbitrary	turning	of	the	‘Spindle	of	Necessity’	indicates	that	there	is	in	fact	
no	 such	 measure.	 Instead,	 “all	 that	 exists	 is	 just	 and	 unjust	 and	 equally	 justified	 in	
both.”137	Plato	refutes	the	optimism	of	 the	Hindu	sages;	 reincarnation	 is	not	governed	
by	karma.	 Instead	the	transmigration	of	the	soul	 is	determined	by	the	turning	of	blind	
Fate.		
The	 nihilistic	 destiny	 of	Western	metaphysics	 is	 readily	 apparent	 in	 Sophocles’	
Theban	 Trilogy,	 especially	Oedipus	 The	 King.	 Sophocles	 tragic	 drama	 presents	 striking	
answers	to	Nietzsche’s	question	of	whether	or	not	truth	is	beneficial	to	life.	The	answer	
is	a	resounding	no!	On	the	contrary,	Sophocles’	attic	 tragedy	offers	a	shockingly	bleak	
vision	 of	 the	 world	 in	 which	 the	 search	 for	 truth	 is	 fated	 to	 culminate	 in	 utter	
devastation.	Even	Oedipus,	the	heroic	king	of	Thebes,	lacks	the	strength	to	endure	the	
truth	 of	 cosmic	 nihilism.	 For	 Oedipus,	 truth	 is	 ultimately	 a	 revelation	 of	 ‘horror’.	
According	to	a	prophecy	of	the	Delphic	oracle,	Oedipus	is	destined	to	kill	his	father	and	
sleep	with	his	mother.	Horrified	by	 the	oracle’s	 prophecy,	Oedipus	 exiles	 himself	 in	 a	
desperate	 attempt	 to	 avoid	 his	 fated	 ruin.	 But	 Oedipus’s	 determination	 to	 evade	 his	
future	 only	 hastens	 the	 prophecy	 to	 fruition.	Oedipus	 is	 ignorant	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
King	 and	 Queen	 of	 Corinth,	 who	 raised	 Oedipus,	 and	whom	Oedipus	 takes	 to	 be	 his	
biological	 parents,	 are	 in	 reality	 Oedipus’	 adopted	 parents.	 It	 is	 because	 of	 this	
ignorance	 that	 in	 self-imposed	 exile	 from	 Corinth,	 Oedipus	 fails	 to	 recognize	 his	 true	
father	 when	 they	 meet	 in	 a	 chance	 encounter	 upon	 the	 road.	 Ignorant	 of	 his	 true	
identity,	Oedipus	 engages	 in	 a	 heated	 dispute	with	 the	 elderly	 stranger.	 In	 a	 state	 of	
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rage,	 Oedipus	 unintentionally	 kills	 the	 stranger,	 Oedipus’	 true	 father,	 Laius,	 King	 of	
Thebes.		
Upon	reaching	the	city	of	Thebes,	Oedipus	discovers	its	citizens	at	the	mercy	of	
the	monstrous	Sphinx.	The	only	hope	for	salvation	 is	to	solve	the	riddle	of	the	Sphinx.	
The	 Sphinx’s	 riddle	 represents	 the	 secrets	 of	 nature	 of	 which	 only	 Oedipus	 is	 wise	
enough	 to	 perceive.	Oedipus	 heroically	 solves	 the	 riddle	 and	 defeats	 the	 Sphinx.	 In	 a	
demonstration	of	gratitude,	the	Thebans	crown	Oedipus	their	king.	As	a	result,	Oedipus	
unknowingly	marries	his	own	mother	Jocasta,	the	Queen	of	Thebes.	To	all	appearance,	
Oedipus	rules	over	a	period	of	prosperity.	However,	the	truth	is	that	Oedipus’	heinous	
crimes	are	festering	deep	within	the	body-politic.	The	gods	strike	Thebes	with	a	horrible	
plague	as	punishment	 for	 the	unspeakable	crimes	of	 their	king.	Oedipus,	desperate	to	
relieve	the	suffering	of	his	people,	pleads	to	“learn	what	act	or	covenant	of	mine	could	
still	redeem	the	state?”138	At	that	moment,	Creon,	brother	of	Jocasta,	returns	from	the	
oracle	 bearing	 news	 that	 “our	 wounds	 will	 issue	 into	 blessings.”139	The	 gods	 bring	
reassurance,	promising	that	“seek	and	you	shall	find.	Only	that	escapes	which	never	was	
pursued.”140	Encouraged	 by	 the	 oracle’s	 prophecy,	 Oedipus	 is	 determined	 to	 discover	
the	 identity	 of	 Laius’	 killer,	 and	 thereby	 “drag	 that	 shadowed	 past	 to	 light.” 141	
Nevertheless,	Oedipus’	resolve	to	discover	the	truth	at	any	cost	leads	to	the	devastating	
recognition	of	the	ungrounded	emptiness	of	being.		
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According	 to	 Aristotle’s	 authoritative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 play,	 Oedipus’	
torment	at	the	hands	of	gods	is	just.	This	is	because	Oedipus	is	afflicted	with	that	which	
Aristotle	calls	the	‘tragic	flaw’	of	pride.	According	to	Nietzsche,	however,	Sophocles’	play	
bears	witness	to	far	darker	truth	–	that	ignorance	is	preferable	to	knowledge.	Nietzsche:	
“Sophocles	understood	 the	most	 sorrowful	 figure	of	 the	Greek	 stage,	 the	unfortunate	
Oedipus,	as	the	noble	human	being	who,	in	spite	of	his	wisdom,	is	destined	to	error	and	
misery	.	.	.”142	Far	from	displaying	a	‘tragic	flaw’,	Oedipus’	only	crime	is	his	devotion	to	
truth.	 In	 the	 pursuit	 of	 truth,	 Oedipus	 summons	 the	 prophet	 Tiresias,	 who	 warns	
Oedipus	that	truth	is	too	difficult	for	the	soul	to	bear.	Oedipus	nevertheless	persists,	and	
Tiresias	declares	that	“the	murderer	of	the	man	whose	murder	you	pursue	is	you	.	.	.	I	
say	that	you	and	your	dearly	beloved	are	wrapped	together	in	hideous	sin,	blind	to	the	
horror	of	it.”143	Oedipus	is	reduced	to	a	state	of	shock	and	despair.	Desperate	to	avoid	
such	a	horrific	prophecy,	 Jocasta	offers	 false	 comfort,	dismissing	 the	command	of	 the	
Delphic	oracle	to	‘know	thyself’.	Jocasta:	“There	is	no	art	of	prophecy	known	to	man	.	.	.	
If	 the	 god	 insists	 of	 tracking	 down	 the	 truth,	 why	 then,	 let	 the	 god	 himself	 get	 on	
track.”144	Ever	 faithful	 to	 the	 gods,	 Oedipus	 is	 beyond	 such	 false	 consolation	 and	
resolves	 to	 face	 the	 truth	 at	 any	 cost.	 Jocasta	 nevertheless	 continues	 to	 plead	 with	
Oedipus	to	“forget	it	all.	It’s	not	worth	knowing	.	.	.	God	help	you,	Oedipus!	Hide	it	from	
you	who	you	are.”145	Oedipus	 is	nevertheless	compelled	 to	continue	seeking	 the	 truth	
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until	the	mystery	is	revealed:	“Forget	it	all?	I	can’t	stop	now.”146	According	to	Nietzsche,	
Oedipus	should	have	followed	the	council	of	Tiresias	and	Jocasta;	the	truth	is	indeed	too	
painful	to	endure.	Upon	discovery	of	the	truth,	Oedipus	cries	out:	“Lost!	Ah	lost!	At	last	
it’s	blazing	clear.	Light	of	my	days,	go	dark.	I	want	to	gaze	no	more.”147	According	to	the	
chorus,	 Oedipus’	 fate	 reveals	 “man’s	 pattern	 of	 unblessedness.”148	What,	 then,	 is	 the	
truth	of	Oedipus’	fate?	What	discovery	could	be	so	horrific	that	Oedipus	is	compelled	to	
gauge	out	his	own	eyes	in	the	shock	of	recognition?		
The	horrific	 truth	of	Sophocles’	attic	drama	 is	as	 follows:	“The	edge	of	wisdom	
turns	 against	 the	 wise:	 wisdom	 is	 a	 crime	 against	 nature.”149	For	 Sophocles,	 we	 are	
‘abandoned’	 by	 the	 gods,	 destined	 to	 suffer	 a	 ‘world	 of	 pain’,	 whose	 only	 respite	 is	
death.	Nietzsche	suggests	that,	“conscious	of	the	truth	he	has	once	seen,	man	now	sees	
everywhere	only	the	horror	or	absurdity	of	existence	.	 .	 .”150	In	recognition	of	his	 fate,	
Oedipus’	act	of	self-blinding	suggests	that	it	is	better	to	live	a	life	condemned	to	eternal	
darkness	than	to	glimpse	the	‘horror’	of	being.	According	to	Nietzsche’s	interpretation,	
“it	was	to	be	able	to	live	that	the	Greeks	had	to	create	these	gods	from	a	most	profound	
need.”151	Nietzsche:	“The	Greek	knew	and	felt	the	terrors	and	horrors	of	existence.	That	
he	might	 endure	 this	 terror	 at	 all,	 he	 had	 to	 interpose	 between	 himself	 and	 life	 the	
radiant	 dream-birth	 of	 the	 Olympians.”152 	This	 veil	 was	 torn	 for	 Oedipus,	 thereby	
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revealing	 a	 glimpse	 of	 ‘the	 horror’.	 In	 spite	 of	 his	 nobility,	 strength,	 and	 courage,	
Oedipus’	 fate	 is	 too	 terrible	 to	bear.	Creon	nevertheless	 attributes	blame	 to	Oedipus,	
advising	him	to	“stop	 this	 striving	 to	be	master	of	all.	The	mastery	you	had	 in	 life	has	
been	your	fall.”153	Nevertheless,	it	is	not	pride,	but	rather	devotion	to	truth	that	drives	
Oedipus.	 The	 teaching	 of	 the	 play	 is	 completely	 nihilistic,	 and	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	
follows:	 “So	being	mortal,	 look	on	 that	 last	day	and	 count	no	man	blessed	 in	 this	 life	
until	he’s	crossed	life’s	bounds	unstuck	by	ruin.”154	Oedipus’	tragic	fate	indicates	that	it	
is	 better	 not	 to	 be	 than	 to	 be.	 Oedipus:	 “Oh	 wretched,	 ephemeral	 race,	 children	 of	
chance	and	misery,	why	do	you	compel	me	to	tell	you	what	it	would	be	most	expedient	
for	you	not	to	hear?	What	is	best	of	all	is	utterly	beyond	your	reach:	not	to	be	born,	not	
to	be,	to	be	nothing.	But	the	second	best	for	you	is	–	to	die	soon.”155	
The	 tragic	world-view	of	Oedipus	King	 is	 reinforced	 in	an	 important	passage	of	
Plato’s	Apology.	At	 the	moment	 of	 his	 death,	 Socrates	 says	 that	 he	 owes	Asclepius	 a	
rooster.	Asclepius	is	the	god	of	healing,	to	whom	Socrates	owes	a	sacrifice.	Presumably	
this	 debt	 is	 owed	 because	 Socrates	 thinks	 that	 death	 heals	 the	 wound	 of	 life.	 For	
Socrates,	 life	 is	a	disease	whose	only	cure	 is	death.	Like	Oedipus,	Socrates	“suffers	 life	
like	a	sickness,”	and	only	death	can	heal	the	illness	of	living.	156	It	is	therefore	better	to	
not	 have	 been.	 Ultimately,	 both	 Socrates	 and	 Oedipus	 attain	 peace	 by	 resolutely	
enduring	the	cruelty	of	their	fate.	For	this	reason,	Oedipus	is	considered	a	hero	within	
the	 ancient	 Greek	 world.	 According	 to	 the	 conventions	 of	 attic	 tragedy,	 a	 hero	 is	
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characterized	by	the	quest	for	truth,	such	as	Odysseus’	epic	journey	in	Homer’s	Odyssey.	
For	the	ancient	Greeks,	the	quest	for	truth	inevitably	involves	the	transgression	of	social	
norms,	 roles,	 and	 customs.	 Since	 the	 social	 order	 is	 divinely	 sanctioned,	 the	
transgression	of	 social	norms	 therefore	 invites	divine	 retribution.	A	hero	clears	a	new	
way	of	being	beyond	established	forms	of	 life.	The	search	for	 truth	therefore	requires	
great	 courage.	 By	 committing	 incest	 and	 patricide,	 Oedipus	 transgresses	 the	 sacred	
cultural	 taboos	 of	 Thebes.	 These	 taboos	 repress	 the	 instincts	 in	 in	 the	 name	 of	
preserving	the	established	social	order.	The	will	of	the	hero	is	 liberated	from	any	such	
restrictions.	Nietzsche	calls	the	Greek	hero	a	‘free	spirit.	For	Nietzsche,	the	will	is	free	to	
the	extent	that	“the	spirit	would	take	 leave	of	all	 faith	and	every	wish	for	certainty	 .	 .	
.”157	However,	even	the	‘free	spirit’	must	submit	to	the	‘tyrannical’	rule	of	the	gods.	
Take,	for	instance,	Aeschylus’	remarkable	Prometheus	Bound,	in	which	the	gods	
themselves	are	cast	as	tyrants.	In	the	only	surviving	fragment	of	the	Prometheus	trilogy,	
the	primordial	Titanic	gods	are	at	war	with	the	new	Olympic	gods.	The	ancient	Titans	are	
defeated	and	imprisoned	within	the	abysmal	depths	of	Tartarus.	Only	Prometheus,	who	
sides	with	 the	new	gods,	against	his	own	kind,	 is	 spared	punishment.	Upon	observing	
the	wretched	state	of	humanity,	Prometheus	raises	mankind	above	bare	animal	life	by	
bestowing	 the	 transformative	 gift	 of	 fire.	 In	 so	 doing,	 Prometheus	 transgresses	 the	
divine	 command	 of	 Zeus.	 The	 ‘tyrant’	 Zeus	 in	 enraged	 by	 Prometheus’	 ‘man-loving	
disposition’,	imprisoning	the	Titan	for	all	of	eternity	upon	a	mountainside	of	‘untrodden	
desolation’	 in	 a	 ‘savage’	 act	 of	 divine	 retribution.	 As	 if	 that	 were	 not	 punishment	
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enough,	Prometheus	must	endure	the	consumption	of	his	liver	by	a	bird	of	prey,	only	to	
have	it	continually	regenerate	in	order	to	be	consumed	again	and	again	until	the	end	of	
time.	As	Prometheus	bears	the	gift	of	foresight,	the	question	arises	as	to	why	the	Titan	
could	not	foresee	his	own	tragic	fate?	It	is	a	cruel	trick	of	Fate	that	Prometheus	is	gifted	
with	 foresight	 but	 not	 with	 the	 gift	 of	 remembrance.	 Though	 gifted	 with	 foresight,	
Prometheus	is	nevertheless	destined	to	forget.	As	a	result,	Prometheus	must	suffer	the	
‘eternal	 return’	of	 the	 infinite	cycles	of	 time.	Time	 is	an	 infinite	circle;	everything	 that	
will	 happen	 has	 already	 happened.	 Conversely,	 everything	 that	 has	 happened	 will	
happen	again	and	again.	Even	the	ancient	Titanic	gods	must	submit	to	the	arbitrary	law	
of	 the	 ‘grey-grim’	 Fates.	 To	 the	extent	 that	we	moderns	also	 look	 to	 the	 future	while	
forgetting	our	past,	Prometheus’s	Fate	is	also	our	own.		
Aeschylus’	 bleak	 cosmic	 vision	 can	 be	 discerned	 in	 Prometheus’	 final	
lamentation:	“So	must	I	bear,	as	lightly	as	I	can,	the	destiny	that	fate	has	given	me;	for	I	
know	well	against	necessity,	against	its	strength,	no	one	can	fight	and	win.”158	Perhaps,	
like	 Oedipus,	 Prometheus	 would	 have	 gouged	 out	 his	 own	 eyes	 upon	 learning	 of	 his	
tragic	 fate,	were	his	 arms	not	 already	bound	by	 indestructible	 adamantine	 chain.	 The	
remarkably	 nihilistic	 vision	 of	 Aeschylus’	 attic	 tragedy	 is	 “that	 it	 is	 better	 to	 die	 than	
suffer	torment”.159	The	contention	that	non-being	is	preferable	to	being	can	readily	be	
discerned	when	Prometheus	reveals	the	nature	of	his	gift	to	humanity.	Prometheus:	“I	
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stopped	 mortals	 from	 foreseeing	 doom	 .	 .	 .	 I	 sowed	 in	 them	 blind	 hopes.”160	The	
response	of	the	chorus	to	this	revelation	is	not	sorrow,	but	approval;	“That	was	a	great	
help	that	you	gave	to	men.”161	It	would	seem	that	knowledge	does	not	bring	freedom,	
but	rather	visions	of	catastrophic	ruin	and	utter	despair.	With	knowledge,	one	can	only	
lament	“the	dreamlike	feebleness	by	which	the	race	of	man	is	held	in	bondage,	a	blind	
prisoner.”162	For	Prometheus,	ignorance	of	our	condition	is	preferable	to	knowledge.	‘It	
is	better	not	to	know’	that	mortals	as	well	as	the	immortal	Gods	and	Titans	are	bound	
by	the	blind	rule	of	Fate.	In	spite	of	Prometheus’	bitter	lamentations,	Hermes	dares	to	
accuse	him	of	pride:	“Bring	your	proud	heart	to	know	a	true	discretion	–	oh	foolish	spirit	
–	 in	 the	 face	 of	 ruin.” 163 	Hermes:	 “When	 you	 are	 trapped	 by	 ruin	 don’t	 blame	
fortune.”164	But	 Prometheus	 remains	 steadfast,	 resolutely	 bearing	 the	 injustice	 of	 the	
gods,	 conceding	 no	 wrongdoing.	 Prometheus:	 “Oh	 Holy	 mother,	 oh	 Sky	 that	 circling	
brings	 light	 to	 all,	 you	 see	 me,	 how	 I	 suffer,	 how	 unjustly.”165 	Prometheus	 must	
resolutely	endure	his	fate,	bearing	witness	to	the	nihilistic	horror	of	being	until	the	end	
of	time.		
For	Nietzsche,	Prometheus’	fate	is	also	that	of	‘the	West’.	Like	Prometheus,	we	
are	destined	to	endure	the	‘eternal	return’	of	time	that	destroys	and	renews	all	that	we	
take	to	be	eternal	and	true.	Nietzsche’s	shocking	discovery	is	that	“something	might	be	
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true	while	being	harmful	and	dangerous	in	the	highest	degree.”166	Truth	is	not	beneficial	
but	harmful	to	life.	For	Nietzsche,	the	challenge	is	therefore	“to	recognize	untruth	as	a	
condition	of	life	.	.	.”167	It	would	seem	that	self-consciousness	is	an	aberration	that	ought	
to	be	annihilated.	The	challenge,	in	light	of	Aeschylus’	‘tragic	vision’	of	cosmic	nihilism,	is	
to	ascend	to	a	higher	perspective	from	which	the	horror	of	blind	Fate	appears	sublime.	
From	 the	vistas	of	 such	heights,	 “all	 things,	whether	good	or	evil,	 are	deified.”168		 For	
Nietzsche,	affirming	the	beauty	of	suffering	is	all	that	can	be	hoped	for;	“for	it	is	only	as	
an	aesthetic	phenomenon	that	existence	is	eternally	justified.”169	For	Nietzsche,	only	the	
aesthetic	re-enchantment	of	experience	provides	relief	from	this	primal	death	wish.	The	
only	consolation	is	to	learn	to	see	beauty	in	necessity.		
Nietzsche’s	genealogical	project	remains	unfinished,	cut	short	by	the	tragic	onset	
of	madness.	We	are	left	with	an	aporia	–	an	unsurpassable	limit	that	must	nevertheless	
be	 surpassed.	 It	would	 seem	 that	 the	 search	 for	 truth	dissolves	 its	 own	 conditions	 of	
existence:	 the	 ascetic	 belief	 that	 truth	 is	 divine	 and	 that	 knowledge	 is	 akin	 to	
blessedness.	We	cannot	simply	evade	Nietzsche’s	shocking	discovery	that	it	is	not	truth,	
but	fiction	that	proves	beneficial	to	life.	Although	I	have	argued	that	Nietzsche’s	attempt	
to	 replace	 ethics	 with	 aesthetics	 is	 ultimately	 inadequate,	 Nietzsche’s	 confrontation	
with	 cosmic	 nihilism	 should	 by	 no	 means	 judged	 a	 complete	 failure.	 In	 my	 view,	
Nietzsche’s	 deepest	 insight	 is	 that	 the	 good	 life	 is	 not	 the	 pursuit	 of	 truth,	 but	 the	
alleviation	of	suffering.	
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We	have	already	 traveled	a	 fair	distance	 from	Heidegger’s	 initial	 confrontation	
with	 Nietzsche.	 Nietzsche’s	 declaration	 that	 ‘God	 is	 dead’	means	 that	 in	 the	modern	
age,	 our	 highest	 values	 devalue	 themselves.	 We	 have	 seen	 that	 in	 response	 to	 the	
radical	 contingency	 of	 value,	 meaning,	 and	 truth,	 Nietzsche	 attempts	 to	 legislative	 a	
new	table	of	values	 ‘beyond	good	and	evil’.	However,	 I	argued	that	the	revaluation	of	
value	does	not	signify	the	overcoming	of	nihilism,	but	rather	its	full	expression.	The	vital	
will	 to	 power	 is	 assigned	 an	 impossible	 task	 –	 to	 create	 meaning	 ex	 nihilo.	 When	
confronted	with	the	cosmic	nihilism	of	the	‘eternal	return’,	the	will	to	power	amounts	to	
a	will	to	nothing.	In	light	of	Nietzsche’s	failure	to	overcome	nihilism	via	the	vitality	of	the	
will,	we	turn	next	to	Heidegger’s	phenomenological	account	of	‘being-in-the-world’.	We	
will	 see	 that	 the	 subject	 does	 not	 exist	 over	 and	 above	 a	 world	 of	 objects	 that	 are	
available	 for	 instrumental	 use.	 Instead,	 we	 will	 explore	 Heidegger’s	 account	 of	 being	
embedded	in	horizon	of	meaning.		We	will	see	that	meaning	is	not	created,	but	given.		
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II.	Overcoming	Onto-Theology		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	Deconstruction	Of	Metaphysics	
The	 topic	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 Heidegger’s	 overcoming	 of	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	
legacy	 of	 Western	 metaphysics.	 Heidegger	 attributes	 the	 inception	 of	 Western	
metaphysics	 to	 the	 classical	 period	 of	 ancient	 Greece.	 Although	 ancient	 Greece	 is	
neither	 the	 beginning	 of	 civilization	 nor	 of	 metaphysics,	 Greek	 philosophy	 has	
nevertheless	 exerted	 an	 unparalleled	 influence	 on	 the	 philosophical	 heritage	 and	
cultural	 traditions	 of	 ‘the	 West’.	 According	 to	 Emmanuel	 Levinas,	 Heidegger’s	
remembrance	of	 the	Greeks	 is	 intended	 to	 “recall	 the	missed	possibilities,	 or	of	what	
went	 unsaid	 or	 un-thought,	 in	 this	 epoch.”170	Like	 Nietzsche,	 Heidegger	 understands	
Western	metaphysics	as	Platonism,	 just	as	Christianity	 is	understood	as	 ‘Platonism	for	
the	people’.	Heidegger’s	‘de-structuring’	of	Western	metaphysics	is	intended	to	disclose	
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the	unrealized	potential	and	alternative	possibilities	of	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	 legacy	of	
Platonism.	 Heidegger	 famously	 attributes	 the	 beginning	 of	 Western	 philosophy	 to	 a	
sense	 of	 ‘awe	 and	 wonder’	 before	 the	 radiant	 clearing	 of	 the	 encompassing	 world.	
Although	‘awe	and	wonder’	inspired	the	beginning	of	Western	metaphysics,	the	history	
of	the	philosophical	tradition	–	inaugurated	by	Plato	and	culminating	with	Nietzsche	–	is	
nevertheless	 a	 history	 of	 the	 concealment	 and	 oblivion	 of	 this	 primordial	 wonder.	
Throughout	the	history	of	philosophy	the	sense	of	wonder	is	forgotten,	along	with	the	
‘grounding	question’	of	what	it	means	to	be	in	the	world.		
Heidegger’s	 ‘de-structuring’,	 or	 deconstruction	 of	 metaphysics	 prefigures	 the	
contemporary	 intellectual	milieu	of	 French	 ‘post-structuralism’,	 especially	 the	 thought	
of	Jacques	Derrida,	Emmanuel	Levinas,	and	Jean-Luc	Nancy.	Indeed,	I	view	Heidegger	as	
the	 ‘father’	 of	 post-structuralism.	 For	 instance,	 Derrida’s	 deconstruction	 of	 any	 fixed	
origin	 is	 an	 appropriation	 of	 Heidegger’s	 	 ‘de-structuring’	 of	 any	 unconditional	
grounding	of	being	history,	and	truth.	According	to	Heidegger,	a	fundamental	element	
of	 Western	 metaphysics	 is	 the	 search	 for	 a	 fixed	 origin,	 ground,	 or	 foundation	 of	
meaning,	value,	and	truth.	Emmanuel	Levinas,	a	brilliant	interpreter	(and	fierce	critic)	of	
Heidegger,	 expresses	 the	prejudice	of	Western	philosophy	well:	 “All	 rationality	 comes	
down	 to	 discovery	 of	 the	 origin,	 the	 principle.	 Reason	 is	 an	 archeology	 .	 .	 .	 “171	This	
position	 can	 be	 readily	 attributed	 to	 Aristotle,	 for	 whom	 the	 most	 fundamental	
philosophical	 discipline	 is	 metaphysics	 –	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 universal	 ground	 of	 all	
things.	Heidegger	 argues	 that	 since	 the	beginning	of	 philosophy,	 “the	Being	of	 beings	
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has	shown	itself	as	the	ground	(arche,	aition).”172	Put	simply,	the	philosophical	tradition	
thinks	 being	 as	 foundation.	 Levinas	 levels	 the	 same	 criticism,	 arguing	 that	 “Western	
thought	consists	in	understanding	being	only	as	the	foundation	of	beings”.173		
For	Levinas	and	Heidegger	both,	metaphysics	is	more	than	a	set	of	foundational	
dogmas	 and	 beliefs.	 Instead,	metaphysics	 forms	 an	 unconscious	 epochal	 horizon	 that	
frames	our	entire	way	of	being,	thinking,	and	acting.	Levinas	suggests	that	the	epoch	of	
metaphysics	encompasses	the	entire	history	of	Western	philosophy.	Levinas:	“The	onto-
theo-logical	 character	 of	 metaphysics	 goes	 together	 with	 the	 characterization	 of	 a	
certain	epoch	 .	 .	 .	The	epoch	 in	question	here	(that	of	onto-theo-logy)	embraces	all	of	
philosophy.”174	Put	simply,	“in	the	epoch	of	metaphysics	we	think	being	as	foundation,	
that	is,	we	think	metaphysically.”175	It	then	follows	that	post-metaphysical	thinking	must	
also	 be	 post-foundational.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Levinas	 argues	 that	 the	 post-metaphysical	
epoch	“signifies	a	rupture	with	the	rationality	of	the	foundation.”176	Heidegger’s	primary	
aim	is	to	‘step	back’	from	foundational	concepts	in	order	to	retrieve	a	primordial	sense	
of	wonder	before	the	ungrounded	void.		
Plato’s	 division	 of	 being	 into	 form	 and	 appearance	 inaugurates	 the	 ‘onto-
theological’	 legacy	 Western	 metaphysics.	 The	 intention	 of	 this	 ‘onto-theological’	
dualism	 is	 to	 comprehend	 the	 unconditional	 ground	 of	 all	 being.	 Heidegger’s	 	 ‘de-
structuring’	of	metaphysics	is	intended	to	draw	attention	to	the	‘ontological	difference’	
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between	the	thing	on	the	one	hand,	and	its	substance,	essence,	or	ground	on	the	other.	
The	 ‘ontological	 difference’	 refers	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	what	 there	 is	 and	 that	
there	 is.	 Heidegger	 intends	 to	 direct	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 basic	 fact	 that	 there	 is.	
According	 to	Heidegger,	 “the	beginning	of	metaphysics	 is	 revealed	as	 .	 .	 .	 the	division	
into	whatness	and	thatness.”177	In	other	words,	the	‘ontological	difference’	refers	to	the	
distinction	between	the	appearance	of	a	specific	thing	in	the	field	of	vision	on	the	one	
hand,	 and	 the	 vision	 of	 a	 field	 in	 which	 any	 specific	 thing	 can	 appear	 on	 the	 other.	
Heidegger	 argues	 that	philosophy	 is	 no	 longer	 inspired	by	 the	 ‘awe	and	wonder’	 that	
there	is,	but	is	instead	focused	on	categorization	of	what	there	is.	It	is	only	in	light	of	the	
‘ontological	 difference’	 that	 being	 itself,	 distinct	 from	 any	 specific	 thing,	 comes	 to	
attention	and	becomes	questionable.	According	to	Heidegger,	“we	think	of	being	itself	
rigorously	only	when	we	think	of	the	difference	between	being	and	beings.”178	It	follows	
that	 ‘rigorous’	 thinking	 must	 forego	 any	 reliance	 upon	 the	 illusion	 of	 a	 secure	
metaphysical	foundation.		
Heidegger	levels	a	sustained	criticism	of	Western	metaphysics	as	‘onto-theology’.	
‘Onto-theology’	 refers	 to	 the	 style	of	 thinking	 that	 seeks	 to	grasp	 the	deepest	ground	
and	highest	 cause	of	 all	 there	 is.	 ‘Onto-theology’	 seeks	 to	 comprehend	 the	 totality	of	
being;	 it	 seeks	 absolute	 knowledge.	 Although	 inaugurated	 by	 Plato,	 the	 ‘onto-
theological’	nature	of	philosophy	can	perhaps	be	most	clearly	discerned	in	the	treatises	
of	Aristotle,	especially	 the	treatise	on	Metaphysics.	Aristotle	 is	 the	first	philosopher	to	
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define	metaphysics	as	the	science	of	being	 itself.	While	natural	science	 is	 the	study	of	
the	attributes	of	being	(for	instance,	as	molecular	for	physics,	as	elemental	for	chemistry,	
or	 as	 cellular	 for	 biology)	 metaphysics	 is	 the	 science	 of	 the	 properties	 of	 being	 as	
such.179	According	to	Aristotle,	the	properties	of	being	are	twofold;	metaphysics	inquires	
into	being	as	either:	1)	the	deepest	ground,	or	as	2)	the	highest	cause.	Heidegger	further	
clarifies	the	twofold	aspect	of	being	as	follows:	“[being]	is	the	unifying	One	in	the	sense	
of	what	is	everywhere	primal	and	thus	most	universal;	and	at	the	same	time	[being]	is	
the	 unifying	 One	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 All	 Highest”.180	According	 to	 Heidegger,	 to	 the	
extent	that	being	is	investigated	as	“the	first	and	most	universal	ground	common	to	all	
beings,”	 metaphysics	 is	 ontology.181	Similarly,	 insofar	 as	 being	 is	 investigated	 as	 “the	
highest	 ground	 above	 all	 beings,	 ultimately	 as	 the	 ground	 of	 itself”	 metaphysics	 is	
theology.182	Together,	ontology	and	theology	comprise	 that	which	Heidegger	calls	 ‘the	
onto-theological	constitution	of	metaphysics’	since	Plato.		
Levinas	again	proves	an	 insightful	 interpreter	of	 the	onto-theological’	 legacy	of	
Western	 philosophy.	 For	 Levinas,	 “the	 problem	 posed	 by	 Aristotle	 is	 indeed	 that	 of	
being	 as	 being,	 but	 being	 is	 immediately	 approached	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 foundation	 of	
beings,	 and,	 finally,	 it	 comes	 to	 be	 named	 God.	 From	 that	 moment	 on,	 philosophy	
becomes	 theology.” 183 	The	 ‘onto-theological’	 constitution	 of	 metaphysics	 therefore	
signifies	the	 introduction	of	the	deity	 into	philosophy	as	a	principle	of	causation,	or	as	
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that	which	Aristotle	calls	the	‘unmoved	mover’.	Heidegger	argues	that	the	conception	of	
being	 as	 a	 unifying	 ground	 or	 cause	 is	 akin	 to	 “the	metaphysical	 concept	 of	 God.”184	
With	 the	 introduction	of	 the	deity	 into	philosophy,	metaphysical	 inquiry	becomes	 the	
contemplation	of	God	as	either	 the	highest	cause	or	 the	deepest	ground	of	 the	world	
that	opens	before	us.	According	to	Levinas,	“onto-theology	consists	in	thinking	of	God	as	
a	 being,	 and	 in	 thinking	 being	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 superior	 or	 supreme	 being.”185	
However,	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	 contemplation	 of	 God	 as	 highest	 cause	 and	 deepest	
ground	 abstracts	 from	 the	 basic	 experience	 of	 wonder	 before	 the	 ungrounded	 void.	
Again,	Levinas	expresses	the	matter	best:	“For	Heidegger,	the	comprehension	of	being	
in	its	truth	was	immediately	covered	over	by	its	function	as	the	universal	foundation	of	
beings,	by	a	supreme	being,	a	founder,	by	God.	The	thinking	of	being,	being	in	its	truth,	
becomes	knowledge	or	comprehension	of	God:	theo-logy.	The	European	philosophy	of	
being	becomes	theology.”186	
‘Onto-theology’	 is	 the	 contemplation	 of	 the	 unconditioned	 foundation	 upon	
which	 everything	 conditioned	 is	 grounded.	 By	 determining	 being	 as	 the	 ground	 of	
entities,	‘onto-theology’	perceives	being	as	that	which	is	most	general	or	universal	to	all	
things.	Heidegger	therefore	claims	that	the	purpose	of	metaphysics	is	the	intellection	of	
the	‘first	principle’.	Metaphysical	inquiry	can	therefore	be	understood	as	“the	question	
about	 beings	 as	 such	 and	 as	 a	 whole,”	 or	 that	 which	 “unifies	 as	 the	 generative	
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ground.”187	For	Aristotle,	the	‘unmoved	mover’	is	the	principle	of	causation	that	unifies	
the	totality	of	being	into	a	comprehensive	system.	‘Onto-theology’	understands	God	as	
perfect	 self-identity	 –	 ‘thought	 thinking	 thought’.	 Aristotle	 therefore	 understands	 the	
first	cause	as	“a	substance	which	is	eternal	and	immovable	and	separate	from	sensible	
things.”188	Aristotle’s	 treatise	 on	Metaphysics	 begins	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 “all	 men	 by	
nature	desire	to	know.”189	True	knowledge,	for	Aristotle,	 is	knowledge	of	that	which	is	
self-identical;	“In	pursuing	the	truth	one	must	begin	with	the	things	that	are	always	 in	
the	 same	 state	 and	 suffer	 no	 change”.190	The	 ‘onto-theological’	 tradition	 therefore	
understands	wisdom	as	“knowledge	about	certain	principles	and	causes”.191		
Heidegger	argues	that	‘onto-theology’	is	founded	upon	the	principle	of	identity	–	
the	 unity	 of	 thought	 and	being.	 The	 principle	 of	 identity	 states	 that	 for	 something	 to	
exist,	it	must	remain	1)	self-identical,	or	identical	to	itself,	as	well	as	2)	self-sufficient,	or	
independent	 of	 any	 relationship.	 According	 to	 Heidegger,	 onto-theology	 therefore	
“represents	identity	as	a	fundamental	characteristic	of	being.”192	While	‘onto-theology’	
interprets	 being	 as	 a	 stable	 identity,	 Heidegger	 attempts	 to	 delineate	 the	 basic	
experience	of	being	as	an	ongoing	process	of	self-differentiated	becoming	that	escapes	
any	 attempt	 at	 stable	 identification.	 Heidegger	 suggests	 that	 being	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 self-
identical.	 Instead,	 being	 is	 a	 continuous	 flow	 of	 self-differentiation.	 The	 ‘onto-
theological’	 principle	 of	 identity	 conceals	 the	 basic	 fact	 that	 all	 things	 lack	 intrinsic	
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identity.	No	stable	identity	or	thing	can	endure	the	transformative	passage	of	time.	On	
the	contrary,	attention	to	experience	reveals	 the	 impermanence	and	 interdependence	
of	all	there	is.	Phenomenal	manifestation	emerges	to	presence	and	fades	into	absence.	
Simply	put,	being	is	a	process	of	self-differentiation,	not	stable	self-identity.	
	
The	New	Science		
In	Being	 And	 Time,	Heidegger	makes	 the	 sweeping	 claim	 that,	 aside	 from	 the	
inception	 of	metaphysics	 in	 ancient	Greece,	 the	 entire	 history	 of	Western	 philosophy	
has	 failed	 to	 pose	 the	 question	 of	 being	 –	 what	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 be?	 According	 to	
Heidegger,	being	does	not	appear	worthy	of	questioning	because	the	answer	is	thought	
to	 be	 already	 self-evident.	 But	 being	 only	 appears	 self-evident	 as	 long	 as	 it	 remains	
unquestioned.	 In	a	sense,	Heidegger	aims	to	reclaim	a	Socratic	knowledge	of	our	own	
ignorance	–	the	recognition	that	we	do	not	in	fact	know	what	it	means	to	be.	By	posing	
the	 question	 of	 being,	 Heidegger	 intends	 to	 reawaken	 the	 fundamental	 ‘awe	 and	
wonder’	 that	 inspired	 the	 ancient	 ‘science	 of	 being’.	 Throughout	 the	 history	 of	
philosophy,	metaphysics	has	been	oriented	by	 that	which	Heidegger	 calls	 the	 ‘guiding	
question’	 –	 the	 scientific	 interrogation	 of	 beings,	 entities,	 or	 objects	 in	 the	 world.	
Heidegger	nevertheless	intends	to	pose	that	which	he	names	the	‘grounding	question’.	
The	 ‘grounding	 question’	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 Heidegger’s	 ontological	 investigation	 of	 the	
universal	 human	 experience	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’.	 The	 grounding	 question	 is	 not,	
however,	 intended	 to	 replicate	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	 quest	 for	 a	 first	 cause	 or	
foundational	 principle.	 While	 metaphysics	 seeks	 to	 derive	 absolute	 certainty	 from	 a	
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fixed	origin,	 the	question	of	being	 is	 ‘grounded’	by	nothing	apart	 from	the	method	of	
inquiry	 itself.	 In	this	sense,	Heidegger’s	 ‘fundamental	ontology’	 is	 intended	to	be	even	
more	 scientific	 than	 science.	 While	 the	 scientific	 investigation	 of	 beings,	 entities,	 or	
objects	 is	 ‘ontic’,	 only	 a	 questioning	of	 being	 itself	 is	 ‘ontological’	 in	 the	 fundamental	
sense.		
In	preparation	for	a	‘fundamental	ontology’	of	being	itself,	Heidegger	undertakes	
an	‘existential	analysis’	of	Dasein	–	the	being	for	whom	being	 is	a	question.	Heidegger	
calls	 the	 human	 being	 Dasein,	 which	 means	 ‘being-there’.	 The	 experience	 of	 ‘being-
there’	is	supposedly	characterized	by	certain	fundamental	ontological	structures	such	as	
‘being-in-the-word’,	 ‘being-with’,	 and	 ‘being-towards-death’.	 In	 addition	 to	 such	 basic	
structures	of	existence,	Dasein	 is	characterized	by	certain	existential	attunements	such	
as	care,	anxiety,	and	guilt.		
In	many	 respects,	Being	 And	 Time	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 response	 to	 Kant’s	
idealist	notion	of	 the	 ‘transcendental	categories’	of	perception	 in	The	Critique	Of	Pure	
Reason.	 For	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 as	 for	 Heidegger,	 the	 entire	 tradition	 of	 Western	
philosophy	amounts	to	the	history	of	an	error.	Kant	and	Heidegger	disagree,	however,	
on	the	content	of	this	error.	For	Heidegger,	the	metaphysical	inquiry	into	entities	fails	to	
pose	 the	 question	 of	 being	 itself.	 For	 Kant,	 however,	 the	 metaphysical	 wonder	 of	
existence	 fails	 to	 inquire	 into	 the	 necessary	 a	 priori	 conditions	 of	 experience.	 Kant	
explains	 that	 the	Western	 philosophical	 tradition	 presupposes	 that	 subjective	 reason	
conforms	 to	 the	object	of	perception.	 For	 instance,	Aristotle	 claims	 that	 “a	 thought	 is	
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moved	 by	 the	 object	 of	 thought”.193	Kant	 nevertheless	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 the	
other	way	around	–	that	the	thought	constitutes	the	object	through	the	activity	of	the	
transcendental	 ‘categories	 of	 perception’.	 The	 ‘categories	 of	 perception’	 are	
‘transcendental’	 because	 they	 remain	 beyond	 experience.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
‘categories	 of	 perception’	 are	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 of	 experience	 and	 yet	 remain	
completely	 unconditioned	 by	 experience.	 Heidegger’s	 ‘existential	 analytic’	 of	 Dasein	
basically	 interprets	 the	 ‘categories	 of	 perception’	 through	 an	 anthropological	 lens.	
Contra	Kant,	for	whom	the	‘transcendental	categories’	are	abstracted	from	any	cultural	
milieu,	 Heidegger’s	 argues	 that	 Dasein’s	 experience	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’	 is	 always	
historically	mediated.		
Kant’s	discovery	of	the	transcendental	‘categories	of	perception’	amounts	to	that	
which	 Kant	 himself	 names	 a	 ‘Copernican	 revolution’	 in	 philosophy.	 In	 other	 words,	
transcendental	 idealism	 amounts	 to	 a	 revolution	 in	 philosophy	 on	 the	 scale	 of	
Copernicus’	 discovery	 that	 the	 Sun,	 not	 the	 Earth,	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 center	 of	 our	 solar	
system.	The	equivalent	 revolution	 in	philosophy	 is	 that	 the	 transcendental	 faculties	of	
the	mind	constitute	the	phenomenal	world	of	appearance.	We	do	not	see	the	world	as	
it	really	is,	only	as	it	appears.	In	my	judgment,	Being	And	Time	should	be	interpreted	as	
a	 counter-revolutionary	 response	 against	 Kant’s	 revolution	 in	 philosophy.	 Heidegger	
characterizes	 Kant’s	 inversion	 of	 metaphysics	 not	 as	 a	 revolution,	 but	 rather	 as	 an	
‘insurrection’	of	the	subject	against	the	object.	 In	 light	of	this	 ‘insurrection’,	Heidegger	
aims	to	cultivate	a	receptive,	rather	than	constitutive	relation	to	the	world.	According	to	
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Heidegger,	 Kant’s	 division	 between	 subject	 and	 object,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 subsequent	
elevation	 of	 the	 subject	 over	 against	 the	 object,	 is	 a	 misinterpretation	 of	 the	
fundamental	experience	of	‘being-in-the-world’.	Dasein	is	not	separate	from	the	world,	
but	instead	exists	within	the	world.	The	prevailing	assumption	that	the	subject	occupies	
a	 privileged	 position,	 elevated	 over	 and	 against	 the	 object,	 is	 therefore	 deeply	
misguided.		
Heidegger	 refutes	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 subject	 over	 the	 object	 through	 a	
description	of	Dasein’s	embeddedness	 in	 the	encompassing	world.	 This	 description	of	
‘being-in-the-world’	 challenges	 yet	 another	 fundamental	 assumption	 of	 modern	
philosophy	 –	 the	 autonomous	 self-determination	of	 the	 rational	 subject.	 This	modern	
notion	 of	 freedom	 predates	 Kant’s	 ‘transcendental	 idealism’	 and	 is	 most	 often	
attributed	to	the	early	modern	philosopher	Rene	Descartes.	For	Descartes,	it	is	of	little	
importance	that	the	subject	exists	within	a	world.	 Instead,	Descartes	suggests	that	the	
subject	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 independent	 and	 separate	 from	 anything	 other.	 As	
independent,	 the	 subject	 “needs	no	place	and	depends	on	no	material	 thing”.194	Such	
independence	 nevertheless	 abstracts	 the	 subject	 form	 ‘being-there’	 in	 the	
encompassing	world.	Descartes	therefore	understands	freedom	as	 independence	from	
the	 finite	 limits	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’.	 Contra	 Descartes,	 Heidegger	 argues	 that	 the	
philosophical	 notion	 of	 freedom	 as	 autonomous	 self-determination	 overlooks	 the	
‘finitude’	 of	 human	 existence.	Heidegger	 further	 delineates	 the	 ‘finitude’	 of	 existence	
through	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘facticity’	 of	 Dasein	 as	 a	 ‘thrown-projection’.	 For	
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Heidegger,	the	facticity	of	‘being-in-the-world’	is	both	a	condition	and	limit	of	freedom.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 world	 limits	 freedom	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 one	 is	 ‘thrown’	 into	 a	
situation	 in	which	certain	choices	are	possible	while	others	are	not.	Dasein	 is	 ‘thrown’	
into	existence	without	having	chosen	to	come	into	existence.	The	encompassing	world	is	
not	of	one’s	own	making	and	therefore	resists	the	sovereignty	of	the	will.	On	the	other	
hand,	the	world	is	a	condition	for	freedom	to	the	extent	that	one	makes	a	‘project’	for	
oneself	of	the	finite	possibilities	of	one’s	‘thrown’	situation.	Although	Dasein	is	‘thrown’	
into	an	established	horizon	of	meaning,	one	can	nevertheless	resolve	to	‘project’	one’s	
own	meaning	into	the	world	as	a	free	act	of	creation.		
The	‘facticity’	of	Dasein	as	a	‘thrown-projection’	determines	one’s	way	of	‘being-
in-the-world’	 as	 either	 authentic	 of	 inauthentic.	 Inauthenticity	 is	 the	 evasion	 of	 the	
wide-ranging	 implications	 of	 the	 indeterminacy,	 contingency,	 and	 finitude	 of	 being.	
Although	the	possibilities	one	may	choose	are	limited	by	the	horizons	of	an	intelligible	
world,	one	is	nevertheless	responsible	to	choose	for	oneself	a	way	of	life	that	is	worthy	
of	commitment.	Inauthenticity	is	the	evasion	of	the	responsibility	to	create	a	life-project	
for	 oneself.	 Inauthentic	 Dasein	 flees	 from	 the	 responsibility	 of	 self-determination,	
preferring	the	comfort	and	security	of	pre-determined	norms,	values,	and	customs	that	
are	 judged	 to	 be	 ‘correct	 and	 proper’	 by	 the	 unreflective	 majority.	 While	 Heidegger	
argues	 that	 inauthenticity	 is	 the	prevailing	way	of	 ‘being-in-the-world’,	 another,	more	
authentic	 way	 of	 being	 is	 nevertheless	 possible.	 Authenticity	 is	 resolution	 before	 the	
nullity	of	one’s	own	existence.	 ‘Nullity’	 refers	 to	 the	absence	of	an	eternal	 substance,	
essence,	or	 form	at	 the	core	of	one’s	own	being.	Heidegger’s	notion	of	 the	 ‘nullity’	of	
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the	 ego	 the	 Buddhist	 notion	 of	 An-Atman,	 which	 means	 non-identity,	 no-self,	 or	
selflessness.	According	to	Heidegger,	there	is	no	true	self	or	stable	identity	at	the	core	of	
one’s	being,	only	a	chasm,	or	abyss.		
Existential	 angst,	 or	 anxiety	 is	 the	 typical	 psychological	 response	 to	 one’s	
recognition	 of	 the	 abysmal	 ‘nullity’	 of	 the	 self.	 However,	 anxiety	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	
negative	state.	Heidegger	contrasts	anxiety	with	fear,	which	 is	the	dread	of	something	
specific	in	the	world.	Anxiety,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	dread	of	the	groundlessness	of	
existence	as	such.	For	Heidegger,	anxiety	is	not	just	a	feeling,	emotion,	or	mood.	Anxiety	
is	a	way	of	perceiving	the	world.	It	 is	a	way	of	‘being-in-the-world’	that	reveals	certain	
features	 of	 reality	 while	 concealing	 others.	 The	 angst	 that	 prevails	 in	 modernity	
indicates	 a	 sense	of	 ‘homelessness’	 in	 the	modern	world.	 In	 this	 sense,	 anxiety	 is	 not	
altogether	different	 from	the	wonder	of	 the	ancient	Greeks.	Both	anxiety	and	wonder	
cause	things	in	the	world	to	recede	from	attention,	thereby	un-concealing	the	world	as	
such.	Heidegger	argues	that	anxiety	can	provoke	authentic	thought,	just	like	the	wonder	
of	the	ancient	Greeks.	The	fundamental	‘attunement’	of	anxiety	directs	our	attention	to	
the	‘uncanny’	fact	that	there	is	something	rather	than	nothing	at	all.	Moreover,	anxiety	
interrupts	 our	 habitual	 sense	 of	 immersion	 in	 the	 everyday	 world.	 The	 existential	
‘homelessness’	of	modernity	delimits	the	‘being-historical’	horizons	of	the	world	as	such.	
This	 phenomenological	 bracketing	 of	 the	 historical	 ‘life-world’	 places	 being	 itself	 in	
question.	
Although	 it	 is	 Heidegger’s	 aim	 to	 ‘de-structure’	 the	 tradition	 of	 Western	
metaphysics	–	inaugurated	by	Plato,	inverted	by	Kant,	and	completed	by	Nietzsche	–	the	
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existential	 themes	 of	 Being	 And	 Time	 often	 replicate	 the	 same	 ‘onto-theological’	
concepts	that	‘fundamental	ontology’	is	intended	to	overcome.	For	instance,	the	notion	
of	‘authentic	resolution’	can	nevertheless	be	interpreted	in	a	way	that	perpetuates	the	
same	subject-object	relation	that	the	existential	analysis	of	‘being-there’	and	‘being-in-
the-world’	 is	 intended	 to	 ‘de-structure’,	 question,	 and	 displace.	 Contrary	 to	 his	 own	
intentions,	Heidegger’s	notion	of	 resolution	 is	 therefore	consistent	with	morality	since	
Kant	–	authentic	resolution	is	akin	to	the	autonomous	self-legislation.	Heidegger	himself	
implies	 as	 much,	 given	 that	 he	 later	 judges	 the	 terminology	 of	 authenticity	 and	
resolution	 to	 be	 insufficiently	 post-foundational.	 In	 spite	 of	 these	 shortcomings,	
Heidegger’s	existential	analysis	of	Dasein	nevertheless	proves	deeply	influential.		
Jean-Paul	 Sartre	 was	 of	 course	 deeply	 influenced	 by	 Heidegger’s	 existential	
analysis	 of	 Dasein.	 In	 fact,	 Being	 And	 Nothingness	 is	 in	 many	 ways	 a	 creative	
appropriation	of	the	existential	themes	introduced	in	Being	And	Time.	In	my	judgment,	
Sartre’s	 existential	 humanism	 is	 useful	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 heightens	 and	
intensifies	 the	 insufficiencies	 that	 are	 also	 present	 in	 Heidegger’s	 early	 existential	
analytic.	 Following	 the	dualistic	 subject-object	 distinction	of	 both	Descartes	 and	Kant,	
Sartre	 presupposes	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 isolated	 individual	 abstracted	 from	 the	
encompassing	world.	According	to	Heidegger,	“the	thought	that	[all	things]	are	products	
of	the	creating	human	expresses	a	destiny	of	the	history	of	the	essence	of	the	West.”195	
Sartre’s	 notion	 of	 existential	 freedom	 is	 no	 exception,	 and	 therefore	 requires	 that	
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“subjectivity	 must	 be	 the	 point	 of	 departure”.196	Jean-Luc	 Nancy	 is	 correct	 when	 he	
suggests	that	Sartre’s	existentialism	replicates	“the	ontology	in	which	being	–	as	subject	
–	 is	 foundation.”197	By	 asserting	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 subject,	 Sartre’s	 appropriation	 of	
Heidegger’s	 philosophy	 merely	 replicates	 the	 same	 ‘onto-theological’	 legacy	 that	
Heidegger	 intends	 to	 displace.	 Sartre’s	 analysis	 therefore	 diverges	 from	 Heidegger’s	
phenomenological	 investigation	of	 ‘being-in-the-world’	 prior	 to	 the	 conceptual	 duality	
of	subject	and	object.	Unlike	Heidegger,	Sartre	abstracts	the	individual	subject	from	the	
more	primordial	experience	of	being-there	in	the	world.	Regardless	of	Sartre’s	Cartesian	
presuppositions,	 his	 analysis	 of	 existential	 freedom	 delineates	 additional	 aspects	 of	
Heidegger’s	 ‘fundamental	 ontology’	 that	 are	 insufficiently	 post-foundational.	 In	 other	
words,	 the	 project	 of	 overcoming	 ‘onto-theology’	 too	 readily	 presupposes	 the	 same	
metaphysical	 foundation	 that	 it	 aims	 to	 ‘de-structure’.	 These	 metaphysical	
presuppositions	can	be	readily	discerned	in	Sartre’s	existential	humanism.	
In	his	widely	 read	essay	Existentialism	 Is	A	Humanism,	Sartre	appropriates	and	
develops	 Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 authenticity.	 Sartre	 grounds	 his	 argument	 upon	 that	
which	he	calls	“the	 first	principle	of	existentialism”	–	 that	“God	does	not	exist”.198	We	
moderns	 are	 fated	 to	 endure	 the	 ‘flight	 of	 the	 gods’	 from	 the	 disenchanted	world	 of	
inert	matter.	Sartre	suggests	that	the	absence	of	God	is	not	cause	for	hopelessness	and	
despair.	Instead,	Sartre	views	the	‘death	of	God’	as	the	foundation	of	human	freedom.	
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The	 ‘non-existence	 of	 God’	 indicates	 that	 there	 is	 no	 God	 that	 could	 have	 created	 a	
human	nature.	If	God	does	not	exist	then	neither	does	a	fixed	human	essence.	There	is	
no	 human	nature	 because	 there	 is	 no	God	who	 could	 conceive	 of	 such	 a	 nature.	 For	
Sartre,	 if	 God	 does	 not	 exist,	 then	 ‘existence	 precedes	 essence’.	 The	 ‘death	 of	 God’	
means	 that	 we	 are	 ‘condemned	 to	 be	 free’.	 Consequently,	 freedom	 should	 be	
understood	 in	 the	radical	 sense;	 that	 is,	as	 the	existential	determination	of	one’s	own	
being.	 If	 we	 are	 condemned	 to	 endure	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 Supreme	 Being,	 and	
consequently	the	absence	of	fixed	human	nature,	then	man	at	his	core	is	“nothing	other	
than	what	he	makes	of	himself”.199	For	this	reason,	Sartre	claims	that	man	ought	to	be	
defined	“in	relation	to	his	commitments”.200		
Jean-Luc	Nancy	 offers	 a	much-needed	 corrective	 to	 Sartre’s	 radical	 account	 of	
existential	freedom.	Nancy	argues	that	the	sovereign	decision	of	the	will	is	arbitrary	and	
ungrounded.	 Instead,	 Nancy	 suggests	 that	 “freedom	 cannot	 be	 presented	 as	 the	
autonomy	of	 a	 subjectivity	 in	 charge	 of	 itself	 and	 its	 decisions,	 evolving	 freely	 and	 in	
perfect	 independence	 from	 every	 obstacle.”201	Contrary	 to	 Sartre,	 Nancy	 claims	 that	
overcoming	 ‘onto-theology’	 should	be	understood	as	 “the	 task	of	delivering	ourselves	
from	the	thought	of	freedom	as	a	property	of	the	subjective	constitution	of	being,	and	
as	the	property	of	an	individual	subject.”202	Echoing	Nietzsche,	it	is	Sartre’s	position	that	
man	 is	 the	 ‘undetermined	 animal’.	 The	 subject	 is	 an	 existential	 project	 without	 any	
metaphysical	basis,	foundation,	or	ground.	However,	the	power	of	creation	ex	nihilo	is	a	
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capacity	formerly	attributed	exclusively	to	God	alone.	Sartre	attributes	the	divine	power	
of	creation	to	the	autonomous	will.	As	Nancy	points	out,	the	sovereignty	of	the	will	does	
not	 signify	 the	 self-overcoming	 and	 self-realization	 of	 the	 ‘over-man’,	 but	 instead	
delineates	 “the	 last	 species	 of	 the	 odious	 god:	 the	man-God,	 himself,	 abandoned	 by	
God,	the	totally	secular	divinity	of	humanity	.	.	.”203	
Sartre’s	 attempt	 to	 assign	 the	 divine	 attributes	 of	 God	 to	Man	 is	 ultimately	 a	
futile	exercise.	The	insight	that	God	is	a	lie	does	not	thereby	attribute	value	to	Man.	On	
the	contrary,	the	absence	of	God	means	that	both	the	human	and	the	divine	realms	are	
devalued.	In	other	words,	the	insight	that	God	is	not,	does	not	simply	mean	that	Man	is.	
Sartre’s	secular	humanism	understands	Man	as	the	self-generating	creator	of	meaning,	
value,	and	truth.	In	this	sense,	Man	is	a	mirror	image	of	God.	But	if	God	is	absent,	then	
so	 too	 is	 Man.	 The	 reflection	 vanishes	 along	 with	 that	 which	 is	 reflected.	 Secular	
atheism	 undermines	 itself;	 the	 ‘death	 of	 God’	 reverts	 to	 the	 ‘end	 of	 Man’.	 For	 this	
reason,	 Heidegger	 argues	 that	 secular	 humanism	 is	 not	 a	 description	 of	 subjective	
freedom,	but	of	alienation	–	of	the	isolated	individual	alienated	from	the	encompassing	
world.	Although	ontologically	incorrect,	Sartre’s	description	of	the	isolated	individual	is	
ultimately	true	to	modern	experience.	Heidegger:	“The	character	of	human	essence	 in	
the	 shape	 of	 the	 working	 creative	 essence	 belongs	 as	 a	 distinction	 to	 the	 age	 of	
modernity,	and	only	to	this	age.”204	Although	the	primordial	human	condition	is	one	of	
‘being-in-the-world’,	 modern	 experience	 is	 that	 of	 ‘world-alienation’.	 The	 ‘onto-
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theological’	determination	of	Man	as	the	‘rational	animal’	disenchants	the	world,	first	by	
projecting	 truth	 into	 a	 beyond,	 and	 then	 by	 objectifying	 nature	 through	 instrumental	
rationality.	In	this	sense,	Heidegger’s	‘remembrance’	of	ancient	metaphysics	delineates	
one	of	 the	most	damaging	 symptoms	of	modern	 life	–	 that	of	 ‘reification’.	Heidegger:	
“By	setting	its	essence	upon	itself,	the	human	rises	into	the	willing	of	its	own	self	.	.	.	all	
things	 simultaneously	become	an	object	 for	 the	 first	 time.	The	human	 in	 this	uprising	
and	 the	 world	 as	 object	 belong	 together	 .	 .	 .	 Reification	 is	 now	 the	 fundamental	
comportment	towards	the	world.”205	
	
The	Holy	
Jacques	 Derrida	 takes	 up	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 abolition	 of	Man	 and	God	 in	 his	
essay	The	Ends	Of	Man.	Derrida’s	major	insight	is	that	Sartre’s	“atheism	changes	nothing	
of	the	fundamental	structure”	of	metaphysics.206	Sartre’s	account	of	existential	freedom	
attributes	the	generative	will	to	mortal	man	rather	than	the	immortal	deity.	According	
to	Derrida,	Sartre’s	project	 is	therefore	“nothing	other	than	the	metaphysical	union	of	
man	and	god,	the	relation	of	man	to	god,	the	project	of	becoming	god	as	the	project	of	
constituting	 human	 reality.”207	The	 implication	 is	 that	 Sartre’s	 existential	 humanism	 is	
not	 an	 expression	 of	 atheism	 at	 all,	 but	 instead	 unintentionally	 preserves	 the	 ‘onto-
theological’	 determination	 of	 the	 human	 being	 as	 “the	 universal	 and	 the	 highest”.208	
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Sartre	 substitutes	 the	 empty	 place	 of	 ‘God’	 with	 the	 signifier	 ‘Man’.	 As	 a	 result,	
“creativity,	previously	the	unique	property	of	the	biblical	God,	becomes	the	distinctive	
mark	 of	 human	 activity.” 209 	The	 divine	 power	 of	 creation	 ex	 nihilo,	 or	 out	 of	
nothingness,	becomes	an	attribute	of	 the	 sovereign	will.	 The	challenge	of	overcoming	
‘onto-theology’	is	not	to	supplement	the	signifier	of	Man	in	the	place	of	God,	but	rather	
to	the	leave	the	abandoned	place	of	God	empty,	clear,	and	open.		
Sartre’s	account	of	existential	freedom	overlooks	the	most	significant	innovation	
of	Being	And	Time	–	the	description	of	human	existence	as	 ‘being	there’,	or	 ‘being-in-
the-world’.	 Sartre	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 the	 ‘essential	 occurrence’	 of	Dasein.	Heidegger:	
“Man	occurs	essentially	in	such	a	way	that	he	is	there,	that	is,	the	clearing	of	being.”210	
Although	Heidegger	utilizes	the	term	‘essence’	 in	this	context,	the	term	does	not	refer	
to	 the	 traditional	 metaphysical	 meaning.	 According	 to	 Western	 metaphysics,	 the	
essence	of	a	thing	indicates	a	predetermined	and	unchanging	nature;	“For	metaphysics,	
the	essence	is	always	the	whatness;	therefore	metaphysics	seeks	the	representation	of	
the	 outward	 look	 of	 beings	 as	 things	 that	 are	 present	 as	 objects.”211	For	 Heidegger,	
however,	 essence	 does	 not	 indicate	 an	 objective	 state,	 but	 rather	 a	 temporal	
occurrence.	In	other	words,	essence	does	not	refer	to	what	a	thing	is,	but	rather	that	a	
thing	 is;	 “essence	 here	 no	 longer	 means	 the	 endowment	 of	 a	 whatness;	 instead,	 it	
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means	an	essential	occurrence	.	.	.”212	Although	Dasein	is	not	constituted	by	an	eternal	
essence,	it	essentially	occurs	in	the	clearing	of	‘the	open’.		
The	German	term	Lichtung,	or	‘clearing’	has	a	rich	and	varied	meaning.	Typically,	
Lichtung	means	 lighting,	or	 illumination.	But	 in	 its	 traditional	usage,	Lichtung	refers	 to	
the	open	 clearing	 at	 the	end	of	 a	 forest	 trail.	 The	 term	evokes	 an	 image	of	 a	 solitary	
figure	walking	 through	 the	dense	 shadows	of	a	narrow	 forest	path.	At	 the	end	of	 the	
trail,	 the	 figure	 emerges	 into	 the	 open	 clearing	 of	 a	 forest	meadow.	 Upon	 emerging	
from	 the	 darkness	 of	 the	 forest,	 the	 light	 of	 the	 clearing	 would	 no	 doubt	 radiate	 a	
sacred	 aura.	 It	 is	 this	 element	 of	 the	 sacred	 that,	 among	 other	 things,	 distinguishes	
Heidegger’s	ontology	from	Sartre’s	existential	humanism.	In	my	judgment,	Heidegger’s	
‘de-structuring’	of	metaphysics	bears	a	close	affinity	to	Jean-Luc	Nancy’s	deconstruction	
of	 religious	 monotheism.	 This	 affinity	 is	 perhaps	 unexpected,	 given	 that	 Heidegger	
equates	‘onto-theology’	with	both	Platonism	and	Christianity.	I	do	not	wish	to	overstate	
the	 similarities	 between	 Heidegger’s	 ‘de-structuring’	 of	 metaphysics	 and	 Nancy’s	
deconstruction	 of	 monotheism.	 There	 are	 significant	 differences	 between	 the	 two	
thinkers.	 For	 instance,	 Nancy	 contends	 that	 ‘the	 West’	 begins	 with	 the	 advent	 of	
Christianity	in	Europe,	rather	than	with	the	inception	of	metaphysics	in	ancient	Greece,	
as	 is	 Heidegger’s	 contention.	 Moreover,	 Nancy	 argues	 that	 the	 ‘triple-headed’	
monotheisms	of	Judaism,	Christianity,	and	Islam	are	auto-deconstructive,	and	therefore	
do	not	function	as	a	limit	to	be	transgressed,	as	does	Heidegger’s	conception	of	‘onto-
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theology’.	 Nevertheless,	 Heidegger’s	 overcoming	 of	 ‘onto-theology’	 and	 Nancy’s	
deconstruction	of	monotheism	remain	deeply	complementary	in	many	respects.		
Nancy’s	 project	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 confrontation	 with	 Nietzsche’s	
provocative	 declaration	 that	 ‘God	 is	 dead’.	 The	 implications	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 are	
neither	simple	nor	clear;	the	‘death	of	God’	could	signify	either	the	emancipation	from	
the	bondage	of	 religious	dogma,	or	 the	catastrophic	advent	of	nihilism	along	with	 the	
disenchantment	of	all	meaning,	value,	and	truth.	For	Nancy,	there	is	a	real	danger	that	
the	‘death	of	God’	does	not,	in	fact,	signify	the	newfound	freedom	of	self-determination	
that	emerges	along	with	the	passage	from	the	Medieval	era	to	Modernity,	but	rather,	
that	 “there	 is	 nothing	 to	 seek,	 nor	 to	 believe	 –	 no	 god.”213	According	 to	 Nancy,	 the	
‘death	of	God’	 signifies	 “the	 supreme	alienation	of	 the	divine	 Idea:	 ‘God	 is	dead,	God	
himself	 is	dead’	 .	 .	 .	everything	which	 is	eternal,	 true,	 is	not,	 there	 is	negation	even	 in	
God	 .	 .	 .”214	Nevertheless,	 Nancy’s	 opposition	 to	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	 notion	 of	 the	
Supreme	Being	should	not	be	understood	as	a	statement	of	atheism,	nor	as	a	rejection	
of	 the	sacred	as	such.	On	the	contrary,	 I	 take	 it	 that	Heidegger’s	statement	 is	 true	for	
Nancy	as	well:	“The	god-less	thinking	which	must	abandon	the	god	of	philosophy	(god	as	
first	 cause)	 is	 perhaps	 closer	 to	 the	 divine	 God	 .	 .	 .” 215 	Heidegger’s	 statement	 is	
evocative	 of	 Nietzsche’s	 insight	 that	 “nihilism,	 as	 the	 denial	 of	 the	 truthful	 world	 of	
being,	might	be	a	divine	way	of	thinking.”216		
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In	 my	 view,	 Nancy’s	 deconstruction	 of	 monotheism	 is	 a	 continuation	 and	
extension	 of	 Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	 of	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	 legacy	 of	 Western	
metaphysics.	 Nancy	 argues	 that	 atheism	 is	 an	 insufficient	 response	 to	 the	 ‘death	 of	
God’.	Nancy:	“Atheism	is	not	enough!	Atheism	is	the	positing	of	the	principle	that	must	
be	 emptied.	 It	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 say	 that	 God	 takes	 leave,	 withdraws,	 or	 is	
incommensurable.	It	is	even	less	a	question	to	placing	another	principle	on	his	throne	–	
Mankind,	Reason,	Society.	It	is	instead	a	question	of	coming	to	grips	with	this:	the	world	
rests	on	nothing	 .	 .	 .”217	In	other	words,	the	challenge	is	to	leave	the	place	of	the	deity	
empty,	clear,	and	open,	and	to	thereby	go	beyond	the	‘onto-theological’	determination	
of	 both	 Man	 and	 God.	 Nancy:	 “The	 empty	 place	 must	 not	 be	 occupied.” 218 	The	
phenomenological	 discovery	 of	 ‘the	 clearing’	 delineates	 an	 alterative	 to	 the	
metaphysical	 determination	 of	 Man	 as	 the	 genesis	 of	 meaning	 and	 the	 legislator	 of	
value.	Heidegger:	“If	man	is	no	longer	the	image	of	the	Judeo-Christian	creator-God	.	.	.	
the	only	conclusion	to	be	drawn	for	being-historical	thinking	is	this:	man	is	not	at	all	an	
image	of	an	Other,	but	[exists]	by	virtue	of	his	relation	to	being.	[Man]	 is	not	the	self-
seeking	 of	 a	 willful	 positing	 of	 essence,	 but	 rather	 belongingness	 unto	 being,	 that	 is,	
unto	what	 is	most	unique	 .	 .	 .”219	In	other	words,	Daesin	 is	grounded	 in	nothing	other	
than	 the	 ungrounded	 ‘clearing’	 of	 the	 phenomenal	 world.	 Nancy:	 “The	 death	 of	 God	
called	for	and	brought	forth	a	mode	of	thought	that	ventures	out	where	God	no	longer	
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guarantees	either	being	or	the	subject	or	the	world.”220	Post-metaphysical	thinking	must	
be	 ventured	without	 any	 recourse	 to	 an	 ‘onto-theological’	 grounding	 of	 being,	 value,	
and	truth.	
Nancy’s	 deconstruction	 of	 monotheism	 elucidates	 that	 which	 Heidegger	
enigmatically	names	‘the	holy’.	According	to	Heidegger	and	Nancy,	‘the	holy’	transcends	
both	the	‘onto-theological’	God	of	philosophy	and	the	anthropomorphic	God	of	religion.	
Heidegger:	“The	holy,	which	alone	is	the	essential	sphere	of	divinity,	which	in	turn	alone	
affords	 a	 dimension	 for	 the	 gods	 and	 for	 the	God,	 comes	 to	 radiate	only	when	being	
itself	.	.	.	has	been	illuminated	and	is	experienced	in	its	truth.”221	It	would	seem	that	‘the	
holy’	can	only	be	thought	from	out	of	the	‘truth	of	being’.	Again,	“only	from	the	truth	of	
being	can	the	essence	of	the	holy	be	thought.	Only	from	the	essence	of	the	holy	is	the	
essence	of	divinity	 to	be	thought.	Only	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	essence	of	divinity	can	 it	be	
thought	 or	 said	 what	 the	 word	 ‘God’	 is	 to	 signify.”222	What	 is	 that	 which	 Heidegger	
names	‘the	holy’?	Of	course,	this	is	the	wrong	question	to	ask,	since	for	Heidegger,	‘the	
holy’	is	not	what	there	is;	God	is	not	an	entity,	being,	or	object,	but	rather	the	non-dual	
‘clearing’	of	the	world	itself.	
Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 holy’	 echoes	 the	 teaching	 of	 at	 least	 two	 distinct	
religious	traditions:	Advaita	Vedanta	and	Kabbalah.	Advaita	Vendanta	means	‘non-dual	
teaching’,	while	Kabbalah	means	‘reception	of	tradition’.	The	affinity	between	Vendanta	
and	Kabbalah	 is	by	no	means	unexpected,	given	that	no-dualism	and	monotheism	are	
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simply	 two	ways	of	expressing	 the	 same	enigmatic	experience	of	 the	 sacred.	Vendata	
teaches	 that	 Atman	 (the	 indwelling	 spirit)	 is	 Brahman	 (the	 transcendent	 godhead).	
Kabbalah	 teaches	 that	Ein	Sof	 (the	 infinite)	 is	beyond	 the	Sefirot	 (the	anthropocentric	
image	 of	 god).	 Likewise,	 Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 holy’	 attempts	 to	 delineate	 an	
experience	of	the	sacred	that	‘de-structures’	the	metaphysical	understanding	of	God	as	
a	principle	of	logic.	For	Heidegger,	‘the	holy’	can	neither	be	understood	ontologically	as	
the	deepest	ground,	nor	theologically	as	the	highest	cause.	Indeed,	‘the	holy’	cannot	be	
understood	 at	 all.	 The	 stillness	 of	 ‘the	 clearing’	 is	 more	 elemental	 than	 any	 ‘onto-
theological’	 concept.	 ‘The	holy’	 is	 the	 radiant	opening	of	 the	world	 in	which	all	 things	
shine.		
According	to	Nancy,	the	deconstruction	of	monotheism	leaves	the	place	of	God	
“wide	 open,	 vacant,	 and	 abandoned,	 the	 divine	 infinitely	 undone	 and	 scattered.”223	
Nancy:	“This	is	no	longer	the	‘divine’,	but	is	the	dis-location	and	dis-position	of	the	world	
.	 .	 .”224	For	 Nancy,	 “the	 opening	 is	 neither	 the	 foundation	 nor	 the	 origin.”225	Nancy	
suggests	that	the	sacred	should	not	be	understood	‘onto-theologically’	as	the	Supreme	
Source	of	nature	and	the	cosmos.	Instead,	the	origin	“in	itself	it	is	nothing,	nothing	but	a	
gap,	 an	 opening.”226 	Nance:	 “There	 is	 no	 other	 world,	 no	 world	 beyond,	 nor	 any	
‘backworld’.	 This	 means	 that	 there	 is	 no	 ultimate	 reference	 for	 the	 networks	 of	 the	
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worlds	references	and	that	therefore	there	is	no	(ultimate)	Sense	.	.	.”227	In	the	absence	
of	that	any	fixed	transcendental	signifier,	“truth,	the	truth	of	philosophy	and	of	history,	
can	do	nothing	else,	henceforth,	than	open	onto	the	abyss	of	 its	own	beginning,	or	 its	
own	absence	of	beginning,	 end,	 and	ground.”228	It	 follows	 that	 “if	 the	world	does	not	
have	an	origin	outside	of	itself,	if	the	world	is	its	own	origin	or	the	origin	of	itself,	then	
the	origin	of	 the	world	happens	 at	 each	moment.”229	If	 there	 is	 no	prior	origin	of	 the	
world,	then	“the	world	springs	forth	everywhere	and	in	each	instant,	simultaneously.”230	
For	 Nancy,	 the	 sacred	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 this	 radiant	 opening	 of	 the	 world	 to	
presence.	
Nancy’s	 turn	 to	 religion	 deconstructs	 the	 simplistic	 dualism	between	dogmatic	
theism	 and	militant	 atheism.	 Nancy	 refutes	 both	 the	 anthropomorphic	 image	 of	 God	
and	 the	 theomorphic	 image	 of	 Man.	 Anthropomorphism	 is	 the	 projection	 of	 human	
qualities	onto	the	primordial	clearing	of	‘the	open’.	The	more	traditional	term	is	simply	
idolatry.	 The	 ancient	 Hebrew’s	 honored	 the	 clearing	 of	 ‘the	 holy’	 by	 prohibiting	 the	
creation	of	any	 ‘graven	 image’	of	God.	The	place	of	God	was	 to	 remain	empty	of	any	
conceptual	 representation.	 The	 most	 striking	 instance	 is	 the	 prohibition	 of	 any	
representation	of	the	sacred	name	of	God,	the	Tetragrammaton.	For	Christians	too,	the	
empty	 place	 of	 God	 is	 symbolized	 by	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 divine	 at	 the	 event	 of	
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resurrection;	“the	divine	is	the	empty	tomb.”231	For	this	reason,	Nancy	argues	that	the	
deconstructed	 God	 “is	 neither	 represented	 nor	 representable	 .	 .	 .	 but	 living;	 ‘the	
invisible	 image	of	an	 invisible	God’.”232	According	to	Nancy,	“what	 ‘resurrection’	refers	
to	 –	 inadequately	 –	 is	 the	 radiance	 of	 manifestation.”233	Nancy:	 “Resurrection	 is	 the	
manifestation	of	god	 inasmuch	as	he	comes	 in	his	own	withdrawal,	 leaves	his	mark	 in	
his	own	obliteration,	is	revealed	in	his	own	invisibility.”234	The	place	of	God	is	to	remain	
open,	empty,	and	clear;	 in	other	words	–	‘holy’.	While	traditional	religion	is	concerned	
with	worshiping	an	anthropomorphic	image	of	God,	Nancy	merely	indicates	the	simple	
wonder	of	being-there	in	‘the	open’,	or	that	which	the	poet	Rilke	calls	“that	pure	space	
into	which	flowers	endlessly	open”.235		
Nancy’s	 account	 of	 the	 radical	 imminence	 of	 ‘the	 holy’	 is	 akin	 to	 a	 secular	
account	of	kenosis.	Nancy:	“The	unique	God	.	 .	 .	cannot	precede	its	creation	any	more	
than	it	can	subsist	above	it	or	apart	form	it	in	some	way.	It	merges	with	it:	merging	with	
it	withdraws	in	it,	withdrawing	there	it	empties	itself	there,	emptying	itself	it	is	nothing	
other	than	the	opening	of	this	void.	Only	the	opening	is	divine,	but	the	divine	is	nothing	
more	 than	 the	opening.”236	Kenosis	understands	 the	divine	act	of	 creation	as	 the	 self-
emptying	 of	 God	 into	 the	 world.	 In	 this	 sense,	 kenosis	 deifies	 this	 world	 as	 the	 self-
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unfolding,	self-development,	and	self-emptying	of	‘Spirit’.	To	some	extent,	kenosis	also	
resembles	Heidegger’s	account	of	 the	 ‘abysmal	ground’	of	being.	By	utilizing	 the	 term	
‘ground’,	 Heidegger	 is	 not	 referring	 to	 the	 traditional	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 as	 an	
ontological	 foundation.	 Instead,	 the	 ‘abysmal’,	 ‘groundless’,	 or	 ‘ungrounded	 ground’	
refers	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 secure	 foundation,	 principle,	 or	 origin.	 Heidegger:	 “The	
abysmal	 ground	 is	 the	 hesitant	 self-withholding	 of	 the	 ground.” 237 	Although	 self-
withholding,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	 interpret	 the	 abysmal	 grounding	 of	 being	 as	
something	negative	or	nihilistic.	For	Heidegger	and	Nancy	both,	the	withholding	of	the	
ground	is	a	necessary	condition	for	‘the	clearing’	of	being;	“for	wherever	there	is	ground	
there	is	cessation	of	clearing.”238	The	withdrawal	of	a	metaphysical	foundation	is	at	the	
same	 time	 the	 emergence	 of	 being	 to	 presence.	 ‘The	 holy’	 is	 not	 separate	 from	 this	
world,	but	rather	the	very	clearing	of	‘the	open’	in	which	we	live,	and	move,	and	have	
our	being.		
We	have	now	seen	that	Heidegger’s	phenomenological	description	of	Dasein,	or	
being-there,	attempts	to	overcome	the	Cartesian	dualism	of	body	and	mind.	I	suggested	
that	Heidegger’s	confrontation	with	nihilism	proves	insufficient.	The	existential	themes	
of	Being	And	Time	 replicate	 the	same	humanist	concept	of	Man	as	a	secular	 image	of	
God	that	Heidegger	intends	to	supplant.	 In	the	end,	what	is	 ‘holy’	for	Heidegger	is	not	
Man,	 or	 God,	 but	 the	 open	 field	 of	 vision	 in	 which	 all	 things	 shine.	 In	 light	 of	 the	
insufficiencies	 of	 Heidegger’s	 phenomenological	 investigation,	 we	 move	 from	
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Heidegger’s	early	 fundamental	ontology	 to	Heidegger’s	 late	 reflections	on	 technology,	
language,	and	art.	We	will	see	that	the	‘clearing’	of	the	horizon	in	which	beings	emerge	
to	presence	is	only	a	partial	account	of	our	experience	of	‘being-in-the-world’.	There	is	
not	 just	 an	 emergence	 of	 beings	 to	 presence,	 but	 also	 a	 withdrawal	 of	 being	 into	
concealment.	We	will	see	that	this	self-concealment	of	being	is	 itself	concealed	by	the	
technological	‘framing’	of	being	as	constant	presence	available	for	instrumental	use.		
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III.	The	Technological	Framing	Of	Earth	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	Turn		
The	 topic	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	 non-instrumental	 environmental	 ethic	 of	
‘dwelling’	 that	 arises	 from	 Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	 of	 metaphysics.	 	 I	 argue	 that	
Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	 of	 metaphysics	 lends	 itself	 to	 an	 environmental	 ethic	 of	
non-violent	 ‘dwelling’.	 I	 trace	 the	 instrumental	 mode	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’	 to	 the	
beginning	 of	Western	metaphysics	 in	 ancient	 Greece.	 The	 root	 of	 the	 problem	 is	 the	
technological	 understanding	 of	 things	 as	 objects	 and	 truth	 as	 objectivity.	 Heidegger	
indicates	 a	 more	 primordial	 understanding	 of	 truth	 as	 ‘event’.	 For	 Heidegger,	 the	
emergence	 of	 a	 non-instrumental	 way	 of	 life	 depends	 upon	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	
technological	 ‘framing’	 of	 nature	 is	 clearly	perceived.	 I	 suggest	 that	while	Heidegger’s	
post-foundational	ethic	does	 indeed	envision	a	non-instrumental	 relation	 to	nature,	 it	
remains	unclear	how	such	an	alternative	way	of	life	may	be	politically	achieved.		
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To	the	extent	that	Heidegger	wishes	to	indicate	a	path	beyond	metaphysics,	his	
late	 philosophy	 offers	 insight	 into	 the	 possibility	 of	moving	 beyond	 the	 perception	 of	
Earth	as	a	mere	natural	resource	available	for	exploitation.	This	is	especially	evident	in	
Heidegger’s	Beiträge,	a	series	of	meditative	writings	that	include	the	recently	translated	
Contributions	 To	 Philosophy	 (Of	 The	 Event),	 The	 Event,	 Mindfulness,	 Overcoming	
Metaphysics,	 The	 History	 Of	 Being,	 and	 The	 Beginning	 Of	 Western	 Philosophy.	
Heidegger’s	 most	 famous	 work,	 Being	 And	 Time,	 is	 intended	 to	 culminate	 with	 an	
investigation	of	being	itself.	This	investigation,	however,	is	ultimately	left	incomplete.	In	
a	remarkable	demonstration	of	intellectual	humility,	Heidegger	judges	the	entire	project	
of	 overcoming	 metaphysics	 and	 the	 method	 of	 ‘fundamental	 ontology’	 to	 be	
insufficient.	Heidegger	 judges	his	 initial	attempt	to	overcome	metaphysics	 from	within	
the	metaphysical	 tradition	 to	 be	 insufficient	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons.	 The	most	 basic	
problem	with	 the	 attempt	 to	 overcome	metaphysics	 is	 that	 the	 imminent	 critique	 of	
metaphysics	unintentionally	presupposes	many	of	the	basic	onto-theological	 ‘concepts	
and	 categories’	 that	 Heidegger	 intends	 to	 overcome.	 Heidegger:	 “The	 previous	
attempts,	in	Being	And	Time	and	the	ensuing	writings	.	.	.	had	to	remain	insufficient.	For	
they	were	always	carried	out	as	a	 rejection	and	so	always	 took	 their	orientation	 from	
that	 which	 they	 rejected.”239	In	 other	 words,	 the	 language	 of	 metaphysics	 proves	
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inadequate	 to	 the	 criticism	of	metaphysics.	Heidegger’s	 task	 is	 therefore	 “to	 cease	all	
overcoming,	and	leave	metaphysics	to	itself.”240		
This	problem	is	evident	even	in	the	use	of	the	word	‘being’.	Heidegger’s	aim	is	to	
establish	the	insufficiencies	of	the	‘ontological	difference’	between	‘beings’	and	‘being’.	
To	the	extent	that	metaphysics	 is	concerned	with	‘being’	at	all,	 it	 is	understood	as	the	
‘Being	of	beings’;	 that	 is,	as	either:	1)	 the	most	general	and	universal	being,	or	2)	 the	
supreme	 and	 highest	 being.	 Furthermore,	 metaphysics	 conceals	 the	 difference	
between:	 1)	 the	 ontic	 study	 of	 a	 specific	 being,	 or	 object,	 and	 2)	 the	 fundamental	
ontological	 inquiry	 into	being	 itself.	 In	my	 judgment,	 the	metaphysical	 terminology	of	
fundamental	 ontology,	 including	 ‘beings’,	 ‘being’,	 and	 the	 ‘Being	 of	 beings’	 sacrifices	
conceptual	 precision,	 in	 addition	 to	 being	 unnecessarily	 tedious.	 By	 Heidegger’s	 own	
admission,	“	‘Being’	and	‘to	be’	are	almost	no	more	than	empty	sounds.”241	A	difficulty	
inherent	to	Heidegger’s	project	of	overcoming	the	metaphysical	understanding	of	being	
is	 that	 the	 term	 ‘being’	 indicates	 a	 noun,	 a	 thing,	 or	 an	 object.	 The	 term	 ‘being’	
therefore	 perpetuates	 the	 same	 subject-object	 relation	 that	 Heidegger	 intends	 to	
supplant	through	the	analysis	of	Dasein,	or	‘being-there’	in	the	world.	By	using	the	same	
metaphysical	language	of	‘being’	and	‘beings’	that	he	seeks	to	supplant,	Heidegger	both	
sacrifices	terminological	clarity	and	perpetuates	the	very	concepts	that	he	judges	to	be	
inadequate.	For	this	reason,	Heidegger’s	later	thought	largely	abandons	the	terminology	
of	 Being	 And	 Time	 and	 is	 instead	 characterized	 by	 the	 experimental	 use	 of	 non-
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metaphysical	language.	In	this	sense,	the	poetic	language	of	Heidegger’s	late	philosophy	
signifies	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 tradition	 of	 Western	 philosophy.	 In	 place	 of	 ‘beings’,	
‘being’,	 and	 the	 ‘Being	 of	 beings’,	 Heidegger	 speaks	 of	 ‘the	 event’,	 ‘dwelling’,	 and	
‘saying’.	
The	 ‘grounding	 question’	 of	 fundamental	 ontology	 delineates	 a	 similar	
methodological	 inadequacy	 of	 Heidegger’s	 failed	 immanent	 critique.	 Heidegger	
distinguishes	 between	 the	 ‘guiding	 question’	 of	 metaphysics,	 which	 is	 concerned	
exclusively	 with	 objectivity	 of	 ‘beings’,	 and	 the	 ‘grounding	 question’	 of	 fundamental	
ontology,	 which	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘being’.	 Unlike	 traditional	
metaphysical	 inquiry,	 ‘fundamental	 ontology’	 is	 not	 concerned	with	 the	 objectivity	 of	
beings	(what	a	being	is),	but	rather	with	the	meaning	of	being	(what	it	means	to	be).	The	
question	that	Being	And	Time	wishes	to	pose	anew	is	therefore:	What	does	it	mean	to	
be?	The	 ‘grounding	question’	of	 fundamental	ontology	nevertheless	approaches	being	
in	light	of	a	pre-conceived	epistemological	framework,	which	proves	insufficient	to	the	
intended	 task.	 The	 methodology	 of	 ‘fundamental	 ontology’	 resembles	 the	 scientific	
method,	which	presupposes	a	certain	amount	of	‘fore-knowledge’	about,	or	familiarity	
with	 the	 object	 of	 inquiry.	 This	 ‘fore-knowledge’	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	 a	
question	 and	 the	 positing	 of	 a	 hypothesis.	 However,	 although	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 focus	
attention	 to	 concrete	 experience,	 ‘fundamental	 ontology’	 inadvertently	 replicates	 the	
methodology	of	abstract	scientific	analysis.	This	resemblance	to	the	natural	sciences	 is	
problematic	 for	 Heidegger,	 for	 whom	 the	 scientific	 method	 of	 experimentation	 and	
observation	 frames	 being	 narrowly	 as	 “a	 calculable	 coherence	 of	 forces”	 and	 “sets	
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nature	 up	 to	 exhibit	 itself	 as	 a	 coherence	 of	 forces	 calculable	 in	 advance.”242	Again,	
science	 “orders	 its	 experiments	 precisely	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 asking	whether	 and	 how	
nature	presents	itself	when	set	up	in	this	way.”243	Heidegger’s	fundamental	question	of	
being	is	therefore	only	capable	of	disclosing	the	aspects	of	being	that	correspond	to	the	
pre-established	 method	 of	 inquiry.	 According	 to	 this	 established	 epistemological	
framework,	 beings	 are	 approached	 as	 objects	 distinct	 from	 the	 inquiring	 subject.	 In	
other	words,	the	question	of	being	presupposes	established	ways	representing	beings	as	
objects	and	 truth	as	objectivity.	Heidegger:	 “Science	 is	 research	 into	beings,	 such	 that	
these	are	already	determined	in	advance	as	objects.”244	The	aspects	of	beings	that	are	
not	readily	perceptible	to	the	scientific	interrogation	therefore	remains	concealed,	and	
subsequently	overlooked	entirely	by	the	history	of	philosophy.	In	light	of	this	problem,	
what	is	needed	is	a	more	receptive	way	of	thinking	and	dwelling.		
In	 his	 late	 thought,	Heidegger	 attempts	 to	 cultivate	 a	more	meditative	way	 of	
thinking	 that	 responds	 to	 being	 as	 occurrence,	 happening,	 or	 ‘event’.	 This	 receptive	
style	of	thinking	is	perhaps	closer	to	the	sensibility	of	visionary	mystics	and	poets	than	
to	 the	 sober	 rationality	 of	 philosophers	 and	 scientists.	 Heidegger	 aims	 to	 overcome	
metaphysical	 thinking	 by	 abandoning	 the	 scientific	 method	 of	 rational	 inquiry	 that	
orients	the	ontological	investigation	of	Being	And	Time.	In	order	to	accomplish	this	task,	
Heidegger’s	 style	 of	 thinking	 undergoes	 a	 ‘turn’	 away	 from	 the	 rigorous	
phenomenological	 methodology	 of	 Being	 And	 Time,	 towards	 a	 more	 meditative	 and	
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poetic	style	of	thinking.	More	specifically,	‘the	turn’	in	Heidegger’s	thought	indicates	an	
abandonment	 of	 the	 traditional	 metaphysical	 language	 of	 Western	 philosophy	 since	
Plato.	 As	 a	 result,	 Heidegger	 engages	 far	 less	 with	 the	 metaphysical	 language	 and	
existential	 themes	 of	 his	 early	 philosophy.	 Instead,	 the	 problematic	 to	 which	
Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 responds	 can	 be	 expressed	 as	 follows:	 “In	 the	 history	 of	
Western	thought,	from	its	inception,	the	being	of	beings	has	indeed	been	thought,	but	
the	 truth	 of	 being	 as	 being	 remains	 unthought;	 not	 only	 is	 such	 truth	 denied	 as	 a	
possible	experience	for	thinking,	but	Western	thought,	as	metaphysics,	expressly	though	
unwittingly	 conceals	 the	 occurrence	 of	 this	 refusal.” 245 	While	 Heidegger’s	 early	
‘fundamental	ontology’	attempts	to	‘de-structure’	metaphysics	from	within	the	tradition	
of	Western	 philosophy,	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 attempts	 to	 go	beyond	metaphysics	
altogether.	The	‘turn’	in	Heidegger’s	late	thought	should	therefore	be	understood	as	an	
attempt	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 conventional	 use	 of	 language,	 beyond	 the	 frame	 of	
immanence,	 and	 beyond	 the	 world-historical	 destiny	 of	 ‘the	 West’.	 The	 ‘turn’	 in	
Heidegger’s	thought	does	not	simply	attempt	to	a	‘step	back’	to	the	inception	of	ancient	
metaphysics	in	ancient	Greece,	but	to	‘leap	beyond’	the	entire	philosophical	tradition	of	
Western	 civilization	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 end	 of	 Western	 philosophy	 does	 not,	 however,	
signify	 the	end	of	 thinking.	On	the	contrary,	Heidegger	suggests	 that	“with	 the	end	of	
philosophy,	thinking	is	not	also	at	its	end,	but	in	a	transition	to	another	beginning.”246		
It	would	be	a	mistake	to	interpret	Heidegger’s	late	thought	as	a	naïve	attempt	to	
return	to	a	bygone	historical	era	of	‘first	beginning’	of	metaphysics.	Instead,	Heidegger	
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envisions	 the	 inception	 of	 ‘another	 beginning’	 altogether.	 Implicit	 in	 the	 intention	 to	
‘leap	 beyond’	 the	 history	 of	 Western	 metaphysics	 is	 a	 radical	 critique	 of	 Western	
civilization	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 radical	 nature	 of	 Heidegger’s	 criticism	 of	 metaphysics	
becomes	more	 clearly	delineated	when	 juxtaposed	with	Marx’s	 criticism	of	 capitalism	
and	 the	 prospects	 of	 a	 ‘proletarian	 revolution’.	 Heidegger	 judges	 Marx’s	 critique	 of	
capitalism	and	 the	 subsequent	notion	of	 revolution	 to	be	 insufficiently	 radical.	 In	 this	
context,	the	term	‘radical’	should	be	understood	according	to	its	original	meaning	as	‘a	
penetration	to	the	roots’.	Heidegger	argues	that	revolution	is	merely	“the	overturning	of	
what	is	already	familiar	but	never	the	transformation	into	the	entirely	Other”.247	What	is	
needed,	according	to	Heidegger’s	late	thought,	is	not	only	a	‘de-structuring’	of	Western	
metaphysics,	 but	 moreover,	 an	 epochal	 transfiguration	 of	 the	 ‘history	 of	 being’.	
Revolution	 amounts	 to	 a	 mere	 reversal,	 inversion,	 or	 reconfiguration	 of	 ‘the	 same’,	
whereas	Heidegger	seeks	a	radical	dislocation	of	2500	years	of	Western	philosophy	and	
civilization.	 The	 need	 for	 a	 more	 extensive	 break	 from	 metaphysics	 than	 a	 political	
revolution	 could	 achieve	 illuminates	 another	 significant	 disagreement	 between	
Heidegger	 and	 Marx.	 While	 Heidegger	 is	 deeply	 concerned	 with	 the	 alienation,	 or	
‘homelessness’	 of	 the	 modern	 condition,	 Heidegger	 fundamentally	 disagrees	 with	
Marx’s	diagnosis	of	the	capitalist	‘mode	of	production’	as	the	origin	of	such	alienation.	
For	Heidegger,	unlike	Marx,	alienation	does	not	originate	 from	the	capitalist	 ‘mode	of	
production’.	 Socialist	 industrialization	 is	 no	 more	 receptive	 to	 being	 than	 capitalist	
production.	Socialism	does	not	offer	a	genuine	alternative	 to	capitalism.	 Instead,	both	
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socialism	 and	 capitalism	 are	 encompassed	within	 the	metaphysical	 frame	 of	Western	
civilization.	What	is	needed,	for	Heidegger,	 is	an	alternative	to	the	entire	metaphysical	
framework	of	‘the	West’.	Even	a	break	with	modernity	would	be	insufficiently	radical	to	
accomplish	such	a	feat.		
Heidegger	 distinguishes	 between	 two	 beginnings	 of	 philosophy:	 the	 ‘first	
beginning’	 of	metaphysics	 in	 ancient	 Greece,	 and	 a	more	 enigmatic	 ‘other	 beginning’	
which	has	yet	to	be	accomplished.	The	first	beginning	amounts	to	a	 ‘step	back’	 to	the	
ancient	 Greek	 origins	 of	 Western	 metaphysics.	 Heidegger:	 “The	 step	 back	 from	 the	
thinking	 that	 merely	 represents	 to	 the	 thinking	 that	 responds.” 248 	According	 to	
Heidegger,	 the	 ancient	 Greek	 philosophers	 were	 the	 first	 to	 attain	 insight	 into	 the	
‘ontological	 difference’	 –	 the	 difference	 between	what	 there	 is,	 and	 that	 there	 is.	 In	
other	 words,	 the	 ‘ontological	 difference’	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 conceptual	
representation	 of	 what	 there	 is,	 and	 the	 awe	 and	 wonder	 that	 there	 is.	 Heidegger	
argues	that	“the	division	into	whatness	and	thatness	does	not	just	contain	a	doctrine	of	
metaphysical	 thinking.	 It	points	 to	an	event	 in	 the	history	of	being.”249	For	Heidegger,	
the	 distinction	 between	 ‘beings’	 and	 ‘being’	 attains	 its	 logical	 fulfillment	 in	 the	
‘abandonment’	 of	 beings	 to	 the	 violence	 of	 technological	 exploitation	 and	 the	
subsequent	‘oblivion’	of	being.	It	is	Heidegger’s	contention	that	nihilism	has	been	innate	
to	 Western	 metaphysics	 ever	 since	 the	 inception	 of	 the	 ‘ontological	 difference’	 in	
ancient	Greece.	Throughout	the	history	of	 ‘the	West’,	 the	simple	wonder	that	there	 is	
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becomes	 obscured	 by	 philosophical	 ‘concepts	 and	 categories’.	 The	 ‘step	 back’	 is	 not,	
therefore,	 merely	 concerned	 with	 a	 retrieval	 of	 the	 principles	 and	 dogmas	 that	
characterize	 ancient	metaphysics.	 Instead,	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 ‘step	 back’	 is	 to	 once	
again	perceive	the	wonder	that	there	is	being	rather	than	nothing.	While	metaphysics	is	
concerned	with	the	conceptual	representation	of	objects,	Heidegger’s	 ‘step	back’	aims	
to	cultivate	a	pre-conceptual	receptivity	to	direct	experience.	Heidegger:	“The	step	back	
lets	thinking	enter	into	a	questioning	that	experiences.”250	In	this	sense,	the	‘step	back’	
does	 not	 aim	 to	 retrieve	 or	 revive	 ancient	 philosophy.	 Instead,	 in	 Heidegger’s	words,	
“only	 when	 we	 turn	 thoughtfully	 toward	 what	 has	 already	 been	 thought,	 will	 we	 be	
turned	to	what	must	still	be	thought.”251	The	‘step	back’	 is	therefore	a	preparation	for	
the	 still	 more	 radical	 ‘leap	 beyond’	 the	 entire	 Western	 philosophical	 tradition	 since	
Plato.		
While	it	is	frequently	noted	that	many	of	Heidegger’s	early	existential	themes	–	
such	 as	 anxiety,	 being-towards-death,	 guilt,	 and	 conscience	 –	 are	 indebted	 to	 the	
modern	theologian	and	philosopher	Soren	Kierkegaard,	it	is	less	often	noted	that	this	is	
also	the	case	with	Heidegger’s	notion	of	 ‘the	 leap’	 in	his	 later	thought.	The	somewhat	
obscure	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 leap’	 can	 be	more	 readily	 understood	within	 this	 context.	 For	
Kierkegaard,	 as	 for	 Heidegger,	 ‘the	 leap’	 is	 not	 altogether	 different	 from	 the	 idea	 of	
religious	conversion.	In	this	sense,	Heidegger	presupposes	that	“there	is	a	thinking	more	
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rigorous	than	the	conceptual.”252	The	‘leap	beyond’	metaphysics	therefore	amounts	to	a	
transition	from	the	intellectual	representation	of	being	as	an	object,	to	a	‘mindfulness’	
of	the	essential	occurrence	of	being	as	‘event’.	The	notion	of	the	‘leap	beyond’	should	
also	be	understood	in	opposition	to	the	steady	progression	of	deductive	and	inductive	
logic.	 ‘The	 leap’	 breaks	 free	 of	 “the	 restriction	 of	 thinking	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 thinking	
established	 by	 logic.”253 	‘The	 leap’	 is	 sudden,	 abrupt,	 and	 completely	 unexpected.	
Heidegger:	 “In	 contrast	 to	 a	 steady	progress	 .	 .	 .	 the	 leap	 takes	 us	 abruptly	 to	where	
everything	 is	 different,	 so	 different	 that	 it	 strikes	 us	 as	 strange.	 Abrupt	means	 sheer	
descent	or	rise	that	mark	the	chasms	edge.”254	In	this	sense,	the	‘leap	beyond’	is	akin	to	
direct	pre-conceptual	 insight	into	non-dual	experience.	It	would	therefore	be	mistaken	
to	interpret	‘the	leap’	as	a	movement	beyond	existence	into	some	kind	of	otherworldly	
realm,	 such	 as	 the	 divine	 realm	 of	 Plato’s	 forms.	 Instead,	 ‘the	 leap’	 involves	 a	
‘bracketing’	 of	 abstract	 rationality	 and	 a	 renewed	 attention	 to	 direct	 experience.	 For	
Heidegger,	thinking	“is	not	about	a	mere	modification	of	the	concept,	nor	about	a	more	
original	 insight	 into	 the	 essence.	 Instead,	 it	 is	 about	 the	 leap	 into	 the	 essential	
occurrence	 of	 truth.”255	Such	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 ‘essential	 occurrence’	 of	 truth	would	
amount	to	nothing	less	than	the	inception	of	 ‘another	beginning’	 in	the	history	of	 ‘the	
West’.	 In	 other	 words,	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 amounts	 to:	 1)	 a	 ‘step	 back’	 to	 the	
unthought	 difference	 between	 being	 and	 beings,	 and,	 more	 significantly,	 2)	 a	 ‘leap	
beyond’	the	world-historical	epoch	of	Western	metaphysics.	
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The	Frame		
	 Contrary	to	the	history	of	philosophy	since	Plato,	for	whom	truth	is	eternal	and	
unchanging,	Heidegger	argues	that	the	‘truth	of	being’	 is	both	temporal	and	historical.	
History	 grounds	 the	 ‘truth	 of	 being’.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 ‘history	 of	 being’	 is	 the	
ungrounded	 site	 of	 truth.	 Heidegger:	 “In	 its	 own	 being,	 truth	 is	 historical” 256 	For	
Heidegger,	 “truth	 is	 inherently	 historical,	 not	 because	 human	 being	 elapses	 in	 the	
course	of	time,	but	because	mankind	is	sent	into	metaphysics,	and	because	metaphysics	
alone	is	able	to	ground	an	epoch	insofar	as	it	establishes	and	maintains	humankind	in	a	
truth	 concerning	 beings	 as	 such	 and	 as	 a	whole.”	257	Heidegger’s	 argument	 is	 actually	
quite	simple.	Metaphysics	does	not	refer	 to	system	of	dogmas,	beliefs,	and	principles,	
but	 instead	 refers	 to	 an	 historical	 horizon	 of	 experience.	 Heidegger:	 “Metaphysics	
determines	the	history	of	the	Western	era.”	258	Again,	“Metaphysics	grounds	an	age,	in	
that	through	a	specific	comprehension	of	truth	it	gives	to	that	age	a	basis	upon	which	it	
is	formed.”	259	An	‘age’,	‘era’,	or	‘epoch’	of	history	refers	to	the	unconscious	horizon	of	
intelligibility	and	meaning	that	frames	our	basic	experience	of	being.	 In	this	sense,	the	
unfolding	and	culmination	of	Platonic	metaphysics	is	akin	to	the	density	of	‘the	West’.		
Heidegger	claims	that	the	‘truth	of	being’	expresses	itself	differently	throughout	
different	historical	epochs	of	being.	Heidegger:	“History	arises	out	of	the	appropriating	
event	 and	 as	 such	 decides	 the	 essence	 of	 truth	 in	 each	 case	 and,	 with	 this	 decision,	
sustains	 a	 ‘time’	 and	 grounds	 ‘epochs’	 that	 essentially	 occur	 .	 .	 .	 as	 ages	 of	 world-
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history.”	260	According	 to	Heidegger,	 the	history	of	 the	 ‘first	beginning’	of	metaphysics	
constitutes	 the	 world-historical	 epoch	 in	 which	 the	 truth	 of	 being	 discloses	 itself	 as	
alethia,	 or	 ‘un-concealment’.	 Only	 in	 light	 of	 this	 original	 ‘clearing’	 of	 being	 can	 any	
specific	 entity	 or	 thing	 emerge	 to	 presence.	 For	 Heidegger,	 the	 inception	 of	 ‘another	
beginning’	would	constitute	a	rupture,	or	break	from	the	epoch	of	the	‘first	beginning’.	
In	this	sense,	the	‘first	beginning’	constitutes	the	epochal	frame	of	Western	metaphysics	
beginning	 with	 Plato	 and	 culminating	 with	 Nietzsche.	 For	 Heidegger,	 “history	 is	 not	
merely	 in	transition	to	another	age	within	the	previous	time-space	of	metaphysics;	on	
the	 contrary,	 time-space	 itself	 is	 becoming	 other.”261	Each	 unique	 ‘world-historical’	
epoch	signifies	a	distinct	metaphysical	 framework	that	structures	our	basic	experience	
of	being.	For	this	reason,	‘another	beginning’	would	constitute	a	fundamentally	different	
way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’.	 Heidegger’s	 understanding	 of	 metaphysics	 as	 a	 ‘world-
historical’	 epoch	 of	 being	 indicates	 that	 history	 is	 not	 a	 linear	 development	 through	
time,	 but	 rather	 a	 series	 of	 unforeseeable	 breaks.	 A	 rupture	 of	 the	 epochal	 frame	 of	
Western	metaphysics	therefore	indicates	the	inception	of	a	way	of	‘being-in-the-world’	
that	is	absolutely	incommensurable	with	the	history	of	the	‘first	beginning’.	
It	is	worth	noting	that	Heidegger’s	account	of	a	‘world-historical’	epoch	of	being	
is	 quite	 different	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 universal	 history	 of	 ‘world-spirit’	 that	 dominates	
modern	philosophy	from	Kant	through	Hegel	and	culminating	in	Marx.	A	juxtaposition	of	
Heidegger’s	notion	of	 ‘historicity’	with	 the	dialectical	notion	of	 ‘universal	history’	may	
clarify	 the	 former.	 Hegel’s	 phenomenology	 of	 ‘World-Spirit’	 is	 a	 secularized	 Christian	
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cosmology.	 The	 dialectical	 movement	 of	 ‘Being	 –	 Essence	 –	 Notion’	 delineates	 the	
Trinitarian	account	of	the	Incarnation,	Crucifixion,	and	Resurrection	of	God.	The	Father	
is	incarnated	as	the	Son	who	is	crucified	and	resurrected	as	the	Holy	Spirit	of	Christian	
fellowship.	 Hegel:	 “Spirit	 is	 the	movement	 of	 Self	 that	 empties	 itself	 of	 itself	 .	 .	 .”262	
Hegel	 argues	 that	 history	 is	 the	 immanent	 unfolding	 of	 ‘universal	 spirit’	 in	 the	world.	
The	 dialectical	 movement	 of	 history	 is	 the	 process	 of	 the	 self-emptying	 of	 ‘Spirit’;	
“history	is	a	conscious	self-mediating	process	–	Spirit	emptied	out	into	Time	.	.	.”263	For	
Hegel,	the	subject	of	history	is	history	itself.	Hegel	therefore	defines	the	‘universal	spirit’	
of	 ‘world-history’	as	 “that	Spirit	whose	nature	 is	always	one	and	 the	 same,	but	which	
unfolds	its	one	nature	in	the	phenomenon	of	the	World’s	existence.”264	The	subject,	or	
‘spirit	of	history’	unfolds	itself	as	a	process	of	self-differentiation,	and	returns	to	itself	in	
a	 process	 of	 self-recognition.	 History	 is	 therefore	 the	 process	 through	 which	 ‘world-
spirit’	 attains	 the	 self-consciousness	 of	 its	 own	movement	 and	 development	 towards	
‘absolute	 knowledge’.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Hegel	 claims	 that	 the	movement	 of	 ‘universal	
history’	is	the	progressive	development	of	‘world-spirit’	to	ever	more	advanced	forms	of	
self-consciousness.	Hegel:	 “The	 life	of	 the	ever	present	 Spirit	 is	 a	 circle	of	progressive	
embodiments.”265	For	Hegel,	 ‘universal	history’	 is	 therefore	 the	history	of	progress,	of	
the	real	becoming	rational	and	the	rational	real;	“Reason	is	the	Sovereign	of	the	World;	
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the	 history	 of	 the	 world,	 therefore,	 presents	 us	 with	 a	 rational	 process.”266	In	 other	
words,	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 reason	 governs	 the	 ascending	 trajectory	 of	 ‘world-history’.	
The	unfolding	of	 ‘world-spirit’	 is	driven	by	an	 innate	telos	that	determines	the	 logic	of	
historical	development.	 	As	obscure	as	Hegel’s	notion	of	‘universal	history’	may	at	first	
seem,	it	 is	actually	the	dominant	ideology	of	modernity.	The	epochal	frame	of	modern	
time-consciousness	 perceives	 history	 as	 a	 linear	 sequence	 of	 events.	 Furthermore,	
history	is	the	linear	progression	from	the	dark	past	towards	a	brighter	future.	Although	
dominant,	this	ideology	most	often	remains	primarily	latent,	and	therefore	unconscious.	
For	 instance,	nearly	all	of	us	 implicitly	believe	 that	 the	modern	age	 is	more	advanced	
than	previous	historical	eras,	and	that	civilization	will	continue	to	advance	into	an	ideal	
future.	In	this	sense,	to	the	extent	that	we	are	modern,	we	are	also	implicitly	Hegelian.			
Heidegger’s	criticism	of	‘universal	history’	is	remarkably	similar	to	Kierkegaard’s	
critique	of	Hegel.	Hegel	claims	that	each	historical	epoch	is	overcome,	transcended,	or	
sublated	 by	 a	 more	 advanced	 stage	 of	 history.	 In	 this	 context,	 sublation	 should	 be	
understood	as	an	overcoming	 that	both	 transcends	and	preserves	 the	horizons	of	 the	
current	 historical	 epoch.	 For	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Kierkegaard,	 however,	 history	 is	
constituted	by	discontinuity	and	rupture	rather	than	the	progressive	continuity	of	time	
that	stretches	from	the	past	to	the	present	and	into	the	future.	There	is	no	innate	logic	
to	history.	History	is	not	the	history	of	progress.	Instead,	each	world-historical	epoch	is	
‘incommensurable’	with	every	other	epoch	of	being.	An	epoch	of	 ‘world-history’	does	
not	progress	to	a	higher	stage	through	the	logical	development	of	a	divine	purpose,	or	
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telos,	 as	 it	 does	 for	 Hegel.	 Hegel’s	 teleological	 notion	 of	 history	 is	 more	 clearly	
delineated	when	juxtaposed	with	Kierkegaard’s	notion	of	the		‘teleological	suspension’	
of	‘universal	history’.	A	‘teleological	suspension’	of	history	presupposes	something	that	
is	 higher	 than	 the	 universal.	 For	 Kierkegaard,	 that	 which	 is	 ‘higher’	 is	 the	 singular	
individual	 before	 God.	 A	 ‘teleological	 suspension’	 of	 history	 is	 similar	 to	 Heidegger’s	
notion	of	an	epochal	transfiguration	of	being.	The	transfiguration	of	a	‘world-historical’	
epoch	 of	 being	 should	 therefore	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 suspension,	 rupture,	 or	 break	
from	the	history	of	the	‘first	beginning’	of	metaphysics.	It	therefore	follows	that	history	
is	 not	 a	 progressive	 development	 through	 time,	 but	 rather	 a	 series	 of	 unforeseeable	
breaks.	 Each	 historical	 era	 represents	 the	 advent	 of	 a	 unique	 way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-
world’.	The	discontinuity	of	history	means	that	the	advent	of	another	‘world-historical’	
epoch	 is	 completely	 unforeseeable	 from	 within	 epochal	 horizons	 of	 the	 Western	
metaphysics.	A	 chasm	 therefore	extends	between	 the	 ‘first	 beginning’	of	metaphysics	
and	 that	which	Heidegger	 calls	 ‘another	 beginning’.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 fundamental	
characteristics	 of	 the	 ‘other	 beginning’	 are	 completely	 unforeseeable	 from	within	 the	
metaphysical	 framework	 of	 the	 ‘first	 beginning’.	 It	 is	 not	 Heidegger’s	 intention	 to	
accomplish	an	epochal	transfiguration	of	being,	but	merely	to	establish	its	necessity.	At	
most,	 Heidegger	 hopes	 to	 prepare	 for	 inception	 of	 ‘another	 beginning’	 by	 cultivating	
experimental	modes	of	thought.		
An	essential	element	of	Heidegger’s	late	thought	is	the	contention	that	the	‘first	
beginning’	 of	 metaphysics	 frames	 being	 as	 ‘constant	 presence’.	 Heidegger:	 “Being	
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means:	 presencing,	 letting-be-present:	 presence.” 267 Again,	 “presence	 means:	 the	
constant	abiding	that	approaches	man,	reaches	him,	 is	extended	to	him.”268	Heidegger	
argues	that	“since	the	beginning	of	Western	metaphysics,	being	has	been	understood	in	
the	sense	of	permanence	of	presencing,	whereby	permanence	has	ambiguously	meant	
both	 fixity	 and	 persistence.” 269 In	 Heidegger’s	 words,	 metaphysics	 is	 the	 “final	
consequence	 of	 this	 determination	 of	 the	 sway	 of	 being	 as	 ‘the	 permanent’,	 ‘the	
constant’	 .	 .	 .”	270		As	 early	 as	Being	 And	 Time,	Heidegger	 describes	 two	 fundamental	
‘attunements’	 towards	 being	 as	 presence:	 ‘present-at-hand’	 and	 ‘ready-to-hand’.	
‘Present-at-hand’	refers	to	the	objective	presence	of	objects	to	reason,	while	‘ready-to-
hand’	 refers	 to	 the	practical	use	of	 tools	 in	daily	 life.	While	 things	appear	 ‘present-at-
hand’	 to	 the	 detached	 observation	 of	 the	 scientist	 or	 philosopher,	 things	 are	 not	
necessarily	experienced	as	 ‘present-at-hand’	 in	 the	context	of	daily	 life.	Rather,	 things	
merely	appear	as	objectively	present	when	related	to	exclusively	as	objects	of	scientific	
observation	 and	 experimentation.	 In	 fact,	 ‘present-at-hand’	 is	 derivative	 of	 the	more	
primordial	way	of	relating	to	things	as	‘ready-to-hand’.	For	Heidegger,	things	appear	as	
‘ready-to-hand’	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ordinary,	 pre-theoretical	 way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’.	
While	 metaphysics	 ‘frames’	 beings	 as	 objectively	 present,	 attention	 to	 experience	
reveals	 things	within	an	 interdependent	network	of	 relations	and	a	matrix	of	meaning	
arising	 from	 everyday	 practical	 use.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 ‘present-at-hand’	 mode	 of	
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relating	to	things	as	objects	is	an	abstraction	of	the	way	things	actually	appear	to	direct	
experience.	 The	 concept	 assumes	 primacy	 over	 that	 which	 is	 conceptualized.	 The	
metaphysical	relation	to	beings	as	objects	that	are	‘present-at-hand’	abstracts	from	the	
practical	 ‘ready-to-hand’	 way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’.	 The	 ‘present-at-hand’	 way	 of	
relating	to	things	as	objects	obscures	the	following	fact:	that	the	pre-theoretical	relation	
to	things	as	tools	is	more	primordial	than	the	scientific	relation	to	things	as	objects.		
Heidegger’s	controversial	 insight	 is	that	technology	did	not	emerge	from	out	of	
the	 modern	 scientific	 revolution.	 Heidegger	 argues	 that	 technology	 precedes	 the	
development	of	science,	just	as	the	‘ready-to-hand’	way	of	being	in	the	world	precedes	
the	‘present-at-hand’	relation	to	being.	According	to	Heidegger,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	
interpret	 technology	 as	 a	 primarily	 modern	 phenomenon.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	
technological	 relation	 to	 being	 is	 as	 ancient	 as	 metaphysics	 itself.	 Heidegger:	
“Technology	 is	 in	 its	essence	a	destiny	within	 the	history	of	being	and	of	 the	 truth	of	
being,	a	truth	that	lies	in	oblivion.”271	Heidegger	traces	the	origins	of	this	destiny	back	to	
the	 inception	 of	 Western	 metaphysics	 in	 ancient	 Greece.	 Heidegger	 distinguishes	
between	technology	on	the	one	hand,	and	essence	of	technology	on	the	other.	In	light	
of	this	distinction,	Heidegger	suggests	that	“technology	is	not	equivalent	to	the	essence	
of	 technology.”272	Furthermore,	 “the	 essence	 of	 technology	 is	 by	 no	 means	 anything	
technological.”273	If	 technology	can	be	understood	as	“the	manufacture	and	utilization	
of	equipment,	tools,	and	machines,	the	manufactured	and	used	things	themselves,	and	
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the	needs	and	ends	they	serve,”	what	then,	 is	the	essence	of	technology?	274	It	 is	clear	
that	 for	 Heidegger	 the	 essence	 of	 technology	 is	 more	 than	 a	 means	 to	 an	 end;	
technology	 is	more	 than	 a	mere	neutral	 instrument	 directed	 towards	 specific	 ends	of	
our	own	choosing.	 Instead,	Heidegger	argues	that	“everywhere	we	remain	unfree	and	
chained	 to	 technology,	 whether	 we	 passionately	 affirm	 or	 deny	 it.	 But	 are	 delivered	
over	 to	 it	 in	 the	 worst	 possible	 way	 when	 we	 regard	 it	 as	 something	 neutral.”275	
Contrary	to	the	standard	interpretation	of	technology	as	a	neutral	tool,	or	the	means	to	
and	a	 specific	 end,	Heidegger	 argues	 that	 the	essence	of	 technology	does	not	merely	
mediate	 our	 access	 to	 things	 in	 the	 world.	 Technology	 discloses	 the	 world	 as	 such;	
technology	 is	 ‘world-disclosing’.	 According	 to	 Heidegger,	 the	 essence	 of	 technology	
“coincides	with	 the	 term	completed	metaphysics.”276	Western	metaphysics	 culminates	
with	 the	 ‘abandonment’	 of	 beings	 to	 the	 fate	 of	 technological	 ‘machination’.	 The	
completion	of	metaphysics	is	therefore	akin	to	the	nihilistic	destiny	of	‘the	West’.	
According	to	Heidegger,	the	historical	unfolding	of	Platonic	metaphysics	‘frames’	
being	 as	 ‘constant	 presence’.	 In	 the	 modern	 era,	 the	 metaphysical	 determination	 of	
being	as	‘presence’	discloses	beings	as	‘standing	reserve’	for	technological	exploitation.	
Heidegger	argues	that	“this	[metaphysical]	view	excludes	.	.	.	that	which	becomes,	that	
which	 comes	 into	 being	 and	 ceases	 to	 be,	 the	 un-constant.” 277 	The	 technological	
‘framing’	 of	 living	 beings	 as	 a	 ‘resource’	 culminates	 with	 “the	 unconditional	
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objectification	 of	 everything	 present”278	and	 “the	 absolute	 objectification	 of	 being	 as	
such.”279	The	 total	 objectification	 of	 being	 is	 a	 logical	 outcome	 of	 the	 ‘ontological	
difference’	–	“the	sole	precedence	of	beings	(of	what	is	objectively	real)	over	being.”280	
With	the	distinction	of	the	‘truth	of	being’	from	beings,	beings	become	objects	and	truth	
becomes	objectivity.	As	a	result,	“being	everywhere	abandons	beings,	 leaving	them	to	
the	 claws	 and	 talons	 of	 objectification.”281	The	 pre-conceptual,	 pre-objective,	 or	 pre-
theoretical	 way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’	 was	 more	 readily	 accessible	 to	 the	 ancient	
Greeks	 than	 to	 us	 moderns.	 The	 insight	 of	 the	 Pre-Socratics	 has,	 nevertheless,	 been	
concealed	and	forgotten	throughout	the	history	of	Platonic	metaphysics.	For	Heidegger,	
the	unfolding	of	metaphysics	 is	 coextensive	with	 ‘the	history	of	being’.	Heidegger:	 “In	
the	 beginning	 of	 its	 history,	 Being	 opens	 itself	 up	 as	 an	 emerging	 (physis)	 and	 un-
concealment	 (alethia).	 From	 there	 it	 reaches	 the	 formulation	 of	 presence	 and	
permanence	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 enduring	 (ousia).”282	At	 the	 inception	 of	 metaphysics	 in	
ancient	Greece,	being	discloses	 itself	as	 the	 radiant	emergence	of	beings	 to	presence.	
Throughout	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy,	 however,	metaphysics	 becomes	 the	 systematic	
representation	 of	 that	which	 can	 be	 conceptually	 grasped	 as	 objectively	 present.	 For	
Heidegger,	 the	 primordial	 ‘clearing’	 of	 an	 epochal	 horizon	 of	 being	 is	 prior	 to	 the	
technological	 ‘framing’	 of	 being	 as	 a	 ‘resource’.	 Heidegger	 therefore	 intends	 to	 ‘step	
back’	to	the	ancient	experience	of	the	emergence	of	beings	into	‘the	open’.	
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At	the	inception	of	Western	metaphysics,	‘beings’	are	distinguished	from	‘being’.	
The	question	of	‘being’	subsequently	recedes	behind	the	disclosure	of	individual	entities.	
As	a	 result,	 the	 fundamental	question	of	being	 is	 concealed	and	obscured.	We	are	no	
longer	 ‘mindful’	 that	 there	 is.	 Henceforth,	 being	 is	 thought	 exclusively	 as	 a	 ‘standing	
reserve’	 constantly	 available	 for	 extraction,	 production,	 and	 exploitation.	 It	 is	
Heidegger’s	 contention	 that	 “the	unconditional	 establishment	of	machination	and	 the	
aligning	 of	 mankind	 to	 this	 establishment	 constitute	 the	 installation	 of	 the	
abandonment	of	beings	by	being	 .	 .	 .”283	The	technological	 ‘framing’	of	beings	and	the	
‘abandonment’	 of	 being	 culminates	 in	 the	 complete	 nihilism	 of	 ‘machination’.	 The	
technological	‘framing’	of	nature	renders	it	virtually	impossible	to	encounter	this	world	
as	sacred.	For	instance,	it	is	Heidegger’s	contention	that	it	is	now	impossible	to	perceive	
a	 river	as	anything	more	 than	a	natural	 resource.	For	 this	 reason,	Holderlin’s	hymn	to	
the	Ister	is	a	work	of	art	that	bears	witness	to	fundamentally	different	world,	one	that	is	
no	 longer	 accessible	 to	 us.	 Similarly,	 the	 Black	 Forest	 no	 longer	 inspires	mystery	 and	
fables.	Instead,	it	is	just	another	stock	of	‘standing	reserve’	to	be	exploited.	Obscured	by	
city	lights,	the	night	sky	no	longer	inspires	‘awe	and	wonder’	before	the	vastness	of	the	
cosmos.	We	have	truly	become	‘homeless’	in	this	world.	The	technological	‘framing’	of	
nature	 is	 total.	 Rivers,	mountains,	 forests,	 and	 fields	 become	a	 ‘natural	 resource’	 just	
humans	 are	 reduced	 to	 ‘human	 capital’.	 Heidegger:	 “The	 irresistibility	 of	 the	
metaphysical	essence	of	 technology	now	 incorporates	 the	human	being,	 calculated	as	
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the	 most	 important	 raw	 material.”284	In	 other	 words,	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 is	 the	 total	
technological	 ‘framing’	 of	 Earth	 as	 standing	 reserve	 for	 instrumental	 ‘machination’	 –	
“the	planetary	imperialism	of	technologically	organized	man.”285	
Heidegger’s	criticism	of	the	‘framing’	and	‘machination’	of	nature	can	be	further	
clarified	by	looking	briefly	at	the	notion	of	‘instrumental	reason’	emerging	from	out	of	
the	 Frankfurt	 School	 of	 critical	 theory,	 especially	 the	 work	 of	 Herbert	Marcuse.	 As	 a	
student	 of	 Heidegger,	 Marcuse’s	 criticism	 of	 technological	 rationality	 is	 deeply	
influenced	 by	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought.	 Following	 Heidegger,	 Marcuse	 attempts	 to	
disclose	the	“basic	experiential	framework”	of	the	modern	epoch	of	being.286		According	
to	 Marcuse,	 technology	 functions	 as	 an	 a	 priori	 –	 it	 reveals	 being	 as	 nothing	 but	 a	
resource	 constantly	 available	 for	 exploitation.287	As	 a	 priori,	 the	 technological	 frame	
“predefines	the	form	in	which	objects	appear.”288	In	other	words,	technology	functions	
as	an	a	priori	category	of	perception	in	the	sense	that	“it	predetermines	the	experience	
of	nature	as	extractable	resource.”289	For	Heidegger	and	the	Frankfurt	School	alike,	the	
essence	of	technology	discloses	“a	specific	world,	[but	technology]	does	not	and	cannot	
transcend	 this	 world.”290	Within	 the	metaphysical	 framework	 of	 technology,	 “being	 is	
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apprehended	 under	 the	 aspect	 of	 manufacture	 and	 administration.” 291 	The	
metaphysical	 determination	 of	 being	 as	 ‘presence’	 lends	 itself	 to	 the	 perception	 of	
nature	 as	 a	 ‘resource’	 available	 for	 total	 administration.	 For	 both	 Heidegger	 and	
Marcuse,	‘machination’	encompasses	the	totality	of	being,	thereby	‘framing’	all	of	Earth	
as	a	 resource	 for	exploitation.	Heidegger’s	account	of	 the	 ‘abandonment’	of	beings	 to	
‘machination’	should	be	understood	in	light	of	the	total	administration	of	‘instrumental	
reason’.	 For	 the	 Frankfurt	 School,	 the	 domination	 of	 nature	 goes	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	
domination	of	man.	The	same	is	true	for	Heidegger	as	well	–	the	technological	‘framing’	
of	 being	 delimits	 the	 epochal	 horizon	 of	 Western	 metaphysics.	 This	 is	 similar	 to	
Marcuse’s	 contention	 that	 “the	 intsrumentalization	 of	 things	 becomes	 .	 .	 .	 the	
instrumentaliziation	of	man.”292	This	is	also	the	position	of	Horkheimer	and	Adorno,	for	
whom	 “man	 becomes	 material,	 just	 as	 nature	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 material	 for	 society.”293	
Nevertheless,	perhaps	the	differences	between	Heidegger	and	the	Frankfurt	School	are	
more	 significant	 than	 their	 similarities.	 While	 the	 Frankfurt	 school	 diagnoses	 the	
‘instrumentalization’	 of	 man,	 the	 reification	 of	 consciousness,	 and	 the	 mutilation	 of	
sensation	 to	 the	 alienation	 of	 global	 capitalism,	 Heidegger	 is	 more	 fatalistic	 in	 his	
outlook.	 For	 Heidegger,	 the	 technological	 ‘framing’	 and	 ‘machination’	 of	 nature	
constitutes	the	nihilistic	destiny	of	‘the	West’.	
The	 innate	 nihilism	 of	 metaphysics	 need	 not	 lead	 to	 the	 defeatism	 of	 radical	
pessimism.	A	faint	glimmer	of	hope	remains.	Heidegger	directs	us	to	Holderlin’s	poetic	
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saying:	 ‘Where	 there	 is	 danger,	 there	 grows	 the	 saving	 power’.	 For	 Heidegger,	 the	
‘saving	power’	is	as	follows:	that	the	essence	of	technology	is	also	the	essence	of	truth.	
Technology	 discloses	 beings	 as	 objects,	 thereby	 revealing	 the	 truth	 of	 being	 as	
objectivity.	It	follows	that	truth	is	therefore	the	adequate	representation	of	an	object	to	
consciousness.	 The	 instrumental	 exploitation	 of	 nature	 as	 a	 ‘standing	 reserve’	 is	 the	
culmination	of	the	metaphysical	determination	of	being	as	‘constant	presence’.	What	is	
needed	 is	 a	 ‘leap	 beyond’	 the	metaphysical	 determination	 of	 being	 as	 presence.	 ‘The	
leap’	signifies	the	inception	of	a	non-instrumental	relation	to	nature.	The	implications	of	
Heidegger’s	criticism	of	Western	metaphysics	are	extensive.	It	would	seem	that	nothing	
short	 of	 an	 ‘epochal	 transfiguration’	 can	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 instrumental	
relation	to	being.	What	is	needed,	therefore,	is	“a	new	basic	experience	of	being	[that]	
would	 change	 human	 existence	 in	 its	 entirety.”294	The	 intention	 of	 Heidegger	 and	
Marcuse	is	identical	in	this	respect.	For	both	thinkers,	only	“a	qualitatively	new	mode	of	
‘seeing’	 and	 qualitatively	 new	 relations	 between	 men	 and	 nature”	 would	 signify	 a	
transfiguration	 of	 the	 epochal	 horizons	 of	 being. 295 	Such	 a	 transfiguration	 of	 the	
technological	 way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’	 would	 consist	 of	 “a	 fundamentally	 different	
experience	of	being,	a	 fundamentally	different	 relation	between	man	and	nature,	and	
fundamentally	 different	 existential	 relations.” 296 	For	 Heidegger	 and	 Marcuse	 alike,	
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salvation	would	 require	 nothing	 less	 than	 the	 emergence	of	 “a	 different	 fundamental	
relation	to	being.”297	
The	 prospect	 of	 such	 an	 ‘epochal	 transfiguration’	 depends,	 first	 of	 all,	 on	 the	
extent	 to	which	 the	necessity	of	 such	a	break	 from	 the	 ‘history	of	being’	 is	 felt	 as	 an	
existential	need.	For	Heidegger,	the	fundamental	need	is	“to	disrupt	history	through	the	
leap	into	the	overcoming	of	metaphysics,	and	thereby	to	raise	beings	as	a	whole	out	of	
the	hinges	of	machination.”298	If	there	is	indeed	reason	to	place	hope	in	a	‘saving	power’,	
then	the	‘plight’	of	the	‘abandonment’	of	being	to	technological	‘machination’	must	give	
rise	to	a	deeply	felt	need	for	the	 inception	of	a	non-instrumental	way	of	 life.	Marcuse	
nevertheless	echoes	Adorno’s	concern	–	that	“the	need	which	might	resist	control	has	
already	been	suppressed.299	For	Heidegger	 too,	 there	 is	a	danger	 that	“we	 fail	 to	hear	
the	 claim	 of	 being	 which	 speaks	 in	 the	 essence	 of	 technology.”300	Heidegger:	 “The	
spiritual	decline	of	 the	Earth	has	progressed	so	far	 that	people	are	 in	danger	of	 losing	
their	last	spiritual	strength,	the	strength	that	makes	it	possible	to	even	see	this	decline	.	
.	.	and	to	appraise	it	as	such.”301	As	a	result,	Heidegger	suggests	that	“the	lack	of	need	is	
the	highest	and	most	hidden	need.”302	Heidegger:	“The	abandonment	of	beings	by	being	
leaves	human	beings	without	a	 sense	of	plight	 [in	 light	of]	 the	endless	 self-expanding	
emptiness	 of	 devastation.” 303 	For	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Marcuse,	 the	 technological	
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‘framing’	of	being	must	give	rise	to	the	genuine	need	for	‘another	beginning’	–	the	need	
for	an	entirely	other	way	of	life.		
	
The	Event		
If,	as	Heidegger	claims,	“thinking	remains	bound	to	the	tradition	of	the	epochs	of	
the	destiny	of	Being,”	then	it	therefore	follows	that	an	‘epochal	transfiguration’	of	being	
must	 include	 a	 cultivation	 of	 pre-objective,	 non-instrumental,	 and	 post-metaphysical	
modes	 of	 thought.304	This	 meditative	 style	 of	 thinking	 is	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 more	
‘mindful’	 and	 ‘thankful’	 way	 of	 ‘dwelling’	 upon	 Earth.	 The	 transition	 to	 a	 non-violent	
mode	 of	 ‘dwelling’	 must	 nevertheless	 be	 ventured	 from	 out	 of	 the	 epoch	 of	
technological	 ‘framing’	 and	 ‘machination’.	 According	 to	 Heidegger,	 the	 technological	
‘framing’	of	being	is	something	resembling	that	which	the	ancient	Greeks	called	destiny;	
“metaphysics	 is	an	epoch	of	 the	history	of	being	 itself.”305	Within	the	 ‘being-historical’	
epoch	 of	 Western	 metaphysics,	 we	 are	 destined	 to	 experience	 the	 world	
metaphysically;	that	is,	dualistically.	A	basic	feature	of	the	metaphysical	frame	is	dualism	
–	the	duality	of	‘being’	and	‘beings’.	Moreover,	metaphysical	dualism	is	not	merely	one	
characteristic	 of	 metaphysics	 among	many.	 Instead,	 Heidegger	 claims	 that	 the	 entire	
“style	of	all	Western-European	philosophy	.	.	.	is	determined	by	this	duality.”306	Through	
an	 analysis	 of	 the	 metaphysical	 language	 of	 Western	 philosophy,	 Heidegger	
demonstrates	 that	 the	 most	 basic	 characteristic	 of	 metaphysics	 is	 “the	 duality	 of	
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individual	beings	and	Being.”307	Put	simply,	“the	foundation	of	metaphysics	is	the	duality	
of	beings	and	Being.”308	Heidegger	argues	that	philosophical	language	is	unable	to	move	
beyond	 this	 dualism,	 and	 is	 therefore	 insufficient	 for	 the	 task	 of	 ‘inceptual	 thinking’.	
Heidegger:	“In	keeping	with	 its	dual	nature,	a	being	has	 its	nature	 in	Being,	and	Being	
persists	 as	 the	Being	of	 a	being.”309	As	 a	 result	of	 the	 ‘ontological	 difference’,	 truth	 is	
perceived	dualistically	–	as	 the	 ‘Being	of	beings’.	 Truth	 is	always	perceived	within	 this	
dualistic	framework;	“We	are	always	speaking	within	the	duality.”310	
Metaphysically	 understood,	 truth	 is	 the	 adequate	 correspondence	 of	 the	
intellect	to	the	thing,	or	the	correct	representation	of	the	object	in	thought.	Again,	truth	
is	“the	correspondence	of	representing	with	what	is	present.”311	Metaphysics	therefore	
understands	 truth	 as	 correctness,	 or	 the	 correct	 correspondence	 of	 knowledge	 to	
matter,	 just	 as	 untruth	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 incorrectness.	 According	 to	 this	
correspondence	theory	of	truth,	“the	true	is	what	is	made	fast	and	therefore	permanent	
in	representational	thought.”312	In	this	sense,	truth	is	an	idea.	More	specifically,	truth	is	
the	 correct	 adequation	 of	 the	 idea	 to	 the	 thing.	Heidegger:	 “An	 idea	 is	 called	 correct	
when	 it	 conforms	 to	 its	 object.	 Such	 correctness	 in	 the	 forming	 of	 the	 idea	 has	 long	
since	 been	 equated	 with	 truth	 –	 that	 is,	 we	 determine	 the	 nature	 of	 truth	 by	 the	
conformity	 of	 the	 idea.”313	In	 opposition	 to	 the	 correspondence	 theory	 of	 truth,	 and	
                                                
307 Ibid, 223 
308 Ibid, 224 
309 Ibid, 221 
310 Ibid, 227 
311 Heidegger, On Time And Being, 71 
312 Heidegger, Nietzsche vls III-IV, 235 
313 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? 58
	 132	
therefore	 the	entire	 tradition	of	Western	philosophy,	Heidegger	 suggests	 that	 truth	 is	
not	a	cognitive	representation	at	all.	Instead,	truth	refers	to	the	open	clearing	of	alethia,	
the	primordial	disclosure	of	a	phenomenal	world.	Alethia	is	the	pre-objective,	non-dual	
opening	of	the	epochal	horizons	of	a	world,	prior	to	the	cognition	of	any	specific	entity	
that	appears	within	 that	open	 region.	The	 implication	of	Heidegger’s	 interpretation	of	
truth	as	alethia	is	that	the	correspondence	theory	of	truth	is	merely	derivative	of	a	more	
basic	 ‘truth	 of	 being’.	 Prior	 to	 the	 cognition	 of	 any	 object	 in	 the	 world,	 there	 is	 the	
primordial	opening	of	the	world	itself.	In	order	to	have	an	intellectual	representation	of	
an	object,	 there	must	already	be	an	open	 ‘clearing’	 in	which	phenomena	emerge	and	
come	to	presence.	In	Heidegger’s	words,	“alethia,	un-concealment	thought	as	opening,	
first	 grants	 the	 possibility	 of	 truth.”314	More	 primordial	 than	 any	 notion	 of	 truth	 as	
representation,	correspondence,	or	adequation	is	the	notion	of	truth	as	alethia,	or	un-
concealment.		
Heidegger’s	 understanding	 of	 truth	 as	 alethia	 constitutes	 a	 fundamental	
difference	 between	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 and	 the	 philosophical	 tradition	 of	 ‘the	
West’.	At	the	inception	of	metaphysics	in	ancient	Greece,	truth	is	perceived	as	the	open	
‘clearing’	 of	 an	 encompassing	 world.	 Heidegger:	 “Since	 Plato,	 alethia	 [has	 been	
interpreted	as]	the	illumination	in	which	beings	as	such	stand,	the	visibility	of	beings	as	
their	 presence.”315	Subsequently,	 being	 is	 perceived	 as	 the	 endurance	 of	 beings	 as	
‘constant	presence’.	With	the	culmination	of	metaphysics	in	the	modern	era,	beings	are	
objectified	 as	 ‘standing	 reserve’	 and	 abandoned	 to	 technological	 ‘framing’	 and	
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‘machination’.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 technological	 ‘framing’	 of	 being	 is	 akin	 to	 the	
consummation	of	the	destiny	of	‘the	West’.	Heidegger:	“Metaphysics,	as	the	history	of	
the	truth	of	what	is	as	such,	would	have	come	to	pass	from	out	of	the	destining	of	being	
itself.	Metaphysics	would	be,	in	its	essence,	the	history	of	being	itself	.	.	.”316	Throughout	
the	 ‘history	 of	 being’,	 truth,	 understood	 as	alethia,	 is	 concealed	 by	 the	 technological	
‘framing’	 of	 nature	 as	 a	mere	 resource	 for	 instrumental	 ‘machination’.	 In	Heidegger’s	
words,	the	concealment	of	the	truth	of	being	“occurs	through	the	collapse	of	the	world	
characterized	by	metaphysics,	and	at	the	same	time	through	the	desolation	of	the	Earth	
stemming	 from	metaphysics.”317	The	metaphysical	determination	of	being	as	presence	
conceals	 the	 fundamental	 experience	of	 truth	as	alethia	–	 the	 ‘open	 region’	of	being.	
Following	 the	 inception	of	metaphysics,	 truth	“is	no	 longer	 that	which	presences;	 it	 is	
rather	 that	 which	 .	 .	 .	 has	 the	 character	 of	 an	 object.”318	Metaphysics	 conceals	 the	
primordial	un-concealment	of	 truth	as	alethia,	 thereby	abandoning	all	 living	beings	 to	
the	 fate	 of	 ‘objectification’.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 metaphysical	 determination	 of	 truth	 as	
representation,	 the	 ‘truth	 of	 being’	 indicates	 that	 truth	 is	 an	 exposure	 to	 the	 pre-
objective	‘happening’,	‘occurrence’,	or	‘event’	of	being.	In	Heidegger’s	words	“time	and	
space	 are	 not;	 instead,	 they	 essentially	 occur.”319	Again,	 “truth	 never	 is;	 instead,	 it	
essentially	occurs.”320	Once	more,	“being	essentially	occurs	as	event.”321	
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Heidegger’s	early	‘fundamental	ontology’	called	attention	to	the	primordial	‘un-
concealment’	of	being;	an	‘un-concealment’	that	is	itself	concealed	by	the	technological	
‘framing’	of	beings	as	objects.	The	intention	is	therefore	to	indicate	this	primordial	‘un-
concealment,	 ‘clearing’,	 or	 ‘openness’	 of	 being	 that	 is	 concealed	 by	 the	metaphysical	
determination	of	truth	as	objectivity.	Heidegger’s	discovery	of	the	primordial	openness	
of	being	nevertheless	takes	on	a	different	meaning	in	his	late	thought.	Heidegger	judges	
his	 own	 understanding	 of	 truth	 as	 alethia	 to	 be	 insufficient.	 The	 notion	 of	 truth	 as	
alethia	 incorrectly	presupposes	 that	 if	openness	 is	 truth,	 then	untruth	must	 therefore	
be	 characterized	 by	 the	 ‘concealment’,	 ‘withdrawal’,	 or	 ‘passage’	 of	 being	 from	 the	
‘open	region’	of	phenomenal	manifestation.	Heidegger:	“Alethia	means	un-concealment	
.	.	.	which	already	indicates	that	concealment	itself	is	experienced	only	as	what	is	to	be	
cleared	away,	what	is	to	be	removed.”322	What	is	needed,	therefore,	is	to	think	“alethia	
in	 a	Greek	manner	 as	 un-concealment,	 and	 then,	 above	 and	beyond	 the	Greek,	 think	
[alethia]	 as	 the	 opening	 of	 self-concealing.”323	Heidegger’s	 late	 thinking	 abandons	 the	
notion	 of	 untruth	 as	 the	 concealment	 of	 truth.	 Instead	 the	 intention	 is	 to	 cultivate	 a	
‘mindfulness’	 of	 the	 self-concealing	 ‘event’.	 There	 is	 a	 remarkable	 affinity	 between	
certain	 aspects	 of	Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 and	 elements	 of	 ‘Eastern’	 philosophy.	 For	
instance,	Heidegger’s	understanding	of	being	as	the	‘essential	occurrence’	of	the	event	
can	 be	 further	 clarified	 when	 juxtaposed	 with	 the	 Buddhist	 notion	 of	
pratityasamutpada,	 or	 ‘dependent	 origination’.	 The	 term	 ‘dependent	 origination’,	
‘dependent	 arising’,	 or	 ‘interdependent	 co-arising’	 indicates	 the	 interdependence	 and	
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impermanence	 of	 all	 phenomenal	 manifestation.	 The	 Buddhist	 notion	 of	
interdependence	teaches	that	separate	things	do	not	exist.	Phenomenal	manifestation	
is	 undifferentiated	 and	 without	 distinction.	 The	 perception	 of	 separate	 and	 distinct	
things	in	the	world	is	an	effect	of	conceptual	discernment.	When	discernment	ceases,	so	
too	does	the	existence	of	distinct	things.	The	Buddhist	notion	of	impermanence	teaches	
that	 nothing	 is	 permanent;	 phenomenal	 manifestation	 is	 not	 a	 state,	 but	 rather	 a	
process	of	continual	flux.	Identity	does	not	therefore	persist	over	time,	only	difference.	
Perceptual	 phenomena	 continually	 arise	 to	 presence	 and	 recede	 into	 concealment.	
While	Western	metaphysics	 is	 well	 suited	 for	 thinking	what	 there	 is,	 it	 is	 completely	
incapable	of	thinking	that	there	is.	In	other	words,	philosophy	cannot	account	for	simple	
miracle	 of	 being	 there.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 intention	 of	 Heidegger’s	 analysis	 of	 the	
‘essential	occurrence’	of	being	is	to	elucidate	the	basic	experience	that	there	is.		
According	to	Heidegger,	being	is	not	an	object,	but	a	gift.	The	etymology	of	the	
German	language	indicates	a	relationship	between	being	and	giving.	Heidegger	suggests	
that	 the	 expression	 es	 gibt	 has	 two	 distinct	 meanings,	 the	 first	 of	 which	 is	 there	 is.	
However,	the	expression	es	gibt	also	means	it	gives.	Es	gibt	therefore	means	both	there	
is	and	 it	gives.	 In	 light	of	this	etymological	relationship,	Heidegger	ventures	to	suggest	
that	 “all	 presence	 has	 its	 source	 in	 grace.”324	For	 this	 reason,	Heidegger	 explains	 that	
“instead	of	saying	‘it	is’,	we	say	‘there	is’	/	‘it	gives.”325	Heidegger	expresses	the	same	in	
a	more	fragmentary	style,	which	is	a	common	feature	of	his	late	philosophy;	“There	is,	It	
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gives	 Being	 as	 the	 un-concealing	 of	 presencing.”326 	Put	 simply,	 existence	 is	 a	 gift.	
Heidegger:	 “A	 giving	 which	 gives	 only	 its	 gift,	 but	 in	 the	 giving	 holds	 itself	 back	 and	
withdraws,	such	a	giving	we	call	sending.	According	to	the	meaning	of	giving	which	is	to	
be	 thought	 in	 this	 way,	 Being	 –	 that	 which	 It	 gives	 –	 is	 what	 is	 sent.	 Each	 of	 its	
transformations	remains	destined	 in	this	manner.”327	But	 if	being	 is	 indeed	a	gift,	then	
what	is	that	which	gives?	According	to	Heidegger,	the	‘event’	reveals	by	concealing	itself.	
The	‘event’	withdraws	from	being,	and	through	that	withdrawal,	gives	being.	Heidegger:	
“The	 event:	 hesitant	 self-withholding	 as	 ripeness,	 fruit,	 bestowal.” 328 	The	 giving	 is	
concealed	by	the	gift	of	being.	Although	hidden,	concealed,	and	withdrawn,	the	giving	of	
being	nevertheless	solicits	a	response.	The	self-concealing	‘event’	of	un-concealment	is	
thought	provoking;	it	‘calls	for	thinking’.	The	appropriate	response	to	the	gift	of	being	is	
therefore	 ‘thoughtfulness’.	 For	 Heidegger,	 there	 is	 no	 difference	 between	 genuine	
thinking	and	heartfelt	thanking.	Just	as	es	gibt	can	mean	either	there	is	or	 it	gives,	the	
German	word	denken	means	both	thinking	and	thanking.	Heidegger	therefore	suggests	
that	 the	essence	of	 thinking	 is	 thanking,	 or	 ‘thankfulness’	 for	 the	 gift	 of	 being.	Again,	
thinking	is	thanking;	Thinking	is	‘thankfulness’	and	‘wonderment’	of	the	miracle	of	being.	
For	 Heidegger,	 the	 end	 of	 philosophy	 does	 not	 necessarily	 signify	 the	 completion	 of	
nihilism,	 as	 it	 does	 for	 Nietzsche.	 Instead,	 for	 Heidegger,	 the	 closure	 of	 metaphysics	
signifies	the	opening	of	thought.	
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Heidegger’s	 understanding	 of	 thinking	 as	 ‘thankfulness’	 for	 being	 there	 is	
completely	 foreign	to	the	Platonic	 tradition	of	Western	metaphysics.	Heidegger	claims	
that	 “in	 the	 beginning	 of	Western	 thinking,	 Being	 is	 thought,	 but	 not	 the	 ‘It	 gives’	 as	
such.	 The	 latter	withdraws	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 gift	 that	 ‘It’	 gives.”329	The	 giving	withdraws	
behind	 the	 gift.	 As	 a	 result,	 Heidegger	 suggests	 that	 “only	 what	 alethia	 as	 opening	
grants	is	experienced	and	thought,	not	what	it	is	as	such.	This	remains	concealed	.	.	.”330	
It	should	be	clear	that	Heidegger’s	experimental	notion	of	‘It	gives’,	or	‘That	which	gives’	
does	 not	 refer	 to	 any	 determinate	 presence,	 but	 instead	 names	 “the	 presence	 of	 an	
absence.”331	While	‘It	gives’	the	destiny	of	the	epochal	transfigurations	of	being,	at	the	
same	time,	“to	giving	as	sending	there	belongs	keeping	back.”332	The	‘epochal-sending’	
of	 ‘the	event’	withdraws	behind	 the	 ‘clearing’	of	being.	The	event	 ‘sends’	 the	epochal	
transfigurations	of	being	 through	 its	own	 ‘withdrawal’,	 ‘departure’,	or	 ‘abandonment’.	
The	self-concealing	‘event’	therefore	opens	a	‘time-space’	in	which	being	may	occur.	In	
Heidegger’s	words	“the	opening	is	not	the	mere	opening	of	presence,	but	the	opening	
of	presence	concealing	 itself,	 the	opening	of	self-concealing	sheltering.”333	Heidegger’s	
meditative	 style	of	 thinking	 /	 thanking	 is	not	 intended	 to	overcome	metaphysics	 from	
within	the	tradition	of	metaphysics	itself,	but	instead	“leads	us	in	a	certain	sense	away	
from	Being,	and	we	think	the	destiny	that	gives	Being	as	a	gift.”334	In	other	words,	the	
aim	 is	 to	 ‘turn’	 away	 from	what	 is	 given,	and	 instead	 cultivate	 ’thankfulness’	 for	 that	
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which	gives.	Heidegger:	“To	think	being	explicitly	requires	us	to	relinquish	being	as	the	
ground	of	beings	in	favor	of	the	giving	which	prevails	concealed	in	un-concealment,	that	
is,	in	favor	of	the	It	gives.”335	Again:	“Being	is	the	event.	It	has	no	ground.”336	While	the	
intention	of	metaphysical	thinking	is	to	penetrate	to	the	foundation	or	ground	of	being,	
the	 task	 of	 ‘being-historical’	 thinking	 is	 to	 endure	 the	 ‘passage’	 of	 being	 into	 the	
‘oblivion’	of	self-concealment.		
In	 light	 of	 the	 ‘abandonment’	 of	 nature	 to	 the	 ‘machination’	 of	 the	 planetary	
technological	‘frame’,	and	in	light	of	the	need	for	a	non-instrumental	way	of	‘dwelling’	
upon	 Earth,	 Heidegger	 poses	 the	 following	 question:	 “Can	 the	 measure	 of	 intense	
suffering	 that	 surrounds	 the	 Earth	 awaken	 a	 transformation?”337	In	 other	 words,	 “Is	
man,	 as	 man	 in	 his	 true	 nature	 until	 now,	 prepared	 to	 assume	 domination	 over	 the	
whole	Earth?	.	 .	 .	Must	man,	as	he	 is,	not	be	brought	beyond	himself	 in	order	to	fulfill	
this	 task?”338	In	 this	 context,	 Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 man’s	 ‘dominion’	 over	 the	 Earth	
should	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 ‘domination’	 of	 nature.	 Instead,	Heidegger	 is	 asking	
what	it	would	take	for	man	to	fulfill	his	destiny,	as	stated	not	by	philosophy,	but	by	the	
Hebrew	Torah	and	Christian	Old	Testament.	According	to	the	Biblical	tradition,	it	is	the	
destiny	of	humanity	to	assume	dominion	of	the	Earth.	Heidegger	interprets	‘dominion’	
to	 indicate	 a	 responsibility	 for	 the	 ‘guardianship’	 of	 the	 all	 beings.	While	metaphysics	
does	 indeed	 constitute	 “the	 epoch	 of	 the	 development	 and	 instillation	 of	 human	
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mastery	over	the	Earth,”	the	instrumental	domination	of	nature	is	not	necessarily	akin	
to	Fate.339		The	‘essence’	of	humanity	is	not	innately	destructive.	Another	history	is	still	
possible.	For	Heidegger,	the	authentic	calling	of	humanity	is	to	assume	responsibility	for	
the	‘guardianship’	of	Earth.	Heidegger:	“Unrealized	essence:	to	ground	the	guardianship	
of	 the	 truth	 of	 being.”340	The	 realization	 of	 such	 ‘guardianship’	 would	 presuppose	 a	
radical	break	from	the	nihilistic	devastation	of	Earth	unleashed	by	the	‘first	beginning’.	
Nothing	short	of	‘another	beginning’	would	suffice.	If	humanity	is	to	realize	its	authentic	
call	to	‘guardianship’,	then	the	very	‘essence	of	man’	must	undergo	a	transfiguration.	In	
this	 sense,	 the	 epochal	 transfiguration	 of	 ‘the	 event’	 involves	 “an	 essential	
transformation	 of	 the	 human.”341	Humanity	must	 be	 compelled	 ‘beyond’	 the	 epochal	
frame	of	metaphysics,	and	therefore	‘beyond’	the	nihilistic	destiny	of	the	instrumental	
‘will	 to	power’.	 If	 the	danger	 lies	 in	the	 instrumental	relation	to	nature,	then	salvation	
must	 involve	 a	 transformation	 of	 our	 inherently	 predatory	 relation	 to	 life.	 Heidegger	
finds	hope	for	such	a	transformation	of	human	‘essence’	in	Holderlin’s	visionary	poetry.	
Holderlin:	“He	who	thinks	most	deeply	loves	that	which	is	most	alive”342.	Heidegger	also	
finds	 inspiration	 in	certain	 ‘Eastern’	ways	of	thought,	especially	Buddhism	and	Taoism.	
For	 instance,	 the	 Heart	 Sutra	 compels	 one	 to	 “dwell	 without	 thought-coverings.”343	
Similarly,	the	Tao	Te	Ching	compels	one	to	“make	the	Earth	a	dwelling	place.”344	In	both	
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texts,	 ‘dwelling’	 arises	 from	 a	 direct	 non-dual	 insight	 into	 pre-objective	 reality.	
According	to	these	religious	traditions,	unconditional	compassion	for	all	 living	beings	is	
the	mark	of	the	full	realization	of	human	essence.	The	same	is	true	for	Heidegger;	the	
mark	of	an	attuned	‘mindfulness’	of	being	is	a	compassionate	and	contemplative	way	of	
‘dwelling’	upon	Earth.	For	Heidegger,	“the	fundamental	character	of	dwelling	is	sparing	
and	 preserving.”345	Again,	 to	 ‘dwell’	 upon	 Earth	 is	 “to	 cherish,	 protect,	 preserve,	 and	
care	for”	all	beings.346	
Such	 a	 meditative	 style	 of	 ‘dwelling’	 on	 Earth	 would	 be	 equivalent	 to	 ‘non-
willing’.	 The	 term	 ‘non-willing’	 indicates	 a	 relation	 to	 being	 that	 is	 prior	 to	 the	
intentional	 act	 of	 subjective	 cognition.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 practice	 of	 ‘non-willing’	
cultivates	a	non-instrumental	relation	to	nature	as	more	than	just	a	resource	available	
for	exploitation.	Moreover,	 ‘non-willing’	 lends	 itself	 to	a	more	meditative,	non-violent	
way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-world’.	 Heidegger	 argues	 that	 it	would	 be	 a	mistake	 to	 interpret	
‘non-willing’	as	an	act	of	renunciation,	but	rather	as	the	experience	of	being	‘released’	
towards	 “the	 sought-for	 essence	 of	 a	 thinking	 that	 is	 not	 a	 willing.”347 	Heidegger	
appropriates	 the	notion	of	Gelassenheit,	 or	 ‘releasement’,	 from	 the	medieval	German	
mystic	Meister	 Eckhart.	 For	Heidegger,	 the	 fundamental	 point	 is	 that	 “releasement	 is	
effected	 from	 somewhere	 else,”	 and	 is	 therefore	 not	 a	 subjective	 intention	 of	 the	
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autonomous	will.348	Heidegger	therefore	argues	that	“authentic	releasement	consists	in	
this:	 that	man	 in	his	very	nature	belongs	 to	 [the	event],	 i.e.,	he	 is	 released	 to	 it.”349	A	
non-instrumental	way	of	‘dwelling’	on	Earth	cannot	come	about	via	sovereign	decision.	
Instead,	 “the	 transformation	 of	 man	 becomes	 a	 necessity	 springing	 forth	 from	 being	
itself.” 350 	Though	 regrettably	 obscure,	 Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 Gelassenheit	 is	 quite	
important	 in	 my	 opinion.	 What	 Heidegger	 means	 by	 ‘releasement’	 from	 the	
instrumental	relation	to	nature	can	be	more	readily	discerned	when	juxtaposed	with	the	
Taoist	notion	of	wu	wei.	Indeed,	this	comparison	is	not	an	interpretive	leap,	given	that	
Heidegger	 was	 deeply	 engaged	 in	 the	 study	 of	 Taoism	 in	 his	 later	 years.	 Wu	 wei	
translates	literally	as	non-action,	but	a	more	faithful	rendering	of	wu	wei	is	spontaneous	
or	effortless	action.	Wu	wei	refers	to	a	way	of	being	and	acting	in	the	world	that	is	not	a	
determination	of	the	subjective	will.	The	intention	is	not	to	shape	the	world	according	
to	the	arbitrary	will,	but	 instead	to	align	one’s	will	 to	the	universal	way	of	nature.	Wu	
wei	is	the	alignment	of	one’s	own	action	with	the	Tao,	the	universal	Way	of	nature	and	
the	cosmos.	Wu	wei	can	be	symbolically	represented	as	a	tree	that	bends	but	does	not	
break	 in	the	wind.	 Just	as	the	tree	bends	 in	the	wind,	Heidegger	seeks	a	way	of	being	
that	is	more	receptive	and	responsive	to	nature.		
In	 light	 of	 the	 nihilistic	 destiny	 of	 Western	 metaphysics,	 it	 is	 Heidegger’s	
contention	 that	 the	 inception	 of	 another	 beginning	 “comes	 to	 intimate	 only	 in	 the	
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resonating	of	beings	out	of	the	plight	of	the	abandonment	by	being.”351	The	attunement	
of	 another	 beginning	 “comes	 to	 intimate	 only	 in	 the	 resonating	 of	 beings	 out	 of	 the	
plight	 of	 the	 abandonment	 by	 being.”352	Only	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ‘plight’	 of	 living	 beings,	
abandoned	 to	 the	 fate	 of	 technological	 ‘machination’,	 does	 the	 need	 for	 ‘another	
beginning’	become	acutely	felt	as	an	urgent	need.	The	fundamental	aim	of	‘mindfulness’	
is	 to	 accomplish	 a	 ‘releasement’	 from	 the	 instrumental	 ‘will	 to	 power’.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	
‘dwell’	 gently	 upon	 Earth	 and	 to	 ‘shelter’	 the	 self-concealing	 epochal	 ‘sending’	 of	 the	
event.	 A	 receptivity	 to	 the	 ‘epochal	 sending’	 of	 the	 event	 is	 “an	 insight	 whose	
illuminating	 lightening	 flash	 enters	 into	 what	 is	 and	 what	 is	 taken	 to	 be.”353	Such	 an	
“event-related	shift	in	being	.	.	.	is	the	historical	origin	of	the	transition	from	the	first	to	
the	other	beginning.”354	The	‘directives’	of	the	‘other	beginning’	compel	one	beyond	the	
sovereignty	of	the	will	towards	Dasein’s	authentic	responsibility	for	the	‘guardianship’	of	
the	 truth	 of	 being;	 “a	 mystery	 that	 is	 unthought	 because	 withheld.” 355 	The	 self-
interested	 and	 predatory	 essence	 of	man	must	 be	 ‘released’	 in	 order	 “to	 receive	 the	
blessing	of	 the	Earth	 and	 to	become	at	home	 in	 the	 law	of	 this	 reception	 in	order	 to	
shepherd	 the	 mystery	 of	 being	 .	 .	 .”356	To	 shepherd,	 shelter,	 or	 guard	 ‘the	 mystery’	
means	to	let	being	remain	mysterious:	veiled,	withdrawn,	or	concealed.	The	point	is	to	
let	go	of	 the	compulsive	drive	 to	 reify	and	exploit	nature	 for	our	own	self-destructive	
purposes.	 Left	unchecked,	 the	metaphysical	 ‘will-to-power’	ultimately	 culminates	with	
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the	 extinction	 of	 life	 and	 the	 complete	 ‘oblivion’	 of	 being.	 Heidegger:	 “The	
consummation	of	metaphysics	is	characterized	by	being’s	oblivion.”357	In	order	to	‘leap	
beyond’	the	epochal	frame	of	Western	metaphysics,	the	necessity	of	doing	so	must	first	
be	 acutely	 felt.	 The	 challenge,	 then,	 is	 to	 adequately	 express	 this	 need	 in	 language	
without	merely	replicating	the	same	metaphysical	‘concepts	and	categories’	that	ought	
to	be	discarded.		
	
The	Trace	
If,	 as	 the	 romantic	 poet	 Novalis	 claims,	 philosophy	 is	 indeed	 a	 form	 of	
homesickness,	 then	 the	 ‘inceptual	 saying’	of	another	beginning	 is	 something	akin	 to	a	
homecoming.	 Heidegger	 famously	 says	 that	 “language	 is	 the	 house	 of	 being.”358	For	
Heidegger,	it	is	therefore	towards	the	‘house	of	language’	which	thinking	must	return	in	
order	to	become	truly	‘inceptual’.	Heidegger	puts	forward	the	shocking	argument	that	it	
is	 not	 man,	 but	 language	 that	 speaks.	 Language	 is	 typically	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 human	
creation,	 emerging	 from	out	 of	 the	 customs,	 norms,	 and	 traditions	 of	 various	 nations	
and	cultures.	Nevertheless,	Heidegger	suggests	that	the	inverse	is	the	case;	that	we	are	
not	the	creators,	but	rather	the	creations	of	language.	‘Saying’	is	therefore	not	a	mere	
human	activity;	“man	acts	as	though	he	were	the	master	and	shaper	of	language,	while	
in	 fact	 language	 remains	 the	 master	 of	 man.” 359 	Language	 is	 the	 most	 ancient	
technology;	 it	 is	 a	 form	 of	 ‘showing’,	 ‘structuring,	 or	 ‘revealing’	 the	 world	 within	 an	
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epochal	framework	of	history.	For	this	reason,	Heidegger	claims	that	“to	‘Say’	means	to	
show,	 to	 let	 appear,	 to	 let	 be	 seen	 and	 heard.”360	Language	 is	 ‘world-disclosing’	 by	
revealing	 the	 horizons	 of	 an	 historical	 epoch.	 Heidegger:	 “Saying	 pervades	 and	
structures	 the	 openness	 of	 the	 clearing.”361	In	 other	 words,	 ‘saying’	 discloses	 entities	
within	 a	 certain	 framework	 of	 intelligibility.	Moreover,	 this	 horizon	 of	 intelligibility	 is	
independent	 of	 the	 cognitive	 act	 of	 representation.	 Heidegger:	 “There	 prevails	 a	
Showing	which	causes	to	appear	what	is	present,	and	to	fade	from	appearance	what	is	
absent	 .	 .	 .	 All	 radiant	 appearance	 and	 all	 fading	 away	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 showing	
Saying.”362	Again,	“saying	brings	 the	thing	as	 thing	to	radiance.”363	If	 language	 ‘frames’	
our	basic	experience	of	being,	then	language	too	is	metaphysical.	In	this	case,	Heidegger	
is	not	only	attempting	to	‘de-structure’	the	limits	of	metaphysical	language.	Moreover,	
the	poetic	style	of	Heidegger’s	 late	thought	 is	 intended	to	transform	our	conventional	
use	 of	 language,	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	 transfigure	 our	 instrumental	 way	 of	 ‘being-in-the-
world’.		
The	most	basic	elements	of	human	experience	are	mediated	by	language.	Just	as	
different	 ‘world-historical’	 epochs	 reveal	 different	 horizons	 of	 intelligibility	 and	
meaning,	language	reveals	fundamentally	different	ways	of	experiencing	and	relating	to	
the	 world.	 For	 Heidegger,	 the	 metaphysical	 framework	 of	 language	 privileges	 the	
temporal	mode	of	 the	present.	 The	 language	of	Western	metaphysics	 tends	 to	 frame	
nature	 as	 ‘standing	 reserve’	 constantly	 available	 for	 exploitation	 by	 ‘instrumental	
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reason’.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 quite	 challenging	 to	 linguistically	 express	 the	 enigmatic	
emergence	 to	presence,	and,	moreover,	 the	passing	 into	concealment	of	phenomenal	
manifestation.	In	light	of	‘the	abandonment’	of	beings	to	the	fate	of	‘machination’,	the	
challenge	 is	 to	 express	 the	 ‘departure’,	 ‘withdrawal’,	 or	 ‘passage’	 of	 being	 from	
presence	into	concealment.	Any	attempt	to	adequately	‘say’,	‘show’,	or	‘reveal’	the	self-
concealing	 event	 of	 un-concealment	 therefore	 requires	 non-conventional	 modes	 of	
expression.	For	Heidegger,	the	attempt	to	‘say’,	or	bear	witness	to	the	epochal	‘sending’	
of	 the	 event	 must	 therefore	 become	 less	 instrumental	 and	 more	 poetic	 in	 style.	
Heidegger:	 “The	words	of	 the	beginning	comes	 to	 language	within	 the	naming	of	 that	
poetry	which	founds	what	is	lasting	and	in	the	saying	within	that	thinking	which	brings	
the	 truth	 of	 being	 to	 endurance.”364	Consequently,	much	 of	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	
bears	 a	 closer	 resemblance	 to	 avant-garde	 experimental	 poetry	 than	 to	 traditional	
philosophical	 discourse.	 Heidegger	 draws	 upon	 poetic	 modes	 of	 ‘saying’	 in	 order	 to	
express	the	linguistic	clearing	of	a	non-instrumental	‘world-historical’	epoch	of	being.	As	
a	 result,	 an	 epochal	 transfiguration	 must	 therefore	 include	 a	 transformation	 of	
language.	
For	language	to	undergo	such	a	profound	transformation,	poetry	must	‘resonate’	
with	the	‘withdrawal’	of	being	from	presence	into	concealment.	According	to	Heidegger,	
the	 ‘attunement’	 to	 being	 from	which	 ‘poetic-saying’	 arises	 is	 difficult	 to	 endure,	 and	
therefore	 quite	 rare.	 The	 challenge	 of	 ‘poetic-saying’	 is	 to	 ‘resolutely’	 endure	 the	
‘passage’	 of	 being	 into	 the	 ungrounded	 ‘abandonment’	 of	 self-concealment.	 For	 this	
                                                
364 Heidegger, The Event, 150 
	 146	
reason,	Heidegger	argues	that	 ‘poetic-saying’	“resides	 in	the	pain	of	 the	experience	of	
the	 departure.” 365 	The	 task	 of	 poetry	 is	 therefore	 to	 ‘echo’	 the	 ‘plight’	 of	 the	
‘abandonment’.	It	is	Heidegger’s	contention	that	the	poetic	‘resonance’	of	the	‘passage’	
of	 being	 into	 self-concealment	 ‘reveals’	 the	 horizons	 of	 a	 ‘world-historical’	 epoch.	
Heidegger:	 “The	 resonating	 is	 the	 first	 and	 most	 proximate	 indication	 of	 the	 other	
beginning.	 It	 indicates	 accordingly	 the	 transition	 from	 the	 first	 to	other	beginning.”366	
The	 resolute	 endurance	 of	 ‘the	 abandonment’	 cannot	 be	 accomplished	 through	
strength	of	will.	 Instead,	authentic	resolution	should	be	understood	as	a	‘releasement’	
from	 the	 technological	 frame	 towards	 the	 self-concealing	 epochal	 ‘sending’	 of	 the	
event.	 Heidegger:	 “Indeed,	 humans	 cannot	 start	 this	 overcoming	 and	 cannot	 bring	 it	
about,	 and	 yet	 they	 are	 a	 party	 to	 it.”367	An	 epochal	 transformation	 of	 being	 is	 not	
initiated	by	man,	but	rather	‘appropriated’,	‘destined’,	or	‘sent’	by	the	event.	Heidegger:	
“When	 mortals	 are	 made	 appropriate	 for	 Saying,	 human	 nature	 is	 released	 into	 the	
needfulness	 out	 of	 which	man	 is	 used	 for	 bringing	 soundless	 Saying	 to	 the	 sound	 of	
language.”368	The	 simple,	 but	 profound	 implication	 of	 Heidegger’s	 claim	 is	 that	 “it	 is	
language	that	speaks.	Man	first	speaks	when,	and	only	when,	he	responds	to	language	
by	listening	to	its	appeal.”369	Heidegger:	“Man	is	capable	of	speaking	only	insofar	as	he,	
belonging	 to	 Saying,	 listens	 to	 Saying,	 so	 that	 in	 resaying	 it	me	may	 be	 able	 to	 say	 a	
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word.”370	The	poetic	 ‘resonance’	of	the	primordial	 ‘saying’	of	the	event	 is	 the	ultimate	
responsibility	of	 the	poet.	Heidegger:	“The	responsibility	of	 the	response	prepares	the	
word	 of	 language	 for	 the	 claim	 of	 the	 event.”371	Again,	 “the	 response	 is	 the	 human	
counter-word	of	language	to	the	voice	of	being.	To	remain	steadfast	in	the	response	is	
the	 essence	 of	 historical	 responsibility.”372	Put	 simply,	 man	 does	 not	 speak,	 but	 is	
spoken.	For	Heidegger,	poetry	is	‘inceptual’	only	when	it	‘resonates’	with	the	primordial	
saying	 of	 ‘the	 appropriating	 event’.	 Poetry	 is	 only	 an	 ‘echo’	 of	 the	 more	 primordial	
‘sending’	 of	 the	 event.	 The	 challenge,	 therefore,	 is	 for	 poetry	 to	 ‘resonate’	 with	 the	
‘saying’	of	 the	event.	Only	 the	poet	 is	 ‘attuned’	 to	 the	 ‘saying’	of	 the	non-conceptual,	
pre-objective,	non-dual	‘event’.		
By	 enduring	 the	 epochal	 sending	 of	 ‘the	 event’,	 the	 poet	 is	 receptive	 to	 the	
necessity	of	‘dwelling’	mindfully	upon	Earth.	This	style	of	‘mindful	dwelling’	expresses	a	
sense	 of	 ‘thankfulness’	 for	 the	 gift	 of	being	 there.	 According	 to	 Heidegger’s	 visionary	
insight,	the	‘directives’	of	the	event	“are	appropriations	of	humans	into	the	uniqueness	
of	their	distinctive	role:	carefulness	–	i.e.,	the	protection	and	stewardship	of	the	truth	of	
being.”373	According	to	Heidegger’s	interpretation	of	the	‘history	of	being’,	the	saying	of	
the	 ‘first	beginning’	expresses	the	radiant	emergence	of	phenomenal	manifestation	to	
presence.	 The	 saying	 of	 the	 ‘other	 beginning’	 signifies	 a	 leap	 beyond	 the	 ‘first	
beginning’.	While	the	‘saying’	of	the	‘first	beginning’	reveals	the	radiant	un-concealment	
of	 being,	 the	 ‘saying’	 of	 ‘another	 beginning’	 bears	 witness	 to	 the	 abysmal	 self-
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concealment	 of	 ‘the	 event’.	 Heidegger:	 “Here	 is	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 the	
event.	 This	 experience	 is	 the	pain	of	 the	departure	of	 being	 .	 .	 .”374	The	words	of	 the	
poet	must	‘resonate’	with	the	‘withdrawal’	of	being	into	the	self-concealing	‘sending’	of	
the	event.	While	 the	 ‘directive’	of	 the	 first	beginning	 is	 to	bear	witness	 to	 the	 radiant	
self-emergence	of	being	to	presence,	the	‘saying’	of	another	beginning	must	signify	the	
‘departure’,	‘withdrawal’,	or	‘passage’	of	being	into	the	‘oblivion’	of	self-concealment.		
Heidegger	wishes	 to	supplant	 the	 rule	of	Plato’s	philosopher-kings	with	 that	of	
the	 poets;	 only	 poetry	 can	 delineate	 another	 ‘world-historical’	 epoch	 of	 being.	
Heidegger	 suggests	 that	 the	 poetic	 expression	 of	 the	 ‘passage’	 of	 being	 into	
concealment	arises	from	an	experience	of	temporality	that	 is	 fundamental	opposed	to	
the	 trajectory	 of	 modern-time	 consciousness.	 The	 poet	 must	 resolutely	 endure	 the	
temporal	 ‘passage’	 from	 the	 radiance	 of	 presence	 into	 the	 oblivion	 of	 concealment.	
Ultimately,	 Heidegger’s	 discussion	 of	 poetry	 and	 language	 indicates	 the	 necessity	 of	
breaking	 the	encompassing	planetary	 frame	of	metaphysics.	The	destiny	of	 ‘the	West’	
does	not	culminate	with	human	freedom,	but	with	planetary	extinction.	For	Heidegger,	
everything	 depends	 upon	 whether	 the	 ‘sending’	 of	 the	 event	 comes	 to	 ‘resonate’	 in	
poetic	language.	But	surely	it	can	be	objected	that	Heidegger	is	guilty	of	overstating	the	
‘world-historical’	 significance	 of	 poetry.	 One	 may	 very	 well	 ask	 whether	 it	 is	 in	 fact	
realistic	to	think	that	poetry	alone	could	inaugurate	an	‘epochal	transfiguration’	of	the	
event.	Nevertheless,	Heidegger	is	no	doubt	correct	–	language	does	shape	a	world.	Any	
one	who	has	learned	another	language	can	attest	the	way	in	which	language	opens	up	
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and	 reveals	 different	 contours	 of	 the	 world.	 Likewise,	 language	 can	 also	 diminish	 a	
world.	 Take	 for	 instance	 the	 neo-liberal	 discourse	 of	 ‘innovation’,	 ‘productivity’,	 and	
‘knowledge	 mobilization’	 replicated	 by	 the	 modern	 research	 University.	 Such	
impoverishment	of	language	constricts	the	horizons	of	a	world.	Nothing	could	be	further	
from	that	which	Heidegger	calls	thinking.	If	the	poetic	transformation	of	language	alone	
cannot	escape	the	 innate	violence	of	the	 ‘first	beginning’,	 then	 it	can	at	the	very	 least	
articulate	the	pressing	need	for	a	more	‘mindful’	way	of	inhabiting	the	Earth.	It	is	in	this	
sense	 that	 poetry	 ‘shelters’	 the	 truth	 of	 being	 from	 the	 planetary	 ‘enframent’	 of	
technology.	 At	 its	 most	 visionary	 heights,	 poetry	 can	 in	 fact	 ‘resonate’	 with	 the	
‘abandonment’	of	being,	and	in	so	doing	‘reveal’	the	contours	of	a	new	epoch	of	‘world-
history’.	Is	there	any	poet	whose	words	truly	‘resonate’	with	the	‘passage’	of	being	into	
oblivion?	In	my	judgment,	the	poetry	of	Rainer	Maria	Rilke	achieves	such	a	feat.	Rilke’s	
most	 visionary	poetry	was	written	at	 the	height	of	destruction	wrought	by	 the	World	
Wars	 of	 the	 20th	 Century.	 Rilke’s	 poetry	 bears	witness	 to	what	 Heidegger	 names	 the	
‘wasteland’	of	the	planetary	‘enframent’	of	technology.	In	my	judgment,	Rilke’s	poetry	
genuinely	‘resonates’	with	the	plight	of	beings,	and,	in	so	doing,	calls	us	to	an	authentic	
‘guardianship’	of	rivers,	mountains,	forests,	and	fields:	
“Dear	darkening	ground,		
You’ve	endured	so	patiently	the	walls	we’ve	built,		
Perhaps	you’ll	give	the	cities	one	more	hour	.	.	.		
Before	you	become	forest	again,	and	water,	and	widening	wilderness	
In	that	hour	of	inconceivable	terror	
When	you	take	back	your	name	
From	all	things	.	.	.”375	
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The	 reception	 of	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 must	 be	 evaluated	 according	 to	
whether	or	not	a	receptive	‘attunement’	to	the	primordial	saying	of	‘the	event’	can	truly	
affect	 an	 epochal	 transfiguration	 of	 being.	 It	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 affectivity	 of	
Heidegger’s	 late	thought	depends	upon	whether	the	 ‘clearing-concealing’	of	the	event	
comes	 to	 ‘resonate’	 in	 poetic	 language.	 In	 other	 words,	 everything	 depends	 upon	
whether	or	not	being	speaks.	Can	poetry	‘shelter’	the	truth	of	rivers,	mountains,	forests,	
and	fields	from	the	planetary	frame	of	technological	machination?	Emmanuel	Levinas,	a	
remarkably	original	philosopher	and	student	of	Heidegger,	responds	with	a	resounding	
no.	Being,	understood	temporally	as	‘event’,	does	not	speak.	Only	another	human	being	
is	 capable	 of	 speaking	 and	of	 expressing	 the	need	 for	 a	 non-instrumental	way	of	 life.	
Ultimately,	what	is	fundamental	for	Levinas	is	not	ontology,	but	ethics.	In	opposition	to	
Heidegger’s	 ‘being-historical’	thinking,	Levinas	makes	the	radical	claim	that	ontology	 is	
not	 fundamental.	Levinas	states	his	 intention	as	 follows:	“We	are	 looking	for	a	way	to	
get	outside	of	ontology	starting	from	[the	ethical	relationship],	which	makes	objectivity	
impossible	 .	 .	 .”376	Ethics,	not	ontology	 is	 first	philosophy.	The	genesis	of	metaphysical	
transcendence	is	not	the	‘ontological	difference’	between	being	and	beings,	but	rather	
the	 difference	 between	 oneself	 and	 another.	 Levinas’	 evaluation	 of	 Heidegger	 is	
reminiscent	 of	 Heidegger’s	 own	 evaluation	 of	 Nietzsche.	 While	 Nietzsche’s	
confrontation	 with	 nihilism	 is	 intended	 to	 overcome	 the	 history	 of	 Western	
metaphysics,	 Heidegger	 suggests	 that	 Nietzsche’s	 thinking	 actually	 signifies	 the	
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culmination	 of	 nihilism	 rather	 than	 it’s	 overcoming.	 Similarly,	 while	 Heidegger’s	 late	
thinking	 is	 intended	 to	 affect	 a	 break	 from	 the	 instrumental	 ‘frame’	 of	 Western	
metaphysics,	 Levinas	 suggests	 that	 even	 Heidegger’s	 late	 poetic	 style	 of	 thinking	 is	
insufficiently	post-metaphysical.		
According	 to	 Levinas,	Heidegger’s	 thinking	 remains	metaphysically	grounded	 in	
least	one	significant	way.	Levinas	claims	that	“for	the	Western	philosophical	tradition,	all	
spirituality	 is	 consciousness,	 the	 thematic	 exposition	 of	 being,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	
knowledge.”377	For	instance,	Aristotle	says	that	‘all	men	by	nature	desire	to	know.’	Since	
Aristotle,	the	search	for	knowledge	has	distinguished	humanity	from	the	rest	of	nature;	
the	knower	is	distinguished	from	the	known.	Western	philosophy	therefore	understands	
the	 human	 being	 as	 the	 ‘rational	 animal’.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 of	 Heidegger’s	 poetic	
thinking.	 For	 Heidegger,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 Aristotle,	 the	 essence	 of	 man	 is	 thinking.	
Consequently,	the	mind	is	distinguished	from	the	encompassing	world,	which	is	in	turn	
objectified	 as	 a	 resource	 for	 exploitation.	 The	 body	 is	 colonized	 and	 nature	 is	 dis-
enchanted.	 Remarkably,	 Heidegger’s	 late	 thought	 is	 not	 entirely	 inconsistent	 with	
Descartes’	 famous	 declaration	 that	 cogito	 ergo	 sum;	 ‘I	 think	 therefore	 I	 am’.	 By	
privileging	 thinking	 as	 the	 fundamental	 human	 essence,	 Heidegger	 inadvertently	
distinguishes	 between	 mind	 and	 matter,	 and	 therefore	 risks	 replicating	 the	 same	
subject-object	 relationship	 that	 the	 phenomenological	 description	 of	 ‘being-in-the-
world’	was	intended	to	supplant.	As	a	result,	even	Heidegger’s	late	thought	too	readily	
lends	 itself	 to	 the	 Cartesian	 distinction	 between	 the	mind,	 understood	 as	ego	 cogtio,	
                                                
377 Emannuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon 
Critchley, & Robert Bernasconi, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 80 
	 152	
and	matter,	 understood	 as	 res	 extensa.	While	 Heidegger’s	 stated	 intent	 is	 to	 give	 an	
account	of	the	‘event’	of	being	there,	the	interpretation	of	Dasein	as	the	‘thinking	being’	
inadvertently	 replicates	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	 determination	 of	 man	 as	 the	 ‘rational	
animal’.	In	response	to	this	insufficiency,	Levinas	takes	up	Heidegger’s	deconstruction	of	
metaphysics	in	a	novel	way.	I	am	in	agreement	with	Levinas’	basic	claim	–	while	it	would	
be	 foolish	 to	 evade	 Heidegger’s	 groundbreaking	 innovations	 in	 philosophy,	 it	 is	
nevertheless	necessary	 to	move	beyond	the	milieu	of	Heidegger’s	 late	 thought.	But	 in	
going	 beyond	 being-historical	 thinking,	 one	 must	 not	 retreat	 to	 a	 naïve	 pre-
Heideggerian	philosophy;	there	is	no	turning	back.	
Although	Heidegger	contests	the	supremacy	of	objective	knowledge	in	Western	
philosophy,	he	nevertheless	 fails	 to	 contest	 the	 supremacy	of	 knowledge	as	 such.	 For	
Heidegger,	 to	 be	 is	 still	 to	 think.	 In	 opposition	 to	 Heidegger,	 Levinas	 argues	 that	 the	
other	“does	not	affect	us	in	terms	of	a	concept.”378	Levinas:	“The	very	relation	originally	
established	between	myself	and	others,	between	myself	and	someone,	cannot	properly	
be	 said	 to	 reside	 in	 an	 act	 of	 knowledge.”379	Levinas	 articulates	 his	 own	 project	 as	
follows:	“The	sense	of	this	whole	effort	is	to	contest	the	ineradicable	conviction	of	every	
philosophy	that	objective	knowledge	is	the	ultimate	relation	of	transcendence,	that	the	
Other	.	.	.	should	be	known	objectively.”380	Levinas	famously	declares	that	every	other	is	
‘wholly	other’.	 The	other	 is	 infinitely	beyond	 the	horizon	of	being.	What,	 then,	 is	 ‘the	
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other’?	Traditionally,	only	God	 is	thought	to	completely	transcend	knowledge.	For	this	
reason,	 scholars	 occasionally	 interpret	 ‘the	 other’	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	
notion	of	God.	In	my	view,	Levinas’	notion	of	‘the	other’	should	be	interpreted	a	secular	
exegesis	of	the	theistic	idea	of	God.	Levinas:	“Now	ethics,	when	proposed	as	a	modality	
of	transcendence,	can	be	thought	on	the	basis	of	the	secularization	of	the	sacred.”381	It	
is	not	God	who	is	‘other’,	but	rather	each	and	every	human	being.	Levinas:	“The	Other	
(l’Autre)	 thus	 presents	 itself	 as	 human	Other	 (Autrui);	 it	 shows	 a	 face	 and	 opens	 the	
dimension	of	height,	that	is	to	say,	 it	 infinitely	overflows	the	bounds	of	knowledge.”382	
Reason	is	not	a	transcendental	human	faculty.	The	transcendence	of	the	other	remains	
forever	concealed	from	the	light	of	reason.	
Levinas	 views	 the	 history	 of	 Western	 philosophy	 as	 ‘the	 destruction	 of	
transcendence’.	The	totality	of	being	is	encompassed	within	the	framework	of	a	closed	
metaphysical	system.	Metaphysics	admits	no	other;	nothing	escapes	the	sovereignty	of	
reason.	 There	 are	 nevertheless	 latent	 possibilities	within	 the	 tradition	 that	 indicate	 a	
path	beyond	it.	Plato’s	account	of	‘the	Good’	bears	within	itself	such	a	latent	potential.	
The	 transcendence	 of	 ‘the	 Good’	 indicates	 a	 ‘breakthrough’	 equivalent	 to	 that	which	
Levinas	 seeks.	 The	 ‘Highest	 Good’	 signifies	 the	 intersection	 the	 vertical	 dimension	 of	
transcendence	within	the	horizontal	plane	of	immanence.383	‘The	Good’	is	transcendent;	
it	exceeds	the	totality	of	being.	In	The	Republic,	‘the	Good’	is	symbolized	by	the	radiant	
light	of	the	Sun.	The	light	of	the	Sun	illuminates	an	intelligible	world,	thereby	making	the	
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knowledge	of	things	possible.	As	the	source	of	intelligibility,	‘the	Good’	is	itself	beyond	
comprehension.	Nevertheless,	for	Levinas,	that	which	transcends	intelligibility	is	not	an	
ideal	form	that	lies	beyond	or	behind	this	world,	but	rather	the	‘alterity’	of	the	human	
face	 that	 is	 encountered	 in	 daily	 life.	 Levinas:	 “The	 relation	 with	 the	 Other	 alone	
introduces	 a	 dimension	 of	 transcendence.” 384 		 Levinas:	 “There	 is	 no	 model	 of	
transcendence	outside	of	ethics.”385	Levinas’	retrieval	of	the	Platonic	Good	reinvigorates	
the	 fundamental	 question	 of	 ancient	 philosophy	 that	 is	 too	 often	 absent	 from	
contemporary	thought	–	the	question	of	the	good	life.	As	we	will	see,	the	good	life	is	not	
one	 of	 solitary	 contemplation.	 ‘The	 Good’	 doesn’t	 just	 provoke	 thought;	 it	 demands	
justice.	
To	the	extent	that	‘the	other’	remains	forever	concealed	from	the	knowing	mind,	
Levinas’	 thinking	 bears	 a	 striking	 affinity	 with	 the	 apophatic	 theological	 tradition.	
Apophaticism,	more	commonly	named	via	negativa,	or	simply	negative	theology,	refers	
to	 a	 non-cognitive	 relation	 to	 the	 absolute.	 Negative	 theology	 is	 most	 commonly	
attributed	 to	 the	 Neo-Platonic	 pseudonymous	 authorship	 of	 Pseudo-Dionysus.	
According	 to	 Pseudo-Dionysus’	Mystical	 Theology,	 the	 representation	 of	 God	 as	 the	
Supreme	 Being	 is	 merely	 a	 false	 image	 of	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	 divine.	 Moreover,	
negative	 theology	 indicates	a	divine	 ‘godhead’	beyond	 the	 ‘onto-theological’	 image	of	
god.	The	godhead	 is	 “that	which	 lies	beyond	all	 vision	and	knowledge.”386	The	 radiant	
‘godhead’	 is	 the	 Supreme	 Source	 of	 all.	 The	 ‘godhead’	 illuminates	 the	 world	 while	
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remaining	beyond	the	world	and	therefore	beyond	knowledge	as	well.	The	‘godhead’	is	
not	merely	unknown,	but	absolutely	unknowable.	The	‘godhead’	 infinitely	exceeds	any	
‘onto-theological’	concept	of	God	as	the	foundation,	ground,	or	origin.	For	this	reason,	it	
is	 impossible	 to	make	 any	 positive	 claim	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 ‘godhead’.	 Instead,	
‘negative	theology’	endeavors	to	“remove	any	obstacle	to	the	pure	view	of	the	hidden	
image.”387	The	task	 is	 to	negate	the	epistemological	constructs	that	 inhibit	 the	original	
unobstructed	 attunement	 to	 the	 divine	 radiance	 that	 shines	 through	 the	 un-
concealment	 of	 all	 phenomenal	manifestation.	 Pseudo-Dionysus	 descries	 his	 vision	 of	
the	‘godhead’	as	follows:	“Here	[in	the	mysterious	darkness	of	unknowing],	renouncing	
all	that	the	mind	can	conceive,	wrapped	entirely	 in	the	intangible	and	the	invisible,	he	
belongs	 completely	 to	him	who	 is	beyond	everything.	Here,	being	neither	oneself	nor	
someone	else,	one	is	supremely	united	to	the	completely	unknown	by	an	inactivity	of	all	
knowledge,	 and	 knows	 beyond	 the	 mind	 by	 knowing	 nothing.”388	The	 method	 of	 via	
negativa	 cultivates	an	unobstructed	attunement	 to	“the	brilliant	darkness	of	a	hidden	
silence.”389	For	Levinas,	however,	it	is	not	the	transcendent	vision	of	the	‘godhead’	that	
is	obstructed,	but	instead,	the	non-cognitive	relation	with	‘the	other’.		
Levinas’	 account	 of	 the	 ethical	 relation	 to	 ‘the	 other’	 also	 bears	 a	 striking	
similarity	 to	 the	 theology	of	Soren	Kierkegaard.	For	both	Levinas	and	Kierkegaard,	 the	
absolute	 is	 not	 an	 object	 to	 be	 known,	 but	 instead	 an	 experience	 to	 be	 undergone.	
Kierkegaard	calls	one’s	relation	to	the	other	an	‘absolute	relationship	with	the	absolute’.	
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Echoing	 Kierkegaard,	 Levinas	 calls	 one’s	 relation	 to	 the	 other	 a	 ‘relation	 without	
relation’.	Levinas:	“Transcendence	designates	a	 relation	with	a	 reality	 infinitely	distant	
from	my	own	reality,	yet	without	this	distance	destroying	this	relation	and	without	this	
relation	 destroying	 this	 distance	 .	 .	 .”390	For	 Kierkegaard,	 the	 Absolute	 reveals	 itself	
through	 a	 personal	 relationship	with	God	 –	 the	One	without	 a	 second.	 The	 unknown	
godhead	is	the	supreme	source.	God	gives	the	truth	as	well	as	the	condition	to	receive	
it.	 For	 Levinas,	 however,	 the	 ‘the	 absolute	 relationship	 with	 the	 absolute’	 is	 not	
religious,	 but	 ethical.	 The	 transcendence	 of	 ‘the	 other’	 is	 not	 only	 apophatic,	 but	
prophetic.	The	plight	of	‘the	other’	demands	justice	not	prayer.	The	genesis	of	meaning	
is	not	 the	 religious	contemplation	of	God,	but	 instead	one’s	 ‘ethical	 relationship’	with	
each	and	every	other.	Levinas:	“The	exposition	of	the	ethical	meaning	of	transcendence,	
and	of	the	Infinite	beyond	being,	can	be	carried	out	starting	from	the	proximity	of	the	
neighbor	 and	 from	my	 responsibility	 for	 the	 other.”391	Levinas	 neither	 reverts	 to	 the	
false	 security	 of	 a	 metaphysical	 foundation,	 nor	 does	 he	 celebrate	 the	 ultimately	
meaningless	‘free	play’	of	the	ungrounded	will.	On	the	contrary,	Levinas	seeks	to	salvage	
unconditional	meaning	without	reference	to	God.	Levinas:	“Meaning	 is	the	face	of	the	
Other.”392	For	Levinas,	“man	himself	is	the	temple	and	liturgy”.393	In	spite	of	their	many	
similarities,	there	remains	a	significant	difference	between	the	tradition	of	via	negativa	
and	 Levinas’	 secular	 theology.	 Both	 Levinas	 and	 negative	 theologians	 are	 concerned	
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with	 the	 method	 of	 conceptual	 negation.	 Nevertheless,	 Levinas’	 ultimate	 concern	
remains	the	ethical	exposition	of	God’s	absence.	Ethics	is	true	religion.			
Levinas’	 exposition	of	 ‘the	 trace’	 is	 akin	 to	a	 secular	eschatology.	 The	mythical	
‘flight	of	the	gods’	leaves	a	trace	of	the	holy	in	the	face	of	the	other.	Levinas:	“It	is	in	the	
trace	 of	 the	Other	 that	 a	 face	 shines.”394	Levinas	 describes	 ‘the	 trace’	 as	 “this	way	 of	
passing,	troubling	the	present,	without	allowing	itself	to	be	invested	with	consciousness,	
this	 striation	of	 rays	across	 the	clarity	of	 the	exposable	 .	 .	 .”395	Eschewing	Heidegger’s	
mysticism,	Levinas	argues	that	‘the	trace’	of	the	other	is	encountered	in	the	expressive	
signification	of	‘the	face’.	Levinas:	“What	is	this	original	trace?	It	is	the	nakedness	of	the	
face	expressing	itself,	interrupting	order.”396	Levinas:	“The	face	is	a	living	presence;	it	is	
expression.”397	Ethics	is	transcendence	within	imminence.	The	‘alterity’	of	the	face	is	an	
encounter	with	 the	 ‘wholly	other’;	 “the	dimension	of	 the	divine	opens	 forth	 from	 the	
human	 face.”398	The	 self-expression	 of	 the	 face	 is	 akin	 to	 a	 transcendent	 force;	 it	
“breaks	up	the	unity	of	transcendental	apperception.”399	‘The	face’	is	not	the	disclosure	
of	knowledge.	Instead,	‘the	face’	amounts	to	a	revelation	of	an	enigmatic	‘alterity’	that	
exceeds	 recognition,	 identification,	 and	 comprehension.	 Levinas:	 “the	 trace	 signifies	
beyond	being.”400	Levinas	argues	 that	ethics	 is	 “a	movement	going	 forth	 from	a	world	
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that	is	familiar	to	us	.	.	.	toward	an	alien	outside-of-oneself,	towards	a	beyond.”401	In	my	
view,	 the	 temporal	 dimension	 of	 ethical	 transcendence	 is	 the	 most	 conceptually	
challenging	element	of	Levinas’	philosophy.	It	would	seem	that	‘the	trace’	withdraws	in	
to	the	concealment	of	the	‘immemorial	past’.	The	past	is	‘immemorial’	in	the	sense	that	
is	 incommensurable	with	any	present	–	“a	past	that	was	never	present”.402	‘The	trace’	
withdraws	from	presence	into	the	concealment	of	“an	irreversible,	immemorial,	and	un-
representable	 past.”403	The	 ‘immemorial	 past’	 has	 never	 been	 present.	 Levinas:	 “the	
trace	is	the	presence	of	that	which	properly	speaking	has	never	been,	of	what	is	always	
past.”404	For	this	reason,	the	past	cannot	the	recollected	or	represented	in	thought.	‘The	
trace’	 is	equivalent	 to	“a	past	 that	no	memory	could	resurrect	as	a	present.”405	Again,	
the	 voice	of	 the	other	 “is	 the	 trace	of	 a	past	 that	 refuses	 itself	 to	 the	present	and	 to	
representation,	the	trace	of	an	immemorial	past.”406	Once	more	for	good	measure,	“the	
trace	 does	 not	 simply	 lead	 to	 the	 past,	 but	 is	 the	 very	 passing	 toward	 a	 past	 more	
remote	than	any	past	and	any	future	.	.	.”407	This	eschatological	element	of	the	‘ethical	
relationship’	achieves	that	which	Heidegger	seeks,	though	fails	to	achieve	–	an	epochal	
break	from	the	history	of	being.	
Heidegger’s	 account	 of	 the	poetic	 resonance	of	 ‘the	 event’	 exerts	 a	 significant	
influence	 upon	 Levinas’	 own	 project.	 Heidegger:	 “What	 is	 decisive	 in	 the	 thinking	 of	
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being	–	to	be	sure,	not	in	metaphysics	and	philosophy	–	is	the	act	of	saying	what	is	said	
and	not	what	is	said	itself	in	the	sense	of	some	graspable	content	of	knowledge	and	of	
truth.”408	For	both	Levinas	and	Heidegger,	the	subjective	voice	is	merely	a	response	to	a	
more	primordial	event	of	‘saying’.	For	Heidegger,	this	primordial	 ‘saying’	 is	constituted	
by	 the	 voice	 of	 being	 itself.	 For	 Levinas,	 however,	 ‘saying’	 is	 the	 voice	 of	 the	 other.	
Consequently,	 ‘saying’	 is	not	 the	 resonance	of	 the	event,	but	 rather	 the	expression	of	
the	face.	Ethics	is	dialogical.	‘Saying’	names	the	original	condition	of	being	addressed	by	
another	 in	 speech.	 Levinas:	 “Speech	delineates	 an	original	 relation.”409	Levinas:	 “The	 I	
receives	 absolutely	 and	 learns	 absolutely	 a	 signification	 that	 it	 has	 not	 itself	 given,	 a	
signification	that	precedes	any	meaning	of	being.”410	Again,	the	expression	of	the	face	is	
“an	 anteriority	 that	 is	 older	 than	 any	 a	 priori.”411	The	 primordial	 signification	 of	 ‘the	
other’	 is	always	prior	 to	 that	which	 is	 signified,	 shown,	or	 revealed.	 Levinas	makes	an	
important	 distinction	 between	 the	 act	 of	 ‘saying’,	 and	what	 is	 ‘said’.	 In	 other	 words,	
Levinas	distinguishes	between	expression	and	what	is	expressed.	The	expression	of	‘the	
other’	 is	 more	 important	 than	 what	 is	 expressed.	 For	 Levinas,	 “saying	 is	 not	 a	
communication	 of	 something	 said.”412	Instead,	 “the	 first	 content	 of	 expression	 is	 the	
expression	 itself.”413	All	dialogue,	whether	poetic	or	political,	presupposes	 this	original	
exposure	to	the	other.	
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The	 difference	 between	 the	 ‘saying’	 and	 the	 ‘said’	 is	 structurally	 similar	 to	
Heidegger’s	notion	of	the	‘ontological	difference’.	Giorgio	Agamben,	whose	philosophy	
of	 language	 is	 deeply	 influenced	 by	 Levinas,	 expresses	 the	 matter	 clearly.	 Echoing	
Levinas,	 Agamben	 argues	 that	 “the	 opening	 of	 the	 ontological	 dimension	 (being,	 the	
world)	corresponds	to	the	pure	taking	place	of	language	as	an	original	event,	while	the	
ontic	dimension	(entities,	things)	corresponds	to	that	which,	in	this	opening,	is	said	and	
signified.”	414	In	 Levinas’	 words,	 “The	 signification	 of	 saying	 goes	 beyond	 the	 said.”415	
The	problem,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 initial	 difference	between	 the	 ‘saying’	 and	 ‘said’	 is	
concealed	 and	 forgotten.	Agamben:	 “The	 taking	place	of	 language	 (the	pure	 fact	 that	
language	is)	is	obliterated	in	that	which	is	said	in	the	instance	of	discourse;	that	is,	this	
taking	place	(the	Saying)	is	thought	only	as	the	foundation	of	the	said,	in	such	a	way	that	
the	Saying	itself	never	truly	arrives	at	thought.”416	In	other	words,	the	event	of	‘saying’	
recedes	 behind	 the	 objectification	 of	 that	 which	 is	 ‘said’.	 In	 Levinas’	 more	 poetic	
language,	 “the	 absolute	 withdraws	 from	 the	 illumined	 site,	 the	 ‘clearing’	 of	 the	
present.”417	For	 this	 reason,	 Levinas	 argues	 that	what	 is	 needed	 is	 “an	 indication	 that	
would	reveal	the	withdrawal	of	the	indicated,	instead	of	a	reference	that	rejoins	it.”418	
In	 this	 regard,	 Levinas’	 account	 of	 ethical	 signification	 is	 structurally	 similar	 to	
Heidegger’s	notion	of	poetic	expression.	For	both,	‘saying’	delineates	the	passage	from	
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constant	presence	into	the	concealment	of	deep	time.	For	Levinas,	however,	the	task	is	
to	bear	witness	 to	 the	basic	condition	of	ethical	 interdependence.	 In	 the	 ‘pre-original’	
speech	situation,	one	 is	always	already	compelled	to	respond.	Agamben	expresses	the	
matter	succinctly:		“As	you	now	speak,	that	is	ethics.”419	It	is	Levinas’	contention	that	the	
height	of	the	Good	survives	the	death	of	God.	Levinas	claims	that	“in	this	relation	of	the	
Good	to	me,	which	is	the	assignment	of	me	to	another	person,	something	comes	to	pass	
that	 survives	 the	 death	 of	 God.”420	The	 expression	 of	 ‘the	 face’	 bears	 a	 ‘trace’	 of	 the	
infinite.	Levinas	shows	a	path	beyond	nihilism,	but	it	difficult;	it	demands	justice.		
We	 have	 now	 looked	 at	 Heidegger’s	 reflections	 on	 the	 innate	 nihilism	 of	 the	
technological	 ‘framing’	 of	 nature.	 We	 traced	 the	 destruction	 of	 nature	 back	 to	 the	
metaphysical	dualism	of	ancient	philosophy	that	views	nature	as	an	object	and	truth	as	
objectivity.	 We	 then	 looked	 at	 the	 more	 fundamental	 experience	 of	 being	 as	 event.	
Heidegger’s	non-linear	temporality	of	‘the	event’	challenges	Nietzsche’s	tragic	notion	of	
time	 as	 the	 endless	 repetition	of	 closed	 circle	 as	well	 as	Hegel’s	 dogmatic	 concept	 of	
history	 as	 progress.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 political	 implications	 of	 Heidegger’s	
environmental	ethic	of	‘dwelling’	require	further	exposition.	In	what	follows,	I	transition	
from	 looking	 at	 political	 nihilism	 in	 light	 of	 Heidegger’s	 confrontation	 with	 Nietzsche	
towards	 a	 more	 explicit	 engagement	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 post-foundational	
democracy	after	 the	 ‘death	of	God’.	This	 requires	 that	we	 transition	 from	Heidegger’s	
appropriation	of	Nietzsche	to	the	post-structural	appropriation	of	Heidegger	by	Levinas,	
Derrida,	and	Nancy.	 I	will	argue	that	Levinas’	account	of	 the	radical	 separation	of	 ‘the	
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ethical’	and	‘the	political’	offers	a	much-needed	corrective	to	the	false	reconciliation	of	
Hegel’s	universal	state.	 I	suggest,	however,	that	the	endless	deconstruction	of	political	
community	 and	 sovereign	 power	 risks	 reducing	 democracy	 from	 a	 mode	 of	 self-
government	to	nothing	but	a	form	of	protest.			
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IV.	The	Body-Politic	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	Strife	Of	The	Political		
Much	has	been	written	on	the	relationship	between	Levinas	and	Derrida.	Simon	
Critchley’s	Ethics	Of	Deconstruction	comes	to	mind	as	an	example	of	this	approach.	It	is	
unfortunate	 that	 this	 treatment	 tends	 to	 overlook	 one	 of	 the	 most	 remarkable	
innovations	 of	 Levinas’	 thinking	 –	 attention	 to	 the	 corporality	 of	 the	 ‘ethical	
relationship’.	 Levinas’	 attention	 to	 embodied	 sensation	 is	 inspired	 by	 the	
phenomenological	method	of	 Edmund	Husserl.	Although	Derrida	 is	 also	 influenced	by	
phenomenology,	 he	 nevertheless	 has	 relatively	 little	 to	 say	 about	 materiality,	
corporality,	 and	 embodiment.	 As	 Tom	 Sparrow	 demonstrates	 convincingly	 in	 Levinas	
Unhinged,	 ethics	 has	 a	 material	 genesis.	 Levinas	 discovers	 a	 post-foundational	
grounding	 of	 ethics	 in	 the	 ‘proximity’	 of	 one	 body	 to	 another.	 The	 central	 aim	 of	
phenomenology	 is	 to	 determine	 the	 aspects	 of	 experience	 that	 remain	 absolutely	
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certain	when	subjected	to	critical	doubt.	Phenomenology	therefore	attempts	to	negate,	
bracket,	 or	 suspend	 habitual	 modes	 of	 consciousness	 that	 inhibit	 one’s	 undistorted	
perception	of	the	world.	For	this	reason,	the	rallying	cry	of	phenomenology	is	 ‘back	to	
the	 things	 themselves!’	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 reach	 an	 unmediated	 perception	 of	 objective	
reality;	“Husserl’s	main	objective	is	to	separate	perception	from	representation	in	such	a	
way	 that	 the	 latter	 should	 not	 interfere	with	 primary	 self-evidence	 of	 knowledge.”421	
The	 ‘phenomenological	 reduction’	 is	 intended	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 ossified	
patterns	 of	 subjective	 consciousness	 from	 the	 elements	 of	 experience	 that	 are	
objectively	 true. 422 	In	 this	 sense,	 Husserl’s	 phenomenology	 is	 a	 continuation	 and	
development	of	Descartes’	attempt	to	attain	objective	certainty	through	critical	doubt.	
It	 is	 this	 phenomenological	 tradition	 that	 leads	 Levinas	 to	 the	 discovery	 of	 ethical	
embodiment.			
Phenomenology	 is	 nevertheless	 widely	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 failure.	 Husserl’s	
phenomenological	 method	 repeats	 many	 of	 the	 same	 errors	 of	 Descartes’	 rational	
idealism.	The	well-worn	criticisms	of	Descartes	 therefore	apply	 to	Husserl	as	well:	 the	
traumatic	diremption	of	body	and	mind,	 the	unfounded	privileging	of	abstract	 reason,	
and	the	naïve	search	for	absolute	certainty.	As	a	result,	phenomenology	maintains	the	
same	 elements	 of	 subjectivism	 that	Husserl	wishes	 to	 ‘bracket’.	 Contrary	 to	Husserl’s	
own	search	for	a	transcendental	grounding	of	reason,	phenomenology	instead	discloses	
the	ungrounded	chasm	at	the	heart	of	being.	It	turns	out	that	there	is	nothing	certain	or	
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objective	 underlying	 subjective	 consciousness.	 Our	 concepts	 are	 always	 inadequate.	
Nothing	 can	 be	 said	 about	 existence	 with	 certainty.	 Regardless,	 just	 as	 Descartes’	
rational	idealism	exerted	a	revolutionary	impact	on	early	modern	philosophy,	Husserl’s	
phenomenological	method	likewise	invigorated	twentieth	century	European	philosophy.	
Martin	Heidegger	was	a	student	of	Husserl,	as	was	Emmanuel	Levians.	Both	Heidegger	
and	 Levinas	 reject	 Husserl’s	 unfounded	 Cartesian	 presuppositions	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	
remain	 more	 faithful	 to	 the	 phenomenological	 method	 than	 Husserl	 himself.	 The	
phenomenological	element	 retained	by	both	Heidegger	and	Levinas	 is	direct	attention	
to	 non-dual	 experience.	 Heidegger’s	 phenomenological	 description	 of	 ‘being-in-the-
world’	 is	 a	 rejection	of	Husserl’s	 subject-object	 distinction.	 Levinas	 goes	 even	 further,	
refuting	Husserl’s	Cartesian	rationalism	through	an	account	of	the	 intrinsic	meaning	of	
embodied	sensation.		
According	to	Levinas,	the	most	significant	insufficiency	of	phenomenology	is	the	
enduring	metaphysical	and	methodological	primacy	of	 subjective	 reason.	This	 remains	
true	 of	 Heidegger’s	 appropriation	 of	 Husserl	 as	 well.	 Heidegger’s	 late	 philosophy	
abandons	 the	 phenomenological	 method	 in	 order	 to	 cultivate	 a	 non-instrumental	
mindfulness	 of	 ‘the	 event’.	 Nevertheless,	 even	 Heidegger’s	 late	 philosophy	 replicates	
the	 metaphysical	 presupposition	 that	 thinking	 is	 the	 genesis	 of	 all	 meaning.	 In	
opposition	to	both	Heidegger	and	Husserl,	Levinas	suggests	that	ethics	has	no	relation	
whatsoever	to	thinking.	The	origin	of	meaning	is	not	the	mind,	but	the	body.	In	spite	of	
its	limitations,	the	phenomenological	method	of	‘bracketing’	subjective	consciousness	is	
absolutely	essential	to	Levinas’	discovery	of	the	corporality	of	‘the	ethical	relation’.	For	
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instance,	Husserl’s	 idea	of	 ‘intentionality’	 refutes	 the	notion	of	pure	consciousness	 in-
itself.	 In	this	sense,	 ‘intentionality’	 is	opposed	to	Aristotle’s	notion	of	 thought	thinking	
itself.	 Instead,	Husserl	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	only	ever	 consciousness	of	something.	 In	
other	 words,	 self-consciousness	 is	 the	 turning	 of	 awareness	 back	 on	 itself	 upon	
encountering	its	other.	Put	simply,	Husserl	discovers	that	the	other	is	the	genesis	of	self-
consciousness.	Levinas	nevertheless	rejects	Husserl’s	division	of	being	into	the	thinking	
mind	 and	 inert	matter.	 Instead,	 Levinas	 argues	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 Cartesian	 separation	
between	me	and	my	body,	nor	a	synthesis,	but	immediately	and	un-objectifiable,	lived	
participation.”423	Levinas	 therefore	 locates	a	post-metaphysical	 corporeal	grounding	of	
ethics	in	the	‘sensible	proximity’	of	one	body	to	another.	According	to	Levinas,	ethics	is	
the	teaching	of	the	body.	Ethics	originates	from	the	‘anarchy’	of	sensation,	prior	to	any	
‘onto-theolgoical’	grounding	of	first	principles	or	highest	values.	Levinas	inverts	Western	
philosophy	 since	Plato,	 arguing	 that	 ‘the	Good’	 is	not	accessible	 to	knowledge,	but	 to	
sensation.	 The	 other	 is	 not	 encountered	 as	 a	 constant	 presence,	 but	 as	 a	 corporeal	
trace.	 Levinas	 refutes	 Kantian	 morality,	 arguing	 that	 “responsibility	 is	 not	 a	
knowledge.” 424 	While	 transcending	 rational	 cognition,	 the	 trace	 of	 ‘alterity’	 is	
perceptible	 to	 embodied	 sensation.	 Levinas:	 “The	 transcendent	 cuts	 across	
sensibility.”425	The	genesis	of	ethics	is	the	fear	and	trembling	of	the	flesh.	Levinas	argues	
that	“sensation	recovers	a	‘reality’	.	.	.	anterior	to	the	crystallization	of	consciousness,	I	
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and	 non-I,	 into	 subject	 and	 object.”426	For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ‘bracket’	
standardized	modes	of	perception	in	order	to	‘attune’	the	senses	to	the	proximity	of	the	
other.	Put	simply,	ethics	requires	bringing	the	senses	back	to	life!		
In	 opposition	 to	 Husserl,	 Levinas	 argues	 that	 the	 ‘bracketing’	 of	 subjective	
consciousness	 does	 not	 actually	 disclose	 objective	 reality.	 Instead,	 the	
‘phenomenological	 reduction’	 facilitates	 a	 receptivity	 towards	 that	 which	 resists	 all	
objectivity	–	the	expression	of	the	body.	The	signification	of	the	face	“affects	us	despite	
ourselves.” 427 	Levinas:	 “The	 subject	 –	 the	 famous	 subject	 resting	 upon	 itself	 –	 is	
unseated	by	the	other	 .	 .	 .”428	The	vulnerability	of	our	embodiment	amounts	to	a	bare	
expose	 to	 the	other;	“an	exposure	without	shelter.”429	The	 implication	 is	 that	ethics	 is	
innate;	 the	 body	 is	 the	 genesis	 of	meaning.	 Responsibility	 is	 neither	 a	 decision	 nor	 a	
commitment,	but	the	corporeal	affect	of	another	body.	Levinas:	“To	be	responsible	is	to	
be	 responsible	 before	 any	 decision.”430	Again,	 “from	 the	 moment	 of	 sensibility,	 the	
subject	 is	 for	 the	other	 .	 .	 .”431	It	 is	 instructive	 to	briefly	mention	 the	appropriation	of	
Levinas’	ethics	by	post-colonial	theory.	Yes,	the	other	is	indeed	the	stranger,	the	refugee,	
and	the	migrant.	But	the	other	 is	not	only	 ‘the	subaltern’.	Every	other	 is	wholly	other!	
The	‘face-to-face’	encounter	with	my	neighbor	–	the	one	who	is	nearest,	whoever	that	
may	 be	 –	 is	 the	 genesis	 of	 meaning.	 Levinas:	 “The	 proximity	 of	 the	 neighbor	 is	 my	
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responsibility	 for	him:	to	be	a	guardian	of	one’s	brother	 .	 .	 .”432	One’s	exposure	to	the	
corporeal	expression	of	‘the	face’	is	inherently	meaningful:	it	 is	not	what	 is	said	that	is	
significant,	 but	 that	 one	 is	 addressed.	 What	 is	 meaningful	 is	 the	 encounter	 itself.	
Levinas:	“The	face	opens	the	primordial	discourse	whose	first	word	is	obligation	.	.	.”433	
Again,	the	ethical	signification	of	“the	face	summons	me	to	my	obligations	.	.	.”434	But	it	
follows	that	even	if	ethics	is	innate	to	the	body,	the	‘body-politic’	operates	according	to	
the	violent	logic	of	sovereign	power.	The	result	is	an	irreconcilable	‘strife’	between	the	
ethical	and	the	political.		
In	addition	to	phenomenology,	the	philosophy	of	ancient	Greece	is	an	inspiration	
for	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Levinas.	 The	 ancient	 Greeks	 envision	 a	 generative	 ‘strife’	
operative	at	the	very	heart	of	being.	According	to	Heidegger,	 the	Pre-Socratics	had	an	
entirely	 different	 attunement	 to	 being	 than	 that	 of	 us	 late	 moderns.	 We	 tend	 to	
perceive	being	as	a	linear	sequence	of	events	stretching	from	the	past	 into	the	future.	
Heidegger:	“For	the	Greeks,	what	is	decisive	is	not	the	causal	sequence,	the	coming	to	
be	 out	 of	 and	 through	 one	 another,	 but	 purely	 and	 simply	 the	 stepping-forth,	 the	
looming	 up.” 435 	In	 this	 sense,	 the	 Pre-Socratics	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 proto-
phenomenologists.	 Heidegger	 attempts	 to	 retrieve	 the	 Pre-Socratic	 vision	 of	
phenomenal	 ‘strife’	 between	 appearance	 and	 concealment.	 Pre-Socratic	 philosophy	 is	
continually	directing	our	attention	to	‘the	strife’	between	the	radiant	self-emergence	of	
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beings	 into	 ‘the	open’,	and	the	subsequent	passage	of	being	 into	the	darkness	of	self-
concealment.	Heidegger:	“Stepping	forth	means	originating	arrival,	arriving	emergence,	
self-manifestation,	 appearance;	 correspondingly,	 receding	 means	 disappearance,	
withdrawal,	going	away.”436	For	Heidegger,	it	is	the	task	of	the	poet	to	‘shelter’	the	strife	
of	the	self-concealing	‘event’.	
The	experimental	style	of	Heidegger’s	 late	philosophy	 is	a	poetic	remembrance	
of	 the	 generative	 ‘strife’	 of	 being.	 Heidegger	 envisions	 ‘the	 event’	 allegorically	 as	 the	
strife	of	 ‘Earth’	and	‘World’.	 ‘Earth’	 is	a	poetic	 image	of	the	passage	of	being	into	self-
concealment	while	‘World’	signifies	the	opening	of	being	to	self-manifestation.	‘World’	
is	 rooted	 in	 the	 dark	 ground	 of	 ‘Earth’,	 just	 as	 ‘Earth’	 opens	 unto	 the	 open	 realm	 of	
‘World’.	 In	 this	 sense,	 Heidegger’s	 thinking	 echoes	 Heraclitus’	 fragmentary	 saying	 –	
‘Strife	 is	 the	 father	 of	 all’.	 Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 strife’	 of	World	 and	 Earth	 is	 no	
doubt	inspired	by	the	mythical	cosmology	of	ancient	Greece.	Hesiod,	the	earliest	poet	of	
the	 classical	 Greek	 era,	 attributes	 the	 genesis	 of	 the	 cosmos	 to	 primordial	 Chaos,	 or	
‘Strife’.	For	Hesiod,	the	cosmic	origin	of	being	is	not	God,	understood	as	the	‘Supreme	
Being’.	Instead,	the	cosmos	is	grounded	in	the	primordial	Chaos,	void,	or	emptiness	that	
precedes	 any	 ‘onto-theological’	 notion	 of	 God	 as	 ‘first	 cause’.	 Hesiod’s	 cosmological	
vision	 predates	 and	 informs	 the	 inception	 of	 Western	 metaphysics.	 The	 creation	
mythology	of	Theogony	bears	witness	to	‘the	fourfold	strife’	of	Tartarus,	Earth,	Sea,	and	
Sky.	According	to	Hesiod,	the	‘strife’	of	Earth	(Gaia)	and	Sky	(Uranus)	generates	the	first	
race	 of	 primordial	 gods,	 or	 Titans,	 the	 most	 terrible	 of	 whom	 is	 Kronos	 (Time).	 For	
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Heidegger,	the	‘fourfold	strife’	of	being	‘sends’	the	destiny	of	an	epochal	transfiguration	
of	 ‘world-history’.	 Echoing	 Hesiod,	 Heidegger	 utilizes	 a	 poetic	 style	 of	 expression	 in	
order	 to	 ‘shelter’	 the	 ‘strife’	 of	 concealment	 (Earth)	 and	 un-concealment	 (World)	 in	
poetry	 and	 art.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 poetic	 expression	 of	 Heidegger’s	 late	 philosophy	 is	
intended	to	signify	the	‘epochal	strife’	of	the	truth	of	being	as	‘event’.	
We	 can	 also	 see	 ‘strife’	 at	 work	 in	 Antigone,	 the	 culmination	 of	 Sophocles’	
Theban	 Trilogy.	 Sophocles’	 attic	 tragedy	 is	 a	 brilliant	 depiction	 of	 the	 irreconcilable	
‘strife’	between	the	laws	of	the	state	and	the	higher	law	of	the	gods.	I	disagree	with	the	
common	Hegelian	interpretation	of	Antigone.	For	Hegel,	the	dialectical	conflict	between	
Antigone	 (Sittlichkeit,	or	ethical	 life)	and	Creon	 (Rechtsstaat,	or	 legal	 state)	 represents	
the	 elevation	of	 self-consciousness	 via	 the	 reconciliation	of	 conflicting	 points	 of	 view.	
Hegel	 argues	 that	 the	 tragic	 opposition	 between	 the	 ethical	 and	 the	 political	 is	
reconciled	 through	 the	historical	development	of	 the	Absolute	State.	 In	my	 judgment,	
Sophocles’	 tragedy	expresses	 a	 far	more	pessimistic	 view	of	 history.	 It	 is	 not	 that	 the	
ethical	and	political	are	reconciled	in	the	absolute	sovereignty	of	the	state.	Instead,	the	
ethical	 is	 sacrificed	 at	 the	 bloodstained	 alter	 of	 history.	 The	 inherent	 tragedy	 of	 the	
political	 is	 that	 sovereign	 power	 recognizes	 no	 higher	 law.	 There	 is	 no	 reconciliation	
here.	 I	 interpret	 Sophocles’	 play	 through	a	 Levinasian	 lens	 as	 expressing	 the	essential	
strife	 of	 the	 ethical	 command	 and	 sovereign	 power.	 The	 world-view	 of	 Antigone	 is	
radically	pessimistic;	the	tragic	conflict	between	the	divine	law	(Antigone)	and	the	laws	
of	the	state	(Creon)	is	fated	to	culminate	in	the	catastrophic	ruin.	Sophocles	delineates	
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the	irrevocable	antagonism	between	obedience	to	the	divine	command	and	submission	
to	state	violence.		
The	stage	is	set	amidst	the	‘strife’	of	civil	war.	The	exile	of	King	Oedipus	from	the	
state	 has	 left	 the	 crown	 vacant,	 with	 Creon	 acting	 as	 regent.	 Eteocles	 and	 Polynices,	
sons	 of	 Oedipus,	 vie	 for	 sovereign	 power.	 The	 two	 brothers	 encounter	 each	 other	 in	
battle,	each	killing	the	other	in	‘face	to	face’	combat.	With	the	death	of	Oedipus’	sons,	
the	burden	of	the	crown	falls	to	Creon,	uncle	to	Antigone.	As	King,	Creon	is	obligated	to	
defend	 the	 state	 above	 all.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 responsibility,	 Creon	 hands	 down	 a	 harsh	
punishment	for	insurgent	fighters:	that	the	bodies	of	the	dead	be			unburied	 to	 rot	
without	 the	 sanctification	 of	 the	 sacred	 funeral	 rights.	 As	 per	 Creon’s	 decree,	 the	
sanctification	of	the	body	of	Antigone’s	brother	Polynices	is	forbidden.	Antigone	is	torn	
between	her	sacred	duty	 to	honor	her	brother	and	her	obligation	to	obey	the	 laws	of	
the	state.	As	King,	Creon	has	a	responsibility	to	uphold	and	defend	the	state.	Creon:	“I	
find	 intolerable	 the	man	who	puts	his	country	second	to	his	 friends	 .	 .	 .	Never	could	 I	
make	 by	 country’s	 enemy	my	 private	 friend	 .	 .	 .	 So	 there	 you	 have	 the	 principles	 by	
which	 I	 govern	 .	 .	 .	 I’ll	 honour	 him	 alone,	 alive	 or	 dead,	 who	 honours	 Thebes.”437	
Allowing	 the	 sanctification	 of	 his	 nephew’s	 body	 would	 signify	 an	 unconscionable	
betrayal	 of	 Creon’s	 duty	 to	 uphold	 the	 law.	 Similarly,	 Antigone’s	 sacred	 duty	 to	 her	
brother	 supersedes	any	obligation	 to	 the	 state.	 For	Antigone,	 the	divine	 law	 is	higher	
than	the	laws	of	the	state.	Ismene,	Antigone’s	sister,	cautions	her	against	transgressing	
the	state.	Ismene:	“Right	unfortunately	is	right	and	makes	us	bow	to	things	like	this	and	
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worse.	Therefore	I	beg	the	shades	below	to	judge	me	leniently	as	one	who	kneeled	to	
force.”438	Antigone	 is	compelled	by	a	 transcendent	 force;	she	rebukes	her	 timid	sister,	
resolving	to	remain	faithful	to	the	gods	regardless	of	the	consequences.	Antigone:	“He	is	
my	brother	 still	 .	 .	 .	 I	 shall	not	abandon	him.”439	Antigone	upholds	 the	divine	 law;	 she	
performs	the	sacred	burial	rights	and	lays	her	brother	to	rest.	
Antigone’s	resolve	to	honour	the	gods	is	equaled	only	by	the	resolve	of	Creon	to	
defend	 the	 state.	When	Creon	 inquires	 as	 to	whether	 she	was	 simply	 ignorant	of	 the	
law,	 Antigone	 responds	 defiantly;	 “I	 never	 thought	 your	moral	 edicts	 had	 such	 force	
they	nullified	 the	 laws	of	heaven	 .	 .	 .”440	A	secondary	character,	named	Leader,	 reacts	
with	contempt	to	Antigone’s	defiance.	Leader:	“See	how	she	goes,	headlong	driven	by	
the	 capricious	 gusts	 of	 her	 own	 will!” 441 	Leader:	 “My	 word!	 The	 daughter	 is	 as	
headstrong	 as	 her	 father.	 Submission	 is	 a	 thing	 she’s	 never	 learned.” 442 	Leader,	
however,	completely	misses	 the	point.	Antigone’s	 refusal	 to	submit	 to	 the	established	
order	 is	 fated;	 her	 transgression	 does	 not	 indicate	 willful	 defiance,	 but	 rather	
submission	to	a	higher	law.	Antigone	is	the	daughter	of	Oedipus,	and	as	such,	is	fated	to	
share	 his	 tragic	 destiny.	 The	 Chorus	 speaks	 the	 truth:	 “The	 ageless	 grey-grim	 Fates	
struck	her	down.”443	Chorus:	“You	fall	to	pay	a	father’s	sin.”444	Antigone’s	transgression	
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of	 the	 law	 does	 not	 signify	 a	 rebellion	 of	 the	 will.	 Instead,	 Antigone’s	 ‘crime’	 is	 her	
recognition	of	an	authority	higher	than	the	state.		
The	 irreconcilable	 conflict	 between	 the	divine	 law	and	 the	 laws	of	 the	 state	 is	
evident	 in	 light	 of	 the	 antagonism	 between	 Antigone	 and	 Creon.	 This	 antagonism	
discloses	‘the	strife’	between	ethical	peace	and	sovereign	violence.	As	King,	Creon	must	
preserve	order	and	defend	the	state.	Creon:	“The	state	is	he	who	rules	it	.	.	.	My	crime,	
of	course,	the	discharge	of	my	rule.”445	From	Creon’s	point	of	view,	the	greatest	crime	is	
not	 the	transgression	of	divine	 law,	but	 instead	treason,	sedition,	and	anarchy.	Creon:	
“Unswerving	submission	 to	whomever	 the	state	has	put	 in	charge	 is	what	 is	asked:	 in	
little	 things	 as	well	 as	 great,	 in	 right	 and	wrong.”446	Creon	 too	must	 endure	his	 tragic	
fate;	 he	must	 uphold	his	 duty	 to	 enforce	 the	 law	without	 exception,	 not	 even	 for	 his	
own	niece.	Creon:	“How	can	I,	if	I	nurse	sedition	in	my	house,	not	foster	it	outside?”447	
Creon	 witnessed	 first-hand	 the	 devastation	 of	 Oedipus’	 pious	 search	 for	 truth.	
Antigone’s’	 father	 remained	 faithful	 to	 the	 command	 of	 the	 Delphic	 oracle	 to	 ‘know	
thyself’.	Nevertheless,	Oedipus’	faithful	devotion	to	the	gods	brings	nothing	but	ruin	to	
the	polis.	For	Creon,	the	nihilism	of	Oedipus’	insight	into	the	ungrounded	void	of	being	
delineates	 the	 absolute	 necessity	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 abysmal	 groundlessness	 of	 being	
indicates	the	need	to	preserve	the	social	order	at	any	cost.	Creon:	“In	the	end	it	is	the	
ancient	codes	that	one	must	keep;	to	value	life	then,	one	must	value	law.”448	In	defiance	
of	 the	 state,	Antigone	 submits	 to	a	higher	 law.	Antigone:	 “By	what	 law	do	 I	 assert	 so	
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much?	Just	this:	once	a	brother’s	lost	no	other	brother	can	be	born	or	grown	again.	This	
is	my	principle,	which	Creon	stigmatized	as	criminal,	my	principle	for	honoring	you,	my	
dearest	 brother.”449	I	 interpret	 Antigone’s	 devotion	 through	 a	 secular	 Levinasian	 lens.	
For	 Levinas,	 the	 command	 of	 the	 other	 is	 higher	 than	 any	 law	 of	 the	 state.	 In	 other	
words,	it	is	the	absolute	singularity	of	human	life	that	compels	Antigone’s	respect.	
As	 King	 of	 Thebes,	 Creon	 is	 forbidden	 to	 exercise	 favor	 or	 show	mercy	 when	
upholding	 the	 laws	of	 the	 state.	He	must	enforce	 the	 law	universally.	 For	 this	 reason,	
Antigone’s	punishment	is	as	harsh	as	it	is	swift.	Creon	imprisons	Antigone	and	sentences	
her	to	death.	Antigone’s	fate	is	truly	horrific;	she	is	to	be	buried	alive	within	the	depths	
of	an	underground	cave.	Creon:	“I’ll	take	her	down	a	path	untrod	by	man.	I’ll	hide	her	
living	in	a	rock-hewn	vault,	with	ritual	food	enough	to	clear	the	taint	of	murder	from	the	
City’s	name.”450	The	citizens	of	Thebes	are	outraged	by	the	brutality	of	Creon’s	savage	
rule.	 Tiresias,	 the	 blind	 prophet	 who	 first	 appears	 in	 Oedipus	 Rex,	 emerges	 to	 bear	
witness	 to	 the	 wrathful	 gods.	 Tiresias:	 “You	 plunged	 a	 child	 of	 light	 into	 the	 dark;	
entombed	 the	 living	with	 the	 dead.”451	In	 an	 act	 of	 divine	 retribution,	 the	 gods	 strike	
Thebes	with	plague	as	punishment	for	Antigone’s	cruel	mistreatment.	Tiresias:	“See	it	–	
how	 the	 City	 sickens,	 Creon,	 these	 the	 symptoms,	 you’re	 the	 fanatic	will	 that	 caused	
them.”452	To	 appease	 the	wrath	 of	 the	 gods,	 Creon	must	 free	 Antigone	 and	 to	 honor	
Polynices	with	the	sacred	burial	rights.	Creon	relents;	his	will	is	turned,	but	it	is	too	late.	
Antigone	has	taken	her	own	life.	Creon	is	devastated.	It	would	be	a	mistake	to	interpret	
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Creon	 as	 the	 villain	 of	 Sophocles’	 Attic	 tragedy.	 To	 understand	 Creon	 as	 a	 villainous	
tyrant	would	overlook	the	tragedy	of	the	irreconcilable	‘strife’	between	divine	law	and	
the	laws	of	the	state.	Creon	is	bound	to	defend	the	laws	of	the	state,	just	as	Antigone	is	
compelled	to	obey	a	higher	 law.	There	 is	an	 irreconcilable	conflict	between	these	two	
realms	of	law.	
Against	Hegel’s	influential	interpretation,	the	antagonism	between	Antigone	and	
Creon	does	not	offer	a	mythical	image	of	the	reconciliation	of	dialectical	conflict	in	the	
Absolute	State.	There	 is	no	 reconciliation	here,	only	devastation.	With	 the	 sacrifice	of	
Antigone,	the	state	has	been	preserved,	but	at	what	cost?	The	result	is	utter	ruin;	even	
the	 ‘savage’	gods	 lament	 the	brutality	of	Antigone’s	 fate.	 If	Heidegger	 is	 correct,	 then	
Antigone’s	 tragic	 fate	 delineates	 the	 nihilistic	 destiny	 of	 ‘the	 West’.	 The	 dialectical	
unfolding	of	‘world-history’	must	be	arrested	before	reaching	its	nihilistic	fulfillment.	In	
my	judgment,	it	is	an	implicit	task	of	Levinas’	corpus	to	overturn	the	‘epochal	sending’	of	
this	nihilistic	destiny.	In	response	to	the	sacrificial	violence	of	the	Absolute	State,	Levinas	
argues	that	“the	State	cannot	set	itself	up	as	a	Whole.”453	For	Levinas,	the	two	‘regimes	
of	 law’	 are	 irreducible.	 Ethics	 is	 anarchy!	 Responsibly	 for	 the	 other	 takes	 precedence	
over	 any	 duty	 to	 the	 state.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 ethical	 and	 the	
political	 spheres	 constitutes	 a	 non-dialectical	 antinomy.	 As	 non-dialectical,	 the	 ethical	
and	the	political	cannot	be	gathered	into	a	totality,	sublated	into	a	metaphysical	system,	
or	reconciled	within	a	universal	state.	The	‘strife’	between	the	divine	law	and	the	laws	of	
the	state	issue	into	an	‘eschatological	break’	from	the	history	of	being.	Levinas:	“When	
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Man	 truly	 approaches	 the	 Other	 he	 is	 uprooted	 from	 history.”454	The	 unconditional	
command	 of	 the	 other	must	 exert	 an	 eschatological	 force	 upon	 sovereign	 power.	 As	
Asher	 Horowitz	 argues	 in	 Ethics	 At	 A	 Standstill,	 the	 ethical	 must	 be	 made	 operative	
within	the	political.		
	
The	Force	Of	Law	
As	 I	noted	previously,	Derrida’s	political	 thought	 is	deeply	 indebted	 to	Levinas’	
post-foundational	 ethical	 materialism.	 For	 Derrida	 as	 well,	 there	 are	 two	 ‘regimes	 of	
law’	–	the	unconditional	Law	of	hospitality	and	the	conditional	laws	of	the	state.	I	take	it	
that	this	is	similar	to	the	distinction	between	Justice	and	law.	Justice	is	Absolute,	or	it	is	
not	 at	 all.	 In	 this	 sense,	 Justice	 constitutes	 a	 transcendental	 basis	 of	 judgment.	 For	
Derrida,	 the	 unconditional	 Law	 of	 hospitality	 signifies	 the	 realm	 of	 ethics,	 while	 the	
conditional	laws	of	the	state	delineate	the	political	sphere.	These	two	basic	forms	of	law	
signify	 an	 abyss,	 chasm,	 or	 	 ‘aporia’	 between	 the	 ethical	 and	 the	 political.	 Although	
irreconcilable,	the	two	regimes	of	hospitality	are	constituted	by	a	relationship	of	mutual	
dependence.	While	the	 law	of	unconditional	hospitality	 is	 the	origin	and	 inspiration	of	
the	 conditional	 laws	 of	 the	 state,	 this	 unconditional	 law	 would	 nevertheless	 remain	
completely	without	political	affect	if	not	for	their	conditional	inscription	via	democratic	
self-legislation.	Levinas’	phenomenological	description	of	the	‘sensible	proximity’	of	the	
other	 delineates	 the	 limits	 to	 any	 political	 appropriation	 of	 the	 ethical.	 According	 to	
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Levinas,	 “politics	 left	 to	 itself	 bears	 a	 tyranny	 within	 itself.” 455 	While	 the	 ‘ethical	
relationship’	 indicates	 an	 ‘eschatological	 peace’,	 the	 political	 bears	 within	 itself	 the	
principle	 of	 ‘perpetual	 war’.	 Unfortunately,	 Levinas	 occasionally	 seems	 resigned	 to	
abandon	politics	to	its	internal	logic	of	agonistic	struggle.	In	other	words,	while	Levinas	
offers	 a	 captivating	 account	 of	 the	 unconditional	 Law	 of	 hospitality	 distinct	 from	 the	
conditional	 laws	of	the	state,	responsibly	for	the	other	nevertheless	 lacks	the	affective	
force	of	sovereign	power.	For	this	reason,	Derrida	stresses	that	the	unconditional	Law	of	
ethics	 must	 be	 ‘inscribed’	 in	 the	 conditional	 laws	 of	 the	 state.	 While	 Derrida	 shares	
Levinas’	 interpretation	of	the	distinction	between	the	ethical	and	the	political,	Derrida	
places	a	greater	emphasis	on	the	political	 implications	of	the	 ‘ethical	relationship’.	For	
Derrida,	 politics	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 transforming	 and	 improving	 the	 law,	 rather	 than	 its	
outright	rejection.	 In	other	words,	the	 ‘ethical	relationship’	must	not	only	contest,	but	
also	transform	the	political.	Derrida:	“This	 improvement	is	possible	within	an	historical	
space	between	the	Law	of	an	unconditional	hospitality	.	.	.	and	the	conditional	laws	of	a	
right	 to	 hospitality,	 without	 which	 the	 unconditional	 Law	 of	 hospitality	 would	 be	 in	
danger	 of	 remaining	 a	 pious	 and	 irresponsible	 desire,	 without	 form	 and	 without	
potency,	and	of	even	being	perverted	at	any	moment.”456	The	difficult	task	of	justice	is	
to	 inscribe	 the	 ethical	 within	 the	 political,	 even	 if	 ethics	 and	 politics	 can	 never	 be	
reconciled	in	a	universal	state.	
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Ethics,	 for	 Levinas,	 is	 a	 ‘face-to-face’	 relation.	 The	 ‘sensible	 proximity’	 of	 the	
other	makes	 a	 singular	 and	unconditional	 claim	upon	me.	Derrida’s	 thinking	 is	 deeply	
indebted	to	this	discovery.	For	Derrida	as	well,	“There	is	no	true	binding	responsibility	or	
obligation	that	doesn’t	come	from	someone,	from	a	person	.	.	.	who	transfixes	me,	takes	
possession	 of	 me,	 holds	 me	 in	 its	 hand	 and	 in	 its	 gaze.”457	For	 this	 reason,	 Derrida	
suggests	that	“the	original	moment	of	responsibility	exposes	me	to	the	singular	other,	
the	one	who	appeals	to	me.”458	Consequently,	I	am	“obliged	by	a	law	that	falls	upon	me	
before	 I	 even	 choose	 to	 obey	 it.” 459 	Nevertheless,	 this	 ‘ethical	 relationship’	 is	
interrupted	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 third	 person.	 Levinas:	 “The	 passage	 from	 ethical	
inequality	 –	 from	 the	 dissymmetry	 of	 intersubjective	 space	 –	 to	 equality	 between	
persons	comes	from	the	political	order	of	citizens	in	a	state.	The	birth	of	the	state	from	
the	ethical	order	is	intelligible	to	the	extent	that	I	have	also	to	answer	for	the	third	party	
‘next	 to’	 my	 neighbor.”460	The	 implication	 is	 that	 responsibly	 is	 universal,	 as	 well	 as	
unconditional.	 My	 unconditional	 responsibility	 for	 the	 other	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	
betrayal	of	my	universal	duty	 to	all.	 In	other	words,	 the	political	need	arises	 from	the	
fact	that	I	am	not	only	responsible	for	the	singular	other,	but	for	each	and	every	other	as	
well.	 There	 is	 no	 individual	 salvation;	 none	 are	 free	 until	 all	 are	 free.	 Ethical	
responsibility	 demands	 an	 emancipatory-egalitarian	 project.	 In	 Derrida’s	 words,	 “the	
antinomy	of	hospitality	 irreconcilably	opposes	The	 law,	 in	 its	universal	singularity,	 to	a	
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plurality	 [of	 laws]	 .	 .	 .”461	For	 this	 reason,	Derrida	claims	that	 there	 is	a	non-dialectical	
antinomy	between,	“the	law	of	unlimited	hospitality	.	.	.	and	the	laws,	those	rights	and	
duties	 that	 are	always	 conditioned	and	 conditional	 .	 .	 .”462	The	antinomy	between	my	
responsibility	 for	one	and	my	responsibility	 for	all	can	neither	be	reconciled,	sublated,	
nor	negated.	This	non-dialectical	antimony	between	the	Law	and	the	 laws	 indicates	an	
irreducible	 opposition	 between	 the	 ethical	 and	 the	 political.	 For	 unconditional	
responsibility	to	be	politically	affective,	the	unconditional	command	of	the	other	must	
nevertheless	be	‘inscribed’	in	the	conditional	laws	of	the	state.	Derrida	therefore	argues	
that	 while	 “unconditional	 hospitality	 is	 transcendent	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 political	 .	 .	 .	
unconditional	 hospitality,	 which	 is	 neither	 juridical	 nor	 political,	 is	 nonetheless	 the	
condition	 of	 both	 the	 juridical	 and	 the	 political.”463 	By	 emphasizing	 the	 necessary	
‘inscription’	of	 the	ethical	 in	 the	political,	Derrida	offers	a	much	needed	correction	 to	
Levinas’	account	of	the	irreconcilable	strife	between	these	two	forms	of	law.	However,	
Derrida’s	 thinking	 requires	 a	 similar	 corrective.	While	 Derrida	 argues	 persuasively	 for	
the	 inscription	 of	 the	 unconditional	 within	 the	 conditional,	 his	 trenchant	 critique	 of	
political	 fraternity	 and	national	 sovereignty	 severely	undermines	 the	prospects	of	 any	
such	transformation	of	democracy.	
	 According	 to	 Derrida,	 democracy	 is	 a	 structural	 concept	 without	 any	 fixed	
normative	 content.	 Moreover,	 Derrida	 understands	 democracy	 in	 light	 of	 the	
temporality	 of	 inheritance.	 Democracy	 is	 not	 only	 a	 matter	 of	 openness	 to	 an	
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indeterminate	future,	but	also	involves	the	inheritance	of	a	contested	past.	That	which	
is	 inherited	 is	 not	 a	 pre-determined	 set	 of	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 practices,	 but	
rather	the	promise	of	‘the	democracy	to	come’.	According	to	Derrida,	democracy	does	
not	refer	to	any	particular	state-form,	but	rather	to	the	concrete	practice	of	collective	
self-legislation.	 Derrida:	 “Inheritance	 is	 never	 a	 given,	 it	 is	 always	 a	 task.”464 	It	 is	
Derrida’s	 hope	 that	 the	 open-ended	 transformation	 of	 democracy	 may,	 to	 a	 greater	
extent,	 ‘inscribe’	 the	unconditional	 law	of	 responsibility	within	 the	conditional	 laws	of	
the	 state.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 hopeful	 expectation	 would	 be	 naïve	 without	 a	 more	
sobering	 consideration	 of	 the	 ‘auto-immune’	 function	 of	 the	 ‘body-politic’.	 ‘Auto-
immunity’	 refers	 to	 the	 paradoxical	 tendency	 of	 an	 organism	 to	 undermine	 its	 own	
internal	 defense	mechanism	 through	 the	 very	 act	 of	 self-defense.	 Derrida	 claims	 that	
the	U.S.	War	on	Terror	is	an	instance	of	such	an	‘auto-immune’	response.	For	instance,	
the	pre-emptive	invasion	of	Iraq	amounted	to	an	attack	upon	itself.	The	‘auto-immune’	
response	 of	 the	 American	 ‘body-politic’	 is	 to	 attack	 the	 very	 defense	 systems	 of	
democracy	itself,	such	as	the	rule	of	constitutional	law.	The	violation	of	civil	liberties	by	
the	U.S.	Patriot	Act	 is	another	example	of	such	an	 ‘auto-immune’	 response.	The	auto-
immunity	 of	 the	 ‘body-politic’	 indicates	 a	 troubling	 and	 persistent	 feature	 of	 political	
community.	 Traditionally,	 community	 is	 defined	 against	 an	 ‘outside’	 threat.	 In	 this	
sense,	 community	 requires	 a	 fairly	 strict	 delimitation	 between	 ‘inside’	 and	 ‘outside’.	
Community	therefore	bears	within	 itself	the	persistent	threat	of	exclusionary	violence.	
The	 problem	 of	 ‘auto-immunity’	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ‘scapegoat’	
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mechanism.	 The	 ‘scapegoat	 mechanism’	 preserves	 social	 cohesion	 through	 the	
repetition	 of	 communal	 violence.	 The	 foundational	 violence	 of	 the	 scapegoat	
mechanism	 requires	 the	 death	 of	 a	 sacrificial	 victim.	 The	 ‘essential	 sacrifice’	 of	 a	
scapegoat	 facilitates	 a	 sense	 of	 communal	 belonging	 through	 the	 cathartic	 release	 of	
repressed	violence.	For	Derrida,	the	perpetual	threat	of	communal	violence	justifies	the	
abandonment	of	sovereignty	altogether	to	the	framework	of	international	law.	
A	brief	look	at	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex	may	offer	further	clarification.	The	exile	of	
Oedipus	 from	 the	 polis	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	 light	 of	 the	 scapegoat	mechanism.	 The	
illegitimate	 rule	 of	Oedipus	 signifies	 a	 contagion	 to	 ‘body-politic’.	 As	 ‘defender	 of	 the	
state’	against	the	monstrous	Sphinx,	Oedipus	is	at	first	welcomed	into	the	polis	as	King.	
Nevertheless,	the	inclusion	of	Oedipus	in	Thebes	signifies	the	infection	of	a	bio-political	
contagion.	Thebes	is	stricken	with	plague	as	an	act	of	divine	retribution	for	the	impurity	
of	 the	city.	 Ignorant	of	himself	as	 the	cause	of	 the	cities	affliction,	Oedipus	endeavors	
“to	 learn	what	act	or	covenant	of	mine	could	still	 redeem	the	state.”465	Oedipus	vows	
“to	sever	from	the	body-politic	a	monstrous	growth	that	battens	there	.	.	.”466	Oedipus:	
“I	am	resolute,	and	shall	not	stop	till	with	Apollo’s	help	all-blessed	we	emerge,	or	else	
we	are	lost:	beyond	all	purge.”467	Nevertheless,	the	prophet	Tiresias	reveals	the	horrific	
truth	 that	Oedipus	himself	 is	affliction	of	 the	polis.	 Tiresias:	 “The	 rotten	canker	 in	 the	
state	 is	you.”468	In	order	 to	heal	 the	plague,	Oedipus	must	 ‘purge’	 the	state	of	 its	bio-
political	 contagion	 –	 himself.	 Oedipus:	 “Thrust	 out	 from	 every	 home,	 I’ll	 be	 the	 very	
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picture	of	that	pestilence	he	brought	upon	our	city.”469	As	a	sacrificial	victim	offered	to	
communal	 fellowship,	 Oedipus	 must	 endure	 being	 “severed	 from	 all	 fellowship	 of	
speech	 and	 shelter,	 sacrifice,	 and	 sacrament.”470	Only	 with	 the	 exile	 of	 Oedipus,	 the	
outsider,	 will	 the	 wounds	 of	 the	 ‘body-politic’	 issue	 into	 blessings. 471 	Only	 Creon	
perceives	 the	 true	horror	of	Oedipus’	 fate.	Oedipus’	 sacrifice	 amounts	 to	 “a	 ruin	 that	
saved	the	state.”472	Horrified	by	the	savagery	of	Oedipus’	exile,	Creon	recoils	 from	the	
sacrificial	 violence	 operative	within	 sovereign	 power.	 Creon:	 “How	 could	 I	 suit	myself	
with	 power	 and	 sovereignty	 if	 power	 and	 sovereignty	 once	 grasped	 were	 grasped	 in	
pain?”473 	In	 my	 judgment,	 Creon	 must	 not	 have	 the	 final	 word.	 The	 rejection	 of	
sovereignty	risks	abandoning	the	difficult	work	of	justice.		
For	Derrida,	 the	 inherent	danger	of	bio-political	 ‘auto-immunity’	necessitates	a	
sustained	 critique	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 democratic	 community,	 solidarity,	 and	 fraternity.	
While	Derrida	calls	 for	 ‘the	democracy	 to	come’,	he	nevertheless	 refrains	 from	calling	
for	a	‘fraternity	to	come’	as	well.	Derrida’s	hostility	to	the	notion	of	fraternity	seems	to	
indicate	 that	 there	 is	 something	 about	 community	 that	 resists	 the	 transformation	 of	
democratic	inheritance.	More	specifically,	Derrida	argues	that	democratic	‘fraternity’,	or	
brotherhood,	 presupposes	 the	 exclusion	 of	 women	 from	 the	 polis.	 Furthermore,	 the	
biological	connotations	of	 the	 term	could	be	used	to	 limit	national	citizenship	 to	birth	
rather	 than	 residence,	 thereby	 bringing	 about	 a	 premature	 closure	 to	 democratic	
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hospitality.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 Derrida’s	 treatment	 of	 fraternity	 that,	 in	 my	 opinion,	
reveals	his	insufficiencies	as	a	political	thinker.	According	to	Levinas,	the	approach	of	the	
other	does	not	necessarily	foretell	the	irruption	of	communal	violence.	Instead,	Levinas	
suggests	 that	 “the	 relation	 with	 the	 Other	 as	 face	 heals	 allergy.”474	Encountering	 the	
other	does	not	threaten	fraternity,	but	facilitates	it.	Levinas	differs	from	Derrida	in	this	
regard.	Contrary	to	Derrida’s	opposition	to	fraternity,	Levinas	argues	that	“society	must	
be	a	fraternal	community	to	be	commensurate	with	.	.	.	the	primary	proximity	in	which	
the	 face	 presents	 itself	 to	 my	 welcome.” 475 	According	 to	 Levinas,	 while	 ethical	
responsibility	 is	more	 fundamental	 than	 any	 sense	of	 democratic	 fraternity,	 fraternity	
nevertheless	remains	essential	to	the	political	task	of	creating	a	more	just	society.	It	 is	
therefore	problematic	that	in	addition	to	rejecting	fraternity,	Derrida	also	opposes	any	
notion	of	‘party,	class,	or	nation’.	If	party,	class,	and	nation	are	all	unsuitable	bases	for	
solidarity,	 fraternity,	 and	 community,	 then	 what	 is?	 Unfortunately,	 Derrida	 does	 not	
seriously	 pursue	 this	 question.	 Instead,	 Derrida	 defends	 the	 notion	 of	 democracy	
without	a	demos,	or	without	a	people.	Derrida	repeats	the	errors	of	classical	liberalism	
in	this	regard.	Derrida’s	strident	opposition	to	the	fraternity	of	a	community,	nation,	or	
people	risks	abandoning	the	fate	of	the	political	to	that	which	Nancy	calls	“an	unlimited	
process	of	an	eco-technological	framing	and	a	vanishing	of	the	possibilities	of	forms	of	
life	 and	 /	 or	 common	ground.”476	In	 other	words,	 by	 rejecting	 the	notion	of	 a	demos,	
Derrida	 risks	 abandoning	 democracy	 as	 well.	 Against	 his	 original	 intent,	 Derrida’s	
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deconstruction	 of	 bio-political	 ‘auto-immunity’	 ultimately	 undermines	 the	 ‘inscription’	
of	the	ethical	in	the	political.		
In	advocating	 for	 the	passage	 from	the	ethical	 to	 the	political,	Derrida	turns	 to	
the	 city	 rather	 than	 the	 nation	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 reconstituting	 the	 current	 state-form.	
Derrida:	“If	we	look	to	the	city	rather	than	the	nation-state,	it	is	because	we	have	given	
up	hope	that	the	state	might	create	a	new	image	for	the	city.”477	Derrida’s	‘new	image’	
of	the	city	envisions	a	post-national	constellation	of	sovereign	city-states.	In	light	of	this	
vision,	 Derrida	 advocates	 for	 a	 decentralized	 federation	 of	 cities	 constituted	 by	
participatory	modes	of	 local	democracy.	 In	my	judgment,	Derrida’s	 ‘new	image’	of	the	
city	should	be	understood	as	an	alternative	 to	Plato’s	 ideal	city	of	 justice.	While	Plato	
prescribes	a	hierarchal	caste	based	social	order,	Derrida	envisions	an	egalitarian	‘city	of	
refuge’	wherein	each	is	the	guardian	of	the	other.	This	‘new	image’	of	the	city	is	inspired	
by	 Levinas’	 Talmudic	 discussion	 of	 the	 Medieval	 European	 ‘cities	 of	 refuge’.	 Levinas	
describes	 the	 ‘city	of	 refuge’	 as	a	place	 “where	men	dwell,	 and	where	 they	are	 faced	
with	concrete	questions	related	to	their	relations	with	their	neighbors	.	.	.”478	Dwelling,	
for	Levinas,	is	characterized	by	a	sense	of	belonging	to	a	living	community.	Levinas	thus	
indicates	an	inter-corporeal	genesis	of	democratic	fraternity.	However,	Derrida	does	not	
discuss	in	sufficient	detail	what	is	new	about	this	image	of	the	city.	In	my	judgment,	the	
‘new	image’	of	the	city	must	bear	little	resemblance	to	the	modern	urban	form.	Global	
cities	such	as	Hong	Kong,	Singapore,	and	Toronto	are	not	cities	at	all	 in	the	sense	that	
Levinas	 intends.	 Instead,	 the	 modern	 city	 is	 a	 sprawling	 economic	 mega-region	 that	
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exists	solely	for	the	sake	of	capital	accumulation.	In	this	sense,	the	modern	city	is	not	a	
space	in	which	one	‘dwells’.	As	Jean-Luc	Nancy,	a	close	interlocutor	of	Derrida	contends,	
“the	city	spreads	and	extends	to	the	point	where,	while	it	tends	to	cover	the	entire	orb	
of	 the	 planet,	 it	 looses	 its	 properties	 as	 a	 city.”479	Nancy	 suggests	 that	 a	 city	 “which	
extends	in	this	way	is	no	longer	properly	urban.”480	Moreover,	Nancy	draws	attention	to	
“the	social	inequality	and	apartheid	structure	concerning	access	to	the	urban	milieu.”481	
For	Nancy,	there	are	two	contrary	effects	of	the	modern	urban	form:	“on	the	one	hand	
there	 is	 a	 concentration	 of	 the	 well-being	 that	 used	 to	 be	 urban	 or	 civil	 in	 a	 few	
neighborhoods,	 in	 few	 houses,	 sometimes	 in	 a	 few	 gated	 communities.	On	 the	 other	
hand,	 there	 is	 a	 proliferation	 of	 what	 bears	 the	 simple	 and	 unmerciful	 name	 of	
misery.”482	The	 exponential	 growth	 of	 population	 and	 the	 intensification	 of	 inequality	
establish	 an	 apartheid	 structure	 of	 urban	 misery.483	The	 misery	 of	 the	 urban	 milieu	
inhibits	a	sense	of	community,	fellowship,	or	solidarity	with	others.	For	this	reason,	the	
city-state	is	not	a	true	alternative	to	the	current	state-form.	Instead,	the	modern	global	
city	 cultivates	 a	 sense	 of	 social	 alienation,	 anonymity,	 and	 isolation.	 Perhaps	 Walter	
Benjamin	 best	 articulates	 the	 alienation	 of	 the	 modern	 city:	 “The	 inhabitants	 of	 the	
great	urban	centers	 revert	 to	a	 state	of	 savagery	–	 that	 is,	of	 isolation.	The	 feeling	of	
being	dependent	upon	others	.	.	.	is	gradually	blunted	by	the	smooth	functioning	of	the	
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social	mechanism.”484	Consequently,	the	ethical	responsibility	for	the	other	is	degraded,	
sublimated,	and	repressed	by	the	daily	misery	of	the	new	urban	apartheid	of	planetary	
civilization.		
Although	 Derrida	 remains	 committed	 to	 the	 empty	 ideal	 of	 urban	
cosmopolitanism,	Nancy	echoes	Heidegger’s	critique	of	 the	ontological	 ‘homelessness’	
of	 modernity.	 According	 to	 Nancy,	 “the	 gravest	 and	 most	 painful	 testimony	 of	 the	
modern	world	 .	 .	 .	 is	 the	 testimony	of	 the	dissolution,	 dislocation,	 or	 conflagration	of	
community.”485	For	Nancy,	 ‘being-there’	 is	 always	 already	 ‘being-together’.	 The	 liberal	
notion	of	the	isolated	individual	is	a	complete	abstraction	from	social	existence.	Nancy:	
“The	 individual	 is	 merely	 the	 residue	 of	 the	 dissolution	 of	 community.” 486 	It	 is	
unfortunate	that	Nancy,	while	offering	a	nuanced	criticism	of	the	devastating	alienation	
of	 liberal	 individualism,	 risks	 repeating	Derrida’s	mistaken	 rejection	 of	 community	 for	
the	 sake	 of	 the	 individual.	 While	 lamenting	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 community	 in	 the	
modern	 era,	 Nancy	 nevertheless	 rejects	 all	 forms	 of	 communitarian	 politics	 as	
inherently	 violent.	 Community	 is	 traditionally	 understood	 ‘onto-theologically’	 as	 the	
participation	 in	a	common	substance,	essence,	or	being.	However,	Nancy	proposes	an	
alternative	 understanding	 of	 “community	without	 common	 origin.”487	In	 other	words,	
Nancy	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 foundational	 myth	 of	 ontological	 foundations.	 Instead,	
community	 is	 without	 foundation,	 principle,	 or	 ground.	 Nancy	 therefore	 refutes	 the	
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mythical	 understanding	 of	 community	 as	 ‘onto-theologically’	 grounded	 in	 a	 common	
substance.	 It	 is	this	shared	essence	that	distinguishes	a	people,	nation,	or	culture.	The	
problem	 is	 that	 such	 an	 ontological	 basis	 of	 community	 too	 often	 motivates	 racist	
ideology	and	nationalist	violence.	As	a	result,	Nancy	seeks	to	develop	a	communitarian	
understanding	 of	 “being-in-common	 that	 is	 not	 a	 common	 being.”488	Such	 a	 bare	
community	would	be	stripped	any	common	historical,	cultural,	or	linguistic	background	
–	 a	 community	with	nothing	 in	 common	apart	 from	 ‘bare	 life’.	Nancy:	 “Community	 is	
bare,	but	 it	 is	 imperative.”489	The	question,	however,	 is	whether	 such	a	community	of	
‘bare	 exposure’	 of	 one	 to	 another	 could	 provide	 a	 sufficient	 basis	 for	 political	
sovereignty.	Put	simply,	Nancy’s	‘inoperative	community’	risks	abandoning	the	political	
as	 such.	 Nancy:	 “Peace	 comes	 at	 the	 price	 of	 abandoned	 sovereignty.” 490 	It	 is	
nevertheless	 my	 contention	 the	 innate	 violence	 of	 sovereignty	 signifies	 the	 need	 to	
think	democracy	anew	rather	than	reject	the	political	outright.	
‘An-arche’	 means	 without	 arche,	 principle,	 or	 foundation.	 For	 Heidegger,	 ‘an-
arche’	 names	 our	 condition	 of	 ontological	 groundlessness.	 The	 absence	 of	 any	
fundamental	‘arche’	takes	on	an	ethical	significance	for	Levinas.		Levinas	argues	that	‘an-
arche’	does	not	signify	an	ontological	condition	of	being,	but	rather	an	ethical	relation	to	
the	 other.	 For	 Levinas,	 there	 is	 no	 ‘onto-theological’	 ground,	 origin,	 or	 foundation	 of	
law.	In	place	of	a	‘fixed	origin’,	there	is	only	the	withdrawal	of	any	arche	that	may	serve	
as	a	foundation.	The	proximity	of	the	other	bears	a	“the	trace	of	pre-historic	an-archic	
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saying.”491	This	‘an-archic’	command	of	the	other	is	higher	than	any	political	power.	The	
basis	 of	 law	 is	 ethical,	 not	 political.	 Basic	 rights	 are	 not	 conferred	 by	 the	 State,	 by	
Nature,	or	by	God,	but	 instead	originate	 from	an	 ‘anarchic	 relation’	 to	 the	other.	 The	
anarchy	of	 the	ethical	 relationship	 is	 the	 genesis	of	 law.	 Levinas	 therefore	 indicates	 a	
‘pre-original’	 anarchic	 relation	 to	 the	 other.	 Levinas:	 “Morality	 begins	when	 freedom,	
instead	of	being	justified	by	itself,	feels	itself	to	be	arbitrary	and	violent.”492	Contrary	to	
Derrida,	 for	whom	“any	 juridico-political	 founding	of	a	 ‘living	 together’	 is,	by	essence,	
violent,	 since	 it	 inaugurates	 there	where	 a	 law	 did	 not	 yet	 exist”493,	 Levinas	 suggests	
that	 “the	 Other	 does	 not	 limit	 freedom;	 calling	 it	 to	 responsibility,	 it	 founds	 it	 and	
justifies	it.”494	My	freedom	is	not	for	my	own	sake,	but	rather	for	the	sake	of	the	other.	
In	 this	 sense,	 Levinas’	 account	 of	 responsibility	 retrieves	 the	 true	meaning	 of	 ethics:	
“The	 free	 man	 is	 dedicated	 to	 his	 fellow	 man;	 no	 one	 can	 save	 himself	 without	
others.”495	None	are	free	until	all	are	free.	It	is	not	the	state,	but	the	other	to	whom	one	
owes	 responsibility.	 There	 is	 a	 Law	 that	 is	 higher	 than	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 state:	 not	 the	
commandment	 of	 God,	 but	 of	 the	 other.	 Levinas	 indicates	 “an	 original,	 non-allergic,	
ethical	relationship	with	alterity	.	.	.	capable	of	founding	communal	meaning.”496	For	this	
reason,	 the	 post-foundational	 anarchy	 of	 the	 ethical	 relationship	 lends	 itself	 to	more	
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direct	 modes	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 than	 the	 standard	 liberal	 forms	 of	
parliamentary	representation.		
We	have	just	looked	at	1)	whether	or	not	there	is	law	that	is	higher	than	the	laws	
of	 the	 state,	 and	2)	 how	 such	 a	 higher	 law	might	 gain	 political	 affect.	While,	 Levinas’	
phenomenological	 account	 of	 the	 ethical	 relationship	 does	 indeed	 illuminate	 a	moral	
absolute	that	survives	the	‘death	of	God’,	it	is	not	clear	whether	or	to	what	extent	such	
a	post-metaphysical	ethic	of	embodiment	directs	us	towards	a	post-foundational	model	
democracy.	 Indeed,	 the	 liberal	 cosmopolitanism	 of	 Derrida	 and	 Nancy	 often	 appears	
hostile	 to	 the	communitarian	basis	of	democracy.	 I	 suggested	 that	deconstruction	 too	
often	 justifies	 the	 current	 planetary	 framework	 of	 neo-liberal	 capitalism	 rather	 than	
point	 towards	 a	 genuine	 democratic	 alternative.	 Indeed,	we	 are	 not	 pursuing	 a	 post-
democratic	 liberalism,	 but	 rather	 a	 post-foundational	 democracy.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	
final	chapter	turns	from	the	post-structuralist	appropriation	of	Heidegger’s	late	thought	
to	 a	 confrontation	 with	 the	 political	 theology	 of	 Benjamin,	 Schmitt,	 and	 Agamben.	 I	
argue	that	post-foundational	democracy	is	akin	to	a	negative	political	theology.	
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V.	Negative	Political	Theology									
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Sovereignty		
In	 his	 deeply	 influential	 treatise	 on	 Political	 Theology,	 the	 legal	 theorist	 Carl	
Schmitt	 undertakes	 a	 highly	 influential	 analysis	 of	 the	 theological	 origins	 of	 sovereign	
power.	The	fundamental	argument	of	Schmitt’s	political	theology	is	that	“all	significant	
concepts	 of	 the	modern	 theory	 of	 the	 state	 are	 secularized	 theological	 concepts.”497	
According	to	Schmitt,	sovereign	power	is	a	political	reflection	of	the	theological	notion	
of	 divine	 power.	 Political	 sovereignty,	 like	 divine	 sovereignty,	 “is	 the	 highest,	 legally	
independent,	underived	power.”498	Put	simply,	the	laws	of	the	state	are	a	mirror	image	
of	the	divine	 laws	of	heaven.	The	King	establishes	the	 laws	of	his	kingdom	just	as	God	
establishes	 the	 laws	 of	 nature.	 Schmitt:	 “The	 world	 architect	 is	 simultaneously	 the	
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creator	 and	 the	 legislator.”499	Just	 as	 God	 establishes	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 through	 the	
divine	act	of	creation,	he	has	the	power	to	suspend	the	law	in	the	miracle.	It	is	the	same	
for	the	sovereign	ruler;	he	can	either	create	or	suspend	the	law	at	will.	In	this	sense,	the	
sovereign	ruler	is	an	image	of	the	God-King	–	‘God	on	Earth’.500	The	sovereignty	of	the	
King	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 absolute	 sovereignty	 of	 God.	 The	 theological	 legacy	 of	
sovereignty	 therefore	 poses	 a	 significant	 problem	 for	 democracy.	While	 democracy	 is	
ostensibly	characterized	by	the	rule	of	the	multitude,	even	democratic	forms	of	popular	
sovereignty	are	characterized	by	the	‘rule	of	One’.	During	a	state	of	emergency,	even	in	
a	democratic	polity,	the	sovereign	must	suspend	the	law	in	order	to	preserve	the	state.	
The	suspension	of	civil	 liberties	 in	 the	United	States	 following	 the	Al	Qaeda	attacks	of	
9/11	and	the	state	of	emergency	in	France	following	the	ISIS	attacks	are	both	instances	
of	 such	 exceptional	 circumstances.	 It	 is	 Schmitt’s	 radical	 claim	 that	 such	 a	 ‘state	 of	
emergency’	 is	 not	merely	 an	 exception	 to	 the	norm.	 Instead,	 Schmitt	 argues	 that	 the	
‘state	of	exception’	is	constitutive	of	political	order	as	such!	
Reminiscent	of	Heidegger’s	discussion	of	 the	 ‘world-historical’	epochs	of	being,	
Schmitt	argues	that	“metaphysics	is	the	most	intensive	and	the	clearest	expression	of	an	
epoch.”501	For	Schmitt,	 the	epoch	of	modernity	 is	 characterized	by	 radical	 immanence	
and	 a	 corresponding	 lack	 of	 transcendence,	 exception,	 or	 event.	 Schmitt:	 “The	
rationalism	of	the	Enlightenment	rejected	the	exception	 in	every	form.”502	Rationalism	
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perceives	the	world	to	be	governed	by	natural	laws	that	are	accessible	to	human	reason.	
According	to	Enlightenment	thinking,	the	‘clock-like’	universe	is	akin	to	a	self-propelling	
machine	operating	according	 to	 intrinsic	 laws.	Once	set	 in	motion,	not	even	a	miracle	
can	 violate	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 that	 govern	 the	 universe.	 Enlightenment	 thinking	
presupposes:	 1)	 that	 existence	 is	 rational,	 and	 2)	 that	 reason	 is	 the	 highest	 human	
faculty.	However,	the	‘flight	of	the	gods’	 in	the	wake	of	scientific	reason	leaves	nature	
thoroughly	disenchanted.	Superstition	is	vanquished	in	the	name	of	progress.	The	world	
is	viewed	scientifically	as	void	of	transcendence,	miracle,	or	wonder.	The	Enlightenment	
world-view	 collapses	 reality	 into	 a	 horizontal	 plane	 of	 immanence.	 Transcendence	 is	
subtracted	from	theology	just	as	‘the	exception’	is	subtracted	from	politics.		
In	 the	 late	 modern	 era,	 the	 sovereign	 is	 ‘beheaded’	 and	 supplanted	 by	 the	
instrumental	 framework	of	 neo-liberal	 administration.	 The	 state	 comes	 to	 resemble	 a	
self-referential	 metaphysical	 system.	 The	 restriction	 of	 sovereignty	 by	 the	 immanent	
frame	of	law	means	that	politics	is	increasingly	characterized	by	the	mechanized	state-
apparatus.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 ‘exception’	 of	 sovereign	 decision	 descends	 into	 mere	
technocratic	 administration.	 For	 Schmitt,	 the	mechanization	 of	 the	 state	 signifies	 the	
historical	culmination	of	the	mechanization	of	man.	There	is	no	need	to	look	any	further	
than	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Descartes	 to	 see	 this	 process	 of	 mechanization	 at	 work.	
Descartes’	 rationalism	 views	 the	 body	 as	 a	 mechanism	 governed	 by	 mind,	 or	 spirit.	
Schmitt:	 “Because	 [Descartes]	 understood	 the	 human	 body	 to	 be	 a	 mechanism,	 all	
things	human,	in	their	very	core,	had	already	been	changed	in	a	revolutionary	manner.	
	 193	
This	 change	 signaled	 the	 coming	 technical-industrial	 revolution.” 503 	It	 is	 Schmitt’s	
contention	 that	 the	 conceptual	 mechanization	 of	 the	 body	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	
mechanization	the	body-politic.	Schmitt:	“The	mechanization	of	the	concept	of	the	state	
thus	 completed	 the	 mechanization	 of	 the	 anthropological	 image	 of	 man.” 504	
Consequently,	 sovereignty	 is	 supplanted	 by	 the	 rational	 administration	 of	 ‘managed	
democracy’.	
Political	 Theology	 attributes	 the	 origin	 of	 political	 order	 to	 ‘the	 exception’	 of	
executive	 decision.	 Schmitt:	 “The	 exception	 reveals	 most	 clearly	 the	 essence	 of	 the	
state’s	sovereignty.”505	Akin	to	a	divine	 intervention,	sovereign	decision	conjures	order	
out	of	chaos.	Schmitt’s	notion	of	sovereignty	is	decisionistic	in	this	sense;	sovereignty	is	
indistinguishable	from	the	executive	decision	of	the	sovereign	ruler.	Schmitt:	“Sovereign	
is	 he	who	decides	on	 the	exception.”506	It	 is	 of	 little	 consequence	what	 the	 sovereign	
decides,	only	that	he	decides.	For	Schmitt,	“what	matters	 for	the	reality	of	 legal	 life	 is	
who	 decides.”507	Aside	 from	Hobbes,	 the	 greatest	 inspiration	 for	 Schmitt’s	 concept	 of	
political	theology	is	the	protestant	theologian	Soren	Kierkegaard.	According	to	Schmitt,	
Kierkegaard	“demonstrated	 the	vital	 intensity	possible	 in	 theological	 reflection	 .	 .	 .”508	
Schmitt	 suggests	 that	 Kierkegaard	 is	 the	 first	 thinker	 to	 understand	 the	 proper	
relationship	between	the	exception	and	the	rule.	For	Kierkegaard,	as	 for	Schmitt,	“the	
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exception	confounds	the	unity	and	order	of	the	rationalist	scheme.”509	Schmitt	explains	
that	 legal	 theory	 involves	 two	 distinct	 concepts:	 norm	 and	 decision.510	It	 is	 Schmitt’s	
argument	 that	 political	 order	 is	 not	 constituted	 by	 legal	 norms.	 Instead,	 “legal	 order	
rests	on	decision,	and	not	the	norm.”511	It	is	not	the	rule	that	determines	the	exception,	
but	 rather	 the	 exception	 that	 establishes	 the	 rule.	 In	 Kierkegaard’s	 words,	 “the	
exception	 explains	 the	 general	 and	 itself.” 512 	It	 is	 Schmitt’s	 intention	 to	 translate	
Kierkegaard’s	 theology	 into	 legal	 theory.	 Just	as	 the	 sovereign	power	decides	on	both	
the	norm	and	the	exception	to	the	norm,	“authority	proves	that	to	produce	law	it	need	
not	 be	 based	 on	 law.”513	The	 authority	 of	 the	 sovereign	 is	 absolute	 or	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all.	
Schmitt:	 “What	 characterizes	 an	 exception	 is	 principally	 unlimited	 authority,	 which	
means	the	suspension	of	the	entire	existing	order.”514	Schmitt:	“The	decision	frees	itself	
from	 all	 normative	 ties	 and	 becomes	 in	 the	 true	 sense	 absolute.”515	The	 exception	
interrupts	 the	 mechanistic	 administration	 of	 the	 post-democratic	 state,	 just	 as	 the	
mechanistic	 laws	 of	 nature	 are	 suspended	 by	 a	 miracle	 of	 divine	 intervention	 in	
theology.	Just	as	God	suspends	the	laws	of	nature	in	a	miracle,	“the	state	suspends	the	
law	in	the	exception	.	.	.”516	For	this	reason,	Schmitt	argues	that	it	would	be	mistaken	to	
unduly	restrict	sovereign	power	via	constitutional	law.		
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Schmitt	 describes	 sovereignty	 as	 a	 ‘borderline	 concept’.	 A	 borderline	 concept	
refers	to:	1)	the	concept	of	a	border,	and	2)	the	border	of	conceptuality.	Sovereignty	is	a	
borderline	concept	because	it	is	a	priori;	it	is	derived	from	nothing	prior	to	itself.	In	this	
sense,	 sovereignty	 exists	 at	 the	 border	 between	 existence	 and	 nothingness.	 Schmitt	
distinguishes	between	decision	and	‘pure	decision’.	While	decision	is	the	application	of	a	
legal	norm,	‘pure	decision’	does	not	refer	to	any	existing	norms	but	instead	founds	the	
law	ex	nihilo.	Schmitt	argues	that	“for	a	 legal	order	to	make	sense,	a	normal	situation	
must	exist.”517	If	this	normal	situation	does	not	exist,	it	must	be	brought	about	through	
sovereign	 decision.	 Schmitt:	 “The	 exception	 appears	 in	 its	 absolute	 form	 when	 a	
situation	 in	 which	 legal	 prescriptions	 can	 be	 valid	must	 first	 be	 brought	 about.”518	In	
other	words,	‘the	exception’,	or	‘event’	indicates	a	situation	in	which	legal	norms	must	
be	 brought	 about	 through	 sovereign	 decision.	 In	 the	 exceptional	 situation,	 notions	 of	
legality	 and	 illegality	 are	 simply	 irrelevant.	 Schmitt	 explains	 that	 “unlike	 the	 normal	
situation,	when	the	autonomous	moment	of	decision	recedes	to	a	minimum,	the	norm	
is	 destroyed	 in	 the	 exception.” 519 	Establishing	 a	 ‘normal	 situation’	 therefore	
presupposes	the	suspension	of	the	current	state	of	affairs.	The	exceptional	decision,	or	
deciding	 on	 the	 exception,	 signifies	 the	 ‘unlimited	 authority’	 to	 either	 establish	 or	
suspend	a	situation	in	which	law	is	operative.520	In	this	sense,	sovereignty	harnesses	the	
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divine	power	 to	 conjure	order	out	of	 chaos.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Schmitt	 argues	 that	 “the	
decision	emanates	from	nothingness.”521		
The	genealogy	of	Schmitt’s	concept	of	sovereign	decision	can	be	traced	to	Soren	
Kierkegaard’s	 notion	 of	 existential	 decision.	 However,	 Schmitt’s	 appropriation	 of	
Kierkegaard	 amounts	 to	 a	 fundamental	 misinterpretation	 of	 the	 early	 modern	
philosopher	and	theologian.	It	is	indeed	true	that	for	Kierkegaard,	as	well	as	for	Schmitt,	
‘the	 exception	 is	 more	 interesting	 than	 the	 rule’.	 I	 nevertheless	 agree	 with	 James	
Martel’s	argument	in	Divine	Violence	that	Schmitt’s	political	theology	is	akin	to	idolatry.	
Schmitt’s	 notion	 of	 sovereign	 decision	 is	 both	 nihilistic	 and	 decisionistic.	 For	 Schmitt,	
decision	is	not	an	application	of	the	rule,	and	is	therefore	not	based	on	any	fixed	origin,	
foundation,	 or	 ground.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Schmitt	 argues	 that	 sovereign	 decision	 is	
metaphysically	 ungrounded.	 For	 Schmitt,	 it	 is	 of	 utmost	 importance	 that	 security	 and	
order	are	established	and	preserved.	It	is	of	little	consequence	what	is	decided.	Instead,	
it	 is	of	greatest	significance	that	one	decides,	so	 long	as	order	prevails.	Decision	arises	
from	 an	 existential	 confrontation	 with	 the	 abysmal	 groundlessness	 of	 being.	 While	
Schmitt	 argues	 that	 sovereign	 decision	 emanates	 from	 nothingness,	 for	 Kierkegaard,	
decision	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 unconditional	 command	of	God.	Decision	 is	 not	 an	 act	 of	
will,	 but	 rather	 obedience	 to	 the	will	 of	God.	 Put	 simply,	 decision,	 for	 Kierkegaard,	 is	
submission	to	‘the	Absolute’.		
In	Fear	And	Trembling,	Kierkegaard	performs	a	detailed	exegesis	of	 the	Biblical	
story	of	Abraham’s	sacrifice	of	his	son	Isaac.	Even	a	brief	look	at	Kierkegaard’s	analysis	
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indicates	 that	 Abraham’s	 decision	 does	 not	 ‘emanate	 from	 nothingness’,	 as	 Schmitt	
argues.	 Instead,	 Abraham’s	 decision	 is	 undergone	 in	 the	 fear	 and	 trembling	 of	
psychological	torment	and	existential	despair	before	the	unconditional	command	of	‘the	
Absolute’.	 According	 to	 Kierkegaard,	 Abraham’s	 decision	 is	 not	 characterized	 by	
unlimited	 authority	 emanating	 from	 the	 force	 of	 will,	 as	 Schmitt’s	 analysis	 would	
suggest.	 Instead,	 Abraham’s	 decision	 is	 endured	 in	 fear	 and	 trembling	 before	 the	
absolute	 command	 of	 God.	 In	 this	 sense,	 Abraham’s	 decision	 is	 not	 a	 free	 choice.	
Instead,	 decision	 signifies	 faith	 that	 the	 absolute	 command	of	God	 is	 higher	 than	 the	
laws	and	norms	of	the	state.	For	Kierkegaard,	God’s	command	signifies	the	‘teleological	
suspension’	 of	 any	 historical	 custom,	 social	 norm,	 or	 state	 law.	 It	 is	 Kierkegaard’s	
position	that	there	is	a	telos,	or	purpose,	that	is	more	fundamental	than	the	historically	
mediated	laws	of	the	state.	Kierkegaard	therefore	argues	that	the	divine	telos	ruptures,	
arrests,	 or	 ‘suspends’	 the	 secular	 nomos.	 While	 Schmitt	 is	 correct	 to	 argue	 that	
Kierkegaard’s	decision	involves	a	suspension	of	the	telos	of	history,	Schmitt	is	incorrect	
to	suggest	 that	Abraham’s	decision	 is	an	 instance	of	 ‘pure	decision’	 that	suspends	the	
‘normal	 situation’.	 I	 take	 it	 that	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 existing	 order	 is	 an	 allusion	 to	
Kierkegaard’s	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 teleological	 suspension.’	 ‘Pure	 decision’	 is	 ex	 nihilo,	
emanating	 from	 the	 nothingness	 of	 the	 ungrounded	 void.	 For	 Kierkegaard,	 however,	
decision	 does	 not	 emanate	 from	 nothingness;	 decision	 does	 not	 found,	 it	 responds.	
More	specifically,	decision	is	a	response	to	the	absolute	command	of	God.	In	the	story	
of	 Abraham’s	 sacrifice	 of	 Isaac,	 it	 is	 the	 command	 of	 God	 that	 is	 sovereign,	 not	 the	
decision	of	Abraham.		
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In	 the	 Book	 of	 Genesis,	 Abraham	 is	 commanded	 by	 God	 to	 commit	 an	
unspeakable	 crime	 –	 to	 sacrifice	 his	 only	 son	 Isaac.	 God	 demands	 the	 sacrifice	 of	 an	
innocent	life.	God	commands	Abraham	to	kill:	“Take	Isaac,	your	only	Son,	who	you	love,	
and	go	to	the	land	of	Moriah	and	offer	him	there	as	a	burnt	offering	on	a	mountain	that	
I	 shall	 show	 you.”522	Against	 his	 own	 will,	 Abraham	 must	 take	 the	 life	 of	 another.	
Although	 the	 social	 prohibition	 against	 murder	 is	 universal,	 Kierkegaard	 nevertheless	
asks	whether	there	can	be	a	‘teleological	suspension’	of	the	universal?	In	other	words,	is	
there	a	purpose	that	 is	higher	than	the	telos	of	history?	 Is	there	a	Good	that	 is	higher	
than	social	customs,	laws,	and	norms?	If	not	then,	Abraham	is	not	a	man	of	faith,	but	a	
savage	killer.	For	Kierkegaard,	the	story	of	Isaac’s	sacrifice	indicates	that	the	divine	will	
supersedes	 all	 conventional	 notions	 of	 good	 and	 evil.	 In	 order	 to	 remain	 faithful	
Abraham	must	renounce	everything	that	he	thought	to	be	good,	right,	and	true.	Indeed,	
God’s	 commandment	 is	 a	 revelation	 of	 abject	 horror.	 Abraham:	 “I	 have	 seen	 the	
terrifying	 face	 to	 face,	and	 I	do	not	 flee	 from	 it	 in	horror”.523	Faith,	 for	Kierkegaard,	 is	
the	 conviction	 that	 “the	 singular	 individual	 is	higher	 than	 the	universal.”524	Abraham’s	
faith	 indicates	 that	 the	 singular	 individual	 standing	before	 the	Absolute	 is	higher	 than	
the	morality	of	social	convention.		
Abraham	 must	 make	 an	 impossible	 decision;	 he	 must	 decide	 upon	 the	
undecidable.	 If	Abraham	obeys	God,	he	will	uphold	his	 faith	while	becoming	a	killer	 in	
the	eyes	of	the	world.	If	he	transgresses	God’s	command,	he	will	betray	his	faith	while	
                                                
522 Quoted in: Soren Kierkegaard, Fear And Trembling, trans. Howard V. Hong & Edna 
Hong, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 10 
523 Ibid, 33 
524 Ibid, 55 
	 199	
retaining	the	honor	of	his	community.	Abraham’s	faith	is	resolute,	he	submits	to	the	will	
of	 God.	 In	 so	 doing,	 Abraham	 represents	 that	 which	 Kierkegaard	 calls	 the	 ‘knight	 of	
faith’.	 The	 ‘knight	 of	 faith’	must	 be	 prepared	 to	 ‘renounce	 everything’	 and	make	 the	
ultimate	sacrifice	to	fulfill	his	absolute	duty	to	God.	Kierkegaard	distinguishes	between	
the	‘knight	of	faith’	and	the	‘tragic	hero’.	While	the	knight	of	faith	“stands	in	an	absolute	
relation	 to	 the	 absolute”,525	the	 tragic	 hero	 seeks	 to	 “annul	 his	 singularity	 in	 order	 to	
become	 the	 universal.”526	The	 ‘tragic	 hero’	 strives	 for	 self-annihilation.	 If	 Abraham	
represents	 the	 ‘knight	 of	 faith’,	 then	 Antigone	 represents	 the	 image	 of	 ‘tragic	 hero’.	
Creon	sacrifices	Antigone	to	preserves	the	laws	of	the	state.	Sophocles’	Theban	Trilogy	
depicts	 the	 tragic	 cycle	of	 sacrificial	 violence.	Oedipus’	 exile	does	not	 return	peace	 to	
the	polis,	but	instead	uncovers	the	essential	strife	at	the	heart	of	the	political.	Likewise,	
Antigone’s	sacrifice	does	not	redeem	the	state,	but	merely	repeats	the	eternal	cycle	of	
mythical	violence.	It	is	necessary	break	the	cycle	of	sacrificial	violence,	just	as	an	angel	
of	God	suspends	Abraham’s	sacrifice	of	Isaac.	In	the	blink	of	an	eye,	an	angel	stops	his	
hand.	Abraham’s	decision	is	a	decision	without	autonomy.	It	would	seem	that	decision	is	
not	willed	ex	nihilo;	it	is	the	response	to	an	absolute	command.	If	Kierkegaard’s	analysis	
of	Isaac’s	sacrifice	were	correct,	then	it	would	seem	that	sovereign	power	demands	non-
violence,	not	war,	as	Schmitt	contends.	 Indeed,	sovereignty	does	not	pose	a	challenge	
to	democracy,	but	instead	serves	as	its	post-foundational	grounding.		
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Violence	
Given	 the	 communitarian	 nationalism	 and	 political	 conservatism	 of	 both	
Heidegger	 and	 Schmitt,	 one	 might	 expect	 Heidegger’s	 fundamental	 ontology	 to	
complement	Schmitt’s	political	 theology.	 In	 fact,	 the	opposite	 is	 the	case;	Heidegger’s	
overcoming	of	 ‘onto-theology’	 is	 fully	 consistent	with	 the	 task	of	 overcoming	political	
theology.	 Indeed,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 National	 Socialism	 is	 not	 at	 all	 inherent	 to	
Heidegger’s	philosophy,	as	Emmanuel	Faye	and	Richard	Wolen	contend,	but	instead	an	
unforgivable	 error	 in	 personal	 character	 and	 judgment.	 This	 is	 also	 Levinas’	 claim:		
“There	 is	 in	Heidegger’s	 ‘late	philosophy’	an	 impossibly	for	power	to	maintain	 itself	as	
monarchy,	 to	 ensure	 its	 total	mastery.”527	In	my	 judgment,	 Heidegger’s	 philosophy	 of	
time	 more	 closes	 resembles	 Benjamin’s	 messianic	 eschatology	 than	 Schmitt’s	
authoritarian	political	 theology.	That	which	Benjamin	calls	 ‘divine	violence’,	Heidegger	
simply	names	 ‘the	event’;	both	 indicate	a	 ‘true	exception’	 to	 linear	 time.	But	 I	do	not	
want	 to	 dwell	 on	 Heidegger	 here.	 It	 is	 Benjamin	 who	 most	 accurately	 depicts	 the	
paradox	of	 sovereignty.	Benjamin	 turns	Schmitt’s	political	 theology	on	 its	head.	 In	my	
view,	Schmitt’s	political	theology	is	a	corruption	rather	than	a	genuine	expression	of	the	
triple-headed	monotheism	of	Judaism,	Christianity,	and	Islam.	Contra	Schmitt,	Benjamin	
argues	that	the	suspension	of	law	by	sovereign	decision	is	not	at	all	‘the	exception’	that	
Schmitt	 claims	 it	 to	 be.	 Indeed,	 Benjamin	 suggests	 that	 the	 ‘state	 of	 emergency’	
describes	the	normal	operation	of	the	neo-liberal	security	state	apparatus.	Increasingly,	
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the	suspension	of	constitutional	 law	 is	not	exception	at	all.	 Instead,	 the	suspension	of	
law	merely	indicates	the	normal	operation	of	sovereign	power.		
The	 Italian	 political	 theorist	 Giorgio	 Agamben	 takes	 up	 and	 further	 develops	
Benjamin’s	thesis.	Agamben:	“The	state	of	exception	tends	increasingly	to	appear	as	the	
dominant	 paradigm	 of	 government	 in	 contemporary	 politics.”528 	This	 ‘paradigm’	 is	
observable	within	the	contemporary	United	States.	Take	for	instance	Obama’s	‘Kill	List’.	
Assassination	 via	 predatory	 drone	 strike	 is	 completely	 beyond	 the	 framework	 of	
constitutional	 law,	 yet	 occurs	 on	 a	 routine	 basis.	 It	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 ‘state	 of	
emergency’	indicates	the	rule	rather	than	the	exception.	Agamben:	“Since	‘the	state	of	
exception	 .	 .	 .	has	become	the	rule’,	 it	not	only	appears	 increasingly	as	a	technique	of	
government	rather	than	an	exceptional	measure,	but	 it	also	 lets	 its	own	nature	as	the	
constitutive	paradigm	of	 the	 judicial	order	come	to	 light.”529	The	ongoing	operation	of	
the	Guantanamo	Bay	 detention	 center	 is	 yet	 another	 instance	 of	 ‘the	 exception’	 as	 a	
routine	 ‘technique	 of	 government’.	 This	 extra-legal	 space	 of	 detention	 must	 exist	
‘outside’	 of	 the	 law	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 the	 normal	 operation	 of	 the	 law.	 Agamben	
suggests	 that	 “the	 state	 of	 exception	 has	 today	 reached	 its	 maximum	 worldwide	
deployment.	 The	 normative	 content	 of	 law	 can	 thus	 be	 obliterated	 and	 contradicted	
with	 impunity	 by	 a	 governmental	 violence	 that	 	 .	 .	 .	 nevertheless	 still	 claims	 to	 be	
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applying	the	law.”530	‘The	exception’	is	not	at	all	exceptional.	Indeed,	the	suspension	of	
law	is	the	norm.		
For	 Agamben	 and	 Benjamin	 both,	what	 is	 needed	 is	 not	 an	 ‘exception’	 to	 the	
norm,	but	rather	an	 interruption	of	the	standard	operation	of	the	‘state	of	exception’.	
Again,	the	intention	is	to	arrest	the	standard	operation	of	sovereign	violence.	Benjamin:	
“The	‘state	of	emergency’	in	which	we	live	is	not	the	exception	but	the	rule	.	.	.	our	task	
to	 bring	 about	 a	 real	 state	 of	 emergency.”531	According	 to	 Benjamin’s	 inversion	 of	
political	 theology,	 sovereignty	 operates	 according	 to	 a	 perpetual	 cycle	 of	 violence.	
Benjamin	 distinguishes	 between	 mythical	 violence	 and	 divine	 violence.	 	 Mythical	
violence	is	‘law-founding’;	 it	refers	to	the	mythical	foundation	upon	which	the	polity	is	
established.	 Sophocles’	Oedipus	 Trilogy	bears	witness	 to	 the	 tragic	 desolation	of	 such	
mythical	 violence.	 Antigone’s	 sacrifice	 and	 Oedipus’	 exile	 from	 the	 polis	 are	 both	
instances	of	‘law-making’	violence.	Antigone	and	her	father	share	a	common	fate:	both	
are	 sacrificed	 at	 the	 alter	 of	 the	 state.	 In	 this	 sense,	 mythical	 violence	 enacts	 a	
foundational	 sacrifice.	 While	 mythical	 violence	 is	 ‘law-making’,	 legal	 violence	 is	 ‘law-
preserving’.	 It	would	be	mistaken	 to	oppose	mythical	 violence	 to	positive	 law.	On	 the	
contrary,	“the	mythical	manifestation	of	immediate	violence	shows	itself	fundamentally	
identical	 with	 all	 legal	 violence	 .	 .	 .”532	Benjamin:	 “All	 mythical,	 lawmaking	 violence,	
which	 we	 call	 executive,	 is	 pernicious.	 Pernicious	 too	 is	 the	 law-preserving,	
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administrative	violence	that	serves	 it.”533	Positive	law	does	not	refer	to	the	absence	of	
violence,	but	 its	procedural	 legitimation.	Only	an	eschatological	 temporality	can	arrest	
the	eternal	return	of	‘law-founding’	and	‘law-preserving’.		
Agamben	is	basically	correct	when	he	articulates	Benjamin’s	task	as	follows:	“To	
ensure	 the	possibility	of	 a	 violence	 that	 lies	 absolutely	 ‘outside’	 and	 ‘beyond’	 the	 law	
and	 that,	as	 such,	 could	 rupture	 the	dialectic	between	 law-making	and	 law-preserving	
violence.	Benjamin	calls	this	other	figure	of	violence	‘pure’,	or	‘divine’,	and	in	the	human	
sphere,	 ‘revolutionary’.” 534 	Agamben’s	 notion	 of	 revolutionary	 time	 should	 be	
understood	 in	 light	 of	 the	 catastrophic	 failure	 of	 proletarian	 revolution	 in	 the	 20th	
Century.	The	revolutionary	seizure	of	the	‘mode	of	production’	is	not	a	break	from,	but	
rather	 an	 expression	 of	 modern	 time-consciousness.	 The	 disintegration	 of	 the	 USSR	
disenchanted	 the	 communist	 horizon;	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 possible	 to	 imagine	 a	 utopian	
future.	 It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 recall	 a	 time	 prior	 to	 the	 mediation	 of	 planetary	
civilization.	 The	 intention	 is	 not	 to	 return	 to	 the	past,	 as	 if	 that	were	possible,	 but	 to	
access	 a	 temporality	 that	 is	 beyond	 the	 ‘eternal	 return’	 of	 mythical	 violence.	 For	
Agamben,	 political	 revolution	 does	 not	 indicate	 the	 fulfillment,	 or	 telos	 of	modernity,	
but	 its	 end,	 or	 eschaton.	 For	 this	 reason,	 political	 revolution	 presupposes	 an	
eschatological	 temporality	 –	 a	 revolution	 of	 time.	 Agamben:	 “Every	 conception	 of	
history	is	invariably	accompanied	by	a	certain	experience	of	time	which	is	implicit	in	it	.	.	
.	 Similarly,	 every	 culture	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 a	 particular	 experience	 of	 time,	 and	no	
new	culture	 is	possible	without	an	alteration	 in	 this	experience.	The	original	 task	of	a	
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genuine	 revolution,	 therefore,	 is	 never	 to	merely	 ‘change	 the	 world’,	 but	 also	 –	 and	
above	all	–	to	 ‘change	time’.”535	For	Agamben,	such	a	revolutionary	temporality	would	
arrest	the	catastrophic	dialectic	of	‘world-history’.		
Agamben’s	notion	of	a	messianic	 revolution	of	 time	ought	to	be	understood	 in	
opposition	to	Hegel’s	dialectic	of	‘universal	history’.	The	dialectical	model	of	history	is	a	
secularization	of	medieval	Christian	cosmology.	Agamben:	“The	modern	concept	of	time	
is	a	secularization	of	rectilinear,	irreversible	Christian	time	.	.	.”536	Agamben	explains	that	
“while	 the	 classic	 representation	 of	 time	 is	 a	 circle,	 the	 image	 guiding	 the	 Christian	
conceptualization	 of	 it	 is	 a	 straight	 line.”537	Hegel	 argues	 that	 history	 has	 a	 universal	
structure	–	the	continual	progression	from	lower	to	higher	stages	of	consciousness	and	
civilization.	 Put	 simply,	 history	 is	 the	 history	 of	 progress.	 However,	 Benjamin	 and	
Agamben	argue	 that	 this	 is	not	 the	case	–	history	 is	not	at	all	 the	history	of	progress.	
Benjamin:	“History	 is	not,	as	 the	dominant	 ideology	would	have	 it,	man’s	servitude	to	
continuous	linear	time,	but	man’s	liberation	from	it.”538	Benjamin	explains	that:	
“Progress	was	conceived	‘first	of	all,	as	the	progress	of	mankind	itself	
(and	 not	 just	 advances	 in	men’s	 ability	 and	 knowledge).	 Secondly,	 it	
was	something	boundless,	in	keeping	with	the	infinite	perfectibility	of	
mankind.	Thirdly,	progress	was	regarded	as	irresistible,	something	that	
automatically	pursued	a	straight	or	spiral	course.”539	
	
This	 ideology	 of	 progress	 is	 reliant	 upon	 an	 even	more	 fundamental	 notion	 of	
empty	homogenous	time.	Benjamin:	“The	concept	of	the	historical	progress	of	mankind	
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cannot	be	sundered	from	the	concept	of	its	progression	through	a	homogenous,	empty	
time.”540	For	Benjamin,	time	is	not	a	projection	into	the	future.	Instead,	time	is	an	event,	
each	 time	 unique.	 Benjamin:	 “History	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 structure	 whose	 site	 is	 not	
homogenous,	 empty	 time,	 but	 time	 filled	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 now.”541	Agamben	
discovers	 an	 alternative	mode	 of	 temporality	 in	 that	 the	 heterodox	 traditions	 of	 ‘the	
West’.	Agamben:	“The	elements	for	a	different	conception	of	time	lie	scattered	among	
the	 folds	 and	 shadows	 of	 the	 Western	 cultural	 tradition.” 542 	Both	 Agamben	 and	
Benjamin	turn	to	the	Jewish	messianic	tradition	for	an	account	of	time	in	opposition	to	
Hegel’s	 ‘universal	 history’.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 temporality	 of	 universal	 history,	 Benjamin	
claims	 that	 the	 stillness	 of	 the	 moment	 “is	 shot	 through	 with	 chips	 of	 Messianic	
time.”543	Likwise,	Agamben	suggests	that	“the	messianic	time	of	Judaism,	in	which	every	
second	was	‘the	straight	gate	through	which	the	Messiah	might	enter’,	thus	becomes	a	
model	 for	 the	 conception	 of	 history	 ‘that	 avoids	 any	 complicity	 with	 the	 thinking	 to	
which	politicians	continue	to	adhere’.”544			
Benjamin’s	description	of	Klee’s	 image	Angelus	Novas	refutes	the	modern	view	
of	history	as	a	linear	sequence	of	events.	For	Benjamin,	Klees’	angel	is	an	eschatological	
image	 of	 the	 catastrophe	 of	 history.	 Benjamin	 envisions	 the	 angel	 turned	 to	 face	 the	
past	as	a	cosmic	storm	of	annihilation	propels	it	blindly	into	the	future:		
“A	 Klee	 painting	 named	 Angelus	 Novus	 shows	 an	 angel	 looking	 as	
though	 he	 is	 about	 to	 move	 away	 from	 something	 he	 is	 fixedly	
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contemplating.	His	eyes	are	 staring,	his	mouth	 is	open,	his	wings	are	
spread.	This	is	how	one	pictures	the	angel	of	history.	His	face	is	turned	
toward	 the	 past.	Where	we	 perceive	 a	 chain	 of	 events,	 he	 sees	 one	
single	 catastrophe	 which	 keeps	 piling	 wreckage	 upon	 wreckage	 and	
hurls	 it	 in	 front	of	his	 feet.	The	angel	would	 like	 to	 stay,	awaken	 the	
dead,	and	make	whole	what	has	been	smashed.	But	a	storm	is	blowing	
from	Paradise;	 it	 has	 got	 caught	 in	his	wings	with	 such	 violence	 that	
the	angel	can	no	longer	close	them.	The	storm	irresistibly	propels	him	
into	 the	 future	 to	 which	 his	 back	 is	 turned,	 while	 the	 pile	 of	 debris	
before	him	grows	skyward.	This	storm	is	what	we	call	progress.”545	
	
While	us	moderns	view	progressive	development	of	history	through	empty	time,	
the	angel	sees	“one	single	catastrophe	which	keeps	piling	wreckage	upon	wreckage.”546		
Benjamin	draws	 from	heterodox	 traditions	 located	at	 the	margins	of	history	 including	
Kabbalah,	romanticism,	and	eschatology.	Eschatology	is	a	theological	tradition	belonging	
to	 various	 currents	 of	 Judaism,	 Christianity,	 and	 Islam.	 Eschatology	 refers	 to	 the	
messianic	 promise	 that	 justice	 will	 be	 accomplished	 on	 Earth.	 Put	 simply,	 the	
eschatological	promise	 is	that	 ‘the	Kingdom	will	come’.	Typically,	the	fulfillment	of	the	
eschatological	 promise	 takes	 an	 apocalyptic	 form;	 the	 literal	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	
eschaton	 is	 ‘end	 time’.	 The	 passing	 of	 the	 eschaton	 signifies	 the	 ‘end	 of	 an	 age’.	
Benjamin:	“The	Kingdom	of	God	is	not	the	telos	of	the	historical	dynamic;	it	cannot	be	
set	 as	 a	 goal.	 From	 the	 standpoint	 of	 history	 it	 is	 not	 the	 goal	 but	 the	 end.”547	The	
eschatological	 ‘end	 of	 an	 age’	 should	 be	 distinguished	 from	 ‘end	 of	 history’.	 The	
eschaton	 indicates	 the	 ‘end’	of	 an	age,	not	 its	 teleological	 fulfillment.	 The	apocalyptic	
‘end	 time’	 indicates	 the	 redemption	 of	 an	 age,	 not	 its	 dialectical	 fulfillment.	 The	
redemption	of	history	is	an	apocalyptic	event;	it	is	a	break	from	the	historical	dialectic.	
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Eschatological	peace	signifies	the	interruption	of	any	such	telos	and	the	arrival	of	a	‘new	
age’.	The	apocalyptic	event	ruptures	the	linear	flow	of	history	as	a	temporal	sequence	of	
‘nows’.	While	the	historical	time-consciousness	of	modernity	is	an	ascending	trajectory	
towards	an	 ideal	 future,	 the	eschatological	 event	arrests	 the	 temporal	 acceleration	of	
planetary	civilization	towards	oblivion.	
Benjamin’s	 account	 of	 ‘the	 moment’	 refers	 to	 the	 non-linear	 temporality	 to	
which	 the	 mystics	 of	 various	 religious	 traditions	 bear	 witness.	 The	 intention	 of	 the	
mystic	is	to	attain	full	presence	in	the	now.	But	this	intention	is	arrested	as	soon	as	it	is	
undertaken.	 Phenomenological	 attention	 to	 experience	 suggests	 that	 the	 time	 of	 the	
now	 does	 not	 actually	 exist.	 As	 Heidegger	 demonstrates,	 there	 is	 no	 such	 enduring	
‘constant	presence’.	It	would	seem	that	the	present	moment	does	not	exist.	As	soon	as	
we	become	aware	of	 ‘the	moment’	 it	 is	already	gone.	The	temporal	 ‘event’	withdraws	
without	permanence.	All	we	can	perceive	is	the	‘trace’	of	messianic	deep	time.	Perhaps	
Heidegger	says	it	best:	“Powerful,	incalculable	time	lets	emerge	everything	not	manifest	
and	 conceals	 everything	 standing	 in	 appearance.	 Time	 has	 all	 things	 in	 its	 power,	
(namely)	 it	 lets	 emerge	 the	 concealed	 and	 conceals	 (lets	 disappear)	 what	 has	
appeared.”548	It	 follows	 that	 if	 the	 time	 of	 the	 now	 is	 an	 illusion,	 then	 so	 too	 is	 the	
concept	of	history	as	a	linear	sequence	of	nows.	In	the	modern	era,	we	tend	to	perceive	
history	as	a	linear	chain	of	cause	and	effect.	In	Heidegger’s	words,	“we	are	accustomed	
to	 thinking	of	 coming	 to	be	as	development,	as	a	 sequence	of	processes	 in	which	 the	
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earlier	 ones	 are	 always	 the	 cause	of	 the	 following	ones,	 as	 transition,	 progression,	 as	
direction	 .	 .	 .”549	The	 impermanence	 of	 the	 moment	 discloses	 a	 time	 apart	 from	 the	
linear	 temporality	 of	 universal	 history.	 As	 an	 experience	 of	 time	 apart	 from	 history,	
messianic	time	has	the	potential	to	exert	an	eschatological	force	upon	the	catastrophic	
unfolding	 of	 universal	 history.	 The	 temporality	 of	 ‘the	 event’	 is	 one	 of	 radical	
impermanence.	Heidegger:	“Time	 is	 situated	 in	passing.	Time	passes	by	ceasing	 to	be.	
That	 which	 arrives	 in	 time	 arrives	 not	 to	 abide,	 but	 to	 pass	 on.	 Where	 to?	 Into	
transience	.	.	.	The	temporal	signifies	what	must	pass,	the	transient.”550	Messianic	time	
signifies	 the	 passing	 of	 an	 age,	 aeon,	 or	 epoch.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 linear	 trajectory	 of	
‘universal	history’,	messianic	time	is	a	temporality	of	discontinuity,	rupture,	and	break.	
In	 the	Greek	of	 the	New	Testament,	 there	 is	a	kairos,	or	 temporal	 interruption	of	 the	
relentless	historical	unfolding	of	chronos,	or	chronological	time.		
The	Judaic	eschatological	tradition	gives	an	account	of	a	non-linear	temporality	
“whose	spatial	model	can	be	represented	by	a	broken	line.”551	According	to	eschatology,	
“history	 cannot	 be	 the	 continuous	 progress	 of	 humanity	 through	 linear	 time,	 but	 its	
essence	 is	hiatus,	discontinuity,	epoch.”552	The	eschatological	vision	 is	not	to	bring	the	
telos	of	history	to	its	nihilistic	fulfillment,	but	“to	blast	open	the	continuum	of	history”553	
In	 opposition	 to	 the	 enteral	 cycle	 of	 ‘law-making’	 and	 ‘law-preserving’	 violence,	
Benjamin	offers	a	notion	of	divine	violence.	Benjamin	suggests	that	“if	mythical	violence	
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is	 law-making,	 divine	 violence	 is	 law-destroying.”554	Divine	 violence	 annihilates	 law;	 it	
sweeps	 away	 the	 mythical	 cycles	 of	 law-forming	 and	 law-preserving	 violence.	 Only	
sovereign	power	can	suspend	the	 law.	 It	 follows	 that	 if	divine	violence	 is	 indeed	 ‘law-
destroying’,	 then	 divine	 violence	 is	 therefore	 ‘outside’	 the	 mythical	 cycles	 of	 ‘law-
founding’	and	‘law-preserving’	violence.	In	this	sense,	‘divine	violence’	indicates	a	notion	
of	 sovereignty	 beyond	 the	 dialectic	 of	 mythical	 and	 positive	 law.	 It	 is	 Benjamin’s	
contention	 that	 in	 arresting	 the	 dialectic	 of	 ‘law-making’	 violence,	 ‘divine	 violence’	 is	
akin	to	a	messianic	break	from	the	history	of	being.	Benjamin:	“On	the	breaking	of	this	
cycle	 [between	 law-making	and	 law-preserving	 violence]	 .	 .	 .	 on	 the	abolition	of	 state	
power,	 a	 new	 historical	 epoch	 is	 founded.”555	According	 to	 Benjamin,	 “the	 proper	
characteristic	of	this	violence	is	that	it	neither	makes	nor	preserves	law,	but	deposes	it	
and	 thus	 inaugurates	 a	 new	 historical	 epoch.”556 	Benjamin:	 “What	 exists	 must	 be	
reduced	to	rubble,	not	for	the	sake	of	the	rubble,	but	for	the	way	leading	through	it.”557	
Divine	violence	is	akin	to	an	apocalyptic	event;	it	signifies	the	inception	of	a	new	epoch	
from	out	of	the	apocalypse	of	planetary	civilization.	As	‘law-destroying’,	‘divine	violence’	
is	apocalyptic;	it	signifies	the	end	of	an	age	and	the	beginning	of	a	new	epoch	of	‘world-
history’.	 In	this	context,	apocalypse	should	not	be	interpreted	nihilistically,	but	 instead	
in	light	of	its	original	meaning	–	revelation.	
As	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	Angelus	Novus	demonstrate,	that	at	its	very	best	art	
can	bear	witness	 to	 the	memory	of	 the	 ‘deep	 time’.	 In	my	opinion,	 Terrence	Malick’s	
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film	The	Tree	Of	Life	(2011)	performs	an	eschatological	remembrance	of	non-linear	time.	
Malick,	who	wrote	and	directed	the	film,	is	deeply	influenced	by	Heidegger’s	philosophy	
of	time.	In	fact,	Malick	is	the	English	translator	of	Heidegger’s	Vom	Wesen	des	Grundes,	
(The	Ground	Of	Reason).	Moreover,	the	visionary	cinematography	and	sweeping	camera	
movement	bears	a	distinct	phenomenological	style;	the	camera	is	continually	sweeping	
upwards	towards	the	bright	open	sky	or	diving	into	the	shadows	of	the	deep.	All	things	
shine	through	the	screen	of	Malick’s	films.	The	Tree	Of	Life	is	certainly	no	exception.	The	
film	can	be	understood	in	light	of	a	question	posed	in	The	Thin	Red	Line	(1998),	Malick’s	
soulful	 meditation	 on	 war.	 The	 opening	 sequence	 of	 The	 Thin	 Red	 Line	 depicts	 the	
protagonist	 stranded	on	an	 island	 somewhere	 in	 the	Pacific	 theatre.	Enveloped	 in	 the	
shadows	of	the	forest	canopy,	he	can	be	heard	reflecting	on	the	elemental	strife	at	the	
heart	of	being:	“What’s	this	war	in	the	heart	of	nature?	Why	does	nature	vie	with	itself?	
The	land	contend	with	the	sea?	Is	there	an	avenging	power	in	nature?	Not	one	power,	
but	two?”	This	question	is	taken	up	again	in	the	opening	sequence	of	The	Tree	Of	Life.	
The	film	begins	with	the	childhood	memory	of	the	mother	character	played	brilliantly	by	
Jessica	 Chastain.	 There	 is	 a	 voiceover	 accompanied	 by	 the	 groundbreaking	
cinematography	 of	 Emmanuel	 Lubezki.	 The	 character	 states:	 “When	 I	 was	 young	 the	
nuns	taught	us	there	are	two	ways	through	life;	the	way	of	nature,	and	the	way	of	grace.	
You	have	to	choose	which	one	you’ll	 follow.”	Malick’s	use	of	the	term	‘nature’	can	be	
misleading	in	this	context.	The	dualism	of	‘nature’	and	‘grace’	risks	replicating	Platonic	
metaphysics	 by	 suggesting	 that	 this	 world	 is	 somehow	 inadequate	 or	 unreal	 in	
comparison	 to	 some	other	actual	or	 ideal	 realm.	 Indeed,	 the	entire	 film	 is	permeated	
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with	 a	 Neo-Platonic	 Christian	 cosmology	 more	 evocative	 of	 Hegel	 than	 Heidegger.	
Nevertheless,	this	apparent	dualism	does	not	subtract	from	Malick’s	essential	insight	–	
that	nature	is	not	a	state	of	war;	that	war	exists	only	between	states.	Instead,	the	‘Tree	
of	Life’	is	an	eschatological	image	of	the	original	gift	of	being	in	the	world.	
The	 ‘Tree	 of	 Life’	 is	 an	 eschatological	 vision	 of	 the	 redemption	 of	 history	 via	
revolutionary	time.	The	entire	film	can	be	interpreted	as	a	modern	retelling	of	the	Book	
of	Job.	The	story	of	Job	bears	witness	to	a	remarkable	vision	of	the	ungrounded	horror	
of	 being.	 Job	 is	 considered	 virtuous	 among	men.	 Tragically,	 it	would	 seem	 that	 virtue	
does	not	equate	happiness.	There	is	no	karmic	law	of	justice	at	work	in	the	cosmos.	In	
exchange	 for	his	 virtue,	 Job	 is	afflicted	with	a	plague	of	unbearable	 suffering.	 In	pain,	
Job	 cries	 out	 to	 God	 for	 justice.	 In	 The	 Tree	 Of	 Life,	 the	 character	 played	 by	 Jessica	
Chastain	is	afflicted	with	Job’s	fate.	The	product	of	a	traditional	religious	upbringing,	she	
was	taught:	“No	one	who	believes	 in	God	can	come	to	a	bad	end.”	This	naïve	belief	 is	
nevertheless	 shattered	when	 confronted	with	 tragedy.	When	 hearing	 of	 the	 death	 of	
her	son,	the	mother	is	stricken	with	grief.	Family	assures	her	that	“time	heals,	nothing	
remains	 the	 same.”	 She	 walks	 along	 a	 path	 into	 a	 forest	 clearing.	 With	 eyes	 turned	
upward	towards	the	open	sky,	the	mother	receives	a	revelation	of	the	infinite	scale	of	
time.	 Physicists	 say	 that	 the	 arrow	 of	 time	 is	 an	 illusion.	 All	 of	 time,	 both	 past	 and	
future,	occurs	at	once.	It	is	this	temporality	that	is	depicted	in	the	mother’s	vision.	Tears	
stream	 down	 her	 face	 as	 she	 closes	 her	 eyes	 in	 wonder	 before	 ‘the	 glory’.	 Malick’s	
depiction	of	creation	 is	 scientifically	accurate,	 from	the	creation	of	 the	Cosmos	 to	 the	
formation	of	Earth	and	the	genesis	of	Life.	Malick’s	films	are	certainly	worthy	of	being	
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called	poetry.	The	Tree	Of	Life	resonates	with	the	wonder	evoked	in	the	films’	epigraph.	
When	 Job	 cries	 to	 God	 in	 despair,	 God	 responds	 with	 a	 question:	 “Where	 were	 you	
when	 I	 laid	 the	 foundations	of	 the	Earth?.	 .	 .	When	the	morning	stars	 sang	with	glory	
and	 all	 the	 sons	 of	 God	 shouted	 for	 joy?”558	It	 is	 this	 non-linear	 temporality	 of	 ‘deep	
time’	which	Benjamin	and	Agamben	call	 ‘revolutionary’.	It	 is	only	from	the	perspective	
of	 this	 eschatological	 remembrance	 of	 history	 that	 the	 innate	 nihilism	 of	 modernity	
comes	into	focus.		
	
Anarchy	
	 In	 my	 judgment,	 Schmitt	 is	 much	 like	 a	 contemporary	 Thomas	 Hobbes.	 Both	
Schmitt	 and	 Hobbes	 understand	 mythology	 as	 being	 absolutely	 essential	 to	 the	
foundation	 and	 preservation	 of	 the	 state.	 Following	 Hobbes,	 Schmitt	 argues	 that	 the	
state	 comes	 into	 being	 via	 a	 foundational	 myth,	 or	 a	 myth	 of	 foundation.	 Schmitt:	
“Whatever	value	human	life	has	does	not	come	from	reason;	it	emerges	from	a	state	of	
war	between	those	who	are	 inspired	by	great	mythical	 images	to	 join	battle.”559	Apart	
from	Plato’s	myth	of	the	metals,	the	most	 influential	foundational	myth	of	the	state	is	
without	a	doubt	Hobbes’	myth	of	Leviathan.	Hobbes	appropriates	the	mythical	image	of	
Leviathan	from	the	Hebrew	Torah.	In	the	Torah,	Leviathan	is	the	name	of	a	great	beast	
of	 the	 sea.	However,	 Schmitt’s	 own	 interpretation	of	 the	meaning	 and	 significance	of	
Leviathan	 is	 considerably	 more	 esoteric.	 Schmitt	 draws	 from	 Kabbalistic	 imagery,	
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suggesting	that	the	Leviathan	is	an	anthropomorphic	image	of	divine	creation.	Just	like	
God,	the	Leviathan	state	demands	absolute	submission.	Schmitt:	“Hobbes’	Leviathan	.	.	.	
is	 the	 mortal	 god	 who	 brings	 to	 man	 peace	 and	 security.	 Because	 of	 this	 .	 .	 .	 the	
Leviathan	demands	unconditional	obedience.	There	exists	no	right	of	resistance	to	him	.	
.	.”560	For	Schmitt,	the	Leviathan	conjures	order	out	of	chaos;	“the	deep	meaning	of	the	
concept	of	the	Leviathan	consists	of	the	concreteness	of	the	‘earthly’	and	‘mortal’	god	
who	 is	 totally	 attuned	 to	 the	political	 deeds	of	man,	who,	 time	and	 time	again,	must	
bring	man	out	of	the	‘chaos’	of	the	‘natural’	condition.”561	In	this	sense,	the	Leviathan	is	
an	 image	 of	 the	 Lawgiver	 who	 compels	man	 out	 of	 the	 state	 of	 nature	 and	 into	 the	
frame	of	the	civil	state.	
The	meaning	and	significance	of	the	Leviathan	myth	cannot	be	understood	apart	
from	 its	 inverse	 image	 –	 the	 Behemoth.	 The	 mythical	 images	 of	 Leviathan	 and	
Behemoth	 signify	 the	 primordial	 strife	 between	 the	 elemental	 forces	 of	 order	 and	
chaos.	While	the	Leviathan	represents	the	order	of	the	‘social	contract’,	the	Behemoth	
represents	the	chaos	of	the	‘state	of	nature’.	Schmitt:	“As	a	symbol	of	a	political	entity,	
the	Leviathan	is	not	 just	any	‘corpus’	or	 just	any	kind	of	beast.	 It	 is	an	 image	from	the	
Hebrew	Bible,	on	garbed	during	the	course	of	many	centuries	 in	mythical,	 theological,	
and	Kabbalistic	meanings.	 In	 the	Book	of	 Job,	 it	 is	depicted	as	 the	strongest	and	most	
tremendous	 sea	 monster.	 Portrayed	 in	 vivid	 detail	 beside	 him	 is	 a	 land	 animal,	 the	
Behemoth.”562	For	 both	 Schmitt	 and	 Hobbes,	 the	 brutality	 of	 Leviathan	 (Order)	 is	
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justified	 by	 the	 even	 greater	 threat	 of	 Behemoth	 (Chaos).	 Schmitt	 explains	 that	 “the	
starting	point	of	Hobbes’	construction	of	the	state	is	fear	of	the	state	of	nature;	the	goal	
and	terminus	is	security	of	the	civil,	stately	condition.”563	For	Hobbes	and	Schmitt	alike,	
“security	exists	only	in	the	state	.	.	.	everything	outside	of	the	state	is	therefore	a	‘state	
of	 nature’.”564	The	Behemoth	 is	 an	 image	of	 the	perpetual	war	 that	 exists	 in	 ‘state	of	
nature’	prior	 to	 the	 foundation	of	political	order.	The	mythical	violence	of	a	 forgotten	
past	serves	to	justify	the	very	real	violence	of	the	Leviathan	state.		
The	prospect	of	returning	to	this	mythical	‘state	of	nature’	provokes	widespread	
fear	 that	 serves	 to	 justify	 state	 violence.	 Schmitt:	 “The	 terror	 of	 the	 state	 of	 nature	
drives	anguished	individuals	to	come	together;	their	fear	rises	to	an	extreme,	a	spark	of	
reason	flashes,	and	suddenly	there	stands	in	front	of	them	a	new	god.”565	According	to	
Schmitt’s	interpretation,	“the	state	of	nature,	or	the	Behemoth,	is	none	other	than	civil	
war,	 which	 can	 only	 be	 prevented	 by	 the	 overarching	 might	 of	 the	 state,	 or	 the	
Leviathan.	It	follows	that	one	of	the	monsters,	the	Leviathan	‘state’,	continuously	holds	
down	the	other	monster,	the	Behemoth	‘revolutionary	people’.”566	In	other	words,	the	
ungrounded	anarchy	of	human	nature	necessitates	 the	rule	of	 the	authoritarian	state.	
Schmitt:	 “The	 absolutism	 of	 the	 state	 is	 the	 oppressor	 of	 the	 irrepressible	 chaos	
inherent	 in	man.”567	In	 this	 sense,	 the	essential	 strife	of	 Leviathan	and	Behemoth	 is	 a	
mythical	 image	 of	 the	 moral	 conflict	 between	 good	 and	 evil.	 Schmitt	 explains	 that	
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“every	political	ideal	in	one	way	or	another	takes	a	position	on	the	‘nature’	of	man	and	
presupposes	that	he	is	either	‘by	nature	good’	or	‘by	nature	evil’.”568	Schmitt	argues	that	
since	evil	 is	 innate	 to	 the	human	condition	 salvation	can	only	be	 secured	 through	 the	
absolute	authority	of	the	state.	Schmitt:	“In	the	face	of	radical	evil	the	only	solution	is	
dictatorship.”569	It	would	seem	that	in	order	to	refute	the	logic	of	dictatorship,	it	is	also	
necessary	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 morality	 of	 good	 and	 evil.	 Against	 Hobbes’	 radical	
pessimism,	Rousseau	argues	that	“there	is	no	general	war	between	man	and	man;	and	
the	human	species	was	not	formed	merely	to	destroy	itself.”570	Indeed,	“there	is	no	war	
between	men;	there	is	war	only	between	States.”571		
	 Contra	 the	 elemental	 strife	 of	 Leviathan	 (Order)	 and	 Behemoth	 (Chaos),	 I	
propose	the	alternative	mythical	 image	of	the	 ‘Tree	of	Life’.	The	 image	of	the	 ‘Tree	of	
Life’	can	be	glimpsed	in	the	creation	myth	depicted	in	the	Book	of	Genesis.	According	to	
the	story,	the	intended	dwelling	place	of	humanity	is	the	primordial	garden.	Within	this	
garden	two	trees	grow	–	the	‘Tree	of	Life’	and	‘The	Tree	of	Knowledge’.	To	dwell	in	the	
garden	is	to	commune	with	the	divine	‘face-to-face’.	In	this	time	before	history,	nature	
is	the	sacred	dwelling	place	of	both	Man	and	God.	Within	the	refuge	of	the	garden,	the	
first	humans	enjoy	complete	freedom,	except	for	one	law:	To	never	eat	from	the	‘Tree	
of	 Knowledge’.	 The	 Creator	 warns	 that	 the	 fruit	 of	 the	 ‘Tree	 of	 Knowledge’	 means	
certain	death!	Adam	and	Eve	nevertheless	rebel	against	God’s	rule;	they	transgress	the	
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divine	law	and	eat	of	the	‘Tree	of	Knowledge’.	Upon	eating	of	this	deadly	fruit,	there	is	a	
traumatic	diremption	between	the	real	and	the	good.	The	good	is	no	longer	conceived	
as	the	simplicity	of	one’s	original	condition.	Instead,	the	good	is	abstracted	from	being	
and	projected	into	an	ideal	realm	towards	which	one	perpetually	strives,	though	never	
reaches.	 Enraged	 by	 Adam	 and	 Eve’s	 betrayal,	 God	 exiles	 humanity	 from	 the	 garden,	
condemning	us	to	toil	and	die	in	mortal	anguish.	The	orthodox	interpretation	of	‘original	
sin’	is	misleading.	It	is	not	sin,	but	peace	that	is	original.	Peace	precedes	any	covenant,	
history,	or	nation.	 In	pursuing	Knowledge	we	have	 forsaken	the	way	of	Life.	By	eating	
from	 the	 ‘Tree	 of	 Knowledge’,	 Adam	 and	 Eve	 forever	 loose	 the	 ‘Tree	 of	 Life’.	
Henceforth,	humanity	must	endure	a	‘fallen’	state.	In	my	opinion,	the	mythical	image	of	
the	 ‘Tree	of	 Life’	provokes	 the	memory	of	 that	has	been	 lost	and	shattered	along	 the	
relentless	 march	 of	 progress.	 The	 ‘Tree	 of	 Life’	 provides	 a	 counter-myth	 to	 Hobbes’	
mythical	 Leviathan	 -	 that	 although	 ‘everywhere	 in	 chains’,	 man	 was	 ‘born	 free’.	 Pre-
history	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 a	 state	 of	 perpetual	war	 –	 a	 struggle	 of	 ‘all	 against	 all.’	 Indeed,	
Hobbes	projects	the	very	real	savagery	of	modern	European	history	into	the	distance	of	
pre-history	before	law,	order,	and	the	state.	Rousseau:	“The	error	of	Hobbes	and	of	the	
philosophers	is	to	confuse	the	natural	man	with	the	men	they	have	before	their	eyes	.	.	
.”572	Hobbes	 sees	 the	 savagery	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 civilization	 and	 calls	 it	 the	 ‘state	 of	
nature’.	Rousseau:	“Hobbes’	error	is	therefore	to	have	assumed	the	state	of	war	.	.	.	to	
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be	natural	to	the	species,	and	to	have	given	it	as	the	cause	of	the	vices	of	which	it	is	the	
effect.”573		
Rousseau’s	 reference	 to	 the	 original	 nature	 of	 the	 species	 should	 not	 be	
prematurely	 dismissed	 as	 mere	 essentialism.	 Of	 course	 there	 is	 no	 innate	 ‘species	
essence’,	 whether	 good,	 as	 Rousseau	 would	 have	 it,	 or	 evil,	 as	 Hobbes	 warns	
forebodingly.	While	Hobbes	 projects	 the	modern	 ‘state	 of	war’	 into	 a	 forgotten	 past,	
Rousseau	can	be	criticized	for	perpetuating	the	Euro-centric	myth	of	the	‘noble	savage’.	
In	both	instances,	a	social	construct	 is	mistaken	for	objective	reality.	However,	fixating	
on	 this	 criticism	 risks	 missing	 the	 point	 of	 Rousseau’s	 utopian	 image.	 As	 Agamben	
argues,	“the	past	becomes	possible	in	some	fashion	through	memory	.	.	.”574	Rousseau’s	
reflections	 on	 the	 ‘state	 of	 nature’	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 such	 a	 recollection.	
Rousseau	does	not	take	 it	 for	granted	(as	almost	all	of	us	do)	that	the	emergence	and	
development	of	civilization	over	the	past	10	000	years	is	an	unfolding	of	the	history	of	
progress.	 Rousseau	 entertains	 a	 dangerous	 thought:	 that	 the	 transition	 to	 civilization	
was	 an	 irrevocable	 mistake	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 species.	 In	 fact,	 contemporary	
anthropologists	such	as	Yuval	Hariri	suggest	that	this	may	in	fact	be	the	case.	Perhaps	it	
is	 we	moderns,	 not	 Rousseau,	 who	 are	 blinded	 by	 ideology.	Western	 civilization	 is	 2	
0000	years	old.	Known	civilization	extends	10	000	years	into	the	past.	Yet	homo	sapiens	
have	dwelt	on	Earth	for	250	000	years.	It	is	Rousseau’s	intention	to	direct	our	attention	
to	the	240	000	years	of	the	species’	history	lost	to	the	concealment	of	‘deep	time’.		
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Early	modern	social	contract	theory	is	a	secularization	of	the	theological	notion	
of	 Abraham’s	 covenant	with	 God.	 According	 to	 social	 contract	 theory,	 a	 collection	 of	
individuals	agree	to	leave	the	‘state	of	nature’	and	enter	into	a	‘social	contract’	with	one	
another	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 guarantee	 of	 security	 against	 anarchic	 violence.	 Just	 as	
Abraham	 submits	 to	 the	 will	 of	 God,	 the	 citizen	 submits	 to	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 state	 in	
exchange	for	peace,	order,	and	security.	Only	the	Leviathan	can	create	order	out	of	the	
primordial	anarchy	that	prevails	in	the	absence	of	sovereign	power.	Abraham	is	not	the	
only	 mortal	 with	 whom	 God	makes	 a	 covenant.	 Indeed,	 God’s	 covenant	 with	Moses	
proves	 most	 instructive.	 Schmitt’s	 political	 theology	 betrays	 a	 fundamental	
misunderstanding	of	Mosaic	Law.	Moreover,	Schmitt’s	political	theology	is	based	upon	a	
fundamental	 misunderstanding	 of	 theology.	 Earlier,	 I	 suggested	 that	 Schmitt	
misinterprets	 Abraham’s	 sacrifice	 of	 Isaac	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 sovereign	 decision.	
Similarity,	Schmitt	incorrectly	interprets	Moses	as	a	‘law-giver’,	or	founder	of	a	people.	
It	is	from	this	understanding	of	Moses	as	the	‘law-giver’	that	Schmitt	derives	his	notion	
of	the	sovereign	ruler.	However,	for	the	ancient	Hebrews,	it	 is	not	Moses,	but	Yahweh	
who	is	the	‘law-giver’.	The	gift	of	law	is	given	in	and	through	the	withdrawal	of	the	‘law-
giver’.	 God	 reveals	 himself	 only	 as	 a	 trace.	 Yahweh	 says	 to	 Moses:	 “While	 my	 glory	
passes	.	.	.	thou	shalt	see	my	trace,	but	my	face	shall	not	be	seen.”575	Even	Moses	cannot	
look	upon	 the	 face	of	his	God	and	 live.	 It	 is	 the	same	 for	 sovereignty	as	well.	Popular	
sovereignty	is	constituted	by	that	which	Agamben	calls	a	‘judicial	void’.	This	logic	is	also	
at	work	in	the	story	of	Solon,	who	is	attributed	with	the	foundation	of	ancient	Athenian	
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democracy.	Solon	is	the	‘law-giver’	and	founder	of	the	polity.	After	establishing	the	city’s	
laws,	rather	than	rule	as	sovereign,	Solon	withdraws	from	the	polity.	Solon’s	withdrawal	
from	the	polity	is	at	the	same	time	its	foundation.	The	foundation	of	democracy	is	at	the	
same	time	the	abdication	of	executive	power.	The	space	of	the	sovereign	must	remain	
open,	 empty	 and	 free.	 Democracy	 is	 founded	 upon	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 executive,	
president,	 or	 King.	 True	 democracy	 more	 closely	 resembles	 Rousseau’s	 popular	
assemblies	 than	 Hobbes’s	 Leviathan	 state.	 If	 Hobbes	 and	 Schmitt	 propose	 a	 political	
theology,	then	Rousseau	offers	a	negative	political	theology.	
While	 I	 disagree	 strongly	 with	 Schmitt’s	 advocacy	 for	 a	 political	 theology	 of	
absolute	 sovereignty,	 his	 analysis	 of	 democracy	 nevertheless	 proves	 invaluable	 to	 the	
task	 of	 outlining	 a	 negative	 political	 theology.	 It	 is	 common	 to	 speak	 of	 liberal	
democracy	as	 if	 there	were	not	a	significant	difference	or	even	contradiction	between	
liberalism	and	democracy.	Against	 this	 common	error,	 Schmitt	 argues	 that	 “liberalism	
and	democracy	have	to	be	distinguished	from	one	another”.576	Indeed,	Schmitt	indicates	
“the	inescapable	contradiction	of	liberal	individualism	and	democratic	homogeneity.”577	
In	distinguishing	between	 liberalism	and	democracy,	 Schmitt	provides	 valuable	 insight	
where	 the	vast	majority	of	political	 theorists	 fail.	According	 to	Schmitt,	 “democracy	 is	
correctly	 defined	 as	 the	 identity	 of	 governed	 and	 governing.”578	If	 this	 statement	 is	
correct,	and	I	believe	it	is,	then	it	follows	that	democracy	is	rendered	inoperative	within	
the	modern	context	for	the	reason	that	the	scale	of	the	nation-state	is	simply	too	vast	a	
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political	 entity	 to	 lend	 itself	 to	 direct	 self-government.	 Schmitt:	 “The	 crisis	 of	 the	
modern	 state	 arises	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 no	 state	 can	 realize	 a	 mass	 democracy,	 a	
democracy	 of	 mankind,	 not	 even	 a	 democratic	 state.”579 	In	 order	 to	 address	 this	
problem	of	 scale,	 the	 nation-state	 utilizes	 representative	 rather	 than	 direct	modes	 of	
democracy.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	we	tend	to	associate	democracy	with	parliamentary	
bodies	rather	than	with	popular	assemblies.	But,	as	Schmitt	contends,	“parliamentarism	
is	 not	 democracy.” 580 	Schmitt:	 “Democracy	 is	 something	 other	 than	 a	 registration	
system	of	secret	ballots.	Compared	to	a	democracy	that	is	direct	.	.	.	parliament	appears	
an	 artificial	 machinery	 produced	 by	 liberal	 reasoning.”581	Representative	 democracy	
must	be	distinguished	from	local	forms	of	participatory	democracy.	Indeed,	the	former	
is	 simply	 liberalism	while	only	 the	 latter	names	 true	democracy.	When	 faced	with	 the	
problem	of	scale,	the	vast	majority	of	political	theorists	opt	to	discard	democracy	in	the	
name	of	liberalism.	Indeed,	I	believe	this	is	Derrida’s	approach.	However,	I	would	prefer	
to	discard	liberalism	in	order	to	salvage	democracy	from	the	ruins	of	modernity.		
According	 to	 Schmitt,	 Spinoza’s	Theological-Political	 Treatise	 fractures	Hobbes’	
Leviathan	state.	Spinoza’s	separation	between	religious	authority	and	sovereign	power	
fatally	 divides	 the	 ‘body-politic’	 against	 itself.	 Schmitt:	 “The	 liberal	 Jew	 [Spinoza]	
recognized	 the	 barely	 visible	 crack	 in	 the	 theoretical	 justification	 of	 the	 sovereign	
sate.”582	Spinoza	 introduces	 “the	 revolutionary	 state-destroying	 distinction	 between	
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religion	and	politics.”583	While	Hobbes	argues	that	sovereignty	is	both	unconditional	and	
indivisible,	 Spinoza	 suggests	 that	 sovereignty	 is	unconditional	but	not	 indivisible.	With	
poetic	 flourish,	 Schmitt	 bemoans	 the	 fact	 that	 Spinoza’s	 distinction	 of	 religion	 and	
politics	“contained	the	seed	of	death	that	destroyed	the	mighty	 leviathan	 from	within	
and	 brought	 about	 the	 end	 of	 the	 mortal	 god.” 584 	Spinoza’s	 notion	 of	 divided	
sovereignty	attains	its	full	expression	in	the	democratic	pluralism	of	Rousseau’s	‘general	
will’.	For	Rousseau,	democracy	is	akin	to	permanent	revolution.	Schmitt:	“The	periodic	
revival	of	the	national	convention	as	an	eternal	natural	right	was	to	[Rousseau]	a	natural	
occurrence;	 in	 other	 words,	 he	 allowed	 for	 the	 incorporation	 of	 Revolution	 into	 the	
configuration	of	 the	state.	Hobbes,	on	 the	other	hand,	asserted	 the	necessity	 to	deny	
and	negate	the	state	of	nature	in	the	true	and	perfect	civil	state.”585	Rousseau’s	notion	
of	 democratic	 sovereignty	 is	 irrecoverable	 with	 political	 theology.	 As	 we	 will	 see,	
democracy	it	is	also	irreconcilable	with	the	modern	state.		
Rousseau	argues	that	only	direct	democracy	is	true	democracy.	It	is	not	the	state,	
but	the	people	who	constitute	the	sovereign	power.	Rousseau	even	goes	as	far	to	argue	
that	“as	soon	as	a	People	gives	 itself	Representatives,	 it	ceases	to	be	free;	 it	ceases	to	
be.”586	Rousseau:	 “The	 Sovereign	 can	 act	 only	 when	 the	 people	 are	 assembled.”587	In	
fact,	Rousseau	argues	that	“any	law	which	the	People	has	not	ratified	in	person	is	null;	it	
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is	not	a	law.”588	For	this	reason,	Schmitt	accuses	Rousseau	of	annihilating	the	notion	of	
sovereign	decision.	 Schmitt:	 “The	general	will	 of	Rousseau	 is	 identical	with	 the	will	 of	
the	sovereign	.	.	.	which	means	that	the	people	became	the	sovereign.	The	decisionistic	
and	 personalistic	 element	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 was	 thus	 lost.”589	Although	
Schmitt	intends	this	as	a	criticism,	Rousseau’s	negation	of	sovereign	decision	points	the	
way	 towards	 the	 genuine	 praxis	 of	 popular	 sovereignty.	 Contrary	 to	 contemporary	
liberal	 ideology,	 there	 is	 not,	 never	 was,	 and	 never	 will	 be	 a	 democratic	 state.	
Representative	 democracy	 is	 a	 contradiction	 in	 terms.	 The	 practice	 of	 participatory	
democracy	 is	simply	 impossible	at	the	state	 level.	Rather,	genuine	popular	sovereignty	
can	only	be	practiced	on	a	local	level.	For	this	reason,	true	democracy	presupposes	the	
decentralization	 of	 sovereignty	 from	 national	 parliaments	 to	 local	 communities	 via	
institutions	 such	 as	 the	 general	 assembly,	 the	 cooperative,	 and	 the	 commune.	
Rousseau’s	native	Geneva	serves	as	an	 inspiration,	as	does	the	ancient	Athenian	polis.	
Both	are	instances	of	small,	decentralized	polities	wherein	it	is	possible	for	the	people	to	
gather,	debate,	and	decide	for	themselves	on	their	common	destiny.		
I	 concede	 that	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 political	 revolution	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 what	
Rousseau	 advocates	 may	 seem	 unlikely.	 The	 decentralization	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 the	
development	of	 local	 forms	of	direct	democracy	would	amount	 to	an	 inversion	of	 the	
historical	 trajectory	 of	 ‘the	 West’.	 The	 historical	 telos	 driving	 Western	 civilization	
reaches	 its	 completion	 with	 the	 emergence	 and	 development	 of	 a	 truly	 planetary	
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civilization.	In	this	sense,	globalization	is	akin	to	the	fate	of	‘the	West.’	Over	the	course	
of	 several	 centuries,	 tribes,	 villages	 and	 cities	 have	 consolidated	 into	 nations.	 Today,	
these	nations	are	consolidating	into	continental	governing	bodies,	and,	inevitably,	into	a	
‘world-state’.	Nevertheless,	it	is	unlikely	that	local	forms	of	self-government	will	replace	
the	nation-state.	Instead,	we	are	witnessing	the	transition	from	national	sovereignty	to	
the	 centralization	of	 power	within	 regional	 supra-state	 institutions	 such	 as	 those	 that	
characterize	the	European	Union.	In	my	view,	the	European	project	signifies	an	attempt	
to	gather	the	continent	together	under	a	single	political	authority.	The	point	is	to	arrest	
the	 nihilistic	 telos	 of	 globalization	 before	 its	 inevitable	 culmination	 in	 the	 totalitarian	
planetary	 state.	 If	 historical	 development	 is	 analogous	 to	 a	 train	moving	 along	a	one-
way	track,	the	point	is	not	to	accelerate	or	decelerate	the	engine	of	history.	Instead,	the	
point	is	to	get	off	the	track	altogether.	The	European	project	is	not	only	post-national	it	
is	 also	 post-democratic.	 For	 Rousseau,	 even	 the	 nation-state	 is	 simply	 too	 vast	 to	
support	 a	 functioning	 democracy.	 Participatory	 democracy	 is	 an	 even	 more	 unlikely	
prospect	within	the	post-national	super-state	comprised	of	unaccountable	technocratic	
institutions.	There	 is	nevertheless	 reason	 to	hope.	 If	Benjamin,	 Levinas,	 and	Agamben	
are	 correct,	 then	 such	 epochal	 transfigurations	 are	 far	 from	 rare.	 Indeed,	 the	 various	
epochs	of	being	are	comprised	of	such	breaks,	ruptures,	or	interruptions	of	history.	It	is	
possible	 that	 the	 age	 of	 ‘world-history’	 inaugurated	 by	 the	 Treaty	 of	Westphalia	 has	
reached	 its	 end.	 While	 the	 nation-state	 is	 approaching	 its	 end,	 the	 neo-liberal	
administration	that	characterizes	the	EU	is	not	necessarily	 its	 inevitable	successor.	 It	 is	
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not	 too	 late	 to	 set	off	along	another	path	–	 if	only	we	could	 remember	a	past	 that	 is	
different	from	the	present	and	its	catastrophic	future.	
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Conclusion:		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Democracy	Now!	
Jeremy	 Valentine	 surveys	 the	 field	 of	 current	 democratic	 theory	 in	 his	 article	
‘The	 Political’.	 I	 will	 outline	 and	 elaborate	 upon	 Valentine’s	 theoretical	 distinctions	 in	
relation	to	my	own	engagement	with	post-foundational	democratic	theory.	In	doing	so,	I	
hope	 to	clarify	my	own	project	as	well	as	how	 it	 fits	 into	 the	broader	constellation	of	
contemporary	democratic	theory.		
Valentine	 begins	 by	 defining	 the	 political	 as	 “the	 ground	 of	 the	 polity”.590	
Valentine	 takes	 up	 Reiner	 Schürmann’s	 description	 of	 the	 epochal	 horizon	 of	 the	
political	 as	 ‘self-grounding	 ground’.	 In	 the	 epoch	 of	 modernity,	 the	 political	 is	
understood	as	self-grounding;	“Modernity	is	that	which	would	be	fully	present	to	itself,	
self-sufficient	 and	 thus,	 in	 a	 manner	 of	 speaking,	 self-grounding.” 591 	Schürmann’s	
writing	on	 anarchy	 and	metaphysics	 demonstrates	 that	Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	of	
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591 Ibid, 507 
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any	metaphysical	arche,	foundation,	or	ground	of	the	political	opens	up	a	 ‘site’	of	 ‘an-
arche’.592 	The	 question,	 however,	 is	 whether	 or	 not	 this	 ungrounded	 ‘site’	 of	 the	
political	can	avoid	succumbing	to	the	nihilist	violence	of	Chaos	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	
foundational	violence	of	Order	on	the	other.	There	is	a	very	real	risk	that	metaphysical	
groundlessness	could	give	way	to	the	horror	of	political	nihilism	rather	than	the	promise	
of	 an	 alternative	 post-foundational	 democracy.	 This	 is	 the	 problem	 to	 which	 my	
dissertation	ventures	a	response.		
Schürmann’s	 post-foundational	 notion	 of	 democracy	 poses	 a	 significant	
challenge	to	the	liberal	notion	of	representative	democracy.	Understood	as	the	‘site’	of	
the	 political,	 true	 democracy	 is	 necessarily	 local.	 While	 representative	 democracy	 is	
grounded	in	the	arche	of	constitutional	law,	I	suggest	that	post-foundational	democracy	
occurs	in	the	inter-subjective	‘site’	of	the	demos.	The	notion	of	‘an-arche’	allows	me	to	
trace	a	line	from	Heidegger’s	overcoming	of	‘onto-theology’	to	Benjamin’s	confrontation	
with	political	theology.		
In	the	epoch	of	modernity,	the	ground	of	the	political	operates	as	the	arche	of	
the	polity.	However,	Valentine	argues	that	the	understanding	of	the	political	as	ground	
becomes	 problematic	 in	 the	 late-modern	 era.	 A	 confrontation	 with	 Nietzsche	 is	
necessary	to	come	to	terms	with	the	innate	nihilism	of	the	metaphysical	understanding	
of	the	political	as	self-grounding.	Nietzsche	shows	that	the	‘self-grounding	ground’	is,	in	
fact,	 ungrounded.	More	 specifically,	 the	polity	 is	 grounded	on	nothing	other	 than	 the	
nihilistic	 ‘will	to	power’.	 In	the	first	chapter,	 I	suggest	that	both	the	passive	nihilism	of	
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radical	pessimism	and	the	active	nihilism	of	the	‘will	to	power’	prove	insufficient	to	the	
challenges	 posed	 by	 the	 abysmal	 groundlessness	 of	 being.	 As	 a	 result,	 I	 argue	 that	
Nietzsche’s	 confrontation	 with	 nihilism	 succumbs	 to	 the	 tragic	 vision	 of	 time	 as	 an	
infinite	circle.	For	this	reason,	it	 is	necessary	to	turn	to	Heidegger’s	temporality	of	‘the	
event’	 and	Benjamin’s	 eschatological	 break	with	 the	 ‘moral	 arc	of	 history’	 in	order	 to	
move	beyond	political	nihilism	towards	a	genuine	post-foundational	democracy.	
Valentine	 distinguishes	 between	 two	 different	 fields	 of	 contemporary	
democratic	theory	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	problematic	nature	of	the	metaphysical	
understanding	 of	 the	 political	 as	 the	 ‘ground’	 of	 the	 polity.	 Valentine	 distinguishes	
between:	1)	deliberative	democracy,	and	2)	political	anti-modernism.		
First,	 I	 will	 look	 at	 deliberative	 democracy	 in	 relation	 to	my	 own	 engagement	
with	 post-foundational	 democracy	 and	 negative	 political	 theology.	 Valentine	 suggests	
that	 Jürgen	 Habermas	 and	 John	 Rawls	 most	 clearly	 outline	 the	 deliberative	mode	 of	
democracy.	 Deliberative	 democracy	 nevertheless	 proves	 to	 be	 a	 failure.	 According	 to	
Valentine,	 “both	 Habermas	 and	 Rawls	 propose	 a	 version	 of	 Enlightenment	 without	
critique.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 political	 does	 not	 take	 place.” 593 	Lacking	 a	 sufficient	
understanding	of	the	political,	deliberative	democracy	succumbs	to	depoliticization,	the	
process	through	which	representative	democracy	gives	way	to	‘managed	democracy’.594	
In	other	words,	deliberative	democracy	 is	not	post-foundational,	but	post-democratic.	
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Reconstruction of American Democracy, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) 
	 228	
Since	Habermas	is	one	of	the	most	prominent	theorists	of	deliberative	democracy,	I	will	
discuss	his	views	now.		
Deliberative	 democracy	 is	 rooted	 in	 Habermas’	 rejection	 of	 the	 Frankfurt	
School’s	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘dialectic	 of	 Enlightenment’.	 Horkheimer	 and	 Adronro	 invert	
Hegel’s	 dialectical	 notion	 of	 history	 as	 the	 progressive	 evolution	 towards	 ever	 more	
advanced	 stages	 of	 consciousness.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Horkheimer	 and	 Adorno	 suggest	
that	history	should	be	understood	as	a	series	of	catastrophes;	“the	Enlightenment	has	
always	aimed	at	 liberating	men	 from	 their	 fear	and	establishing	 their	 sovereignty.	Yet	
the	 fully	 enlightened	 Earth	 radiates	 disaster	 triumphant.” 595 	The	 Frankfurt	 School	
criticizes	 Enlightenment	 rationality	 as	 an	 advanced	 form	 of	 barbarism.	 This	 critique	
arose	within	the	historical	context	of	the	rise	of	European	nihilism	and	the	destructive	
violence	 of	 the	 second	 World	 War.	 While	 Horkheimer	 and	 Adorno	 view	 the	 war	 as	
symptomatic	 of	 the	 repressed	 elements	 of	 liberal	 modernity,	 Habermas	 views	 the	
destruction	of	Europe	as	an	irrational	rejection	of	Enlightenment	rationality	rather	than	
as	a	consequence	of	the	domination	of	nature	intrinsic	to	the	project	of	Enlightenment	
itself.	 Contra	 Horkheimer	 and	 Adorno,	 Habermas	 views	 the	 outbreak	 of	 political	
violence	 as	 the	 result	 of	 an	 irrational	 anti-modernism	 rather	 than	 a	 catastrophic	
symptom	of	the	ills	of	modernity.		
Habermas	 understands	modernity	 as	 the	 unfinished	 project	 of	 Enlightenment.	
Discourse	 theory	 is	 a	 continuation	 of	 this	 project;	 “Discourse	 theory	 works	 with	 the	
higher-level	 intersubjectivity	 of	 communication	 that	 unfolds	 in	 the	 institutionalized	
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deliberations	of	parliamentary	bodies,	on	the	one	hand,	and	in	the	informal	networks	of	
the	 public	 sphere,	 on	 the	 other.” 596 	In	 what	 follows	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 Habermas’	
understanding	of	democracy	and	dialogue	are	both	insufficient.	I	will	also	look	at	some	
ways	in	which	my	own	project	attempts	to	address	some	of	these	insufficiencies.		
I	understand	Habermas’	 theory	of	deliberative	democracy	as	a	response	to	the	
decline	of	the	nation-sate	and	the	transition	to	a	new	post-Westphalian	political	order.	
While	 the	 nation-state	 is	 undergoing	 a	 period	 of	 precipitous	 decline,	 a	 compelling	
alterative	to	the	nation-state	has	yet	to	emerge.	Habermas	advocates	for	the	transition	
from	 the	nation-state	 to	 supra-national	 forms	of	administration	 such	as	 the	European	
Union	(EU).	The	problem,	however,	is	that	which	Habermas	calls	the	‘democratic	deficit’	
of	such	post-national	forms	of	government.	Although	representative	democracy	is	well	
suited	for	the	nation-state,	such	models	of	democratic	representation	are	 less	tenable	
at	the	super	and	supra-state	level.		
Habermas	advocates	for	deliberative	democracy	as	a	solution	to	the	democratic	
deficit	of	the	EU.	In	my	view,	rather	than	offering	a	solution	to	the	democratic	deficit	of	
the	EU,	deliberative	democracy	 is	 symptomatic	of	 the	problem	 itself.	 The	deliberative	
model	of	democracy	draws	 inspiration	from	the	historical	transformation	of	the	public	
sphere	during	the	transition	from	the	Medieval	to	early-Modern	period.	The	emergence	
of	the	free	press,	coffee	houses,	and	bourgeoisie	social	clubs	nurtured	and	sustained	the	
transition	from	feudalism	to	capitalist	markets	and	representative	government.	Liberal	
democratic	theory	distinguishes	between	the	state,	civil	society	(the	public	sphere),	and	
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the	 individual	 (the	 private	 sphere).	 In	 a	 liberal	 polity,	 civil	 society	 is	 a	 necessary	
condition	 for	 representative	 democracy.	 Liberalism	 places	 a	 heavy	 emphasis	 on	
deliberative	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 free	 press.	 The	 civil	 debates	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	
provide	the	political	education	necessary	for	national	citizenship.		
It	 is	Habermas’	naïve	hope	 that	 if	 democracy	 can	no	 longer	be	 representative,	
then	it	can	at	least	be	transparent.	Habermas	relies	on	a	transnational	public	sphere	to	
cultivate	 a	 new	 post-national	 political	 consciousness	 to	 replace	 national	 identity.	
Habermas	argues	that	democracy	presupposes	an	ideal	speech	situation	as	a	regulatory	
ideal.	The	problem,	however,	is	that	the	transnational	public	sphere	falls	far	short	of	this	
ideal.	Indeed,	the	transnational	public	sphere	is	nothing	but	a	synonym	for	international	
corporate	media.	Rather	than	fostering	a	new	post-national	political	consciousness,	this	
impoverished	 discourse	 undermines	 democracy	 through	 the	 standardization	 of	
consciousness	 and	 the	 repression	 of	 viable	 political	 alternatives.	 I	 therefore	 view	
Habermas’	deliberative	democracy	as	a	regression	from	rather	than	an	advancement	of	
the	original	Frankfurt	critique.		
It	is	because	of	this	impoverished	notion	of	democracy	and	discourse	that	I	turn	
to	Levinas	in	order	to	seek	a	more	productive	understanding	of	democratic	dialogue	as	
an	 alterative	 to	 Habermas’	 discourse	 theory.	 For	 Habermas,	 language	 serves	 an	
instrumental	function:	discourse	is	undergone	for	the	sake	of	testing	the	validity	of	truth	
claims.	 The	 discursive	 legitimation	 of	 diverse,	 often	 contradictory	 truth	 claims	 is	
intended	 to	 generate	 social	 consensus	 and	 foster	 post-national	 identity.	 For	 Levinas,	
however,	 discourse	 is	 not	 a	 tool	 to	 generate	 meaning.	 Rather,	 discourse	 is	 already	
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inherently	 meaningful.	 Levinas	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 said	 and	 saying;	 between	
what	the	other	says,	and	that	the	other	says.		It	is	not	the	validity	of	what	is	said	that	is	
fundamental,	but	rather	that	one	is	addressed.		
In	 my	 judgment,	 Levinas’	 notion	 of	 ethical	 inter-corporality	 lends	 itself	 to	
political	 models	 that	 are	 drastically	 different	 than	 Habermas’	 discourse	 theory	 of	
democracy. 597 	While	 Habermas	 looks	 at	 formal	 structures	 of	 discourse	 at	 the	
institutional	level,	Levinas	undertakes	a	phenomenological	analysis,	looking	at	dialogue	
as	 an	 interpersonal	 phenomenon.	 While	 deliberative	 democracy	 institutionalizes	
communicative	 processes	 in	 government	 bureaucracy	 and	 corporate	 media,	 a	 post-
foundational	 democracy	 inspired	 by	 Levinas’	 ethics	 of	 responsibility	 would	 require	 a	
drastic	transformation	of	the	state	along	with	the	decentralization	of	sovereignty	from	
the	 executive,	 legislature,	 and	 courts	 to	 the	 local	 community	 –	 the	 site	where	 bodies	
meet.	
We	began	with	the	problem	of	the	modern	understanding	of	the	political	as	the	
ground	of	politics.	This	foundational	understanding	of	the	political	set	us	on	the	search	
for	 an	 alternative	 post-foundational	 politics.	 Having	 looked	 at	 the	 first	 model	 of	
deliberative	 democracy,	 I	 will	 now	 look	 at	 Valentine’s	 second	 model	 –	 the	 anti-
modernist	revolt	against	the	depoliticization	of	democracy.		
Valentine	 argues	 that	 the	 reactionary	 model	 views	 the	 political	 through	 a	
nostalgic	lens,	hoping	for	the	return	of	a	concept	of	the	political	that	may	in	fact	never	
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have	 been.598	In	 the	 second	 chapter,	 I	 suggested	 that	 Heidegger’s	 deconstruction	 of	
metaphysics	 is	 not	 susceptible	 to	 this	 same	 criticism.	 Heidegger’s	 ‘step	 back’	 to	 the	
inception	of	Western	metaphysics	 in	ancient	Greece	 is	not	 rooted	 in	nostalgia	 for	 the	
absolute.	On	 the	 contrary,	 I	 view	Heidegger’s	 return	 to	 ancient	 philosophy	 through	 a	
Benjaminian	lens	–	as	the	eschatological	remembrance	of	repressed	historical	potential.	
In	 the	 final	chapter,	 I	discussed	 the	 temporal	element	of	 such	an	eschatological	break	
from	the	linear	flow	of	time.	In	my	view,	the	notion	of	‘revolutionary	time’	is	essential	to	
an	alternative	political	vision.	But	such	a	non-linear	temporality	must	be	more	than	an	
exception	 that	 proves	 the	 rule.	 Indeed,	 the	 perception	 of	 ‘revolutionary	 time’	 must	
illuminate	that	which	Benjamin	calls	a	‘true	exception’	–	a	real	political	alternative.	
Valentine	 suggests	 that	 the	 legal	 theorist	 Carl	 Schmitt	 is	 characteristic	 of	
reactionary	anti-modernism.	Contrary	to	Habermas,	Schmitt	argues	that	the	political	 is	
determined	 by	 decision,	 not	 deliberation.	 Against	 the	 depoliticization	 of	 democracy,	
Schmitt	argues	that	the	executive	ought	to	decide	on	the	rule	as	well	as	the	exception	to	
the	rule.	Sovereign	decision	is	‘above	the	law’,	founding	political	Order	out	of	primordial	
Chaos.	I	take	issue	with	Mouffe’s	claim	that	Schmitt’s	notion	of	the	political	is	grounded	
in	a	naïve	faith	in	absolute	truth.	On	the	contrary,	I	view	Schmitt’s	political	theology	as	a	
failed	response	to	the	problem	of	cosmic	nihilism.	Schmitt’s	notion	of	sovereign	decision	
stems	 from	 the	 horror	 of	 the	 abysmal	 groundlessness	 of	 meaning,	 value,	 and	 truth.	
Since	truth	 is	ontologically	ungrounded,	political	order	must	be	created	ex	nihilo,	from	
out	of	nothing.		
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For	 Schmitt,	 the	 political	 operates	 according	 to	 the	 distinction	 of	 friend	 and	
enemy.	 Schmitt	 views	 the	 political	 in	 light	 of	 an	 Us,	 a	 homogenous	 whole	 that	 is	
opposed	to	an	equally	homogenous	Them.	In	this	sense,	Schmitt	views	the	most	salient	
political	distinction	as	that	which	divides	two	mutually	opposed	nations	rather	than	the	
division	internal	to	a	polity	itself.	I	attempt	to	come	to	terms	with	the	elemental	strife	of	
the	 political	 in	 the	 fourth	 and	 fifth	 chapters	 of	 the	 dissertation.	 I	 look	 at	 Heidegger’s	
discussion	 of	 the	 ‘strife’	 of	 Earth	 and	 World	 in	 ancient	 Greek	 cosmology,	 the	
irreconcilable	conflict	between	the	divine	law	and	the	law	of	the	state	in	Antigone,	the	
phenomenological	 strife	 of	 concealment	 and	 unconcealment,	 and	 the	 irreducible	
difference	between	the	ethical	and	the	political	in	Levinas	and	Derrida.	I	also	looked	at	
the	 elemental	 strife	 of	 Hobbes’	 Leviathan	 (Order)	 and	 Behemoth	 (Chaos).	 In	 all	
instances,	 I	 argued	 that	 such	 irreconcilable	 strife	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 tragic	
Nietzschean	 view	 of	 history	without	 redemption.	 In	 opposition	 to	 this	 tragic	 ‘strife’,	 I	
offer	 the	 non-dual	 image	 of	 the	 Tree	 of	 Life.	 The	 key	 to	 this	 image	 is	 the	 non-linear	
experience	 of	 ‘revolutionary	 time’.	 I	 therefore	 distinguish	 between	 Chronos	
(chronological	time)	and	Kairos	(the	revolutionary	moment).	This	leads	to	a	discussion	of	
Benjamin	 and	 the	 dialectic	 of	 ‘law-forming’	 and	 ‘law-preserving’	 violence	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	 and	 divine	 violence	 on	 the	 other.	 For	 Benjamin,	 divine	 violence	 suspends	 the	
dialectic	of	foundation	and	abyss.	But	the	question	remains,	can	such	an	‘exception’	be	
more	than	just	a	momentary	interruption	of	the	norm?	Or	can	the	non-linear	experience	
of	time	clear	an	ungrounded	‘site’	of	post-foundational	democracy?		
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In	 response	 to	 the	 two	 dominant	 theoretical	 trends	 of	 deliberative	 and	
reactionary	 democracy,	 Valentine	 sketches	 three	 post-foundational	 models	 of	
democracy	 in	 order	 to	 point	 beyond	 the	metaphysical	 concept	 of	 the	 political	 as	 the	
ground	of	politics.	These	models	can	be	traced	back	to	Heidegger’s	understanding	of	the	
political	not	as	the	ground	of	politics,	but	as	the	‘site’	of	politics.	Valentine	distinguishes	
between	three	models	of	post-foundational	democracy:	1)	deconstruction,	2)	agonism,	
and	3)	anarchy.		
First,	 I	 will	 look	 at	 the	 deconstructive	 notion	 of	 post-foundational	 democracy.	
Jean-Luc	Nancy	and	Jacques	Derrida	are	representative	of	this	deconstructive	approach.	
Nancy	argues	that	 in	the	modern	epoch,	any	substantial	grounding	of	the	political	has	
become	 unbelievable	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 planetary	 framework	 of	 globalization,	
modernization,	and	secularization.	Nancy	attempts	to	derive	a	post-foundational	politics	
from	 a	 deconstructed	 ontology	 of	 ‘being-with’.	 For	 Nancy	 it	 is	 neither	 the	 Staat,	nor	
Volk,	nor	Führer	that	grounds	the	political,	but	rather	our	‘bare’	ontological	exposure	to	
each	other.	In	the	modern	era,	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	ground	politics	on	participation	
in	 a	 common	 ontological	 substance.	Without	 a	 substantive	 notion	 of	 common	 being,	
post-foundational	democracy	must	instead	be	fashioned	from	a	fragile	sense	of	being	in	
common.	The	problem,	however,	 is	 that	Nancy’s	deconstructed	ontology	 is	simply	too	
insubstantial	 to	 indicate	 a	 basis	 for	 an	 alterative	 post-foundational	 democracy.	 In	
Nancy’s	 own	 words,	 deconstruction	 renders	 political	 community	 ‘inoperative’	 (i.e.	
broken).	Nancy	fails	to	appreciate	the	true	extent	of	social	fragmentation	in	the	modern	
era	 and	 the	need	 to	 belong	 to	 something	more	 substantial	 than	 a	 fragile	 ontology	 of	
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‘bare	life’.	For	this	reason,	I	argue	that	the	emergence	of	post-foundational	democracy	
requires	a	much	more	extensive	engagement	with	popular	sovereignty	and	the	problem	
of	 political	 community	 than	 either	Nancy	 or	 Derrida	 are	willing	 to	 undertake.	 I	 argue	
that	 a	 political	 community	 can	 only	 emerge	 from	 out	 of	 embodied	 practices	 of	
participatory	democracy	at	the	local	‘site’	of	social	interaction.	 
We	encounter	 a	 similar	 problem	 in	Derrida’s	 political	 thought.	 Like	Habermas’	
discourse	ethics,	Derrida’s	politics	of	deconstruction	can	be	seen	as	a	 response	 to	 the	
historical	transition	from	the	Westphalian	order	of	the	nation-state	to	an	undetermined	
post-Westphalian	 ‘democracy	 to	 come’.	 In	 this	 sense,	 Derrida’s	 political	 thought	
attempts	to	respond	to	the	deterritorialization	of	democracy.	Deterritorialization	refers	
to	the	dissolution	of	sovereign	territorial	borders	as	a	result	of	globalization.	It	involves		
“the	disappearance	of	the	site	on	which	the	democratic	used	to	be	situated.	The	site	of	
representation	and	the	stability	of	the	location	which	make	up	parliament	or	assembly,	
the	territorialization	of	power,	the	rooting	of	power	to	a	particular	place,	 if	not	to	the	
ground	 as	 such	 –	 all	 this	 is	 over.”599	Derrida	 suggests	 that	 “since	 no	 locality	 remains,	
democracy	must	 be	 thought	 today	 globally,	 if	 it	 is	 to	 have	 a	 future.”600	The	 problem,	
however,	 is	 that	 the	 transition	 from	 the	 nation-state	 to	 a	 transnational	 super-state	 is	
more	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 new	 regime	 of	 post-democratic	 administration	 rather	 than	 a	
post-national	‘democracy	to	come’.	Democracy	must	not	deconstruct	its	own	conditions	
of	 existence	 in	 the	 name	 of	 inclusion.	 A	 political	 community	must	 always	maintain	 a	
                                                
599 Derrida interviewed by Richard Beardsworth: Nietzsche and the Machine, Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies, 7, (1994), 7-66. <http://foucault.info/pst/az-cf-74998-923601835> 
600 Ibid, 7-66.  
	 236	
border,	 a	 limit,	 or	 a	 ‘constitutive	outside’.	 In	 order	 for	 there	 to	be	 an	Us,	 there	must	
always	be	a	Them.	This	logic	simply	cannot	be	avoided.	What	can	be	avoided,	however,	
is	 a	 hegemonic	 notion	 of	Us,	 along	 with	 a	 hostility	 towards	 Them.	 It	 is	 important	 to	
recognize	that	there	are	as	many	differences	within	a	community	as	there	are	between	
communities.	 Contra	 Schmitt,	 the	 distinction	between	Us	and	Them	need	not	 lead	 to	
the	distinction	between	friend	and	enemy.	I	nevertheless	reject	the	cosmopolitan	vision	
of	Derrida	and	Habermas.	Instead,	I	argue	for	an	eschatological	interruption	of	the	telos	
of	 historical	 development	 leading	 from	 the	 nation-state,	 to	 the	 super-state,	 and	
culminating	 in	 the	 world-state.	 Against	 the	 centralization	 of	 sovereignty	 ‘above’	 the	
nation-state,	I	advocate	for	the	decentralization	of	sovereignty	‘below’	the	state	to	the	
sub-state	level.	While	it	is	true	that	the	Westphalian	model	of	the	political	is	undergoing	
a	period	of	precipitous	decline,	the	solution	to	the	problem	of	deterritorialization	is	not	
depoliticization,	but	rather	decentralization.	Democracy	is	local,	not	global!	
Second,	having	 looked	at	the	deconstructive	model	of	democracy,	 I	will	 look	at	
whether	 the	 democratic	 agonism	 of	 Chantal	 Mouffe	 and	 Jacques	 Ranciere	 points	
towards	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 genuinely	 post-foundational	 democracy.	 Lars	 Tønder	
argues	that	in	addition	to	the	deliberative	theory	of	democracy,	there	should	be	a	field	
called	 radical	 democracy.601	Contrary	 to	 deliberative	 democracy,	 radical	 democracy	 is	
characterized	 by	 agonistic	 resistance	 to	 the	 state.	 In	 my	 judgment,	 the	 model	 of	
democratic	 agonism	 perceives	 the	 political	 through	 the	 tragic	 Nietzschean	 lens	 of	
conflict	and	division.	Mouffe:	“By	‘the	political’	 I	refer	to	the	dimension	of	antagonism	
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that	 is	 inherent	 in	 human	 relations	 .	 .	 .	 ‘politics’	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 indicates	 the	
ensemble	 of	 practices,	 discourses,	 and	 institutions	 which	 seek	 to	 establish	 a	 certain	
order	 and	 organize	 human	 coexistence	 in	 conditions	 that	 are	 always	 potentially	
conflictual	because	they	are	affected	by	the	dimension	of	the	‘the	political’.	”602	Mouffe:	
“From	 the	 perspective	 of	 ‘agonistic	 pluralism’	 the	 aim	 of	 democratic	 politics	 is	 to	
transform	antagonism	into	agonism.”603	The	problem,	however,	is	that	there	is	no	firm	
distinction	 between	 antagonism	 and	 agonism.	 To	 some	 extent,	 agonistic	 politics	 will	
always	be	antagonistic.	This	proposition	is	simply	too	pessimistic	for	me	to	accept.	There	
must	be	another	way.	
Mouffe’s	 political	 thought	 ought	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 light	 of	 the	 intellectual	
genealogy	of	Hobbes,	Marx,	 and	 Schmitt.	 Like	Hobbes,	Mouffe	 argues	 that	 the	 ‘social	
contract’	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 more	 advanced	 stage	 of	 history	 than	 the	
primitive	‘state	of	nature’.	On	the	contrary,	the	‘war	of	all	against	all’	persists	at	the	very	
heart	of	civilization.	Mouffe	suggests	that	the	task	of	politics	is	not	to	repress	or	replace	
our	 savage	 nature,	 but	 to	 desublimate	 our	 inherently	 violent	 instincts	 through	 non-
violent	political	discourse;	“The	state	of	nature	 in	 its	Hobbessian	dimension	can	never	
be	completely	eradicated	but	only	 controlled.”604	Following	Marx,	Mouffe	views	 social	
conflict	 as	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 history.	 Contra	 Marx,	 Mouffe	 pluralizes	 class	 conflict.	
While	Marx	views	history	as	the	manifestation	of	class-conflict	between	the	proletariat	
and	 the	bourgeoisie,	Mouffe	 views	 social	 strife	 as	 a	plural	 rather	 than	binary	 conflict.	
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Conflict	 does	 not	 only	 arise	 from	 class,	 but	 from	 gender,	 race,	 language,	 values,	 etc.	
Similar	 to	 her	 appropriation	 of	 Marx,	 Mouffe	 transforms	 Schmitt’s	 friend-enemy	
distinction	into	the	non-violent	opposition	between	friend	and	opponent;	“The	category	
of	the	enemy	does	not	disappear,	but	it	is	displaced.”605	Mouffe	suggests	that	“far	from	
jeopardizing	 democracy,	 agonistic	 confrontation	 is	 in	 fact	 its	 very	 condition	 of	
existence.”606	
	One	need	look	no	further	than	the	current	polarization	of	political	discourse	in	
the	 United	 States	 to	 appreciate	 the	 insufficiencies	 of	 Mouffe’s	 agonistic	 model	 of	
democracy.	Such	extreme	political	polarization	is	nothing	but	civil	war	by	other	means.	
In	 my	 view,	 while	 conflict	 cannot	 and	 ought	 not	 to	 be	 completely	 eliminated,	 social	
antagonism	 nevertheless	 should	 not	 constitute	 the	 ideal	 of	 political	 praxis.	 While	
Mouffe	 draws	heavily	 from	Hobbes’	 vision	of	 social	 strife,	 I	 find	 greater	 inspiration	 in	
Rousseau’s	vision	of	social	harmony.	I	view	cooperation	rather	than	antagonism	as	the	
true	 democratic	 ideal.	 I	 nevertheless	 reject	 the	 false	 consensus	 arrived	 at	 via	
bureaucratic	 procedure	 in	 Habermas’	 deliberative	 model	 of	 democracy.	 Contra	
Habermas,	 I	 argue	 that	 real	 consensus	 cannot	 be	 arrived	 at	 via	 deliberation	 between	
international	corporate	bodies	such	as	the	World	Bank,	the	IMF,	the	Council	on	Foreign	
Relations,	the	G20,	the	Trilateral	Commission,	the	UN,	the	World	Economic	Forum,	the	
EU,	 etc.	 Instead,	 I	 advocate	 for	 democratic	 participation	 of	 corporeal	 bodies	 at	 the	
community	level.	Local	self-government	is	the	goal,	not	the	planetary	state.	
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In	 spite	of	my	many	differences	with	Mouffe’s	notion	of	political	 agonism,	her	
distinction	between	liberalism	and	democracy	is	of	fundamental	importance	to	my	own	
project.	For	Mouffe,	 liberalism	and	democracy	are	not	at	all	 ‘co-original’,	as	Habermas	
contends.	 Following	 Schmitt,	Mouffe	 argues	 that	 liberal	 democracy	 is	 not	 a	 cohesive	
political	model,	 but	 rather	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 two	 different	 and	 often	 contradictory	
political	traditions	–	one	modern	(liberalism)	and	the	other	ancient	(democracy).	Mouffe	
therefore	 distinguishes	 between	 liberalism	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 democracy	 on	 the	
other.	Mouffe:	“On	the	one	side	we	have	the	liberal	tradition	constituted	by	the	rule	of	
law,	the	defense	of	human	rights,	and	the	respect	of	individual	liberty;	on	the	other	the	
democratic	 tradition	 whose	 main	 ideas	 are	 those	 of	 equality,	 identity	 between	
governing	 and	 governed,	 and	 popular	 sovereignty.” 607According	 to	 Mouffe,	 when	
liberalism	and	democracy	come	into	conflict	with	each	other,	 liberalism	almost	always	
wins	 out;	 “The	 dominant	 tendency	 today	 consists	 in	 envisioning	 democracy	 in	 such	 a	
way	 that	 it	 is	 almost	 exclusively	 identified	 with	 the	 Rechtsstaat	 and	 the	 defense	 of	
human	rights,	leaving	aside	the	element	of	popular	sovereignty,	which	is	deemed	to	be	
obsolete.”608	Nevertheless,	I	am	not	convinced	that	Mouffe’s	own	political	thought	is	an	
exception	to	this	tendency.	Indeed,	Mouffe	views	rights	as	a	more	salient	site	of	political	
contestation	 than	 sovereignty.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 Benjamin	 and	 Agamben’s	
deconstruction	 of	 sovereign	 power	 proves	 indispensable	 to	 my	 own	 investigation	 of	
post-foundational	democracy	in	the	fifth	and	final	chapter.	
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While	 Mouffe’s	 agonistic	 notion	 of	 the	 political	 replicates	 Nietzsche’s	 tragic	
world-view,	 Rancière remains	 faithful	 to	 Benjamin’s	 eschatological	 vision	 of	 a	 radical	
break	 from	 the	 ‘charnel	 house’	 of	 history.	 For	 Rancière,	 there	 are	 two	 histories:	 “the	
cumulative	 history	 of	 the	winners	which,	 in	 a	 single	move,	 pursues	 its	 ‘triumphs’	 and	
consigns	the	memory	of	them	to	the	past;	and	the	messianic	power	that	can	make	an	
authentic	image	of	the	past	and	shine	in	the	present	instant	in	order	to	ignite	a	spark	of	
hope,	at	 the	very	heart	of	past	events.”609	The	aim	 is	 to	enact	a	break	 from	the	tragic	
Promethean	 fate	 of	 ‘the	 West’.	 Like	 Prometheus,	 we	 moderns	 possess	 the	 gift	 of	
foresight	 but	 lack	 the	 gift	 of	 remembrance.	We	 perceive	 the	 coming	 catastrophe	 but	
cannot	evade	its	arrival.	It	is	Benjamin’s	hope,	and	mine	as	well,	that	Klee’s	image	of	the	
‘angel	of	history’	may	provoke	the	remembrance	of	a	non-linear	temporality	capable	of	
breaking	the	‘arrow	of	time’.		
	I	view	Rancière’s	notion	of	the	division	between	democracy	and	the	political	as	a	
necessary	 correction	 to	 Hegel’s	 notion	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 Absolute	 State.	 Hegel	
perceives	the	State	as	a	systematic	totality	that	encompasses	all	of	its	parts	in	a	unified	
organic	whole.	Against	Hegel’s	authoritarian	notion	of	the	State,	Rancière	insists	on	the	
non-identity	of	democracy	and	the	State.	In	this	sense,	Rancière	is	indebted	to	Levinas’	
distinction	between	 the	ethical	 and	 the	political.	 According	 to	Rancière’s	 formulation,	
democracy	is	akin	to	Levinas’	notion	of	the	ethical;	both	ethics	and	democracy	exist	 in	
opposition	to	politics	and	the	State.	For	Rancière,	the	notion	of	a	democratic	State	is	a	
contradictory	 notion.	 While	 the	 State	 signifies	 the	 instrumental	 administration	 of	
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politics	as	usual,	Rancière	understands	democracy	as	anarchic	resistance	to	the	State.	In	
other	words,	 democracy	 is	 not	 a	way	 of	 organizing	 the	 State	 alongside	 other	models	
such	as	oligarchy,	aristocracy,	and	monarchy.	Instead,	democracy	is	constituted	through	
resistance,	dissent,	and	opposition	to	politics	as	such.	The	protestor	becomes	the	model	
citizen,	 just	 as	 protest	 becomes	 the	 fundamental	 form	 of	 political	 praxis.	 Rancière:	
“Genuine	participation	is	the	invention	of	that	unpredictable	subject	which	momentarily	
occupies	the	street.”610	Nevertheless,	in	providing	a	corrective	to	Hegel’s	Absolute	State,	
Rancière	 risks	 an	 overcorrection.	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 Rancière’s	 notion	 of	 the	
irreconcilable	 difference	 between	 democracy	 and	 the	 State	 is	 politically	 defeatist.	
Revolution	is	not	an	option,	only	resistance.	A	concrete	alternative	to	the	state	remains	
lacking.	 I	 therefore	 point	 to	 participatory	 democracy	 as	 a	 possible	 alternative	 to	 the	
modern	 surveillance	 state.	 While	 far	 from	 perfect,	 participatory	 democracy	 remains	
preferable	 to	 representative	 democracy,	 deliberative	 democracy,	 and	 radical	
democratic	agonism.	In	opposition	to	representative	and	deliberative	bodies,	I	propose	
the	 council,	 commune,	 and	 cooperative	 as	 concrete	 political	 alternatives.	 Against	 the	
grain	of	history,	Rousseau’s	native	Geneva	and	 the	ancient	Athenian	 city-state	 should	
serve	as	inspiration	for	the	future	of	democracy.		
Finally,	having	looked	at	the	deconstructive	and	agonistic	models	of	democracy,	I	
will	now	look	at	Sheldon	Wolin’s	anarchic	notion	of	post-foundational	democracy.	Wolin	
defines	 “the	 political	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 free	 society	 composed	 of	
diversities	 can	 nonetheless	 enjoy	 moments	 of	 community	 when,	 through	 public	
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deliberations,	 collective	 power	 is	 used	 to	 promote	 or	 protect	 the	 wellbeing	 of	 the	
collectivity.”611	Distinct	 from	 the	political,	 “politics	 refers	 to	 the	 legitimized	 and	public	
contestation,	 primarily	 by	 organized	 and	 unequal	 social	 powers,	 over	 access	 to	 the	
resources	 available	 to	 the	public	 authorities	of	 the	 collectivity.”612	Wolin	 explains	 that	
“politics	 is	 continuous,	 ceaseless,	 and	 endless.	 In	 contract,	 the	 political	 is	 episodic,	
rare.”613	As	 a	moment,	 democracy	 is	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 norm	 rather	 than	 the	 norm	
itself.	Wolin	therefore	concedes	that	“democracy	thus	seems	destines	to	be	a	moment	
rather	than	a	form.”614	Like	Mouffe,	Wolin’s	conclusions	are	too	pessimistic.	Democracy	
can	be	more	 than	 just	 an	exception	 to	 the	norm,	 it	 can	be	a	 ‘true	exception’,	or	 that	
which	Kierkegaard	calls	a	teleological	suspension	of	the	law	in	the	name	of	a	higher	law.	
Democracy	is	this	higher	law,	as	a	form,	as	well	as	a	moment.	As	a	moment,	democracy	
is	not	just	a	momentary	‘time-slice’	taken	from	the	linear	sequence	of	history.	Instead,	
true	democracy	 involves	a	 remembrance	of	non-linear	 ‘deep	time’,	 through	which	the	
unrealized	 potential	 of	 history	 finds	 expression	 in	 the	 time	 of	 the	 present.	 Wolin’s	
notion	of	the	political	as	an	instant	rather	than	a	duration	of	time	compliments	my	own	
discussion	 of	 Benjamin’s	 philosophy	 of	 time.	 The	 advent	 of	 post-foundational	
democracy	would	be	akin	 to	an	act	of	 ‘divine	violence’,	 an	 interruption	of	 the	violent	
logos	of	‘world-history’	that	swings	between	absolute	order	and	the	groundless	abyss.		
                                                
611 Sheldon Wolin, ‘Fugitive Democracy’, Contellations vl 1, No 1, 1994. 
612 Ibid. 
613 Ibid. 
613 Ibid. 
614 Ibid. 
614 Ibid. 
	 243	
Following	Mouffe,	Wolin	also	distinguishes	between	 liberalism	and	democracy.	
Wolin	 suggests	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 liberalism	 and	 democracy	 is	 often	
overlooked	given	that	the	modern	form	of	representative	democracy	is	a	hybrid	model	
of	 liberal-democracy.	 Wolin:	 “The	 democracy	 we	 are	 familiar	 with	 is	 constitutional	
democracy,	 democracy	 indistinguishable	 from	 its	 constitutional	 form.” 615 	I	 am	 in	
agreement	with	Wolin	when	 he	 suggests	 that	 constitutional	 liberalism	 is	 designed	 to	
limit	 democracy.	Originally,	 the	will	 of	 the	majority	was	 limited	by	 the	 constitution	 in	
order	to	protect	the	rights	of	minorities	from	the	will	of	the	majority.	Today,	however,	
constitutional	 law	 protects	 a	 very	 different	 minority	 –	 the	 so-called	 1%.616	For	 this	
reason,	 the	 constitutional	 framing	 of	 democracy	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 a	
depoliticization	of	democracy.	Depoliticization	refers	to	the	narrowing	of	political	praxis	
within	the	confines	planetary	neo-liberal	framework.	As	the	divine	origins	of	sovereignty	
become	 increasingly	 disenchanted,	 sovereign	 decision	 undergoes	 a	 process	 of	
depoliticization.	 Democracy	 becomes	 limited,	 restricted,	 enframed	 as	 nothing	 more	
than	a	legitimation	function	of	neo-liberal	administration.	
The	 enframement	 of	 democracy	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 constitutional	
government.	Wolin	explains	that	“a	constitution	in	setting	limits	to	politics	sets	limits	as	
well	 to	 democracy,	 constituting	 it	 in	 ways	 compatible	 with	 and	 legitimating	 of	 the	
dominant	 power	 groups	 in	 the	 society.”617	But	 as	Wolin	 points	 out,	while	 “the	 crucial	
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institution	 [of	 constitutional	 democracy]	 is	 the	 Presidency,”	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	
case	with	true	democracy.618	On	the	contrary,	I	argue	in	the	last	chapter	that	democracy	
is	not	constituted	the	sovereign	decision	of	the	executive,	but	rather	the	general	will	of	
the	people	assembled.	Mouffe	points	out	that	Wolin’s	understanding	of	democracy	as	
the	absence	of	 the	presidency,	executive,	or	 king	 is	 identical	 to	 that	of	Claude	 Lefort.	
Mouffe:	“As	Claude	Lefort	has	shown,	the	democratic	revolution	is	at	the	origin	of	a	new	
kind	of	institution	of	the	social,	in	which	power	became	an	empty	place.”619	Democracy	
is	 thus	 “the	 absence	 of	 power	 embodied	 in	 the	 person	 of	 the	 prince	 and	 tied	 to	 a	
transcendental	 authority.” 620 	Just	 as	 representative	 government	 saw	 the	
decentralization	 of	 sovereign	 power	 from	 the	 King	 to	 Parliament,	 post-foundational	
democracy	involves	the	decentralization	of	sovereignty	from	the	national	Legislature	to	
the	local	community,	region,	or	neighborhood.	After	the	death	of	God,	the	empty	‘site’	
of	the	absent	God-King	must	be	left	open	and	free.			
	 I	have	now	looked	at	elements	of	my	own	project	in	relation	to	the	major	trends	
of	1)	deliberative	democracy,	 and	2)	 radical	 anti-modernism	 in	 contemporary	political	
theory.	 I	 then	 looked	 at	 various	 elements	 of	 my	 own	 argument	 in	 relation	 to	 three	
trends	of	post-foundational	democracy	as	outlined	by	Valentine:	1)	deconstruction,	2)	
agonism,	and	3)	anarchy.	I	argued	in	the	dissertation	that	post-foundational	democracy	
is	participatory,	not	representative.	From	Schürmann	to	Wolin,	we	saw	that	the	general	
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will	 is	 ungrounded,	with	 no	 foundation	 apart	 from	 the	 direct	 assembly	 of	 the	 people	
themselves.	Democracy	is	an-arche:	without	arche,	principle,	or	ground.	
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Postscript:		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
No	Future?	
Since	 writing	 this	 dissertation,	 accelerationism	 has	 become	 the	 most	
consequential	ideological	debate	in	political	theory.	Framing	my	argument	in	light	of	this	
debate	could	prove	both	interesting	and	beneficial.		
My	dissertation	responds	to	the	 lack	of	an	alternative	vision	 in	political	 theory.	
Today,	 the	 field	 is	 divided	 between:	 1)	 left	 accelerationism,	 which	 advocates	 for	 full	
automation	and	a	universal	basic	income,	and	2)	right	accelerationism,	which	envisions	
technological	singularity	as	post-human	extinction.	One	is	grounded	in	naïve	optimism,	
the	 other	 in	 radical	 pessimism.	While	 the	 former	 aims	 to	 revive	 social	 democracy	 re-
branded	as	post-capitalism,	the	latter	is	an	expression	of	the	nihilistic	death-drive.	I	find	
this	left-right	binary	to	be	deeply	unsatisfying.	While	my	dissertation	doesn’t	provide	all	
the	answers,	it	may	indicate	way	beyond	this	rigid	framework.			
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Accelerationism,	 which	 has	 deep	 roots	 in	 Italian	 Futurism,	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	
modern	 understanding	 of	 history	 as	 an	 ascending	 curvature	 of	 time.	 It	 aims	 to	
accelerate	 the	 innate	 logic	 of	 history	 towards	 its	 teleological	 fulfillment	 as	 either	
Enlightenment	 or	 Extinction.	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 any	 attempt	 to	 delineate	 an	
alternative	 vision	must	 first	 pass	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 political	 nihilism	 rooted	 in	 the	
ancient	Greek	experience	of	cyclical	time.	In	my	view,	accelerationism	has	yet	to	come	
to	terms	with	the	‘death	of	God’	as	the	essential	site	of	‘the	political’	in	the	modern	era.	
An	 alternative	 vision	must	 dispense	 with	 the	modern	 understanding	 of	 chronological	
time	and	historical	progress.	But	in	rejecting	the	deification	of	Reason,	History,	and	the	
State,	 politics	must	 not	 retreat	 into	 refusal,	 rebellion,	 and	 resistance.	 Indeed,	 neither	
left	nor	right	accelerationism	offers	a	compelling	notion	of	political	praxis.			
In	 light	 of	 the	 ‘deterritorialization’	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 the	 site	 of	 the	 political	
must	either	be	trans-national	or	sub-national.	I’ve	argued	that	democracy	is	either	local,	
or	 not	 at	 all.	My	 advocacy	 for	 local	 democracy	may	 prove	 vulnerable	 to	 Srnicek	 and	
Williams	 criticism	 of	 ‘folk	 politics’	 outlined	 in	 their	 book	 Inventing	 The	 Future.	 Folk	
politics	 is	 characterized	 by	 1)	 the	 reactionary	 praxis	 of	 resistance,	 and	 2)	 the	 false	
authenticity	 of	 the	 local.	 Folk	 politics	 is	 accused	 of	 arresting	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	
alternative	political	vision.	“The	contemporary	 left	 tends	towards	a	 folk	politics	 that	 is	
incapable	 of	 turning	 the	 tide	 against	 global	 capitalism.	 In	 its	 place,	 the	 left	 needs	 to	
reclaim	 the	 contested	 legacy	 of	 modernity	 and	 advance	 visions	 of	 a	 new	 future.”621	
While	I	agree	with	the	critique	of	praxis	as	mere	protest,	 I	am	not	prepared	to	discard	
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with	the	local	as	‘the	site’	of	the	political.	William	and	Srnicek	fail	to	distinguish	between	
local	 action	 such	 as	protest	 and	 resistance	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	 local	modes	of	 self-
government	such	as	assemblies	and	cooperatives	on	the	other.	 I	have	argued	that	the	
local	remains	a	promising	‘site’	for	an	emergent	counter-hegemonic	project,	especially	
when	the	alternative	to	local	self-government	is	post-democratic	management.		
William	and	Srnicek	argue	that	“the	contemporary	left	should	reclaim	modernity,	
build	a	populist	and	hegemonic	force,	and	mobilize	towards	a	post-work	future.”622	“A	
counter-hegemonic	 strategy	 entails	 a	 project	 to	 overturn	 the	 dominant	 neo-liberal	
common	sense	and	rejuvenate	the	collective	imagination.”623	Although	I	agree	with	the	
need	 for	 a	 counter-hegemonic	 strategy,	 I	 have	 reservations	 about	 the	 necessity	 of	
reclaiming	 the	 modern	 Enlightenment	 project.	 Left-accelerationism	 lacks	 an	
appreciation	of	the	nihilistic	tendencies	of	Enlightenment	reason	and	the	technological	
framing	of	 Earth.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 I	 find	Heidegger’s	philosophy	of	 technology	
indisputable	to	my	own	argument.		
In	 spite	 of	 my	 reservations	 with	 accelerationism,	 what	 I	 nevertheless	 find	
intriguing	is	the	insight	that	“free	time	is	the	basic	condition	for	self-determination	and	
the	 development	 of	 our	 capacities.” 624 	I	 argued	 in	 the	 dissertation	 that	 post-
foundational	democracy	is	grounded	in	the	non-linear	experience	of	time.	The	memory	
of	 the	 ancient	 Athenian	 polis	 shines	 through	 the	 endless	 passage	 of	 time.	 The	
remembrance	of	democracy	 requires	 that	we	distinguish	between	 liberalism,	which	 is	
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modern,	 and	 democracy,	 which	 has	 more	 ancient	 beginnings.	 In	 my	 view,	 the	 most	
important	 question	 facing	 political	 theory	 today	 remains:	 ‘Is	 there	 a	 future	 for	
democracy?’		
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